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PREFACE 
 
The interest of jurists in legal systems other than their own has been a matter of long 
tradition. All legal systems have the same purpose of regulating and harmonizing the human 
activity within their respective societies, and in each society the legal system forms part of 
the culture and civilization as well as of the history and the life of its people. Many legal 
problems are conceptually the same wherever they arise. Jurists from different systems 
confront the same problems. Sometimes codes and case law give the same answer, sometimes 
those answers are different; if this was the case, I wanted to explore whether some answers 
were better than others. 
It would certainly not be accurate to say that there has been no approximation between 
the civil law and the common law traditions. Arguments that these two systems are drawing 
progressively closer can be heard more and more often. In spite of having started from 
opposite extremes, it is said that as a result of the movements the civil law and the common 
law have made in the direction of the other, there is no longer much difference between them. 
The same social needs, and similar economic and technical conditions, have led to the 
adoption of similar solutions for their legal problems. However, even admitting as a fact that 
the results might be close to each other, the methods used to reach them are nevertheless 
extremely divergent. After all, the ‘idioms of legal thought’ and the guiding habits of mind 
are different. A civilian naturally reasons from principles to instances, the common lawyer 
from instances to principles. The civilian puts his faith in syllogisms, the common lawyer in 
precedents; the first silently asking himself as each new problem arises, ‘What should we do 
this time?’ and the second asking aloud in the same situation, ‘What did we do last time?’ 
The civilian thinks in terms of rights and duties, the common lawyer in terms of remedies. 
The civilian is chiefly concerned with the policy and rationale of a rule of law, the common 
lawyer with its pedigree. The instinct of a civilian is to systematize, the working rule of the 
common lawyer is solvitur ambulando.1 
By the end of the nineteenth century, Oliver Wendell Holmes was telling Americans 
not to study civil law because ‘it tends to encourage a dangerous reliance…on glittering 
generalities’ instead of ‘the exhaustive analysis of a particular case which the common law 
begins and ends.’2 It has not always been so. At the beginning of the same century, new 
                                                            
1 Thomas Mackay Cooper, ‘The common law and the civil law-A Scot’s view.’ (1950) 63 Harvard Law Review 
468, 470 
2 Oliver W Holmes, ‘Misunderstandings of  the Civil Law.’ (1871) 6 American Law Review, 37, 49. 
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translations appeared of Grotius, Puffendorf, Pothier and Domat.3 Courts and treatise writers 
used them. An English judge praised Pothier as the highest authority one could cite next to an 
English case.4 A New York court consulted Grotius, Puffendorf and Barbeyrac to decide who 
owned a fox caught on Long Island, a decision that still appears in many American 
casebooks.5 
At no point does this thesis have the purpose of pretending to demonstrate the cultural 
superiority of one system over the other. Each system possesses strong characteristic of a 
distinct and comprehensive nature that establishes its own individuality. In its own ethnic and 
historical framework, each system serves well the society in which it functions; each has 
demonstrated its ability to satisfy the social and economic needs of a world in constant 
change. Each has also maintained a balance between the elements of flexibility and 
adaptation, on the one hand, while assuring the essential attributes of stability and security, 
on the other. I assumed from the beginning that comparative law is much more than a set of 
different legal rules. It has a historical, political, social and cultural dimension. The law is 
rooted in the culture, it reflects the Volksgeist (the spirit of the People) and it responds to the 
specific demands of a given society in a given time and place. Substitution of one legal 
tradition for another would neither be possible nor desirable. 
At the start of this research, a shocking contrast between styles revealed that the 
difficulties were going to be huge. To a civilian lawyer who was having his first contact with 
the common law, it looked as if I had in front of my eyes a gigantic, disorganized, amorphous 
mass of cases. It was not until later, that I learned that the same feeling existed among 
common law lawyers. It was not a civilian, but Bernard Rudden who wryly observed that ‘the 
alphabet is virtually the only instrument of intellectual order of which the common law makes 
use.’6 In particular, in relation to torts, it has been submitted that the fundamental reason for 
this is that, unlike the law of property or the law of contract, both of which (at least in part) 
have to formulate guidelines within which individuals can arrange their affairs, the law of 
torts always has to respond retrospectively to alleged wrongdoings.7 In any event, the fact is 
that it was clear from the beginning that the lack of normative coherence and consistency that 
a code provides (and to which I was used to) was going to represent for me a permanent 
source of disorientation.  
                                                            
3 Simpson, ‘Innovation in nineteenth century contract law.’ (1975) 91Law Quarterly Review, 247. 
4 Cox v Troy, 5 B & Ald 474, 480 (1822) by Best, J. 
5 Pierson v Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 2 Am Dec. 264 (1805). 
6 Bernard Rudden, ‘Torticles’, (1991-1992) 6-7 Tulane Civil Law Forum 105, 110. 
7 D.J. Ibbetson, A historical introduction to the Law of Obligations (1999) 57. 
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Early doubts started to emerge: would it really be possible to compare an abstract 
system of thought divorced from particular sets of facts, as the civil law is, to a bunch of 
inductive ideas capable of functioning only within limited factual spheres? Was it really 
going to be possible to compare a system capable of transcending disputes by moving away 
from factual immediacies to a technique of dispute resolutions?  
 Warning about the difficulties of comparative law, one of the greatest English 
comparatists, Professor Frederick Lawson, remarked how hard it is to comprehend the main 
subjects of just a single system of private law. He certainly was well aware of the enormous 
background that lies behind a comparative work and, most of all, the Herculean effort that it 
takes to anyone who has the courage or naivety to venture into the dense and trackless forest 
of a second system. Just as an experienced traveller contemplating a long and dangerous road 
that is as likely as not to take him to the right destination might reasonably refuse to leave 
home, the prospective obstacles of the comparison of the laws of different families are in 
such a big number and of such scaring dimension, that wisdom would advise to give up 
before even starting. At the same time, and perhaps for the same reasons, the challenge 
represented an irresistible temptation. It has been said that to learn another system of law is 
like learning another language and just as a person who is bilingual is much better able to 
appreciate the merits of the languages he speaks, the contrast between two systems, so 
different in their genius and their genesis like the common and the civil law, can certainly 
provide a much richer range of model solutions than they could possibly do on their own. 
Although initially my intention was not to describe any specific national jurisdiction, 
but simply to contrast a set of prevailing attitudes, tendencies or currents of thoughts towards 
liability for non physical damage in the two main legal systems, soon this approach started to 
show its impracticability. Despite the strong forces tending to produce uniformity within each 
system, diversity exists and, on many occasions, the precise legal rules in force of particular 
jurisdictions differed so widely that it would be inaccurate to keep the assumption of 
monolithic, unified or homogeneous viewpoints and some necessary references to specific 
jurisdictions (in both systems) were finally made. Because of the major contribution that 
France and Germany have made to the civil law tradition and the intellectual leadership that 
both occupy in the civil law world, most of the time I have chosen those models as a 
representative, although partial expression, of the civil law perspective to each of the issues 
that were under scrutiny. In the common law, England, Australia, Canada and New Zealand 
are often subject of my attention. 
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The notion of ‘non physical damage’ as a unifying concept would probably not mean 
too much to a common law lawyer. By the same token, psychiatric harm and economic loss 
as particular types of damage with different applying rules would make many civilians to 
raise eyebrows in disbelief (or disdain). In the common law, the rules relating to the negligent 
infliction of non physical harm did not develop alongside the principles governing the 
negligent infliction of physical damage. The significant consequence of this peculiarity is that 
the nature of the injury suffered becomes a very important factor in determining the 
protective scope of the duty of care. To single out psychiatric harm and economic loss as self-
contained categories represent an immediate need for creating special control factors, and this 
appears to be intrinsically associated with arbitrary and anomalous results. These two 
perplexing and difficult areas of the law seem in amazing contrast with the intriguing 
simplicity of the French system which approaches cases of non physical damage applying the 
same criteria as to any other tort claim. 
In the first chapter, I analyze the law relating to the recovery of damages for 
psychiatric harm. I start the research in the common law where it unquestionably represents a 
very complex area of the law without apparent coherent background principles. In the second 
part, the research compares and contrasts the different (in some cases considerably different) 
approaches of several civil law jurisdictions with particular emphasis on French and German 
law. 
In the second chapter, I examine the recoverability of economic loss. Out of its 
infinite variety of factual situations, I have chosen as a starting point for the analysis and 
discussion three of the main categories: misstatements, relational economic loss, and 
defective products or building structures. Following the same pattern as in the previous 
chapter, I discuss in the first place the approach taken in the common law, where the levels of 
complexity seem to be much higher. 
Finally, the third chapter is reserved for the conclusions, stressing in particular the 
undeniable artificiality of the category, the excessive role attributed to policy and the relevant 
place that should be reserved for morality in the law of torts. 
In retrospect, to choose non physical damage as the theme of my thesis was probably 
unwise for someone with no experience in the common law. Neither psychiatric damage nor 
economic loss has arrived at any fixed form; everything is highly ambivalent. The puzzles 
and anomalies that constantly surround them are certainly greater than in any other area of 
the law and they represented a permanent reminder of my lack of wisdom. Both psychiatric 
damage and economic loss are complex, vast and multifaceted issues. Both are of universal 
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scope. They count among those topics which universally create difficulties transcending the 
idiosyncratic formal-conceptual foundations of the various local systems. Both are placed at 
the very heart of tort liability and raise the most fundamental questions about the boundaries 
and frontiers of liability and private litigation. Be that as it may, I accepted the challenge. 
Whether I have succeeded or not is not for me to decide. However, what I would like to 
reinforce is that this is the look of a civilian, not a common law lawyer, and this naturally 
reflects, not only on the conclusions but also in the method, systematization, and even the 
style of analysing cases and over viewing of principles. For that, I ask the sympathy of the 
reader. 
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PART I: PSYCHIATRIC INJURY.  
 
CHAPTER 1:  THE COMMON LAW. 
 
1.1 Introduction. 
 
More than a century ago, Professor Bohlen said that perhaps upon no question has there 
been so much conflict in the decisions of courts of the higher authority as upon that of the 
right to recover for negligence which causes no direct physical impact, but where an 
appreciable physical injury ensues in consequence of a fright or nervous shock produced 
thereby.8 It is frustrating, if not depressing, that after more than a century the law relating to 
psychiatric harm still remains so inconsistent that it represents a constant source of strongly-
held opinions. A respected commentator, whilst arguing that ‘this is the area in the law of 
torts where the silliest rules now exist and where criticism is almost universal’ suggested that 
liability in this area should be abandoned altogether.9 Among the judicial opinions, probably 
the most frequently cited is Lord Steyn’s who referred to the law governing compensation for 
psychiatric harm as a patchwork quilt of distinctions which are difficult to justify and where 
there are no refined analytical tools enabling the courts to draw lines by way of a compromise 
solution in a way which was coherent and morally defensible. 
The common law has historically demonstrated a reluctance to consider emotional 
tranquility and psychic equilibrium as an interest worthy of extensive legal recognition and 
protection. Arguments of lack of precedent, difficulty of proof, fears of fraudulent and 
proliferation of claims, immeasurability of mental damages and potentially unlimited liability 
were some of the ways used by common law courts to express that reluctance to provide a 
remedy for emotional injury.10 
Some early comments ventured to call that state of the law ‘naturally transitional rather 
than altogether unsatisfactory’.11 Unfortunately, although some progress has been made 
                                                            
8 Francis H. Bohlen, ‘Right to recovery for injury resulting from negligence without impact.’ (1902) 50 
American Law Registers 141. 
9 J Stapleton, “In Restraint of Tort” in P Birks (ed) The Frontiers of Liability (1994) vol 2,  94-96. 
10 John G. Fleming, ‘Distant shock in Germany (and elsewhere).’ (1972) 20 American Journal of Comparative 
Law 485. In its report Liability for psychiatric illness, the English Law Commission put forward six ‘policy 
arguments’ as being grounds for limitations of liability: the possibility of a flood of claims; the potential for 
frauds; the potential for conflicting medical opinions; the notion that psychiatric illness is not worthy of 
compensation; the notion that the plaintiff is only a secondary victim; the potential for litigation to affect 
prognosis. Law Commission n° 249 para 6.6. 
11 Hughes Parry, ‘Nervous shock as a cause of action in tort.’ (1925) 41 Law Quarterly Review 297, 297. 
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through the years, too many limitations on recovery still remain as ‘infirmities’ or 
expressions of ‘doctrinal fragility’12 or as amounting to ‘a monument to its lack of maturity 
and confidence in this field’.13 
The expression ‘nervous shock’, which was originally used to describe the mental 
distress negligently caused, is no longer in favour. Judges who have expressed disapproval 
for this term find it preferable to refer to psychiatric damage, or similar.14 The former 
expression more aptly describes the cause of the injury than the injury itself. Besides, the 
term itself tends to perpetuate the layman’s image of instant, momentary fright as constituting 
the central core of the subject, when such temporary shocks to the system are of marginal 
significance.15  
In the past, it was generally contended that ‘mental pain or anxiety the law cannot 
value, and does not pretend to redress, when the unlawful act complained of causes that 
alone’.16 This statement was certainly the product of a time when medical science, especially 
psychiatric studies, was in its infancy. The courts regarded with suspicion complainants who 
experienced no physical injuries, but who maintained they suffered grievous emotional 
damage. There was no assurance that science could satisfactorily establish a cause and effect 
relationship between the injury and the incident which allegedly gave rise to it. In his 
judgment in Coultas17, Sir Richard Couch speaks of an express judicial distrust of the 
malingering plaintiff, and an implicit disbelief, of a medical charlatan who (as in the Coultas 
case itself) would furnish evidence to support him.18 Accordingly, modern cases rest on the 
principle that mental harm must result in an acknowledged medical condition, whether 
physical, such as a heart attack or miscarriage, or psycho-pathological, as with various 
neuroses, hysteria, schizophrenia or morbid depression. 
                                                            
12 John G. Fleming.  (1994) 2 Tort Law Review 202, 203. 
13 Nicholas Mullany, ‘Psychiatric injury and communications of trauma’ in Mullany and Linden (Eds) Torts 
Tomorrow. A tribute to John Fleming (1998) 162, 164. 
14 Kay Wheat, ‘Proximity and nervous shock.’ (2003) 32 Common Law World Review 313, 316. Bruce 
Feldthusen, Economic Negligence. The recovery of pure economic loss. (2000) 
15 Harvey Teff, ‘Liability for negligently inflicted nervous shock.’ (1983) 99 Law Quarterly Review. 100, 107. 
In Australia, it has been suggested that ‘mental harm’ may become the preferred term, in view of its adoption by 
recent reform legislation enacted in all States and Territories.  
16 Lord Wensleydale in Lynch v. Knight (1861), 9 H.L. Cas. 577 at 598. ‘Mere mental suffering, although 
reasonably foreseeable, if unaccompanied by physical injury, is not a basis for a claim for damages’ Alcock v 
Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1992] 1 AC 310 per Lord Ackner at 401. ‘The law cannot compensate for 
all emotional suffering even if it is acute and truly debilitating.’ White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire 
[1992] 2 AC 455 per Lord Steyn at 491. 
17 Victorian Railways Commissioners v Coultas (1888) 13 App Cas 222.  
18 Alan Sprince, ‘Negligently inflicted psychiatric damage: a medical diagnosis and prognosis.’ (1998) 18 Legal 
Studies 59, 60. 
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 The reason for this is that, in the absence of physical injury, the requirement of a 
recognizable psychiatric illness, however imprecise the notion may be at the margin, appears 
to be a broadly effective deterrent to trivial claims as might otherwise be pursued.19 The 
courts seem to have been motivated by the belief that requiring physical consequences will 
verify the reality of trauma and make it easier to distinguish cases deserving of compensation. 
 
1.2 Intentional infliction of mental suffering. 
 
It is interesting to note that in England, liability for emotional distress was first 
recognized when inflicted intentionally.20 Until the end of the 19th century, mental distress 
could not stand alone but had to be the result of the perpetration of some recognized wrong. 
Such damages, since they could not exist alone, but clung onto the main award for the 
substantial tort involved became known as parasitic,21 properly a ground for denigrating 
claims for psychiatric injury.22 A court would feel comfortable awarding damages for any 
mental distress suffered in addition to damages for the violation of the major interest 
protected by the tort, because the fact that the tort had been committed was a guarantee of the 
genuineness of the claim.23 That way the courts were also dealing with familiar territory: 
construing the relevant damage as physical injury24 rather than mental injury meant that 
compensation was awarded for damage about which there could be no disagreement.25 
In 1897, the English Court of Appeal had to deal again with the issue of nervous shock 
which did not follow upon physical impact. The defendant, Downton, as a practical joke, told 
Mrs. Wilkinson, the plaintiff, that her husband was smashed up in an accident and that he was 
lying with both legs broken. The effect of this false story on the plaintiff was a violent shock 
                                                            
19 Teff, above n 8, 105. 
20 S.K. Parmanand, ‘Intentional infliction of emotional distress – A neglected delict’ (1984) 101 South African 
Law Journal 171,173. Apparently I de S et ux v. W de S (Y.B. Lib. Ass., f. 99, pl 60 (1348) was the first case 
recognizing a mental, as distinct from a physical injury. It concerned a tavern-keeper’s wife who avoided a 
hatchet thrown at her by an irate customer. 
21 Lord Denning MR has expressed dislike for the expression because ‘it conveys the idea of damages which 
ought not in justice to be awarded, but which somehow or other have been allowed to get through by hanging on 
to others.’ Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd. V. Martin & Co. (Contractors) Ltd. [1973] QB 27 at 35. 
22 Des Butler, ‘Psychiatric injury resulting from negligence’ (2002) 10 Torts Law Journal 13, 19. 
23 Peter R. Handford, ‘Intentional infliction of mental distress: Analysis of the growth of a tort’ (1979) 8 Anglo-
American Law Review 1, 3. 
24 Professor Goodhart argues that, technically, trespass to the person involved some physical impact. This 
physical impact having been established, the court never had any difficulty in recognising that pain and 
suffering could constitute an element of damage, but in the absence of physical impact, it was more difficult to 
determine what tort had been committed merely by giving a mental shock to another. A.L. Goodhart, ‘The shock 
cases and area of risk’ (1953) 16 Modern Law Review 14, 16. 
25 Des Butler, ‘Identifying the compensable damage in ‘nervous shock’ cases’ (1997) 5 Torts Law Jornal 70. 
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to her nervous system, producing vomiting and other more serious and permanent physical 
consequences at one time threatening her reason and entailing weeks of suffering and 
incapacity.26 
Naturally, in a case as such, where the elements of moral blame and outrage associated 
with the intentional infliction of emotional distress were present, the damage award seems to 
be more punitive than compensatory and the question whether the defendant owed a duty to 
the particular plaintiff of secondary importance.27 
Wright J. held that the defendant’s act was plainly calculated to produce some effect of 
the kind which was produced, namely nervous shock. In an effort to avoid the outcome of the 
Privy Council’s decision in Coultas a new innominate tort was created: a cause of action on 
the case for damages for intentional infliction of nervous shock. In order to succeed, a 
plaintiff had to establish that the defendant intended to inflict harm in the form of physical 
injury or nervous shock, and that he had, in fact, suffered the kind of harm which the 
defendant intended. 
An interesting question might arise in a case where the facts were identical with those 
in Wilkinson v. Downton28 except that the words were true. It is conceived that in those 
circumstances, the decision would be different –there would be no right to recover. Magruder 
states that normally, a person’s purpose in breaking bad news to another is not the desire to 
cause mental distress, but rather to let the other person know something he is entitled to 
know. The question is, he adds, whether the law should recognize a duty of care to convey 
bad news tactfully so as to minimize the risk of physical consequences from sudden shock. 
He concludes that, in the absence of authority on the point, it may be surmised that such a 
duty would be recognized only in a very extreme case.29  
In a recent case,30 the House of Lords analysed whether there is scope for the 
application of the Wilkinson v Downton principle in other circumstances. The plaintiff, Alan 
Wainwright, suffered humiliation and distress as the result of being strip-searched while 
                                                            
26 Wilkinson v. Downton. [1897] 2 QB 57. See also Janvier v. Sweeney [1919] 2 KB 316 (C.A.) where the 
defendant, a private detective, in order to coerce a female servant into giving him access to certain letters in 
possession of her mistress, accused her of being associated with a German spy and threatened her with arrest; he 
was held liable for her illness resulting from nervous shock. 
27 David Leibson, ‘Recovery of damages for emotional distress caused by physical injury to another’. (1976-
1977) 15 Journal of Family Law 163, 166. For a general discussion of the distinction drawn between intentional 
and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and how the element of moral culpability plays a part in the 
distinction, see Millard, ‘Intentionally and negligently inflicted emotional distress: toward a coherent 
reconciliation.’ (1982) 15 Indiana LawReview, 617, 623-625. 
28 [1897] 2 QB 57. 
29 Calvert Magruder, ‘Mental and emotional disturbance in the law of torts’ (1935-1936) 49 Harvard Law 
Review 1033, 1045. 
30 Wainwright v Home Office [2004] 2 AC 406 (HL). 
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visiting a relative in prison. Although the conduct of the prison officers in requiring the 
plaintiff to undress was in good faith, it was not protected by statutory authority. The 
questions for the House of Lords were whether damages were recoverable by the plaintiff for 
the tort of invasion of privacy or under an extension of the referred principle (the plaintiff’s 
argument being that the prison officers’ conduct was calculated to cause him distress).  
Lord Hoffmann, with whom the other members of the House of Lords agreed, after 
discussing Wilkinson v Downton and later developments held that it did not provide a remedy 
for distress which did not amount to psychiatric injury. In any event, there was no actual 
intent (imputed intent being insufficient in this context) on the part of the prison officers to 
cause distress to the plaintiff.  
Even on the basis of a genuine intention to cause distress, Lord Hoffmann said he 
would wish to reserve his opinion on whether compensation should be recoverable. He 
maintained that in institutions and workplaces all over the country, people constantly do and 
say things with the intention of causing distress and humiliation to others. This shows lack of 
consideration and appalling manners, but he was not sure that the right way to deal with it 
was always by litigation. 
In his opinion, therefore, the claimants could build nothing on Wilkinson v Downton. 
It did not provide a remedy for distress which did not amount to recognised psychiatric injury 
and so far as there may be a tort of intention under which such damage is recoverable, the 
necessary intention was not established. 
It has been submitted that the decision in Wainwright suggests that the rule in 
Wilkinson v Downton very doubtful has a useful role to play in contributing to the coherent 
development of the law.31 
 
1.3 The impact theory of recovery: the Coultas case. 
 
The first recognized theory to deal with mental distress was grounded on the untenable 
belief that emotional damage could only be expected to occur as a result of a person’s 
physical injuries, and that mental trauma alone could not serve as a basis for recovery.32 The 
test was arbitrary, without any rational foundation and tended to lead to unjust and 
                                                            
31 Stephen Todd, The law of torts in New Zealand (2009) 129. 
32 It generally is considered that the Privy Council adopted what has since been referred to as the ‘impact rule’ 
under which a plaintiff cannot recover for mental distress in the absence of direct physical impact upon him. 
While Coultas is often cited as the first case to utilize the impact rule there is reason for denying that 
interpretation since the issue of impact was not actually decided. 
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incongruous decisions.33 The impact rule, for example, would exclude liability from a 
defendant who was fortunate enough not to hit the plaintiff but whose negligent near miss 
caused the plaintiff to suffer nervous shock and a resulting miscarriage. 
It has been suggested that Oliver W. Holmes might have contributed to revitalize the 
theory providing a new rationale based upon notions of practicability. In effect, in a well-
known case at the beginning of the twentieth century, he found that the reason for the impact 
rule was to separate genuine from fraudulent claims, not to separate the physical from the 
mental. The requirement of an impact was said to function as some guarantee of 
genuineness.34 
A crossing accident in Australia in 1886 set the opportunity for the Privy Council to 
decide the question. James Coultas, his wife Mary and her brother, driving their horse cart 
from Melbourne to Hawthorne had the most frightful experience when a negligent gatekeeper 
allowed them to cross a railway line when the train was coming. The shock of the onrushing 
train scraping their wheels made Mrs. Coultas have a miscarriage. When sued, the Railway 
Company argued that Mrs. Coultas had suffered no actual physical injury, which was a 
standard requirement for personal injury cases. 
The Privy Council, speaking through Sir Richard Couch, held that damages arising 
from mere sudden terror unaccompanied by any actual physical injury, but occasioning a 
nervous or mental shock, could not under such circumstances be considered a consequence 
which, in the ordinary course of things, would flow from the negligence of the gatekeeper. In 
the opinion of the Lordships, ‘it would be extending the liability for negligence much beyond 
what that liability has hitherto been held to be.’35 
 In addition, they said that if the plaintiff were allowed to recover, then  
not only in a case like the present but in every case where an accident caused by negligence had given a 
person a serious nervous shock, there might be a claim on account of mental injury. The difficulty 
which now often exists in case of alleged physical injuries of determining whether they were caused by 
the negligent act would be greatly increased, and a wide field open for imaginary claims. 36 
 
                                                            
33 However, in the United States, after New York became the first state in the Union to adopt it (Mitchell v 
Rochester R.R. Co. 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896) favorably citing Coultas) many other jurisdictions 
followed the path, making the impact rule the most accepted theory of the top industrial states in the early 
twentieth century. John Burley, ‘Dillon revisited: towards a better paradigm for bystander cases’ (1982) 43 Ohio 
State Law Journal 931, 933. 
34 Troy A. Tureau, ‘Bystander recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Louisiana enters the 20th 
century’ (1992) 37 Loyola Law Review 1005, 1008.  David Lenox, ‘Negligent infliction of emotional distress –
Should the Florida Supreme Court replace the impact rule with a foreseeability analysis?’ (1983) 11 Florida 
State University Law Review 229, 233. 
35 At 225. 
36 At 227. 
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There was no reference to the defendant’s contention that there had to be impact in the 
shape of some contemporaneous physical injury. However, the reference to ‘mere sudden 
terror unaccompanied by any actual physical injury’, has been interpreted as indirectly 
responding that issue.37 
The Court decided the case strictly on the basis of remoteness of damage according to 
the prevailing technique of the time for limiting defendant’s liability. However, if remoteness 
means the absence of direct and natural causal sequence, of a natural or necessary descent 
from the wrong to the damage,38 then, it is not clear why fright from a collision with a 
locomotive was not expected in the ordinary course of things. Apparently, the court seemed 
to think that Mrs. Coultas’ injuries were more extensive than might reasonably be expected. 
Their definition of remoteness did not reflect temporal or spatial distance between the 
defendant’s negligence and Mrs. Coultas’ injuries. Rather, it classified her injury as remote 
because of its judgment that a normal person would not suffer physical injuries as a result of 
such an incident. It therefore, used remote to mean abnormal or unusual.39 It has been 
submitted that this focus on the personal characteristics and response of the plaintiff 
introduced gender into the case in an unsubtle way. It was Mary Coultas who fainted and 
suffered the physical effects of nervous shock, not her brother or her husband, although they 
also were exposed to the same danger.40 
 Naturally, the fright was not the ground of the action, but the physical injury (the 
miscarriage). The fright was only alleged (and proved) as a necessary link in the chain of 
causation between the wrong and the damage. It was clear that the plaintiff was trying to 
recover for the consequences of the fright and not the fright in itself; but the court maintained 
that the basis was fright, and that if no recovery could be had for fright it was hard to see how 
there could be recovery for its consequences.  
No doubt, the decision reveals awareness of the reports from the Royal Commission on 
Railways (1867), and from the Select Committee of the House of Commons on Railways 
(1870) showing concerns about a crisis in personal injury compensation relating to sums paid 
out in damages by railways companies in the middle of the nineteenth century. The policy 
consideration expressed the Court’s conviction that extending the liability of negligent 
                                                            
37 James A. Rendall,‘Nervous shock and tortious liability’ (1960-1963) 2 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 291, 296. 
38 Bohlen, above n 1, 165. 
39 Martha Chamallas and Linda Kerber, ‘Women, mothers, and the law of fright: a history.’ (1989-1990) 88 
Michigan Law Review  824. 
40 Ibid. 827. 
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defendants to cover the medical sequelae of non-physical impact trauma would escalate the 
problem.41 
It has been suggested that, in Coultas, the Court found a reason of public policy and, 
from there, intended to construct substantive law by means of elevating an evidentiary issue 
(as the type of injury) to the status of substantive law. Palles CB, the greatest of Irish 19th 
century judges, as he has been called42, also pointed out that since the damage is the gist of 
negligence, the existence and potential compensability of nervous shock should be regarded 
as an evidentiary rather than a substantive issue.  
I am of opinion that as the relation between fright and injury to the nerve and brain structures of the 
body is a matter which depends entirely upon scientific and medical testimony, it is impossible for any 
Court to lay down, as a matter of law, that if negligence cause fright, and such fright, in its turn, so 
affects such structures as to cause injury to health, such injury cannot be a consequence which, in the 
ordinary course of things would flow from the negligence, unless such injury accompany such 
negligence in point of time.43 
 
The Coultas case was received with little enthusiasm, and, as it was a decision of the 
Privy Council, it has never been regarded as binding in the English courts.  
In the United States, the inequities of the impact requirement soon started to show and 
some courts tried to get round it by holding that even the most trivial contact constituted 
impact. But, while recovery was granted for such trivial impacts, serious emotional harm with 
consequent physical damage would often go uncompensated because the negligent conduct 
causing the mental distress failed to produce any impact. The rule was first abolished in 
Texas in 1890, being gradually followed by other jurisdictions. 
 
1.4 The zone of danger approach. 
 
The first case in England recognizing liability for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress was Dulieu v White & Sons.44 Mrs. Dulieu was a pregnant publican’s wife who was 
working cleaning glasses behind the bar when a horse drawn van, driven by one of the 
defendant’s servants, crashed through the window of the public house. Mrs. Dulieu was not 
physically injured but suffered from nervous shock. Following this incident Mrs. Dulieu 
                                                            
41 Danuta Mendelson, The interfaces of the liability for negligently caused psychiatric injury (nervous shock) 
(1998) 63. American commentators point out how the courts over there also noted the public concern of 
imposing liability on the railroad industry, of such great importance to the nation at the time. Tureau, above n 
27, 1016. 
42 Ronan Keane, ‘Judges as Lawmakers–The Irish experience’ (2004) Judicial Studies Institute Journal 1, 7. 
43 Bell v The great Northern and Western Rly. Co. (1890) 26 LRIr at 441. 
44 [1901] 2 KB 669. 
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prematurely delivered a disabled child. She recovered damages for her own illness or ‘shock’, 
which involved real and immediate fear of injury. 
In ruling for the plaintiff, the Court set two conditions: First, the plaintiff’s mental 
distress had to be accompanied by a physical manifestation (the miscarriage, in this case); 
second, the plaintiff needed to establish that her shock resulted from fear for her own safety.  
It is apparent that in Dulieu v White & Sons45 the Court sought to control the scope of 
liability by using what became known as the ‘zone of danger rule’, according to which a 
plaintiff would be allowed to recover for psychiatric illness provided that this was caused by 
reasonable fear of being physically injured by the defendant’s negligence. This meant that 
damages were only to be awarded if the claimant was either within or geographically close 
enough to the foreseeable area of impact.46  
After conceding that a claim based on damage from emotional shock would be 
sustainable in negligence, Kennedy J. seemed to have felt that the door must not be open too 
wide and added: 
 
It is not, however, to be taken that in my view every nervous shock occasioned by negligence and 
producing physical injury in the sufferer gives a cause of action. There is, I am inclined to think, one 
limitation. The shock, where it operates through the mind, must be a shock which arises from a 
reasonable fear of immediate personal injury to oneself. 47 
 
Thus was born the notion of the ‘ambit of physical risk’ that has so plagued later courts. 
Another aspect of Kennedy J.’s judgment that merits consideration is that he rejected 
the argument that the plaintiff should be denied recovery when it is shown that she is 
particularly susceptible of emotional upset (as when she is pregnant) and would probably not 
otherwise suffer injury, at least to the same extent. To support his position he cites the 
doctrine of the thin-skulled man. 
It is interesting to note that the remoteness argument was rejected by Phillimore J. in 
these words: ‘the difficulty of those cases is to my mind not one as to the remoteness of the 
damage, but as to the uncertainty of there being any duty.’48 
The Kennedy limitation has been described as ‘empirical’ and ‘pragmatical’ rather than 
‘logical application of principles.’49 The ‘zone of danger’ test provides recovery where the 
                                                            
45 [1901]2 KB 669. 
46 Trevor Hicks,  Post traumatic stress disorder and the law (2003)  28. Indeed, those outside the zone of danger 
of physical harm could not recover for such harm even if they did suffer it. They were not foreseeable, and 
under the usual rule, would not be able to satisfy the proximate cause requirement. This was the point of 
Cardozo’s opinion in Palsgraf v Long Island R.R. although he used the language of duty. 
47 At  681. 
48 At 685. 
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impact rule would not; however, its admittedly arbitrary limits have likewise resulted in 
denial of recovery for deserving plaintiffs.50 Although the ‘zone of danger’ test provided a 
convenient and relatively simple way of limiting a defendant’s liability, the deficiencies were 
clear, and its critics soon showed that it would permit recovery for a mother, ‘timid and 
lacking in the motherly instinct’, who feared only for herself, while withholding damages 
from another mother situated beside her, ‘courageous and devoted to her child’, who worried 
only about her child, and not at all for herself. The application of the rule under these 
circumstances would be quite arbitrary and would create the very evil the test was designed 
to eliminate. 
It took a quarter of a century for the courts in England to overthrow the Kennedy 
restriction, and in some jurisdictions even longer.51  
 
1.5 Fear of peril or harm to others. 
 
In 1925, in Hambrook v. Stokes Bros.52 the English Court of Appeal allowed for the 
first time recovery in a situation in which the plaintiff, safely outside the area of possible 
impact suffers psychiatric damage through fear that another has been, or may be killed, 
injured, or put in peril. The plaintiff sued for the death of his wife, pregnant at the time, 
caused by the negligence of the defendants who had left a lorry with its engine running at the 
top of a hill, and facing a narrow street. Her three children had just walked up the same street 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
49 Windeyer J. in Mount Isa Mines Ltd. v. Pusey (1971), 45 A.L.J.R. 88 at 97. 
50 Mark Beede, ‘Duty, foreseeability, and the negligent infliction of mental distress.’ (1981) 33 Maine Law 
Review 303, 313. 
51 In Scotland, the first case to depart from the Dulieu v. White & Sons limitation was Mc Linden v. Richardson 
(1962) S.L.T. In South Africa, it was only in 1973, in Bester v. Commercial Union, that the Appellate Division 
abandoned the restriction. In that case, two young brothers ran over a street. One of them was hit by a vehicle 
and died the following day. The other one, who was just ahead his brother when the accident happened, 
sustained serious emotional shock. Tager considers that one of the reasons for the restrictive and narrow attitude 
of their law towards nervous shock is the conservatism of South African law, which regards the principles 
applicable to the Aquilian action as the only principles applicable to nervous shock. – an approach that restricts 
development and the study of the law of other jurisdictions. Louise Tager, ‘Nervous shock in South African 
Law.’ (1972) 89 South African Law Journal, 436. Bester’s case received favourable comment, primarily for 
ridding South African law of the artificial constraints inherited from English law; J.R. Midgley, ‘The role of 
foreseeability in psychiatric injury cases.’ (1992) 55 Tydskrift vir Hedendaagse Romeins Hollandse Reg, 441. 
Prior to Bester, the South African law of delict lacked clear principles in the field of psychiatric injuries. Since 
Roman-Dutch authority was scant, the courts consistently sought guidance from English law as far as the 
negligent infliction of emotional shock was concerne; Johann Neethling, ‘Delictual liability for psychological 
lesions in South African law’ in Ulrich Magnus and Jaap Spier (Eds) European Tort Law (2000) 211. 
    In the United States, the Kennedy limitation was set aside in 1968 in California for the first time in Dillon v. 
Legg. At the present time, the picture is one of astonishing divergence. See Douglas B. Marlowe, ‘Negligent 
infliction of mental distress: A Jurisdictional survey of existing limitation devices and proposal based on 
analysis of objective versus subjective indices of distress’. (1988) 33 Villanova Law Review 781, 817. 
52 [1925] 1 KB 141. 
11 
 
 
 
in the direction from which she saw the lorry appear out of control and swaying from one 
side of the street to the other. The lorry stopped before it could reach her as a result of the 
collision with a building not far from where she was standing. Although she could not see 
what happened to her children (because the street took a bend at the end) she feared the 
worst, immediately rushing to the scene, where bystanders informed her that a child matching 
her daughter’s description had been struck. Mrs. Hambrook, who was pregnant at the time, 
suffered a miscarriage three months later and died. Her husband sued under the Fatal 
Accidents Act for the death of his wife caused by the negligence of the defendant.  
The court had to consider whether they could widen the scope of the duty owed, which, 
in accordance with Dulieu v. White,53 did not extend beyond fear for oneself.54 
It is relevant to point out that, although the woman had not seen herself the lorry 
running over her children (all that she saw was the lorry turning the bend and running into a 
wall) ‘the shock resulted from what the plaintiff’s wife either saw or realized by her own 
unaided senses, and not from something which some one told her.’55 Emphasis was given to 
two elements: presence at the scene of the accident and perception of it with one’s own 
unaided senses (as opposed to being informed by someone else). 
It was not necessary for a person to fear merely for his own or her own safety. 
Concerns were expressed that a mother who feared for her child should  not be disadvantaged 
simply because she was not close enough to the incident to fear for herself. Bankes L.J. held 
that it was a normal consequence of the defendant’s negligence that a mother, knowing that 
her children were in such peril, would receive a shock, and that this was sufficient for the 
purpose of the action. He did not discuss the question whether or not the woman was within 
the area of physical risk, as the defendant admitted negligence on this point. Atkin, L.J. said 
that to hinge recovery on the speculative issue whether the parent was shocked through fear 
for herself or for her children ‘would be discreditable to any system of jurisprudence.’56 
Atkin L.J. apparently thought some emphasis was necessary on the matter:‘I agree’, he 
said, ‘that in the present case, the plaintiff must show a breach of duty to her, but this he 
shows by the negligence of the defendants in the care of their lorry.’57 It has been suggested 
that he reached his conclusion on the ground that the plaintiff’s wife was within the area of 
physical risk, but it does not follow from this that he would have held that the area of 
                                                            
53 [1901] 2 KB 669. 
54 Wheat, above n 7, 313, 318. 
55 [1925] 1 KB at 152. 
56 At 157. 
57 Ibid. at 156. 
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emotional risk was insufficient for this purpose if the question had fallen for decision.58 In 
fact, it is not even clear whether the mother was actually subject to physical danger herself as 
the runaway lorry might not have been able to take the curve. Some commentators state that, 
in fact, she was not in personal danger. Others, however, argue that Mrs. Hambrook was not 
to know that the lorry would collide with a building before it could reach her, and that the 
facts suggest that she had all the reasons to be in immediate fear for her own personal safety, 
and that this situation could have been foreseen.59 Rendall, pointing out the fact that the 
mother did not actually see the accident,60 states that ‘this oddity becomes the more baffling 
in light of Bankes L.J.’s remarks that the shock must result from what the mother saw or 
realized by her own unaided senses.’61 The Court was in fact indirectly recognizing that the 
zone of danger could not be defined merely by the risk of physical injury, and that it had 
necessarily to be extended to the area of those exposed to emotional injury. 
Anyhow, the question in issue, as Professor Goodhart points out, was not as to the 
probable or improbable consequences of an admitted breach of duty to use care, but as to the 
extent of the duty itself.62 The plaintiff was suing for the breach of an independent duty owed 
to herself. The same act may constitute a breach of two distinct duties owed to two different 
persons. In that sense, Hambrook v. Stokes63 offered opportunity for a wide extension of 
liability to bystanders. 
 
1.6 Foreseeability of the plaintiff. 
 
In 1943, in what Professor Wright called one ‘of the most important decisions in the 
law of tort which has appeared since Donoghue v. Stevenson’64, the question of nervous 
shock reached the House of Lords for the first time. In Bourhill v. Young65 an eight month 
pregnant fishwife, descended from a tram some twenty metres from a road junction. She 
walked around to the driver’s platform to collect her fish basket. While she was picking up 
                                                            
58 Goodhart, above n 17, 18. There is considerable doubt whether the issue was one of duty or remoteness. Atkin 
L. J. said that ‘the question appears to be as to the extent of the duty, and not as to remoteness of damage’ 
[1925] 1 KB 141 at 158 
59 J. Havard, ‘Reasonable foresight of nervous shock’. (1956) 19 Modern Law Review 478, 486. 
60 Sargant L.J. was of the opinion that the injuries did not result from something she saw. He supported his 
opinion by reference to the evidence that the woman was concerned about her daughter solely, though all three 
children were out of her sight and equally likely to have been injured. This he took to be evidence that she was 
really upset by what witnesses of the accident told her. 
61 Rendall, above n 30, 294. 
62 Arthur L. Goodhart, Essays in Jurisprudence (1931) 116. 
63 [1925] 1 KB 141. 
64 Cecil A. Wright, ‘Comment. Duty of care. Nervous shock.’ (1943) 21 Canadian Bar Review 65. 
65 [1943] AC 92. 
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the basket, a motorcyclist, riding at an excessive speed, passed on the opposite side and 
collided with a car at the intersection. She could not see the impact, but heard a loud noise of 
a collision. After the cyclist’s dead body had been removed, she saw blood on the road.66 She 
claimed that as a result she suffered a severe shock to her nervous system and one month later 
gave birth to a stillborn child..67 
The progress since 1888 was significant if it is considered that every member of the 
House of Lords, without hesitation, accepted that  
the crude view that the law should take cognizance only of physical injury resulting from actual impact 
has been discarded, and it is now well recognized that an action will lie for injury by shock sustained 
through the medium of the eye or the ear without direct contact.68 
 
The second aspect to note is that the question was approached from the standpoint of 
duty, and not remoteness as in the Coultas case. Three of the judgments (Lord Thankerton, 
Lord Russell of Killowen, and Lord Macmillan) were based on the ground that because the 
bystander was outside of the ambit of ordinary physical impact, the defendant owed no duty 
of care to her. This seems to indicate that only persons who were within the range of 
foreseeability of harm likely to be caused in the normal manner by physical impact have any 
hope of basing a claim for injury resulting through nervous shock.69 Because the plaintiff was 
outside the area in which it was reasonable to foresee that she might be physically injured, 
and therefore, no duty was owed to her, the central issue, whether she could have recovered 
for shock if she had been standing within that area, remained open. Although Hambrook v. 
Stokes Brothers was discussed by their Lordships, no definite conclusion was reached. 
 It has been submitted that the decision is not very helpful in articulating the boundaries 
of liability and is best regarded as dealing with the question of whether a road user owes a 
duty of care not to cause shock to a bystander who has no connection with the victim of the 
accident rather than as denying the possibility of the thin skull rule applying to cases in which 
a duty of care not to cause shock does exist.70 
                                                            
66 It seems that Mrs. Bourhill’s shock came from the initial bang, rather than from the sight of what she saw, 
although she gave contradictory evidence about this. William W. McBryde, ‘Bourhill v Young: the case of the 
pregnant fishwife’ in Miller and Meyers (Eds.) Comparative and historical essays in Scots Law (1992) 70.  
67 A parallel tragedy, generally unknown because irrelevant to the case, is that the tramcar driver, whom nobody 
could blame for the accident, was much affected by it. He spoke about it frequently. He was agitated by the 
thought of giving evidence in the court proceedings. He was found dead in Holyrood park on april 1939, having 
committed suicide by the consumption of lysol (a poisonous disinfectant). McBryde, ibid 71. 
68 Per Lord Macmillan. 
69 McBryde above n 59, 71. It should be noted that the duty of owners of motor vehicles usually was stated in 
very general terms in relation to persons on the highway. In Bourhill, however, the test of duty was almost 
exclusively limited to the question of physical impact. 
70 K. M. Stanton, The modern Law of Tort (1994) 207.  
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Mendelson states that there should have been only one issue before the House of Lords, 
namely, whether in the circumstances of the case, on the test of reasonable foreseeability, the 
motorist owed Mrs. Bourhill a duty of care, irrespective of the nature of her injury. The 
House of Lords, however, coupled that with the issue of remoteness of damage and asked 
whether the scope of reasonable foreseeability as the test for the existence of duty of care 
should extend to the foreseeability of risk of nervous shock at the stage of remoteness of 
damage.71 
In Bourhill v. Young72 the same conclusion was reached both by ‘the area of physical 
impact’ test and by ‘the reasonable foresight of shock’ one, but no doubt in other cases the 
difference between them may be extremely significant.73 The way in which the issue was 
approached raises the question: if the cause of action is damage due to the unlawful infliction 
of shock, why should the area of possible physical injury be relevant? Goodhart points out 
that the emphasis on physical tests is related to the nineteenth century desire to equate the law 
with the physical sciences. After stating that all such tests have proved illusory, he concludes 
that the measure of legal responsibility must still depend on a value judgment and that this 
cannot be answered satisfactorily by measuring the number of yards which separate the 
defendant from the person who has suffered an injury from his act.74 
Professor Wright, in a well-known comment shows that, even if Cardozo C.J’s 
judgment in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railway Company75 is not mentioned in any of the 
judgments, there can be little doubt that the similarity of approach is more than a coincidence 
and, indeed, some of the language used in the case gives evidence of stemming directly from 
that decision.76 The Court clearly accepted the doctrine held in that famous case that 
negligence is a relative term; that it is not enough for the plaintiff that the defendant’s 
conduct was negligent towards somebody else; that the defendant’s conduct must have been 
negligent with relation to the legally protected interests of the plaintiff. 
  Foreseeability, no doubt, is in the core of Lord Thankerton’s decision: 
                                                            
71 Mendelson, above n 34, 145. 
72 [1943] AC 92. 
73 On the contrary, Goodhart believes that the case was decided not on the ground that the plaintiff was outside 
the area of risk, but on the ground that it was not reasonably foreseeable that an ordinary person would receive a 
shock of such magnitude as to cause illness from such an incident. He also believes that the area of physical risk 
doctrine is not necessary for the purpose of enabling the courts to reject extravagant claims. The ordinary 
reasonable foresight doctrine, he says, will give sufficient protection in such cases. Goodhart, above n 17, 19. 
74 Ibid., 23. 
75 248 N.Y.339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). 
76 Wright, above n 57, 65. 
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The risk of the bicycle ricocheting and hitting the appellant, or of flying glass hitting her, in her position 
at the time, was so remote, in my opinion, that the cyclist could not reasonably be held bound to have 
contemplated it…77 
 
 Lord Russell of Killowen also referred to foreseeability: 
In considering whether a person owes to another a duty a breach of which will render him liable to that 
other in damages for negligence, it is material to consider what the defendant ought to have contemplated 
as a reasonable man. 
 
And then in transparent Cardozo’s language:  
 
The first essential for the appellant to establish is the existence of a duty owed to her by John Young of 
which he committed a breach. As between John Young and the driver of the motor-car, John Young was 
admittedly negligent, in that he was in breach of the duty which he owed to him of not driving, while 
passing the stationary tramway-car, at such a speed as would prevent him from pulling up in time to 
avoid a collision with any vehicle which might come across the front of the tramway-car from Colinton 
Road into Glenlockhart Road, but it by no means follows that John Young owed any duty to the 
appellant.78 
 
In Lord Macmillan’s speech the memory of the Palsgraf case could not be more fresh:  
In the present instance the late John Young was clearly negligent in a question with the occupants of the 
motor-car with which his cycle collided. He was driving at an excessive speed in a public thoroughfare 
and he ought to have foreseen that he might consequently collide with any vehicle which he might meet 
in his course, for such an occurrence may reasonably and probably be expected to ensue from driving at a 
high speed in a street. But can it be said that he ought further to have foreseen that his excessive speed, 
involving the possibility of collision with another vehicle, might cause injury by shock to the appellant?79  
 
The results reached by these judgments seem to indicate that, as the appellant was 
outside the area in which it was reasonable to foresee that she might be physically injured, the 
cyclist owed her no duty of care. None of them was concerned with the question of shock at 
all. The question whether Mrs. Bourhill could have recovered for the shock she suffered if 
she had been standing within that area was left open. 
Lord Porter said that ‘in order to establish a duty towards herself, the appellant must 
still show that the cyclist should reasonably have foreseen emotional injury to her as a result 
of his negligent driving…’ It is significant to point out that the foresight required by Lord 
Porter is foresight of emotional injury which, naturally, is not the same thing as foresight 
concerning physical injury (although in many cases they coincide). 
In King v Phillips80 a mother looking out of a window saw a taxi, some 70 yards away, 
backing slowly onto her son on a tricycle. She heard her son scream, but his injury was so 
                                                            
77 Per Lord Thankerton at  99. 
78 At 102. 
79 At 105. 
80 [1953] 1 QB 429, [1953] 1All ER 617 (C.A.) 
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slight that he was able to run home. Nonetheless she suffered psychiatric injury as a result of 
the shock.  
The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of McNair J. who had held that there had 
been no duty. According to him, the mother  
was wholly outside the area or range of reasonable anticipation and it would be contrary to common 
sense to say that a taxicab driver ought reasonably to have contemplated that, if he backed his taxi 
without looking where he was going, he might cause injury by shock, or any other injury, to a woman in 
a house some 70 or 80 yards away up a side street.81  
 
Goodhart argues that if the cause of action is damage due to the unlawful infliction of a 
shock, there is no reason why the area of possible physical injury has to be relevant. He 
attributes the confusion between foresight of emotional injury and foresight of physical injury 
to the fact that, before the emotional injury was recognized as a separate tort, it was given 
recognition only as a type of damage resulting from physical injury. In these cases, shock 
followed the physical injury, while in the cases concerning psychiatric injury, physical injury 
follows the shock. He suggests that, although there is an obvious and fundamental difference 
between the two, nevertheless it has been difficult for the courts to rid themselves of the idea 
that in some way or other the shock which the person has suffered must be connected with 
some pre-existing physical injury or danger to himself.82 
Singleton LJ remarked that the driver could not reasonably or probably anticipate that 
any injury, either physical or from shock, would be caused to the mother. He also stated that 
the driver owed a duty to the boy, but he knew nothing of the mother; she was not on the 
highway; he could not know that she was at the window, nor was there any reason why he 
should anticipate that she would see his taxicab at all; he was not intending to go into Birstall 
Road except for the purpose of turning. He concluded that the fact that she saw the tricycle 
under the taxicab did not enable one to distinguish that case from Hay (or Bourhill) v 
Young.83 
It has been suggested that if it is to be admitted that a woman can reasonably be 
expected to suffer nervous shock as a result of apprehension for the safety of her child (and 
Singleton L.J. seems to admit this), it is difficult to see how her distance from the accident 
                                                            
81 [1952] 2 All ER at 461. 
82 Goodhart, above n 17, 22. 
83 [1953] All ER at  620. 
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can qualify this foresight, providing she is in a position to appreciate the nature and quality of 
the immediate threat to her child.84 
Denning L.J. declared himself unable to see any reason for applying a different test to 
determine liability for nervous shock injury than the one applied to settle liability for injury 
through physical contact. He suggested that the test is simply foreseeability of injury and if 
injury does occur then the defendant is liable unless the injury is too remote. He approved the 
Hambrook case which he found exactly similar except in one respect. The crucial difference, 
in his opinion, was ‘that the slow backing of the taxicab was very different from the terrifying 
descent of the runaway lorry.’ 
It is difficult to see the justification for this distinction in foresight, as in either case it is 
the potentially damaging effect of immediate fear for the child which is in issue, and this 
would be the same in each case. Goodhart has pointed out the weakness of this conclusion, 
stating that it is not immediately obvious why a mother should receive less of a shock when 
she sees her child being slowly run over, than when it is done rapidly.85  
Lord Justice Denning founded his decision on foresight but he employed remoteness 
analysis rather than the duty language used in Bourhill v. Young.86 ‘I think’, he said, ‘the 
shock in this case is too remote to be a head of damage’.87 
It has been submitted that Lord Denning’s approach in this case may seem like a relic 
of a bygone era.88 Singleton LJ and Hodson LJ did not share his view and, applying the 
principle of Bourhill v. Young89, held that the taxi driver could not reasonably have 
contemplated that as a result of his negligence in reversing his taxi without looking where he 
was going he would cause psychiatric injury to the mother 70 yards away. The most relevant 
aspect of Lord Denning’s influential judgment, though, is that he states that the test of 
liability for nervous shock is foreseeability of injury by nervous shock.90 
Although King v Phillips91 is considered one of the cases which displayed some shift of 
emphasis towards concern with the area of emotional shock, physical proximity continued to 
                                                            
84 Havard, above n 52, 494. In the King case the mother, although at a considerable distance, both heard and saw 
the accident which threatened the life of her son. She was, therefore, more closely connected emotionally with 
the accident than was the mother in the Hambrook case, although she herself was never in any physical danger 
as the latter may have been. 
85 Arthur L. Goodhart, ‘Emotional shock and the unimaginative taxicab driver’. (1953) 69 Law Quarterly 
Review 352. 
86 Allen M. Linden, Canadian Tort Law (2001) 392. 
87 At  624. 
88 Nicholas Mullany and Peter Handford, Tort Liability for Psychiatric damage (2006) 107. 
89 [1943] AC 92. 
90 At 441. 
91 [1953] 1 QB 429, [1953] 1All ER 617 (C.A.) 
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be stressed, in a way which seemed to imply that it is necessarily relevant in determining the 
kind of emotional reaction that could be anticipated. 
 
1.7 The categorization of the victims. 
1.7.1 Generally 
 
The factual distinction between primary and secondary victims of an 
accident is of long-standing. It was first alluded to in speeches in Bourhill v. Young.92 Lord 
Russell, for example, recognized it when he pointed out that Mrs. Bourhill was not physically 
involved in the accident. Lord Wright noted that some persons are direct victims of accidents 
that cause shock, whilst others are only affected in a derivative way, that is, through the 
circumstance of some connection with a victim in the first category.  
In Alcock, Lord Oliver of Aymelton said that cases involving liability for nervous shock 
were to be broadly divided into two categories: those in which the injured plaintiff was 
involved, either mediately or immediately, as a participant, and those in which the plaintiff 
was no more than the passive and unwilling witness of injury caused to others.’93 
In relation to those in the latter category, His Lordship said that ‘the law in general 
provides no remedy, however severe the consequences of the distress or grief may be to the 
health or well-being of the third party and however close his relationship to the victim.’94 For 
that, he did not find any support in logic,  
for there is, on the face of it, no readily discernible logical reason why he who carelessly inflicts an 
injury upon another should not be held responsible for its inevitable consequences not only to him who 
may conveniently be termed ‘the primary victim’ but to others who suffer as a result.  
 
 Neither was it unforeseeable because 
it is readily foreseeable that very real and easily ascertainable injury is likely to result to those   
dependent upon the primary victim or those upon whom, as a result of negligently inflicted injury, the 
primary victim himself becomes dependent. 
 
 He was driven to conclude that it must be attributable to the fact that such persons are 
not, in contemplation of law, in a relationship of sufficient proximity, an artificial concept 
that depends more upon the court’s perception of what is the reasonable area for the 
imposition of liability than upon any logical process of analogical deduction.95 
                                                            
92 [1943] AC 92. 
93 At 923. 
94 At  409. 
95 [1992] 1 AC at 411. 
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The distinction did not have any other purpose than to remind us that the law of torts 
does not generally compensate secondary victims, unless they can prove a duty owed to them 
personally. It assisted in the application of general notions of foreseeability and proximity, 
but did not otherwise have major consequences.96 
 The first category included cases in which the claimant was actually exposed to the 
risk of physical injury, even though no physical injury occurred, as in Dulieu v White & 
Son97; or where he reasonably believed he was at risk of physical injury, as in‘rescuer’ cases, 
like Chadwick v British Railway Board98 and cases where the plaintiff, as a result of the 
defendant’s negligence, reasonably believed that he had been the cause of injury to someone 
else, as in Dooley v Cammell Laird & Co Ltd.99 Everyone else would be a secondary victim. 
However, the cathegorization has proved controversial and has not been particularly well 
received by commentators. For one thing, it is not clear cut: are ‘rescuers’ pimary or 
secondary victims? Are bystanders who witness the accident, but who could have been hurt 
by it, primary or secondary victims? Can a person be both, a primary and secondary victim? 
Many concerns have been expressed, especially following the decision in Frost. The 
primary/secondary dichotomy proved not to be very helpful, is insufficient to allow all cases 
to fit in it and does not serve to achieve the desired analytical uniformity.  
 
1.7.2 Page v Smith: Primary victims. 
 
In Page v Smith,100 the first case on psychiatric injury to a primary victim to reach the 
House of Lords, the plaintiff was involved in a collision with his car when the defendant 
turned negligently causing the claimant to run into him. Although both cars were damaged, 
the collision seemed minor. Neither the plaintiff, his wife and child who were passengers, or 
the defendant sustained any physical injury. There was no evidence to suggest that the 
plaintiff was, at any time, in fear for his own safety or the safety of the occupants of the other 
car. He was able to drive home, but within hours of the accident  he was suffering a relapse of 
the symptoms of myalgic encephalomyelitis101, that he had suffered for 20 years and that was 
                                                            
96 Mullany and Handford, above n 81, 416. 
97 [1901] 2 KB 669. 
98 [1967] 1 WLR 912. 
99 [1951] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 271. 
100 [1995] 2 All ER 736. 
101 Also known as chronic fatigue syndrome or post-viral fatigue syndrome. For the history of the controversial 
existence of the condition, see: E. Kim, ‘A brief history of chronic fatigue syndrome.’ (1994) 272 Journal of the 
American Medical Association, 1070. 
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dormant at the time of the accident. He maintained that, because of the accident, his condition 
became chronic and permanent with the result that he could never work again. It was not 
contested that the circumstances of the accident were such that some bodily injury to the 
plaintiff was foreseeable, even though it did not in fact occur. 
Lord Lloyd expressed his agreement with the speech of Lord Oliver in Alcock, but 
attached important legal consequences to the distinction: the control mechanisms that applied 
in relation to a claim by a secondary victim had no application in the case of a claim by a 
primary victim. He indicated that as a primary victim, the plaintiff did not have to prove that 
his psychiatric illness was foreseeable. Foreseeability of physical injury was enough to enable 
the victim to recover damages. Therefore, after Page, there is a clear distinction between 
primary and secondary victims: the former encountering very few barriers, whereas the latter 
facing considerable obstacles.102  
Handford believes that Lord Oliver made a significant contribution by distinguishing 
between primary and secondary victim cases, a distinction that makes it easier to appreciate 
that psychiatric damage cases can arise in situations which do not involve an accident in the 
ordinary sense of the word.103 However, it is clear that Lord Oliver was only concerned with 
the limitations which should be imposed on the foreseeability test as an issue of proximity. 
He did not propose a different foreseeability test for primary victims. Lord Lloyd instead, 
distinguished between primary and secondary victims in order to limit liability to the latter by 
establishing other rules limited to secondary victims.104 
Lord Lloyd’s reference to Lord Oliver’s categorisation of the victims might, at first 
sight, appear as a harmonious identification with the former’s definition. A closer look, 
however, reveals a significant distinction. Lord Lloyd referred to those who were within the 
area of foreseeable physical injury as opposed to those who were not.105 Lord Oliver instead, 
emphasized the participation or involvement in the event of the primary victims as opposed to 
those who merely witnessed it (secondary victims). These tests are not identical. One may 
participate without being placed in physical danger and vice versa. Lord Oliver’s formulation 
                                                            
102 Michael Jones, ‘Liability for psychiatric damage: searching for a path between pragmatism and principle’ in 
Jason Neyers et alii (Eds) Emerging Issues in Tort Law. (2007) 120.  
103 Peter Handford, ‘A new chapter in the foresight saga: psychiatric damage in the House of Lords.’ (1996) Tort 
Law Review, 7. 
104 Chris Hilson, ‘Nervous shock and the categorisation of victims.’ (1998) 6 Tort Law Review, 45. Peter 
Handford, ‘Psychiatric injury in the workplace.’ (1999) 7 Tort Law Review 126, 135. 
105 Harvey Teff, ‘Liability for psychiatric illness: advancing cautiously.’ (1998) 61 Modern Law Review 855. 
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is a broader one and may include some plaintiffs as primary victims that are unlikely to 
succeed under Lord Lloyd’s test.106  
In spite of perhaps a well-meaning attempt to facilitate recovery to primary victims by 
stating that the control mechanisms do not apply to them, ironically Lord Lloyd’s designation 
of primary victims had the opposite effect of narrowing the law because of the implication 
that to be a primary victim one must be within the area of potential physical danger. The 
emphasis on physical proximity and personal danger is tantamount to reviving the outmoded 
and arbitrary ‘zone of danger’ rule.107 
The amorphous distinction between primary and secondary victims made in Page had 
an unfortunate effect on English law and led to significant difficulties. For instance, is a 
person who was in the area of physical danger but suffered shock through fear for the safety 
of someone else a primary or secondary victim? Are rescuers always primary victims, 
because they are owed a duty of care directly, or only when they have been exposed to 
danger? Alternatively, are they normally secondary victims because they are not, or not 
viewed as, having been personally threatened? Or are they sui generis? Similarly, is the 
distinction between primary and secondary victims relevant to employees whose psychiatric 
illness has been caused by their employer’s negligence towards others?108   
In Frost v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police,109 when the court attempted 
to apply the distinction to rescuers and employees110 Lord Hoffmann seemed in such a state 
of despair that he felt compelled to declare that the ‘search for principle was called off in 
Alcock’.  
                                                            
106 Lord Goff in White v. Chief Constable disagreed with the interpretation of Lord Lloyd’s judgment. 
According to him, Lord Lloyd was not saying that the presence of someone within the range of foreseeable 
injury was necessary, it was merely sufficient. In other words, there can be primary victims, e.g. employees, 
rescuers, who are not within the range of physical injury. 
107 It has been suggested that the central distinction draw  in Alcock (leaving aside the special treatment of 
rescuers) was that between those who fear for themselves and those who fear for others. The area of physical 
risk approach of Lord Lloyd obliterates that distinction, for even where the plaintiff’s shock is caused by seeing 
what has happened to another, he is classified as a primary victim, if it just so happens that the defendant’s 
breach might have led to his being injured instead. Donal Nolan, ‘Taking stock of nervous shock’ (1999) 10 
King’s College Law Journal 112, 118. 
108 Ibid. 
109 (1997) 1 All ER 540. 
110 Luh Lan Luh and Susanna Leong Huey Sy. Nervous shock, rescuers and employees. (1998) Singapore 
Journal of Legal Studies 121, 126. In classifying police officers engaged in rescuing spectators at Hillsborough, 
we find Rose L.J. according them primary status because they were on duty and directly involved; Judge L.J. 
(dissenting) deeming them to be secondary victims because they were not physically endangered, and Henry 
L.J. saying that, as participants, they could be seen as primary victims, but the real issue was whether proximity 
could be presumed or had to be critically examined and such labelling did not to seem to matter! Teff, above n 
97, 855. Also in ‘Liability for negligently inflicted psychiatric harm: justifications and boundaries.’ (1998) 57 
Cambridge Law Journal, 113. 
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However, some encouragement that the issue is not closed may be derived from the 
latest consideration of the matter in W v Essex County Council111 where the House of Lords 
held that it was arguable that the parents of some children abused by a boy placed with them 
as a foster child by the local authority might establish that they were primary victims, on the 
basis that they had suffered psychiatric damage as a consequence of feeling that they were 
indirectly responsible for the abuse, having introduced the foster-child into the house.  
Giving the judgment of the court, and contrary to the opinions of the majority expressed 
in Frost, Lord Slynn maintained that it was not always necessary for the plaintiff to be in the 
area of potential physical harm before he could be classified as a primary victim. In his view, 
there was no case that conclusively showed that the situation where parents felt involved in 
that way was excluded from the category of primary victims. His Lordship concluded that the 
categorisation of those claiming to be included as primary or secondary victims is not finally 
closed and remains to be developed in different factual situations. 
 
1.7.3 The Hillsborough tragedy: secondary victims. 
 
In April 1989 at Hillsborough Stadium, a few minutes before the start of a football 
match, a senior police officer decided to open an outer gate at the Leppings Lane end 
allowing an excessive number of spectators to enter into a section already filled to capacity. 
As a result, 96 of them were crushed to death and over 400 were injured. The scenes were 
broadcast live on television. Sixteen plaintiffs, who were either relatives or friends of victims, 
claimed damages for psychiatric illness. Some of them had been in the stadium at the time, 
some watched the horrifying scenes live on national television, and others heard of the 
tragedy on the radio.  
The Chief Constable of South Yorkshire, the police officer responsible for the police 
force which had been conducting the crowd control on the day of the disaster, admitted 
liability for those people injured or killed, but argued that the police owed no duty of care to 
the plaintiffs who were claiming damages for nervous shock. The court of first instance 
allowed ten of the sixteen claims. The Court of Appeal dismissed all the claims. Ten cases 
were brought before the House of Lords, providing it with a fresh opportunity to review 
                                                            
111 Jones, above n 95, 123. From another point of view, it is clear that the parent’s psychiatric injury occurred 
well after the aftermath of the events, under the tests approved in Alcock and White, but the reluctance of the 
House of Lords to apply those authorities in this hard case is perfectly understandable. K. Mackenzie, ‘Oh, what 
a tangled web we weave’ in Baulac, Pitel & J Schulz (eds) The joy of torts.  (2003) 143. 
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liability for nervous shock in the light of the uncertainties in this area left by McLoughlin v. 
O’Brian.112 All ten plaintiffs failed in their claims.113  
The main issues in the Hillsborough case were centred on the scope of liability when 
the plaintiff was neither a parent nor a spouse of the primary victim, and on whether a means 
of communication other than direct, unaided perception could ground a claim. On the facts of 
the case, it was put to test whether watching television or even listening to the radio qualified 
as direct perception. 
It has been submitted that Alcock114, summarizing the English law on liability for 
psychiatric illness, rather than clarifying that vexed area, has exacerbated its incoherence.115  
 
1.8 The class of persons who can claim for nervous shock. 
 
As regards ‘the class of persons whose claim should be recognised’, one can distinguish 
between those closely related to the victim, the coincidental bystander, and the rescuer.116  
In the early English cases of nervous shock liability, when the physical impact rule still 
reigned, the element regarding ‘the class of persons whose claim should be recognised’, 
played no part. With the gradual expansion of liability beyond the boundaries of direct 
physical impact or fear of such injury to oneself, the test for  determining the existence of a 
duty of care was submitted to new control mechanisms imposing further limits on liability. 
Therefore, the courts started focusing on immediate family ties, restricting recovery to those 
within special relationships such as marital or filial bonds. 
Lord Wilberforce’s view in McLoughlin v. O’Brian117 was that recovery in cases 
involving the closest of family ties, such as parents, children and spouses could be justified, 
but cases involving less close relationships should be very carefully scrutinised. ‘The closer 
the tie (not merely in relationship, but in care) the greater the claim for consideration’, he 
said.118 On the other hand, he excluded recovery in the case of the ordinary bystander on the 
                                                            
112 [1983] 1 AC 410. Bernadette Lynch, ‘A victory for pragmatism? Nervous shock reconsidered’. (1992) 108 
Law Quarterly Review 367, 367. 
113 For references of how the succession, in a relative short period of time, of large scale disasters in England 
may well have heightened the judicial appreciation of the potential for massive number of psychiatric illness 
claims flowing from high profile instances of negligence, see Michael Davie ‘Negligently inflicted Psychiatric 
illness: the Hillsborough case in the House of Lords.’ (1992) 43 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 237, 249. 
114 Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1992] 1 AC 310. 
115 Harvey Teff, ‘Negligently Inflicted Psychiatric Damage.’ (1996) 4 Tort Law Review 44, 44. 
116 Melanie Janssens, ‘Nervous shock liability – A comparative study (England, France, Germany, Netherlands.’ 
(1998) 6 European Review of Private Law. 
117 [1983] 1 AC 410, 
118 [1983] 1 AC 410, 422. 
24 
 
 
 
basis that such persons must be assumed to be possessed of fortitude sufficient to enable them 
to endure the calamities of modern life, or that defendants cannot be expected to compensate 
the world at large.119 
Before him, in Hambrook v. Stokes120, Lord Atkin went even further, supporting the 
possibility of recovery for bystanders.  
Personally I see no reason for excluding the bystander in the highway who receives injury in the same 
way from apprehension of or the actual sight of injury to a third party. There may well be cases where 
the sight of suffering will directly and immediately physically shock the most indurate heart.121 
 
Also in Mount Isa Mines Ltd. v. Pusey122, Windeyer J noted that it is apparent that  
‘persons other than relatives of persons hurt may genuinely suffer nervous shock…on 
witnessing another’s suffering or danger in an unexpected accident,’123 and he expressed his 
opinion that the time had come when courts should move away from treating close relatives 
as an exceptional class in amelioration of the general denial that damages could be had for 
nervous shock. 
The House of Lords in Alcock, however, followed Lord Wilberforce’s steps, holding 
that a person could recover damages for negligently inflicted psychiatric illness as a result of 
witnessing death, injury or peril to another only if he had ‘close ties of love and affection’ 
with that person.124 A rebuttable presumption was established in favour of parents or spouses 
and, for Lord Keith and Lord Oliver, also engaged couples. For plaintiffs who were not 
entitled to the benefit of the presumption, like siblings, remoter relatives or friends, evidence 
that their ties with the victims were as strong as that in a parental or spousal relationship 
would be required. The precise methodology to be utilised to establish this requisite was not 
articulated, the only guidance offered being that of Lord Ackner who spoke of comparing the 
love and affection between these claimants and the victim to that of the normal parent, spouse 
or child of the victim. 
                                                            
119 At 422. 
120 [1925] 1 KB 141. 
121 At 157-158. Goodhart said that it is a gloomy view of nature human which suggests that the sight of the 
death or injury of someone else, other than husband, wife or child, cannot create such a shock. Goodhart, above 
n 17. 
122 (1970) 125 CLR 383. In that case, two employees of the defendant who were testing a switchboard were 
severely burnt by an intense electric arc. The short circuit caused a loud explosion. The plaintiff, who had not 
witnessed the accident because he was working on the floor below, ran to the scene and found one of the victims 
just burn up before his eyes. The victim’s clothes were burnt off, his skin was peeling and he was grievously 
hurt. The plaintiff assisted in carrying him to an ambulance. The victim whom he aided, died nine days later. 
Mr. Pusey subsequently developed a serious mental disorder, involving an accute schizophrenic episode and 
depression. The Australian High Court held that the defendant was liable for the plaintiff’s psychiatric injuries. 
123 At 404. 
124 [1991] 3 WLR 1057, 1100 (per Lord Keith). 
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Davie finds the half-way house between an approach that lists specific classes of 
relationship which qualify the plaintiff for recovery and an unstructured test of foreseeability 
requiring case by case determination attractive. He believes that the use of a rebuttable 
presumption in favour of spouses, parents and children conduces to certainty, whilst allowing 
for the possibility of claims by more remote relations caters for the needs of justice in the 
instant case.125 On the contrary, Teff suggests that, instead of being sidetracked into deciding 
whether the plaintiff’s relationship with the primary victim is comparable to some other, 
imprecisely delineated, relationship, it should be asked the more direct question: was the 
plaintiff’s condition a reasonably foreseeable result of the defendant’s negligence?126 
In Alcock, two of the appellants were at the ground, from where they witnessed the 
scenes. One of them (Brian Harrison) lost two brothers and the other a brother-in-law. Lord 
Keith considered that in neither of those cases was there any evidence of particularly close 
ties of love or affection with the brothers or brother in law, and in his opinion, the mere fact 
of the particular relationship was insufficient to place the plaintiff within the class of persons 
to whom a duty of care could be owed by the defendant. 
In similar terms, Lord Ackner said that the relationship between them was not 
presented as close and intimate amounting to that very special bond of affection which would 
be able to produce shock-induced psychiatric illness. 
 Lord Oliver went even further and thought that, although both were present at the 
ground and saw scenes which were obviously distressing and such as to cause grave worry 
and concern, their perception of the actual consequences of the disaster to those to whom they 
were related was gradual. 
Therefore, Brian Harrison learned that his case must fail because he did not prove that 
he had loved his brothers enough. As Nasir has pointed out, if the claim by a person who lost 
two brothers in circumstances as horrifying as those in the Hillsborough disaster was 
unsuccessful, it is difficult to envisage recovery by someone other than a parent or spouse.127  
In Alcock  an explicit recognition was given to the fact that the essential element in 
relational proximity is the underlying emotional bond between the plaintiff and the accident 
                                                            
125 Davie, above n 106, 239. 
126 Harvey Teff, ‘Liability for psychiatric illness after Hillsborough.’ (1992) 12 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
440, 446. 
127 K. J. Nasir, ‘Nervous shock and Alcock: The judicial buck stops here’. (1992) 55 Modern Law Review 705, 
705. The question of how to identify appropriate criteria for satisfying the requirement of close ties did never 
have a proper answer. As Cane puts it: ‘How can we justify a rule which requires mentally traumatized people 
to go to court and prove that they have strong feelings of love and affection towards another?’ Peter  Cane, The 
anatomy of Tort Law (1997) 70. 
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victim.128 In fact, this has been suggested to be the only meaningful criterion of recovery for 
negligently inflicted psychiatric illness. Proximity to the scene of the accident and 
communication of the event are generally causally irrelevant and their role in judicial 
analyses of psychiatric illness claims has been explained as mere ‘policy levers’ which 
simply operate to reduce the number of psychiatric injury claims that can be made.129  
It has been submitted, however, that in practice, plaintiffs who are not parents or 
spouses (or the equivalent) of the primary victim are likely to have considerable difficulties in 
recovering damages due to the fact that successful claimants outside these categories are 
almost unprecedented (though just how many have tried is impossible to tell). The most 
graphic example is that of Brian Harrison, who lost two brothers, whom he knew to be in the 
affected area at the time of the disaster, witnessed the scenes from a stand immediately 
behind that area  and, nevertheless, was denied recovery because there was insufficient 
evidence of the closeness of the relationship!130 
At first instance, Hidden J. had suggested that it was not logical to distinguish between 
spousal (ie. parent-parent), parent-child and child-parent (presumably involving sufficient 
relational proximity) relationships on the one hand, and relationships between siblings on the 
other, because all are in the relationship of the entity of the nuclear family and it is in the 
normal course of events that the children, having grown up together, are extremely close 
within the family.131 No doubt, this would be a fairer point at which to draw the line, with no 
realistic danger of the floodgates opening if such a relationship were to be accomodated.132 
Writing in 1986, that is before Alcock, Trindade thought that there was no reason why 
recovery should be confined only to members of the actual family and included, among those 
who deserved compensation a fiancé, or a boyfriend or a girlfriend.133 In fact, one of the 
Alcock plaintiffs, Alexandra Penk, a fiancée of a young man who died in the disaster 
probably would probably have recovered had she been present at the scene.  
                                                            
128 Per Lord Keith [1992] AC at 397. In similar words, Lord Oliver mentioned that it is the fact of an 
affectionate relationship which is ‘the source of the shock and distress in all these cases.’ Ibid, at 416. 
129 Teff, above n 8, 100. 
130 Nasir, above n 120, 712. Apparently there is only one case, which is unreported, where a sibling –a brother as 
it were- succeeded with his claim, McCarthy v. Chief Constable of Yorkshire Police, 11 December 1996, quoted 
from Law Commission Report (249) 1998, apud Gerald Schaefer, ‘The development of the law on psychiatric 
injury in the English Legal System.’ New Zeland Post Graduate Law e-Journal. Issue 4, 5. 
131 Jones v. Wright [1991]1 All ER 353 at  p. 375. 
132 Eng Beng Lee, ‘Case Comments. Vindication of the three proximities. Alcock & Ors. V. Chief Constable of 
the South Yorkshire Police.’ (1992) Singapore Journal of Legal Studies, 534. 
133 Markesinis, on the other hand, points out that whether a claim by a mistress or paramour of a married victim 
could be barred by public policy remains to be seen. Basil Markesinis and Simon Deakin, Tort Law (6th ed. 
2008) 151. 
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Similarly, he believed that a teacher-pupil relationship should be regarded as 
sufficiently close, and gave the example of a defendant who negligently runs down a pupil 
who is on a school outing, within the sight or hearing of his teacher. In his opinion, he should 
be liable for the nervous shock which might be suffered by the teacher.134  
An alternative solution has been advanced by the Law Commission’s Report on 
Liability for psychiatric Illness. The Commission proposed to replace the current rebuttable 
presumption in respect of a spouse, parent or child (and possibly fiancé), with an expanded 
list (the ‘fixed list’), wherby close ties are irrebuttably presumed for spouses, parents, 
children, siblings and cohabitants. Adoptive relationships are included, but not those between 
step-parents and step-children or half-siblings. Ouside the fixed list, it would be open to 
anyone to prove a tie of love and affection as close as for those on it. No attempt was made to 
define what this entails, any more than it was in Alcock.135 
 
1.9 Proximity in time and space. 
1.9.1 Generally. 
 
Boardman v. Sanderson136 is generally considered the first in a series of cases in which 
the courts held that it was foreseeable that a plaintiff not present at the scene of the accident 
would arrive shortly afterwards. In this case, a father and his son had accompanied a friend to 
a garage to collect his car. The father went into the garage office, leaving his son outside. The 
friend, in backing the car out of the garage, negligently ran over the son’s foot. The father 
heard his screams and immeadiately ran to his son. These events caused the father to suffer 
nervous shock. The court held the defendant liable because he knew (unlike in King v. 
Phillips) that the plaintiff, the father, was within earshot and was certain to come onto the 
scene immeadiately on hearing his son in distress. 
In McLoughlin v. O’Brian137, Lord Wilberforce had singled out closeness of time and 
space as important elements in establishing proximity.138 For him, proximity was an aspect of 
                                                            
134 Francis Trindade, ‘The principles governing the recovery of damages for negligently caused nervous shock.’ 
(1986) 45 Cambridge Law Journal 476, 488. 
135 Cf. Report, paras 6.27 (14)(e), 6.30-6.31. 
136 [1964] 1 WLR 1317. 
137 [1983] 1 AC 410. 
138 Lord Oliver observed in Alcock [1991] 4 All ER 907 at 930 that the first of these factors is properly to be 
construed as a determinant of foreseeability, only the last two relate to the proximity requirement, and this is 
because proximity, as Lord Atkin has elaborated it, ultimately concerns the matter of a person sufficiently 
closely and directly affected by the defendant’s negligence. John Murphy, ‘Negligently inflicted psychiatric 
harm: a re-appraisal’. (1995) 15 Legal Studies 415, 426. 
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policy. He thought that because ‘shock’ in its nature was capable of affecting so wide a range 
of people (i.e. reasonable foreseeability), some limitation had to be placed on the extent of 
admissible claims. In the case of Mrs. McLoughlin, who had not seen the accident itself, but 
the aftermath, it was considered that there was a sufficient temporal proximity.139 
In Alcock, Lord Wilberforce’s statements in McLoughlin that there must be close 
proximity to the accident, in both time and space and that the shock must come through sight 
or hearing of the event, or of its immediate aftermath were endorsed by Lord Oliver.140 He 
stressed the need for the plaintiff to be present at the scene or in the ‘more or less immediate 
vicinity’, and for a ‘close temporal connection’ between the event and the plaintiff’s 
perception of it.141 He also emphasized that there were no precedent of cases for injuries 
suffered where there was not at the time of the event a degree of physical propinquity 
between the plaintiff and the event caused by the defendant’s breach of duty to the primary 
victim, nor where the shock sustained by the plaintiff was not either contemporaneous with 
the event or separated from it by relatively short interval of time.142 
 Lord Ackner also accepted that the proximity to the accident must be close in time and 
space, and that injury by shock can be caused, not only through the sight or hearing of the 
event, but of its immediate aftermath. 
Lord Jauncey, considering fruitless any discussion about the criteria that would 
constitute the immediate aftermath, made a simple reference to McLoughlin v. O’Brian 
‘where it extended to a time somewhat over an hour after the accident and to the hospital in 
which the victims were waiting to be attended to.’ In particular, he pointed out the fact that 
when Mrs. McLoughlin arrived at the hospital, it appeared that they were in very much the 
same condition as they would have been had the mother found them at the scene of the 
accident.  
The arbitrary nature of the test comes clear from that remark, suggesting that if the 
victims have received preliminary treatment they can no longer be said to be within the 
aftermath of an accident, but if they remain ‘begrimed with dirt and oil’ relatives or other 
shocked by viewing their condition are not excluded from a potential cause of action.143 If the 
hospital had been able to clean them up, sedate them and put them to bed, Mrs McLoughlin 
would not have been able to recover. 
                                                            
139 [1983] 1 AC at 422. 
140 At  422. 
141 At 411. 
142 At 416. 
143 Mullany and Handford, above n 81, 223. 
29 
 
 
 
Trindade, writing before Alcock, questioned what would happen if the plaintiff’s 
mother or plaintiff’s husband were overseas at the time of the accident, but on being told of 
the accident flew home immediately and rushed to the hospital to find the injured relative 
comfortably tucked in bed, albeit heavily bandaged. Is nervous shock suffered in such 
circumstances not compensable, he said, because blood is nowhere to be seen and the injured 
victim is no longer begrimed with dirt and oil? He also argued that a nervous shock suffered 
by a plaintiff on being told about an injury to the spinal cord of his loved one caused in a 
bloodless accident might be much more significant than any shock which was or would have 
been sustained by the plaintiff by attendance at the scene of the accident.144 
In Alcock, one issue that raised the question of the aftermath concept was the claim of 
those plaintiffs who identified relatives in a temporary mortuary shortly after the disaster. 
Despite the apparent relevance of the aftermath doctrine to the facts of Alcock, only two Law 
Lords (Lord Jauncey and Lord Ackner) dealt with mortuary identification and the aftermath 
concept. 
Lord Jauncey incorporated the purpose of the visit to the mortuary as a factor: 
 
 ‘In these appeals the visits to the mortuary were made no earlier than nine hours after the disaster and 
were not made for the purpose of rescuing or giving comfort to the victim but purely for the purpose of 
identification. This seems to me a very different situation from that in which a relative goes within a 
short time after an accident to rescue or comfort a victim. I consider that not only the purpose of the 
visits to the mortuary but also the time at which they were made take them outside the immediate 
aftermath of the disaster.’145 
 
This introduction of a further restriction on recovery has been unanimously criticized. 
Mullany and Handford find it unreasonable to suggest that the reason for coming to the scene 
will affect the closeness in time required for relief. The implication of this, they say, seems to 
be that the courts consider the viewing of a body somehow less emotionally disturbing than 
seeing an injured person who is still alive, albeit possibly seriously injured. They also stress 
the fact that Lord Jauncey overlooked the distinction between those who go to a mortuary, 
knowing for a fact that a loved one has died, to go through the formality of identifying the 
body, and those who have the distressing task of searching through rows of corpses not 
knowing whether the one they seek is alive but hoping and praying that they will not find that 
person’s body.146 
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It is, therefore, not immediately evident why the purpose of the plaintiff’s visit to the 
primary victim of an accident should be relevant to the question of recovery for negligently 
inflicted psychiatric illness. Davie finds it difficult to believe, for example, that Mrs. 
McLoughlin would have been denied compensation if she happened coincidentally to have 
been at the hospital when the members of her family were admitted and saw them being 
conveyed to the casualty department..147 In McLoughlin v. O’Brian148, it was clear that both 
Lord Wilberforce and Lord Edmund-Davies were using the fact that the mother’s motivation 
in going to the hospital was similar to that of a rescuer to support the aftermath doctrine.149 
But, obviously, that analogy was not aimed at suggesting that the plaintiff may recover in 
aftermath cases because of his intention to give aid to the primary victim. Davie argues that 
most relatives rushing to the hospital would appreciate that aid is at hand and that solace and 
comfort is all they can offer. However, their intention of providing comfort neither makes 
them a more likely victim of psychiatric illness nor does it make them any more deserving of 
compensation. He also suggests that it may make sense to encourage rescue attempts by 
ensuring that rescuers receive recompense for their injuries. However, there is no need to 
encourage relatives to offer comfort; this will happen with or without the law’s 
intervention.150 
In Lord Ackner’s opinion, McLoughlin was on ‘the outer margin of acceptable 
extension.’151 Even if he considered that identification of bodies in mortuaries could be 
described as part of the aftermath, it seems that it has to be done fast enough, or else there 
will be no sufficient proximity in time and space to the accident. In any case, Mr.Alcock’s 
identification of his brother-in-law, some eight hours after the accident could not be described 
as the immediate aftermath. 
Before Alcock, two first instant decisions involving parents not present at the accident 
had been successful at suing for shock suffered on being told about the death of a son, but 
these required reconsideration.  
In Ravenscroft v. Rederiaktiebølaget Transatlantic152 the plaintiff suffered shock when 
her husband told her that their son had been crushed to death while working on a ship’s cargo 
deck. Her husband did not allow her to visit the morgue to protect her from the horrifying 
sight of the disfigured body. Balcombe LJ in the Court of Appeal held that, since the relevant 
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shock suffered by the plaintiff did not arise through sight or hearing of the accident or of its 
immediate aftermath, the defendants were not liable to her. 
In Hevican v. Ruane153 the plaintiff was told of his son’s death approximately two hours 
after the accident. An hour later, he saw the body of his dead son in the mortuary along with 
other members of his school soccer team that had died in the same bus accident. The plaintiff 
recovered, but the correctness of this decision was specifically doubted in Alcock by Lords 
Keith, Ackner and Oliver. Davie submits that, unless the temporal dividing line in aftermath 
cases lays between two and a half hours (Ravenscroft) and the three hours (Hevican), it would 
seem that some significance is attached to where the plaintiff sees the body, a hospital being 
more promising for recovery than a mortuary, and perhaps the condition of the body.154 
It has been submitted that to focus on hours or minutes in this type of situations is 
fallacious. It cannot be asserted that the trauma of viewing a dead child is any less horrific 
after eight or nine hours than two. Anguish of this gravity does not dissipate as rapidly as 
this.155 Mullany and Handford give the example of a parent on holiday overseas who receives 
a phone call that his or her son has been killed, and returns on the next available flight to 
view the body a week later. Providing all the other prerequisites of liability are satisfied, they 
claim that recovery should be no more difficult to come by than if the parent had been able to 
call at the mortuary within a couple of hours of the death.156 
Teff has pointed out how invidious distinctions are inevitable when the immediate 
aftermath is treated in isolation, as a crude notion of temporal proximity. Mrs McLoughlin 
could succeed because she experienced shock only two hours after the crash, whereas a 
spectator at Hillsborough who identified a victim at the mortuary eight hours after the disaster 
would almost certainly have failed on that ground alone. A mother affected in precisely the 
same way as Mrs. McLoughlin, but too far away or too overcome to reach the hospital 
quickly would likewise fail.157  
The arbitrary nature of the test is also pointed up by the facts in Taylor v. Somerset 
Health Authority158 where the plaintiff was waiting to see her husband at the hospital when 
she was told that he had died, and identified his body a few minutes later. Auld J held that 
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this identification was not capable of being part of the immediate aftermath of 'the event' as it 
went to the fact of the death as distinct from the circumstances. In Taylorson v. Shieldness 
Produce159, the plaintiffs were informed that their son had been involved in an accident. They 
went to the hospital and waited, intermittently, by his bedside until his death three days later. 
The Court of Appeal denied the plaintiff’s claims on the basis that to find that these events 
were part of the immediate aftermath would be too great an extension of the principles set out 
in Alcock. 
The absurdly high degree of physical and temporal proximity that is needed is hidden in 
Lord Oliver’s judgment accepting that even being at the same place of the accident (including 
events of huge dimensions, as it was the case in Hillsborough) could be not enough. It 
appears that a mere general perception of events, witnessing a disaster knowing that a 
particular person may be involved, but without being sure of his or her fate will lead to the 
failure of a claim. 
Unfortunately, in spite of the wide criticism that the Alcock decision has suffered, no 
significant movements from the court’s attitude to nervous shock have been observed. The 
UK Law Commission’s recommendation that the law should abandon the requirements of 
closeness in time and space and shock did not have any practical application. 
 
1.9.2 The immediate aftermath of an accident. 
 
The first occasion on which the House of Lords held a defendant liable for negligently 
causing nervous shock to the plaintiff came with McLoughlin v O’Brian160. It was one of the 
so-called ‘aftermath’ cases, raising the question whether someone not present at the scene of 
grievous injuries to her family but who comes upon those injuries after an interval of time can 
recover damages for nervous shock. Prior to that decision, it was generally accepted that 
damages for nervous shock could only be awarded to persons who feared for their own 
personal safety, or who feared for the safety of very close relatives such as their children only 
if they in some way witnessed the tortious event at the time of its occurrence.161 
The plaintiff’s husband and three of their children were involved in a car accident 
caused by the negligence of the drivers of two other vehicles. Mrs. McLoughlin, at her home, 
an hour or so later, was informed of the accident by a neighbour. She rushed to the local 
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hospital where she found her husband and two of the children, covered with mud and oil, 
suffering from various injuries. She was also told that her other daughter had died in the 
accident. As a result of the experience at the hospital she suffered severe shock for which she 
sought to recover damages. The respondents argued that in the light of the previous 
authorities, they owed no duty of care to a person who was not at the scene of the accident 
nor within a zone of physical danger. 
At first instance, Mrs. McLoughlin was denied recovery on the ground that, whereas 
grief or sorrow162 could reasonably be foreseen in such circumstances, principle and common 
sense dictated that injury by shock was too remote. The Court of Appeal rejected that narrow 
view of foreseeability but, nevertheless, applying the Anns v. Merton London Borough 
Council’s two tier approach of negligence, dismissed the appeal.163 In the Court’s view, 
considerations of public policy suggested restricting any duty of care to persons in close 
proximity of time and place to the scene of the accident.164 
The House of Lords, in five divergent opinions, considered that the policy 
considerations were not sufficient to negative the prima facie duty of care. The floodgates 
argument and the fear of fraudulent claims were rejected.  
In his comments on the case, Street states that in Mrs. McLoughlin’s action against the 
four defendants, the five Law Lords were agreed on one thing, and nothing more: that her 
claim succeeded. The ratio decidendi is then that if a mother does not witness or hear an 
accident involving her husband and children, but it is foreseeable that in the immediate 
aftermath of the accident she will see the victims, she has a claim in negligence for nervous 
shock resulting from these events. In other words, it was authoritatively settled, for the first 
time, that an action lay for nervous shock by someone who neither saw nor heard the 
accident.165 
Lord Wilberforce relied heavily on Dillon v. Legg166 where the Supreme Court of 
California adopted a foreseeability test, to be determined on a case-by-case basis, using three 
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factors as guidelines: proximity to the scene, direct emotional impact stemming from sensory 
and contemporaneous observance of the accident, and closeness of relationship.167  
His Lordship, expressing concern about the possibility of widening too much the range 
of people that could be protected, stated that there is 
a real need for the law to place some limitation upon the extent of admissible claims. It is necessary to 
consider three elements in any claim: the class of persons whose claims should be recognized; the 
proximity of such persons to the accident; and the means by which the shock is caused…The closer the 
tie (not merely in relationship, but in care) the greater the claim for consideration. The claim, in any 
case, has to be judged in the light of the other factors, such as proximity to the scene in time and place, 
and the nature of the accident.168 
 
Those elements were considered necessary limitations on the application of reasonable 
foreseeability, conditioning the duty of care. However, it is immediately evident that at least 
one of those factors was absent, as the plaintiff first saw the victims at the hospital only a 
couple of hours after the accident. Even so, Lord Wilberforce was emphatic in pointing out 
that  
experience has shown that to insist on direct and immediate sight or hearing would be impractical and 
unjust and that under what may be called the ‘aftermath’ doctrine, one who, from close proximity 
comes very soon on the scene, should not be excluded.  
 
To justify that extension, he argued that the circumstance was analogous to that of a 
rescuer. The comparison with rescuers has been criticized since it is widely accepted that a 
remedy for rescuers owes much to the policy of encouraging their activities. Obviously, no 
such incentive is required to prompt close members of a family to visit one another in 
hospital. It is probably because physical proximity to the scene of the accident has played 
such a central role as a criterion of liability that judges may feel constrained to resort to 
artificial analogies such as rescue when proximity is absent. 
Lords Russell and Edmund-Davies found that foreseeability was not a universal test 
and that in an appropriate case policy considerations might be relevant, but that on the facts 
of McLoughlin there were no policy reasons which justified refusal of the claim. 
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On a distinct approach, Lord Bridge of Harwich thought that the defendant’s duty 
depended on bare reasonable foreseeability of injury by shock, as any attempt to limit 
liability by reference to criteria such as those mentioned by Lord Wilberforce would impose 
arbitrary limits He considered that it would be an approach which threatened to freeze the law 
in a rigid posture which would deny justice to some who, in the application of the classic 
principles of negligence derived from Donoghue v Stevenson, ought to succeed.169 These 
factors should only be considered for any relevance they might have on the degree of 
foreseeability of the plaintiff’s psychiatric illness. 
Lord Scarman also thought that 
space, time, distance, the nature of the injuries suffered, and the relationship of the plaintiff to the 
immediate victim of the accident, are factors to be weighed, but not legal limitations, when the test of 
reasonable foreseeability is to be applied.170 
  
Adopting the reasonable foresight test, he held that foreseeable nervous shock should 
be recoverable unless Parliament decided otherwise. In his view, the House of Lords could 
not deal with questions of policy but was confined to issues of principle. Therefore, any 
limits should be set by legislation. 
Because of the similarities of the factual situations, much of the reasoning in 
McLoughlin v. O’Brian171 was relied upon by the High Court of Australia when deciding 
Jaensch v. Coffey172. The plaintiff, who was at home when her husband was seriously injured 
in a collision, did not go to the scene of the accident but was taken shortly afterwards to the 
hospital where she saw him with a dislocated hip and in great pain. As in McLoughlin, the 
High Court took pains to stress that the plaintiff, though not present at the scene of the 
accident was present at, and personally perceived, the aftermath of the accident.  
In an effort to define the ‘aftermath’ Mr. Justice Deane said that: 
The facts constituting a road accident and its aftermath are not…necessarily confined to the immediate 
point of impact. They may extend to wherever sound may carry and to wherever flying debris may land. 
The aftermath of the accident encompasses events at the scene after its occurrence, including the 
extraction and the treatment of the injured. In a modern society, aftermath also extends to the 
ambulance taking an injured person to hospital for treatment and to the hospital itself during the period 
of immediate post-accident treatment.173 
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Reasonable foreseeability was for Brennan J. the sole test of liability in nervous shock 
cases, but Gibbs C.J. and Deane and Murphy J.J. took the approach that there were other 
limitations outside the test of foreseeability which, on policy grounds, might prevent the duty 
of care from arising. For Deane J. the additional factor was a relationship of proximity, a test 
which he outlined in this case for the first time. 
After Tame v New South Wales174, considered below, this, as well as other requirements 
have been relaxed, or hold that they are simply factors to be taken into account in an overall 
assessment based on reasonable foreseeability. 
  
1.9.3 Shocking events on television. 
 
 Another controversial issue in Alcock was whether a means of communication other 
than direct unaided perception could ground a claim. If presence was necessary, as the House 
of Lords recognized, the next question that arose, therefore, was if watching television, or 
even listening to the radio also qualified as ‘direct perception’.  
 At first instance, nervous shock was considered reasonably foreseeable in principle 
for claimants who had seen live TV broadcasts, but not for those who had been told of the 
disaster or had heard a live radio broadcast and only later on saw recorded TV news items. 
The justification was that radio coverage is unlikely to provide identification of a victim 
together with details of personal suffering sufficiently specific to satisfy the proximity test. 
Hidden J. said that ‘it is the visual image which is all-important. It is what is fed to the eyes 
which makes the instant effect upon the emotions, and the lasting effect upon the memory.’175 
However, the learned judge applied a significant limitation, holding that a line has to be 
drawn between watching the event through television live and watching it through a delayed 
telecast. He also held that, while nervous shock caused by watching live coverage was 
recoverable, nervous shock caused by listening to a live broadcast over the radio was not. 
The Court of Appeal said that nervous shock caused via live TV could be recoverable 
only in very exceptional circumstances. Because of the existence of the broadcasting code of 
ethics, the defendant could reasonably expect that the television cameras would not show 
shocking pictures of suffering by recognisable individuals.176 A violation of the code would, 
in the Court’s opinion, represent a novus actus interveniens which would break the chain of 
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causation between the defendant’s conduct and the psychiatric illness. In many instances this 
would mean ample room for debate on the difficult causal question whether losses would be 
properly attributable to the initial act of negligence, or should fall on the shoulders of the 
broadcaster. 
The House of Lords, following the Court of Appeal, held that those plaintiffs who had 
watched the scenes at Hillsborough on television were not within the requisite degree of 
proximity to the tragedy and could not recover for the psychiatric illness they had sustained. 
The basic rule stated by Lord Wilberforce that the shock must be caused by sight or hearing 
of the accident or its immediate aftermath was unanimously approved of by the House. In 
McLoughlin, the learned judge had left open the question of whether this could be satisfied by 
viewing of simultaneous television broadcasts, but in Alcock the Law Lords established that 
this could be only in very exceptional circumstances. Though the television scenes certainly 
gave rise to feelings of the deepest anxiety and distress, this was equivalent to being told 
about the events by a third party. 
Lord Keith held that the viewing of television broadcast could not be ‘equiparated with 
the viewer being within sight or hearing of the event or its immediate aftermath…nor can the 
scenes reasonably be regarded as giving rise to shock, in the sense of sudden assault on the 
nervous system.’177 He took into consideration that the television broadcasting code of ethics 
did not allow to depict scenes of death or suffering by recognisable individuals, and that no 
such pictures were shown on the occasion of the Hillsborough disaster. Therefore, it was not 
reasonably foreseeable that a television viewer would see scenes that would cause psychiatric 
illness. 
Butler argues that such reasoning was defective in, at least, three respects. a) To place 
such reliance upon the Code of Ethics amounts to an abdication of the determination of the 
limits of liability to an outside body. He questions where the law would be left if the 
broadcasting authorities changed their views as to what could and could not be broadcast. b) 
He believes that, in modern days of keen competition between media operators, it is not 
unreasonable to expect broadcasters to breach the Code of Ethics from time to time.  As a 
consequence, Butler submits that any notion that, merely because there is a Code of Ethics 
that purports to prohibit broadcasters from engaging in particular conduct, broadcasters will 
not engage in that conduct is, to say the least, naïve. c) Even a well intentioned broadcaster 
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attempting to comply with a Code of Ethics may still inadvertently (or unexpectedly) 
broadcast such an image.178 
Lord Ackner said that, although the television pictures certainly gave rise to feelings of 
the deepest anxiety and distress, in the circumstances of the case the simultaneous television 
broadcasts of what occurred could not be equated with the ‘sight or hearing of the event or its 
immediate aftermath’. Accordingly, shocks sustained by reason of those broadcasts could not 
found a claim.179 He agreed, however, with Nolan LJ that simultaneous broadcasts of a 
disaster could not in all cases be ruled out as providing the equivalent of the actual sight or 
hearing of the event or its immediate aftermath. He expressed the view that in particular 
horrific circumstances, the ‘recognisable individual’ requirement might be discarded and 
gave the example, previously postulated by Nolan L.J. in the Court of Appeal, of a situation 
where it was reasonable to anticipate that the television cameras, whilst filming and transmitting 
pictures of a special event of children travelling in a balloon, in which there was media interest, 
particularly amongst the parents, showed the balloon suddenly bursting into flames. Many other 
situations could be imagined where the impact of the simultaneous television picture would be as great, 
if not greater, than the actual sight of the accident.180 
 
It has been suggested that the distinction would be that in the balloon case the parents 
would know that their children had been killed or injured, whereas parents watching crowd 
scenes would not know but only fear for their children’s safety.  Trindade had given a 
similar example: suppose, he wrote, a plaintiff in Oxford is watching a live broadcast of a 
motor race being conducted in another part of England in which her husband is a participant, 
and owing to the negligence of the defendant, the car which her husband is driving explodes 
and he is incinerated. Is there any good reason why the plaintiff should not recover for the 
nervous shock that she suffers as a result of watching that live television broadcast? Is there 
any good reason why watching should not be regarded as equivalent to sight or hearing?181 
The comparison proposed by Lord Ackner of the balloon scenario and the Hillsborough 
disaster shows a hypothetical case of nervous shock where it could be equiparated with the 
viewer being within sight or hearing of the event or its immediate aftermath. The conditions 
would be: live transmission of an event which the defendant could reasonably have foreseen 
would be televised and watched by family members of the primary victims, and a sudden 
unexpected disaster. In such a case, the lack of capacity of the broadcaster to decide whether 
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or not to broadcast distressing pictures makes it impossible to consider the transmission as a 
break of the chain of causation between the initial harmful act and the psychiatric illness. 
Davie suggests that given the obiter nature of the remarks on this exception and the fact 
that there was no majority in favour of it, it would seem that future courts will have a free 
rein to utilise this exception or not as they think fit. He also believes that, provided that the 
claims of simultaneous television viewers are confined to loved ones of the primary victims 
and are not extended to strangers, this would not seem to pose a threat of an undue flood of 
claims.182 Woollard is of the same view, stating that although the intervention of mass media 
immediately raises the spectre of numerous potential claims, the majority of cases would 
probably involve single plaintiffs who would still have to prove a tie of love and affection in 
order to succeed and therefore a flood of claims is unlikely to materialize.183 
 In relation to television as a means of causing sudden shock, Lord Oliver suggested 
that  
the shock in each case arose not from the original impact of the transmitted image, which did not, as has 
been pointed out, depict the suffering of recognisable individuals…The trauma is created in part by 
such confirmation and in part by the linking in the mind of the plaintiff of that confirmation to the 
previously absorbed image.184  
 
It has been submitted that the point here concerns the fact that the transmitted images 
were not in fact causally sufficient to produce sudden psychiatric illness. The message from 
Lord Oliver’s speech seems to be that if scenes of death or suffering of recognisable 
individuals had been transmitted, this could have given rise to shock; but pictures indicating 
peril can only stimulate anxiety and this is not sufficient for a claim of negligently inflicted 
psychiatric illness.185 It has been pointed out that in Alcock, the House of Lords sees one 
factor, the mode of perception, artificially divorced from another, closeness of ties, as if they 
were entirely self-contained.186 
Lord Jauncey also concluded that the viewing of the television scenes of Hillsborough 
could not be equiparated with the viewer being within the sight or hearing of the event or its 
immediate aftermath. The explanation he found was that, 
 a television programme such as that transmitted from Hillsborough involves cameras at different 
viewpoints showing scenes all of which no one individual would see, edited pictures and a commentary 
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superimposed. I do not consider that such a programme is equivalent to actual sight or hearing at the 
accident or its aftermath.187 
 
Butler, however, argues that the camera angles do not necessarily lessen the impact 
upon a viewer. A zoom view, different angle or commentary may render the events more 
horrific for a television viewer than a percipient witness in another part of the ground relying 
on the naked eye.188 Davie also considers that the television viewer is a superior observer of 
the scene in terms of the enhanced appreciation made possible by the features of televisions 
such as multiple perspectives, close-ups, replays, slow motion, commentary etc. He 
concludes that the relevant question is whether television viewing is equivalent to being there 
in terms of one’s ability to appreciate what is occurring, and in relation to this, he does not 
doubt that the answer must be positive.189 
 
1.9.4 Immediate sight or hearing. 
 
Another aspect confirmed by Alcock was the traditional view that claims for shock 
caused by being informed by a third party of the death of a loved one are excluded by the 
notion of proximity. The requirement of hearing and seeing the accident had been enunciated 
by Denning L.J. in King v. Phillips190 saying that, 
a mother who suffers shock on being told of an accident to a loved one cannot recover damages from 
the negligent party on that account…But…a mother who suffers from shock by hearing or seeing, with 
her own unaided senses, that her child is in peril…may be able to recover from the negligent party even 
though she was in no personal danger herself.191 
 
Lord Wilberforce in McLoughlin said that the ‘shock must come through sight or 
hearing of the event or its immediate aftermath’.192 He posed as justification for this limit the 
fact that ‘there is no case in which the law has compensated shock brought about by 
communication by a third party.’193 Butler submits that this assertion was misconcieved 
because, although his Lordship relied on Australian and Canadian authorities in addition to 
                                                            
187 [1991] 3 WLR 1057, 1125. 
188 Butler, above n 171, 12. 
189 Davie, above n 106, 246. 
190 [1953] 1 QB 429, [1953] 1All ER 617 (C.A.) 
191 [1953] 1 QB429, 441. 
192 [1983] 1 AC 410, 423. The only reported case prior to McLoughlin where a plaintiff succeeded when he was 
not actually at the scene of the accident was Boardman v Sanderson. This decision was justified on the ground 
that the plaintiff father who heard his son’s scream suffered the injury of nervous shock through learning of the 
event by his own unaided senses at the time of the accident. Cf. Choo Han Teck. ‘Extended shock. Jones & 
Others v. Wright.’ (1991) Singapore Journal of Legal Studies, 491. 
193 [1983] AC 410 at 421-2. 
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English cases in supporting the other limits, he failed to take into account a sizeable line of 
Australian authority that approved of liability where there was third party communication.194  
The requirement of immediate sight or hearing of the accident or the aftermath would 
most likely rule out even claimants with close tie and affection unless they came upon the 
immediate aftermath. Besides, it suggests bygone social conditions where relatives could be 
expected to be close at hand and arrive at the accident scene within minutes.195  
In light of these circumstances, Lord Bridge of Harwich said that the hard and fast line 
of policy that required direct perception might lead to injustice. To support his view, he gave 
the example of a mother who sees the newspaper photograph of unidentified, trapped victims 
of a fire at a hotel where she knew her family had been staying, and is later told of their 
death. The learned judge argued that it would indeed be unconscionable to deny her claim 
merely because an important link in the chain of causation of her psychiatric illness was 
supplied by her imagination of the agonies of mind and body in which her family died rather 
than direct perception of the event.196 This example suggested that the unforeseeability of 
suffering to loved ones being depicted by television was not sufficient to exclude the 
possibility of recovery. 
The House of Lords in Alcock unanimously accepted the orthodox requirement that 
nervous shock must be induced by direct personal perception, rejecting the possibility of 
recovery where the plaintiff’s psychiatric injury resulted from being told of an accident or 
distressing event by another.197 Mullany regards the refusal to compensate Mr. and Mrs. 
Copoc for their psychiatric injury consequent on learning of the death of their son at 
Hillsborough simply because they were not at the stadium themselves, as a low point in 
English tort law.198 He also points out that the psychiatric literature does not allow the 
assertion that the impact of trauma is inevitably more severe if directly perceived. The effect 
of oral (or written) communication, he says, can be equally devastating for the most steadfast 
of minds. The traditional insistence on unaided senses, he concludes, is an affront to all 
reasonable, compassionate and right thinking members of contemporary society and an 
embarrassment to the common law.199 
                                                            
194 Des Butler, ‘A ‘kind of damage’: removing the ‘shock’ from nervous shock’ (1997) 5 Torts Law Journal 12 
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198 Nicholas Mullany, ‘Personal perception of trauma and sudden shock: South Africa simplifies matters.’ 
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1.9.5 Proximity in other common law jurisdictions 
         (a) Canada. 
 
In Canada, the requirement that the plaintiff must have been present at the scene of the 
accident or its immediate aftermath has been the most important limiting factor in leading 
cases such as Abramzik v Brenner 200, Rhodes v Canadian National Railway 201 and Devji v 
District of Burnaby202. 
In Abramzik, which predates McLoughlin, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal heard the 
claim of a mother who suffered a nervous breakdown after hearing the news that her two 
children had been killed in a level crossing accident. The woman was informed of the 
accident by her husband, who had arrived on the scene shortly after the accident. Recovery 
was denied.  
In Rhodes the plaintiff’s son was killed in a train disaster in Hinton, Alberta. She heard 
about the accident on the radio while at her home in Vancouver Island, and immediately 
travelled to Hinton to see if her son was among the victims. She saw pictures of the wreckage 
in the newspapers and over a period of several days came to the realisation that he must have 
died. She did not see her son or his body because his remains had been consumed by fire in 
the accident. For reasons unconnected with the defendant, she had to endure a very distressful 
period of  eight days before reaching the scene of the crash and when she eventually got there 
the wreckage had been removed. After that, she was sent to the wrong memorial service so 
she missed the official ceremony in remembrance of the dead and her son’s remains were 
sent to her unannounced, by ordinary mail, in an unmarked cardboard box. All this caused the 
plaintiff to suffer a major depression and other signs of mental disturbance. In the event, the 
appellate court rejected her claim for reactive depression. 
It has been suggested that the case bears a strong resemblance to Lord Bridge’s 
example of the hotel fire. Though the extrinsic factors which prolonged Mrs. Rhodes’ ordeal 
plainly complicated the issue of causation, too much stress may have been laid on the absence 
of a specific shock and on third party communication. 
The Court was united in the result, but divided on the statement of the rule. Mackenzie 
suggests, however, that the British Columbia Court of Appeal, while expressing it in different 
                                                            
200 (1967) 65 D.L.R. (2d) 651. 
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ways, the common ground appears to be a requirement that the plaintiff has to witness the 
scene of the accident or its immediate aftermath.203 
In Devji v. District of Burnaby, the parents and sisters of a young man who died in a 
motorcycle accident suffered psychiatric injury on learning of the death and attending 
hospital four hours latter to view the victim’s body in the morgue. 
The British Columbia Court of Appeal refused to extend the aftermath principle beyond 
the previously accepted limits, or to recognise claims based on the receipt of shocking news 
where direct perception was lacking. The court placed much stress on the maintenance of the 
existing limits as determined by earlier precedents.  
Mackenzie finds the arbitrary results of such distinctions well illustrated in Yu v. Yu204, 
where the plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident in which her eight-year-old 
daughter was killed. The plaintiff was rendered unconscious in the accident and did not learn 
of her daughter’s death until after coming to in the hospital.205  
Rejecting the argument that her illness was not caused by perception at the scene, 
Clancey J. allowed her claim for psychiatric illness in reaction to the child’s death, stating his 
inability to see how public policy could serve to limit recovery by a mother who has been 
rendered unconscious by the negligence of a defendant while a mother who retains her 
faculties succeeds. That would lead to the unusual finding that by inflicting greater injury on 
a plaintiff, a defendant could limit his liability.206 
 
(b) Australia. 
 
Australian courts have proved to be at the forefront of development in relation to 
psychiatric damage. The first case to consider McLoughlin was Jaensch v Coffey.207 The facts 
were very similar. The plaintiff’s husband had been severely injured in a motor accident 
caused by the defendant’s negligence. The plaintiff was at home at the time of the accident. 
She was taken to a hospital and there saw her husband in severe pain wheeled in and out of 
an operating theatre on three occasions. She was told that her husband was ‘pretty bad.’ She 
went home to have some rest and had a telephone call next morning at 5.30 a.m. from a 
                                                            
203 K. Mackenzie, ‘Oh, what a tangled web we weave’ in Baulac, Pitel & J Schulz (eds) The joy of torts.  (2003) 
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doctor who informed her that her husband was in intensive care. At 8.30 a.m. she had another 
call from the intensive care unit saying that her husband ‘had a change for the worse and that 
she should get to the hospital as soon as possible.’ She stayed at the hospital not knowing 
whether her husband would survive. The plaintiff’s early unhappy life had predisposed her to 
anxiety which coupled with her experience at the hospital caused her to believe that her 
husband would die and the security of her happy marriage would be ‘washed down the drain.’ 
After her experience at the hospital, although her husband survived, Mrs. Coffey suffered 
severe anxiety and depression. Her psychiatric condition caused gynaecological problems and 
a hysterectomy had to be performed later. 
Chief Justice Gibbs reserved his opinion as to the correctness of some of Lord 
Wilberforce’s comments, ‘in particular on his statements that there must be a close proximity 
in space as well as in time and that “the shock must come through sight or hearing of the 
event or of its immediate aftermath.” The law must continue to proceed in this area step by 
cautious step.’208 
Justice Deane noted that it was possible to point to a number of judicial statements to 
the effect that a person ‘who suffers shock on being told of an accident to a loved one cannot 
recover damages from the negligent party on that account.’ He added, however, that the 
requirement that the plaintiff must have perceived the peril or injury by his or her ‘own 
unaided senses’ had not enjoyed unqualified support either in the United Kingdom or 
Australia209 and that the question whether the requirement of proximity precluded recovery in 
a case where reasonably foreseeable psychiatric injury was sustained as a consequence of 
being told about the death or accident, remained an open one. His Honour said that it was  
somewhat difficult to discern an acceptable reason why a rule based on public policy should preclude 
recovery for psychiatric injury sustained by a wife and mother who is so devastated by being told on the 
telephone that her husband and children have all just been killed that she is unable to attend at the scene 
while permitting recovery for the reasonably, but perhaps less readily, foreseeable psychiatric injury 
                                                            
208 At 555. Whilst his Honour required more than foreseeability, he was unwilling to be bound by unnecessary 
and inflexible rules that would hamper development. Ramanan Rajendran, ‘Told nervous shock: has the 
pendulum swung in favour of recovery by television viewers?’ (2004) 31 Deakin Law Review 6. It has been 
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perceived the aftermath. Precisely what might constitute an aftermath he did not consider. Wheat, above n 7, 
331. 
209 He was refering to Schneider v. Eisovitch [1960] 2 QB 43O and Andrews v. Williams (1967) VR 831. In 
Schneider, damages were awarded to the plaintiff who suffered shock on being told of her husband’s death in a 
car crash in which they had been both involved but during which she lost consciousness. The court considered 
that the fact that a period of time elapsed before the news was heard made no difference, because the news was a 
consequence which flowed directly from the breach of duty. The case is distinctive because the plaintiff was 
both a primary and a secondary victim so that the negligent defendant’s duty of care, once established could not 
be debarred by spatial limitations. In Andrews, the plaintiff, who had been driving and was rendered 
unconscious through a collision, was told a few days later of the death of her mother who had been a passenger. 
It should be noted that the plaintiffs in these cases suffered personal injury in the same accident as the victim. 
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sustained by a wife who attends at the scene of the accident or at its aftermath at the hospital when her 
husband has suffered serious but not fatal injuries.210  
 
However, his Honour thought it was unnecessary to pursue the question  since the 
authorities plainly indicated that the overriding limitation upon the test of reasonable 
foreseeability did not preclude recovery in a case, such as the one under consideration, where 
the psychiatric injury was sustained as a result of the combined effect of what a plaintiff 
himself or herself observed and what he or she was told while at the scene of the accident or 
its aftermath.211 
As regards perception through unaided senses, the majority of the Australian High 
Court left open the position of a plaintiff who did not witness the tortious event or aftermath 
but suffered shock on being informed. But the decision in Jaensch v Coffey212 entitling the 
plaintiff to recover damages for nervous shock even though she was not at the scene of the 
accident, and did not go to the scene, suggested that, at least for those who have a close tie of 
relationship with the person who suffered the accident or was put in peril by the negligence of 
the defendant, it should not be necessary that the shock come only through sight or hearing of 
the event or its immediate aftermath, nor that there be nearness in the sense of time and 
space.213 
Furthermore, Kirby P., in his dissent in Coates v Government Insurance Office of New 
South Wales214, rejected the submission of the defendant that an individual who was not 
present at the scene or aftermath of an accident, and was informed about the accident by 
telephone or a later message should not be entitled to recover, considering that  
the rule of actual perception is in part a product of nineteenth century notions of psychology and 
psychiatry. In part it was intended as a shield of policy against expanding the liability of wrongdoers for 
the harm they caused. And in part, it was a reflection of the nineteenth century modes of 
communicating information.215  
 
                                                            
210 At  608. 
211 In Petrie v. Dowling (1992) 1 Qd R 284, Kneipp J of the Queensland Supreme Court noted that in Jaensch v. 
Coffey Deane J had indicated that a plaintiff who suffered shock from the combined effect of hearing distressing 
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an accident but in the belief that she had not sustained serious injury, only to be told bluntly that her daughter 
had died.’ At 286-7. 
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He also expressed his conviction that the rule was hopelessly out of contact with the 
modern world of telecommunications.  
If any judge has doubts about this, he or she should wander around the city streets and see the large 
number of persons linked by mobile telephones to the world about them. Inevitably such telephones 
may bring, on occasion, shocking news, as immediate to the senses of the recipient as actual sight and 
sound of a catastrophe would be. This is the reality of the world in which the law of nervous shock must 
operate.216  
 
Gleeson C.J. and Clarke J.A. left open the issue of the status of the told rule in 
Australia. 
A similar line of reasoning can be seen in Reeve v. Brisbane City Council.217 The 
plaintiff’s husband, a cleaner at a bus depot, was run down and killed by a bus driven by the 
second defendant, an employee of the first defendant. The plaintiff did not go to the depot 
and only saw the body for the first time several days later at a funeral parlour. Despite her 
absence from the scene and failure to witness the accident or its aftermath, Lee J. found that 
the requisite relationship of proximity was present. His Honour stated that proximity could be 
satisfied by the close relationship between the plaintiff and the victim ‘notwithstanding the 
absence of any physical connection with or independent perception of the accident or its 
aftermath.218 
Butler explains that Lee J. saw proximity as a compendious concept, whereas Deane J 
in Jaensch v. Coffey219 had identified proximity as being able to be broken into the 
components of physical, circumstantial and causal proximity. They do not dictate a 
conclusion in a particular case, but rather provide a guide to the factual inquiry the court is 
required to make. Generally, it depends on the circumstances what weight each component 
carries: accordingly, the strength of one aspect of the concept may supply deficiencies created 
by the absence or weakness of another. Thus, since the plaintiff and her husband had been 
close, that factor combined with causal proximity were so strong as to supply the necessary 
proximity, without the need for any physical proximity between the plaintiff and the accident 
scene, and presumably any actual perception of the accident.220  
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In Pham v. Lawson221, the idea that there is no reason in logic to exclude from recovery 
those persons who were merely informed of an accident was reinforced. Lander J. referred to 
the previous case of Petrie v Dowling222 allowing recovery to a plaintiff who had been 
informed that her daughter had been killed in an accident, and expressed agreement with the 
opinion of Kirby P in Coates v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales223 that 
physical presence at an accident or its aftermath is not required of secondary victims. The 
emphasis in the judgment is upon the vagueness of the aftermath concept and on the 
compelling nature of the emotional ties of secondary victims, no matter how they learn of 
death or injury to a relative or loved one. Reviewing the law, his Honour said that the 
judgments in Jaensch v. Coffey224 had established that at common law a duty of care will be 
owed in circumstances where a spouse was not present at the accident, but was later told of 
the consequences and attended hospital where some of its consequences were perceived 
personally. 
Butler suggests that the significance of this case is that, obiter, a majority of the Court 
(Lander J, with Bollen J agreeing) was prepared to go on to hold that if the only stressor had 
been the respondent’s being informed of the accident, a duty of care would still have arisen. 
Any exclusion of such a claim rested in policy rather than in logic. In his opinion, Pham v. 
Lawson225 represented a widening by Australian apellate court of the net of recovery for 
psychiatric injury by unendangered bystanders, confirming a trend among judges in Australia 
to permit recovery where the plaintiff did not perceive the accident or its aftermath and was 
only informed about the accident and its consequences.226 
In Annetts v. Australian Stations Pty Ltd.227, 18 years after Jaensch v. Coffey,228  the 
Australian High Court had the opportunity to examine the law pertaining to psychiatric 
illness and, in particular, the requirement of direct perception.  
Mr. and Mrs. Annetts’s son was employed as an apprentice worker on the defendant’s 
cattle station in a remote part of Western Australia. The Annetts were assured that their son 
would be under constant supervision and that he would be well cared for. He was not. After a 
few weeks, the station manager sent him to work alone at another isolated cattle station, with 
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a defective car and no proper lines of radio communication. On 6 December 1986, the 
Annetts were informed by telephone that their son had disappeared and suspected that he was 
in grave danger of injury or death.  On being informed of the disappearance on the telephone, 
Mr. Annetts collapsed. A prolonged search, in which the parents took part, failed to find him, 
but found his bloodstained hat. Some months later, in April 1987, his body was found in the 
Gibson desert. It appeared he had died as a result of dehydration, exhaustion and 
hypothermia. Mr. Annetts was shown photos of skeletal remains which he identified as his 
son. As a result of these events, Mr. and Mrs. Annetts claimed that the defendants’ 
negligence caused the death of their son and that the same negligence caused them 
psychiatric injury.229 
The High Court, by majority, held that liability for damages for psychiatric injury is not 
(and should not be) limited to cases where the injury is caused by a sudden shock to a 
plaintiff who has directly perceived a distressing phenomenon or its immediate aftermath, 
even though such factual considerations may be relevant.230 
 Justices Gaudron, Gummow and Kirby held that to treat those who directly perceive 
some distressing phenomenon or its aftermath as the only persons who may recover for 
negligently caused psychiatric harm is productive of anomalous consequences and limits the 
categories of claimants other than in conformity with long-established negligence principles. 
Justices Gummow and Kirby said that a rule imposing a requirement of geographical or 
temporal distance of the plaintiff from the distressing phenomenon or on the means by which 
the plaintiff acquires knowledge of the phenomenon is apt to produce arbitrary outcomes and 
to exclude meritorious claims. They held that distance in time and space from a distressing 
phenomenon, and means of communication or acquisition of knowledge concerning the 
phenomenon, may be relevant to assessing reasonable foreseeability, causation and 
remoteness of damage, but are not themselves decisive of liability.231  
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The question to be asked, said the Court, is whether it is reasonable to require one 
person to have in contemplation injury of the kind that has been suffered by another and to 
take reasonable care to guard against such injury.  
According to Handford, by abandoning direct perception and sudden shock, two of the 
policy requirements which had been imposed by previous pronouncements, and the 
redefinition of the normal fortitude test, Australia entered a new era.232 No doubt, this is the 
most desirable approach: to consider the individual situation, and to ask whether in the 
circumstances psychiatric injury was foreseeable, keeping artificial exclusionary rules to a 
minimum.233 
Trindade suggests that, as five of the seven judges in Annetts were in favour of 
abandoning the direct perception rule, it must be considered as abandoned. It also means that 
the question whether a plaintiff could recover in a case where reasonably foreseeable 
psychiatric injury is sustained as a consequence of being told about the death or accident – a 
question considered open by Deane J. in Jaensch v. Coffey, must now be regarded as settled 
by the high Court in favour of allowing recovery to plaintiffs who suffer a psychiatric illness 
as a result of being told of the death, injury or imperilment of a loved one caused by an act of 
the defendant.234  
In essence, in Annetts, liability was based on the simple test of foreseeability of 
psychiatric injury, and issues such as whether there was direct perception or sudden shock 
were simply factors in the overall foreseeability assessment.235 It has been submitted that 
what may have emerged is ‘an open-ended take-into-account-all-the-circumstances rule’, to 
determine whether, based on those circumstances, the plaintiff ought to recover.236 Under 
such a rule, a court might balance the strength of one factor in the plaintiff’s case with a 
weakness in other. The decision sharpens the division that now exists between the 
jurisdictions which are prepared to trust the foreseeability approach and those, such as 
England, where the House of Lords made it harder for plaintiffs to recover for psychiatric 
injury while paradoxically softening the foreseeability test for one particular class of victim 
(Page v Smith). 
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The conservative opinion of Trindade that the abolition of the direct perception 
requirement might lead to an escalation in liability for nervous shock unless it is clear that it 
is only in the case of those who have a close tie (family or of care) with the person killed, 
injured or put in peril, contrasts with Mullany’s conviction that there is no reason to suspect 
that the current state of affairs would change significantly with the rejection of the told 
rule.237 
 
(c) South Africa. 
 
The rejection of the direct perception of event or its immediate aftermath requirement 
gained the adhesion of the full bench of the South African Supreme Court of Appeal in 
Barnard v. Santam Bpk.238  A 13 year old boy was killed in a bus accident; the appellant 
mother suffered psychiatric injury upon being informed by her husband (who had himself 
received the information from the police ) of the death of her son. There was no witnessing of 
the accident, no recognition of the corpse, no question of aftermath.239 The damage arose 
solely as a consequence of the receipt of distressing information. 
The facts in Barnard were very similar to those in Reeve v. Brisbane City Council.240 
Inspite of the fact that the South African Supreme Court of Appeal did not refer to the 
Queensland case, Mullany notes that it arrived at the same conclusion: psychiatric injury was 
a reasonably foreseeable consequence of informing a mother of the death of her son; that 
relationship was very close and the closer the tie between the primary victim and the 
traumatised person, the more reasonable the inference that disorder was reasonably 
foreseeable to the tortfeasor. The means by which trauma came to be appreciated was 
inconsequential.241 
The conclusion is logical. As Mullany submits, once it is accepted that the oral 
communication of distressing news by a third party can be as equally devastating to the 
recipient as direct personal perception of the subject of the news, it must also be accepted that 
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the medium of third party communication is irrelevant. It is the overall context in which bad 
news is communicated which is important.242  
Trindade, however, seems not to be alone. In effect, the High Court’s extension of 
liability in Annetts-Tame raised some alarm and six jurisdictions, in late 2002 and 2003, 
following the recommendations contained in the Ipp Panel’s Review of the Law of Negligence 
Report, legislatively modified the rules for negligently inflicted psychiatric injury established  
by the Court.243 
 
1.10 The ‘sudden shock’ requirement.  
1.10.1   The rule in Alcock. 
 
In Alcock, their Lordships held that in order to be actionable the plaintiff’s psychiatric 
injury must be the consequence of shock, in the sense of a sudden assault on the nervous 
system. Lord Ackner described nervous shock as ‘the sudden appreciation by sight or sound 
of a horrifying event, which violently agitates the mind.’244 Lord Keith required ‘a sudden 
assault on the nervous system.’245 Lord Oliver referred to a ‘sudden and unexpected shock to 
the plaintiff’s nervous system.’246 Consequently, psychiatric damage caused by a gradual 
process over time, like in the example given by Brennan, J. in Jaensch v Coffey247 and cited 
with approval by Lord Oliver248, where the plaintiff is worn down by caring for an injured 
spouse, will not give rise to liability.249 Also clinical depression attributable to the plaintiff 
having to live with the fact that a loved one is permanently disabled as a result of the 
defendant’s negligence is not actionable.250 
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claim by a father for psychiatric illness allegedly caused by sitting at his 23-year old son’s bedside for 14 days, 
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       In Beecham v Hughes (1988) 52 DLR (4th) 625, the plaintiff suffered from reactive depression which began 
some time after a road accident in which his common law wife sustained severe brain damage, resulting in 
permanent disablement. On the facts, his depression which developed long after the accident, was held to arise 
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Lord Oliver said that the common features of all the reported cases of that type decided 
in England prior to the decision of Hidden J in Alcock include the fact that the injury arose 
from sudden and unexpected shock to the plaintiff’s nervous system251  ‘rather than dawning 
consciousness over an extended period.’252  
According to Mullany, notwithstanding that, prior to Alcock, the requirement of 
‘sudden shock’ had not received express judicial ratification in England, the speeches in that 
appeal affirmed the need for a sudden assault on the nervous system.253 In his opinion, their 
Lordships’ suggestion that the requirement was implicit in all previous cases is questionable 
and qualifies the pedigree of the requirement as cloudy.254 
In general, the origin of the ‘sudden shock’ rule is attributed to the judgment of 
Brennan J. in Jaensch, where he maintained that psychiatric injury had to be ‘shock-induced’, 
rather than one ‘induced by mere knowledge of a distressing fact’. He explained that while 
the term ‘nervous shock’ had long become antiquated, it still had some utility in relation to 
the damage regarded as warranting compensation. He stressed that the notion of psychiatric 
illness induced by shock was a compound, rather than a simple idea, its elements being on the 
one hand psychiatric illness and on the other the shock which causes it. In his opinion, 
‘shock’ meant the sudden sensory perception –that is, by seeing, hearing or touching- of a 
person, thing or event, which is so distressing, that the perception of the phenomenon affronts 
or insults the plaintiff’s mind and causes a recognizable psychiatric illness. 255  
In spite of its undeniable influence in Alcock, it is not at all clear that other members of 
the court supported Brennan J’s limitation. In fact, the alleged requirement did not even sit 
comfortably with the facts of the case itself, as Deane J explains that for a few days Mrs. 
Coffey coped well, and that the first symptoms of her illness did not begin to emerge until 
about a week later. 
Teff maintains that psychiatric injury is by no means exclusively associated with 
trauma. He believes that though sudden sensory perception may be medically significant in 
certain situations, as in the horrific scenes associated with exceptional mass disasters, in 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
not from seeing his wife injured or from the shock of experiencing the accident, but from his subsequent sorrow 
and inability to accept that she would never be the same person again. Cf. Louise Bélanger-Hardy, ‘Négligence, 
victimes indirectes et préjudice moral en common law: les limites à la réparation se justifient-elles?’  (1998) 36 
Osgoode Law Journal, 412. 
251 At 411. 
252 At 401. 
253 Mullany, above n 191, 36. 
254 Ibid. 
255 In Pham v Lawson (1997) 68 SASR 124, Lander extended the concept so that the ‘thing or event’ that was to 
be perceived did not need to be the accident itself, but could also include being told of the accident. 
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general, it is no more compelling as an indicator of foreseeable psychiatric injury than 
cumulative shock.256 The requirement, it has been said, is quite simply a nonsense in medical 
terms, inconsistent with the psychiatric literature and the functioning of the mind,257 and 
counsel should not be forced in every claim for psychiatric damage to attempt to identify and 
attribute particular medical significance to a specific event.258 
Part of the problem seems to reside in the persistence of the use of the term ‘nervous 
shock’. Besides the fact that it blurs the distinction between the cause of harm and its nature, 
it positively reinforces the misconception that serious psychiatric illness commonly results 
from an abrupt jolt to the nervous system.259  
The reliance on the ‘sudden shock’ concept has been considered questionable. In effect, 
it is not apparent what the difference is between suffering nervous shock on sudden 
perception of an accident to a loved one, and suffering the same nervous shock after a 
suspenseful and probably nerve-wracking wait of nine hours before the worst is confirmed.260 
The idea suggested by Lord Oliver was that witnessing the incident from neighbouring 
stands, knowing that someone very dear was in the affected area but with the uncertainty as 
to whether or not the loved one was amongst those who were being smashed, could only 
stimulate anxiety and, therefore, was not sufficient for a claim of negligently inflicted 
psychiatric illness. 
Teff points out that the undesirable distinction between ‘sudden assaults on the 
nervous’ system and more gradual, cumulative ones has the effect of vitiating manifestly 
deserving claims when gradual accumulation is so closely identified with the precipitating 
incident that it constitutes the plaintiff’s experience of it.261 Mr. Copoc, for instance, knew 
that his son was at the Hillsborough match and believed him to be in the danger zone. He and 
his wife watched the live TV presentation in a state of continuous fear. He made telephone 
calls until 4.00 am the following morning to no avail, after which he went to Sheffield 
                                                            
256 Harvey Teff, ‘The requirement of ‘sudden shock’ in liability for negligently inflicted psychiatric damage.’ 
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looking in vain for his son at the hospital. He finally identified his body at the mortuary on 
information received from the police. His claim failed.262 
 Lord Oliver described such sequence of events as a more elongated and, to some 
extent, retrospective process263, therefore, presumably only able to ‘stimulate anxiety’. His 
Lordships’ description, certainly calls to mind the slow backing of the taxi driver in  King v 
Phillips and the caustic comment of Professor Gooodhart that ‘it is not immediately obvious 
why a mother should receive less of a shock when she sees her child being slowly run over, 
than when it is done rapidly’. Ever since then, it has been unanimously accepted, at least 
among scholars, that the fact that one claimant’s experience is less protracted than another’s 
does not mean that the latter has suffered any the less. On the contrary, on an abstract 
analysis, he will usually suffer more.264 The ‘shock’ requirement represented, no doubt, an 
undue additional gloss on Lord Wilberforce’s second criterion and, although we may dismiss 
as spurious Lord Denning’s notorious distinction between the ‘terrifying descent’ of the lorry 
and the ‘slow backing’ of the taxi, a muted version of it has been given currency by the 
proclaimed requirement in Alcock of sudden, shock-induced injury.265 
It is certainly odd that whilst recovery for gradually sustained physical injury has never 
been in doubt, plaintiffs who suffer mental injury have to have such a hard time. The 
unreasonable rule undoubtedly reflects the fact that, in its historical development, cases of 
nervous shock had their origin in situations where the plaintiff sufferer was threatened with 
physical injury by sudden impact. In effect, all early cases involve single incidents, such as 
accidents or near misses with trains, horses, or road vehicles. Sudden shock was perceived to 
be a central element in what happened, and the successful plaintiff’s medical condition was 
seen as induced by some instantaneous reaction to a specific occurrence. Even in medicine, 
shock was believed to be process or catalyst for the physical injury being compensated, and 
as such was treated as a synonymous with fright, with its connotations of sudden jolt to the 
nervous system.266 The early insistence on physical impact and physical presence remains 
hidden under the ‘shock’ requirement. Maitland would probably have thought that ‘the 
physical impact rule we have buried, but it still rules us from its grave.’ 
Teff submits that its endurance in the face of better understanding of mental illness and 
its relation to shock, suggests that something more is at stake. It is the fear, forcefully 
                                                            
262 Ibid, 448. 
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265 Teff, above n 119, 47. 
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expressed by Lord Oliver, that a legal regime for psychiatric illness which lacked such 
controls would have to compensate for such ‘ordinary and inevitable incidents of life’ as 
negligently caused bereavement and the stress and strain suffered from caring for the primary 
victim over a long period.267 There is, in fact, some consensus that the position was brought 
about by a conscious (and unfortunate) attempt by the House of Lords to limit liability for 
nervous shock to a tolerable level, which entailed drawing lines with little reference to logic 
or fairness. In effect, the law’s current stance effectively penalizes those whose illness 
involves a more prolonged reaction to an event or events closely connected with the 
defendant’s negligent conduct. 
Certainly it is inconsistent that the law should insist on the fact that an accident must 
produce a particular sudden affront to the senses and should exclude as irrelevant the fact of 
the injury, disability or death that it causes, since this is the most lasting and devastating 
effect of the accident with regards to the plaintiff.268 
Lord Oliver himself recognized that while extending recovery to nervous shock created 
by a more elongated process may seem a logical analogical development, the law in that area, 
nevertheless, was not wholly logical, and he saw no pressing reason of policy for taking that 
further step along a road which must ultimately lead to virtually limitless liability.269 Teff 
argues that Lord Oliver’s unusually pronounced fear of the floodgates opening reflected the 
particular context of a mass disaster viewed by millions. By contrast, in the case of primary 
victims, there have been strong indications of late that a single shocking event is not 
required.270 
That further step was taken in Frost v Chief Constable of South York Police271, in what 
can be seen as the beginning of the end of the sudden shock requirement in England. The fact 
that the psychiatric injury suffered by five policemen was not instantaneous, but arose as a 
consequence of prolonged exposure to horrifying and uncontrollable circumstances over a 
period of many hours did not operate to defeat their claims. In a very significant statement, 
Henry L.J. said that the length of exposure and the circumstances of the exposure was the 
trauma that caused the psychiatric illnesses, rather than any sudden and immediate shock. 
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And he added that ‘the label on the trigger for psychiatric damage is unimportant: what 
matters is…the fact and foreseeability of psychiatric damage, by whatever process’.272 
It might be significant also that, when that case went to the House of Lords, none of the 
Law Lords, except Lord Goff, referred to the sudden shock issue. In his dissenting speech, 
His Lordship emphasized the need to abandon the requirement of nervous shock and to 
concentrate on the requirement that the plaintiff should have suffered from a recognized 
psychiatric illness. 
 
1.10.2 The rule in other jurisdictions. 
 
 Handford has pointed out that amidst the decisions refusing relief in the absence of 
sudden impact, a growing body of international case law has emerged where the requirement 
has begun to be eroded. It may, as Henry L.J. suggested, be rationalised as a permissible 
expansion of liability based on a more sophisticated understanding of mental illness and its 
relation to shock.273 
In effect, in Annetts v Australian Stations Pty. Ltd.274 the Court, by majority, rejected 
the need for a person suffering from psychiatric injury as a result of the breach of a 
defendant's duty of care also to prove that they suffered a ‘nervous shock’ in the sense of a 
sudden affront to the senses. The fact that the shock was sudden rather than gradual remains 
relevant as a factor in the overall determination whether psychiatric injury was reasonably 
foreseeable, but the absence of sudden shock no longer mandates a decision in favour of the 
defendant.275  
Gummow and Kirby JJ. said that the need to establish ‘sudden shock’ is not a settled 
requirement of the common law of Australia276 and that the requirement should not be 
accepted as a pre-condition for recovery in cases of negligently inflicted psychiatric illness.277 
Gleeson C.J. expressed agreement with that view and Gaudron J. said that ‘no aspect of the 
law of negligence renders ‘sudden shock’ critical either to the existence of a duty of care or to 
the foreseeability of a risk of psychiatric injury’. None of the other judges, except Callinan J. 
who, in dissent on the issue, held that the ‘nervous shock’ rule should remain part of the 
prerequisites to recovery for psychiatric injury, expressed any disagreement with those views. 
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For that reason, Trindade submits that the ‘sudden shock’ requirement is no longer part of the 
common law of Australia in nervous shock cases.278 
Similarly, the South African Supreme Court of Appeal has rejected it as ‘outmoded and 
misleading’. It saw the requirement of ‘sudden shock’ as devoid of psychiatric content and 
found much merit in focusing on one relevant question only, i.e. whether the claimant had 
sustained a detectable psychiatric injury. If it had transpired that, in fact, Mrs. Barnard’s 
injury had been sustained in the absence of a shock to her senses, she would not have failed 
on this basis.  
In Singapore, also the High Court allowed for the first time, in Pang Koi Fa v Lim Djoe 
Phing279, a claim for nervous shock as a result of medical negligence. In doing so, it did not 
limit a claim for shock to the traditional accident impact and aftermath situation where the 
plaintiff would have witnessed or come upon the aftermath of a sudden horrifying accident 
and suffered nervous shock as a result.280 The High Court, refusing to demand evidence of 
shock and, recognising the inequity it can cause where disorder arises gradually, granted 
recovery to a plaintiff for the consequences of watching her daughter linger on in hospital 
after negligent surgery until she died three months later. 
 
1.11 The twist in the reasonable foreseeability test. 
 
In Page v Smith281 the main issue for consideration was whether it was foreseeable that 
someone in Mr. Page’s position would have suffered psychiatric injury. Related to this was 
the question whether the plaintiff was a person of ‘normal fortitude’ and whether that was 
relevant to the foreseeability issue. In other words, although physical injury was foreseeable 
(even if in the event it did not occur) it had to be decided whether foreseeability of 
psychiatric injury was a separate requirement.282 
Until Page, it had long been accepted that, in applying the foreseeability test, the 
plaintiff was assumed to be a person of normal fortitude, and the issue was whether it was 
possible to foresee psychiatric injury to a person of normal fortitude. As it has been pointed 
                                                            
278 Francis Trindade, ‘Case Comment. Reformulation of the nervous shock rules.’ (2003) 119 Law Quarterly 
Review 204, 210. 
279 (1993) 3 SLR 317. 
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out, this is not to say that the plaintiff must be a person of normal fortitude, but simply that 
there will be no liability unless psychiatric injury to such a person is foreseeable.283 
Otton J.’s award of damages (£162,153 ) was overturned by the Court of Appeal on the 
basis that nervous shock was not a foreseeable consequence of such an accident. Hoffmann 
L.J., confirming the traditional view that the test of liability for shock is foreseeability of 
injury by shock, stated that foreseeability of physical injury is neither necessary nor 
sufficient284 He also added that, for the purposes of foreseeability, the plaintiff must be 
assumed to be a person of normal fortitude, a requirement with origins in the speech of Lord 
Porter in Bourhill v Young.285 
Ralph Gibson L.J. also dismissed the action because he thought that there was not 
enough evidence that the recurrence of the plaintiff’s illness was in fact caused by the 
accident. 
The unanimous decision of the Court of Appeal was authoritatively backed up by 
several leading cases like King v Phillips286, the Wagon Mound (n°1)287, Mount Isa Mines 
Ltd. v Pusey288 and Jaensch v Coffey.289 
However, the House of Lords, by a majority of three (Lord Ackner, Lord Browne-
Wilkinson and Lord Lloyd of Berwick) to two (Lord Keith of Kinkel and Lord Jauncey of 
Tullichettle) reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal, restoring the verdict of the trial 
judge.290 Whilst the minority ratified the requirement of foresight of psychiatric injury, 
concluding that the Court of Appeal was correct, the majority (mostly expressed by Lord 
Lloyd) decided that, as the plaintiff was within the range of foreseeable physical injury, he 
should be considered a primary victim. In that case, it was enough to show that any personal 
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injury, whether physical or psychiatric, to the plaintiff was foreseeable. The defendant was 
liable even if no physical injuries were sustained and the only damage suffered by the 
claimant was purely psychiatric damage.291 Absence of foreseeability of shock-induced 
psychiatric illness was no longer fatal to claims. The test of reasonable foresight of 
psychiatric injury, till then considered all embracing, was henceforth applicable only to 
secondary victims.292 
Mullany notes that the majority’s distinction between the two kinds of claimant, 
contrary to countless common law cases, cannot be supported by principle or logic,293and is 
simply an incorrect analysis to suggest that all of the authorities endorsing a foreseeability of 
injury by shock test were not concerned with primary victims.294 
 By rejecting the traditional notion that foreseeability of psychiatric injury is required in 
all cases, and stating instead that, where the plaintiff is personally endangered and within the 
area of foreseeable physical risk, all that is required is that some physical injury be 
foreseeable, the House of Lords was, as Handford put it, ‘rewriting some cardinal principles 
of the law of psychiatric damages.’295 Most of all, there is a lack of convincing justification of 
why, if a person physically injured in an accident has to prove that such injury was a 
reasonable foreseeable consequence of the tortfeasor’s negligence, another, psychiatrically 
injured, should be excused from proving that his or her condition could and should have been 
foreseen.296  
As it was pointed out, the direction signalled by Page v. Smith297 is backwards, not 
forwards: absent a close relationship between the claimant and the injured victim, the 
emphasis is once again on physical proximity and personal danger as it was in the early days, 
even though in the interim it has been recognised that injury by shock is a different kind of 
injury from injury by impact.298 
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Mullany and Handford stress that Lord Lloyd saw no need to complicate a trivial car 
accident by requiring foresight of psychiatric illness, rather than just physical harm, and felt 
that it would not be sensible, in an age when medical and psychiatric knowledge were 
expanding fast, ‘to commit the law to a distinction between physical and psychiatric injury, 
which may already seem somewhat artificial, and may soon be altogether outmoded’. 
Handford, in particular, remarks that it might be asked why, when the plaintiff had been 
deprived of the capacity to work and had suffered loss quantified by Otton J at ₤ 162, 153, 
and the defendant was presumably insured should the attempt to compensate the plaintiff for 
his loss be frustrated by the need to show that psychiatric injury, rather than any other sort of 
personal injury, was foreseeable?299  
Although the decision may be commendable in the sense that it makes it easier for one 
group of psychiatric injury sufferers to recover, and that it lends support to the notion that 
psychiatric illness need not be treated any differently from physical harm, it does so by 
stressing the purely geographical consideration of whether the plaintiff was within the range 
of physical injury. To say the least, it represents a source of desorientation which justifies its 
unenthusiastic reception outside the UK.300 
 
1.12  Reasonable foreseeability: prospectively or ex post facto ? 
 
An additional complicated issue is whether the test of reasonable foreseeability should 
be applied prospectively or ex post facto, that is, the defendant should apply his mind to the 
position immediately before the accident, or what actually occurred should be taken into 
consideration? Witting suggests that the question thus becomes whether psychiatric injury 
was foreseeable as the result of an accident, or as the result of this particular accident.301 
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In Page v Smith the majority took the view that foreseeability was to be judged 
prospectively in relation to primary victims,302 that is, what was reasonably foreseeable by 
the defendant before the event. With secondary victims, on the other hand, the foreseeability 
test is applied ex post facto. Lord Lloyd, favouring the approach of the trial judge, explained 
that the need of the ex post facto test is that ‘if one did not know the outcome of the accident 
or event, it is impossible to say whether the defendant should have foreseen injury by shock. 
It is necessary to take account of what happened in order to apply the test of reasonable 
foreseeability at all.’303 However, His Lordship, stressing once more his schizophrenic view 
of the law towards psychiatric harm, said that, in the case of a primary victim it was neither 
necessary, logical, nor just and that ‘to introduce hindsight into a trial of an ordinary running-
down action would do the law no service.’304 In his opinion, it could not be right that a 
negligent defendant should escape for psychiatric injury just because, though serious physical 
injury was foreseeable, it did not in fact transpire.305 
  In his dissent, Lord Jauncey adopted Lord Wilberforce’s approach in McLoughlin 
v.O’Brian306 and said that  
‘Foreseeability, which involves a hypothetical person, looking with hindsight at an event which has 
occurred, is a formula adopted by English Law, not merely for defining, but also for limiting the 
persons to whom duty may be owed, and the consequences for which an actor may be held responsible. 
It is not merely an issue of fact to be left to be found as such.307  
 
 His Lordship argued that failing to consider the matter ex post facto could lead to a 
situation where, because the plaintiff could have claimed damages if he had suffered one kind 
of harm, he could now have damages for the harm he does actually suffer. 
With his habitual precision, Mullany explains that liability for all personal injury, 
whether physical or psychiatric, ought to be based on what the tortfeasor could reasonably 
foresee just prior to his action. He considers obvious that the court has to assess culpability 
by reference to what has happened, because if you do not know the outcome of an accident it 
is impossible to determine whether what occurred should have been foreseen. However, he 
also points out that this judicial use of hindsight is completely different from attributing the 
defendant knowledge of the peculiarities of an accident before it takes place and to inquire 
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whether, knowing these details, the injury sustained could and should have been 
anticipated.308 It is in the nature, the essence and the logic of foreseeability as a substantial 
element to determine liability that the only thing that can be demanded from a tortfeasor is to 
abstain from actions whose damaging consequences can be recognised in advance.  
Lord Goff, in his dissenting judgment in Frost v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire309, 
after labelling Page v Smith310 ‘a remarkable departure from generally accepted principles’, 
subjected Lord Lloyd’s views to unusually scathing criticism coming from one member of 
the House to another. He emphasized that Lord Lloyd had departed from the previous 
understanding of the law in a number of respects and ‘had dethroned foreseeability of 
psychiatric injury from its central position as the unifying feature of this branch of the law’. 
He claimed that his approach was inconsistent with the adoption by Viscount Simonds in The 
Wagon Mound of Denning LJ's statement of principle and with the actual reasoning of the 
Privy Council in that case. His Lordship finally said that Lord Lloyd’s exclusion of hindsight 
where the plaintiff is a primary victim also appeared to be a departure from the law as 
previously understood, emphasizing that Lord Lloyd gave no reason for this departure. 
The final result in Page is a particularly favourable position for primary victims, 
justified under the laudable attempt to commit the law, in harmony with medical knowledge, 
to the equal protection of physical and mental injury. Unfortunately, as it has been submitted, 
Page does not fit with medical understanding of the causes of psychiatric harm. In effect, the 
mere fact that a trivial physical injury has occurred is not an indicator for developing a 
psychiatric reaction.  
Mullany advocates that although expressly stated in Page v Smith311 that the fear of 
psychiatric injury suits justifies the control mechanisms imposed on secondary victims, the 
reality is that the prospects of litigation and the number of appeals has increased as counsel 
strive to promote plaintiffs to the primary position.312 Teff agrees and suggests that as regards 
primary victims, one can now anticipate more litigation over road accidents in which only 
psychiatric injury has occurred, for though at least minor physical harm will commonly have 
been foreseeable in such accidents, none materialise, especially as car safety improves.313 
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1.13 The ‘normal fortitude’ requirement. 
1.13.1    Generally. 
 
In Page v Smith, Lord Lloyd, after emphasizing that Bourhill v Young314 was only 
concerned with a secondary victim, said that there was nothing in that case to displace the 
ordinary rule that where the plaintiff is within range of foreseeable physical injury (which 
Mrs. Bourhill was not) the defendant must take his victim as he finds him, and concluded that 
in the case of a primary victim it is not appropriate to ask whether he is a person of ‘ordinary 
phlegm’. He maintained that in the case of physical injury there was no such requirement: the 
negligent defendant, or more usually his insurer, takes his victim as he finds him and he 
suggested that the same should apply in the case of psychiatric injury. Finally, His Lordship 
pointed out that, 
There is no difference in principle, as Geoffrey Lane J. pointed out in Malcolm v. Broadhurst [1970] 3 
All ER 508 between an eggshell skull and an eggshell personality. Since the number of potential 
claimants is limited by the nature of the case, there is no need to impose any further limit by reference 
to a person of ordinary phlegm. Nor can I see any justification for doing so.315  
 
However, as Wheat acutely observes, that ‘ordinary rule’ had, until then, applied only 
to cases of physical injury, because rightly or wrongly, psychiatric injury had always been 
treated differently, requiring specific foreseeability.316  
Lord Jauncey, in dissent, considered Lord Porter’s dictum in Bourhill v Young317 to be 
‘still acceptable in 1995’ and dismissed the claim on the basis that the plaintiff’s injury could 
only be attributed to his peculiar sensitivity.318 Lord Keith, also in dissent, thought that a 
person with reasonable strong nerves would be capable of withstanding a minor accident, 
such as the one suffered by Mr. Page, with psyche intact. 
Mullany strongly criticizes the exclusion of the unusually sensitive from the protection 
offered by the law of negligence, which he maintains ‘has always been, and remains 
unacceptable.’ The normal susceptibility standard in psychiatric damage cases, he says, 
seems irreconcilable with the general rule of negligence that tortfeasors must take their 
                                                            
314 [1943] AC 92. 
315 [1995] 2 All ER 736. In Malcom v. Broadhurst a woman suffered head injuries in a car accident which 
exacerbated a pre-existing nervous disorder.  
316 Wheat, above n 7, 324. Lord Goff in his dissenting in Frost also observed that it appeared from the passage 
from Lord Wright's opinion in Bourhill v Young, that that was not the ordinary rule. ‘The maxim only applies 
where liability has been established. The criticism is therefore that Lord Lloyd appears to have taken an 
exceptional rule relating to compensation and treated it as being of general application, thereby creating a wider 
principle of liability.’ 
317 [1943] AC 92. 
318 At 657. 
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victims as they find them.319 In his powerful article, Mullany submits that the exceptionally 
sensitive (whose existence may certainly be foreseeable) should recover irrespective of 
whether the average member of the community would have been similarly afflicted and 
irrespective of whether the plaintiff was involved in the trauma, was an onlooker or was 
informed of it later.320 
In a complete opposite view, Weir doubts whether it is really sensible to equate thin 
skins and thin skulls.  
Vulnerability to physical lesion is pretty standard throughout the population –a force that would wound 
you would wound me, too- but the range of psychic liability is very great indeed- a quite minor accident 
can throw one person into a serious decline (Brice v Brown is the outrageous instance) and leave 
another unaffected. This being so, can it be right simply to transpose to the mental sphere the idea ‘you 
take your victim as you find him’?321 
 
It has been argued that fault liability looks to a defendant’s culpability as the basis for 
concluding that the defendant ought to be held responsible and therefore ought to pay 
compensation for the claimant’s harm. Culpa involves foresight of harm and, therefore, the 
defendant’s foreseeability should relate to the harm that the claimant has actually suffered 
and not merely foresight of any damage that might have been caused by the defendant’s 
conduct.322 Defendants should only be liable for that which they can reasonably foresee and 
therefore take steps to avoid. This is a fundamental tenet of negligence law.323 
Two additional arguments should be considered: First, even accepting that the 
development of a psychiatric illness was a foreseeable risk, the question that still remains 
would be to what extent did the defendant actually contribute to the illness which followed 
the collision. Witting suggests that the correct approach was taken by Lee J in Harrison v 
Suncorp Insurance & Finance324 where it was held that the plaintiff’s predisposition towards 
schizophrenic-related illnesses, although not significant enough as to break the chain of 
                                                            
319 Mullany, above n 285, 118. 
320 Ibid, 119. 
321 Tony Weir, ‘Book reviews.’ (1993) 52 Cambridge Law Journal 521. Jones argues that even if psychiatric 
damage can be as disabling as physical injury, it is sensible to treat it as a different type of damage, since that is 
how it is conceived of by lay people, and the common law should pragmatically reflect the understanding of the 
common man, appropriately informed by expert opinion. However, he suggests that the test for liability in both 
cases (with or without physical injury) should be foreseeability of psychiatric damage. Jones, above n 94, 113. 
Professor Todd recognises both, that the decision in Page holding that psychiatric injury to primary victims need 
not be foreseeable has its supporters, as well as that it has also been castigated as lacking in authority and 
contrary to fundamental principle. Todd, ‘Psychiatric injury and rescuers.’  (1999) 115 Law Quarterly Review 
345, 350. 
322 Jones, above n 95,  125. 
323 Mullany, above n 286, 116. 
324 Unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, Lee J, 12 December 1995. 
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causation, should have an impact on the assessment of his damages.325 Also Donovan J in 
Dooley v Cammell Laird & Co Ltd326 considered the existence of a pre-accident neurasthenia, 
which was worsened and accelerated by the accident, as irrelevant to the question of liability, 
although it did influence the assessment of damages issue, leading to a reduction in the award 
by two thirds. 
Jones agrees that, in theory, if psychiatric symptoms are attributable to several different 
causes, of which the negligence of the defendant is merely one, then it would be logical to 
attempt to apportion liability accordingly. In practice, however, he says, it seems that this has 
rarely been done since the principle that the claimant establishes causation if it is proved that 
the defendant’s negligence has materially contributed to the damage has been understood to 
mean that the claimant succeeds in full.327 
The second argument points out that, even admitting the existence of a duty of care, 
there can still be great difficulty in determining whether Smith was in fact in breach of that 
duty. Applying the principle stated in Hughes v. Lord Advocate328 to the facts in Page, a 
Scottish commentator submits that that question would turn on whether or not the recurrence 
of the plaintiff’s illness was a reasonable consequence of Smith’s careless driving. He argues 
that since personal injury was ex hypothesi reasonably foreseeable as a probable consequence 
of the defendant’s negligence, the question is whether personal injury is restricted to direct 
physical harm or includes psychiatric illness caused by nervous shock. If the latter, there is a 
breach of duty, as personal injury is foreseeable as a reasonable and probable consequence of 
the defender’s actions. But, if psychiatric illness caused by nervous shock is not regarded as 
personal injury, then it follows that before there is a breach of duty, psychiatric illness must 
be foreseeable as a probable consequence of the defendant’s conduct. Merely to foresee a 
different kind of injury, direct physical harm, is not enough to satisfy Hughes.329 
The House took a short-cut. It simply applied The Wagon Mound, requiring 
foreseeability of the kind of damage, while refraining from classifying the kind of damage as 
either psychiatric or physical (a categorisation certainly not easy to establish on the facts).330 
In effect, the central discussion of Viscount Simond’s statement in The Wagon Mound (n° 1) 
                                                            
325 Witting, above n 294, 86. 
326 [1951] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 271. 
327 Jones, above n 95, 135. In Rahman v Arearose Ltd [2001] QB 351, 363 (CA) the test put forward was 
whether there was any rational basis for an objective apportionment of causative responsibility. Todd, above n 
24,944. 
328 (1963) S.C. (H.L) 31. 
329 Joe Thomson, ‘Page v. Smith – A Scottish footnote.’  (1996) 112 Law Quarterly Review,  383. 
330 Jenny Steele, ‘Case and Comment. Pleural plaques in the House of Lords: the implications for Page v Smith.’ 
(2008) Cambridge Law Journal 29. 
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that ‘the essential factor in determining liability is whether the damage is of such a kind as 
the reasonable man would have foreseen’331 was devalued by Lord Lloyd pointing out that 
Viscount Simonds did not attempt to define what he meant by ‘kind of damage’, and that the 
concept was too elusive; in his opinion, this was a masterpiece of understatement when one 
considers the difficulty of reconciling the narrow, defendant-favourable, interpretations of 
kind or type in some cases with the broad, plaintiff-favourable interpretations in some others. 
In a powerful article, Mullany submits that this is, at best, a strained interpretation, and 
that there is no basis to question the scope of Viscount Simonds’ ratification of what was 
clearly seen as an all-purpose test for personal injury actions. He concludes that the 
entrenchment of the general shock theory in English law cannot be dismissed as the by-
product of unjustified observations and consequent distortion of principle.332 
It is true that there has been no definite statement as to what constitutes a type of 
damage and, in particular, no statement that all forms of personal injury constitute a single 
type of damage so that if personal injury of any kind is foreseeable then any resulting 
personal injury is recoverable. The explicit reference of Lord Lloyd that there is no 
justification for regarding physical and psychiatric injury as different ‘kinds’ of injury333 is in 
clear contradiction with Lord Ackner’s speech in Alcock, three years earlier334, that nervous 
shock cases are a type of claim in a category of its own, no longer a variant of physical 
injury, but a separate kind of damage.335 But to astonish the observer, Lord Ackner himself 
agreed with Lord Lloyd in Page!336 
Noble questions Lord Lloyd’s meaning in denying a difference between physical and 
psychiatric damage. Does it mean that the rule requiring the damage to be of the same type as 
that foreseen is abrogated, or are we returning to the very wide categories of damage, 
whereby the foresight of personal injury as opposed to property or financial damage will 
                                                            
331 [1961]AC 388, 426. ‘It is vain to isolate the liability from its context and to say that (the defendant) is or is 
not liable, and then to ask for what damage he is liable. For his liability is in respect of that damage and no 
other. If, as admittedly it is, (the defendant’s) liability depends on the reasonable foreseebility of the consequent 
damage, how is that to be determined except by the foreseeability of the damage which in fact happened –the 
damage in suit? And, if the damage is unforeseeable so as to displace liability at large, how can the liability be 
restored so as to make compensation payable?’ At 425. 
332 Mullany, above n 286, 115. 
333 At 190. 
334 Jones, above n 95, 126. 
335 [1992] 1 AC 310 (HL) at 400. 
336 Mullany says that Lord Ackner’s shift of position is striking when only three years ago he proceeded on the 
basis that foresight of mental injury by shock was essential. Above n 286, 115. 
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suffice? Or are we merely saying that in primary cases, psychiatric damage is foreseeable to 
normal people, and the defendant must take the plaintiff as he finds him?337 
As a whole, Page has been considered an unfortunate decision338, a source of 
confusion, an unhelpful contribution to the duty debate and has had generally unenthusiastic 
reception outside the UK.339 
 
1.13.2 The rule in other common law jurisdictions. 
(a) Canada. 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada has only very recently considered, for the first time, the 
issue of psychiatric damage in Mustapha v Culligan of Canada Ltd.340 On November 21, 
2001 an incident occurred in the home of Mustapha family, in Windsor, Ontario that 
shattered Mr. Mustapha’s life. In the course of replacing an empty bottle of Culligan water, 
he and his wife saw a dead fly and part of another dead fly in the fresh, unopened 
replacement bottle. Mr. Mustapha became obsessed with thoughts about the dead fly in the 
water to the point where he began to suffer from a major depressive disorder with associative 
phobia and anxiety. He brought an action against the water supplier, Culligan of Canada 
Limited. 
The key aspect of the foreseeability issue addressed in the Mustapha case concerned 
whether the determination to be made should be based on the plaintiff's particular 
vulnerability to injury, or whether a more objective standard should be applied. 
The trial judge found that the psychiatric effect of the incident was due to Mr. 
Mustapha’s particular sensibilities. Although his reaction was “objectively bizarre”, his 
particular circumstances, along with Culligan’s knowledge that the nature of its product 
indicated a concern for purity and cleanliness, made psychiatric injury from the incident 
foreseeable for Mr. Mustapha. Culligan was found liable for the damages arising from and in 
relation to Mr. Mustapha’s psychiatric illness, as diagnosed, and damages were assessed. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal overturned the judgment on the basis that the injury was 
not reasonably foreseeable and hence did not give rise to a cause of action 
                                                            
337 Magaret Noble, ‘Remoteness of damage’ (1995) 29 Law Teacher, 378. 
338 Peter Handford, ‘Psychiatric injury in the work place.’ (1999) 11 Tort Law Review, 128. 
339 Todd, above n 24,187. 
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The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff’s damages were too remote to allow 
recovery. As the manufacturer of a consumable good, the defendant owed Mr. Mustapha, the 
ultimate consumer of that good, a duty of care in supplying bottled water to him, and it 
breached the standard of care by providing the plaintiff with contaminated water. The 
requirement of personal injury, which includes serious and prolonged psychological injury, 
was also met: the plaintiff suffered a debilitating psychological injury which had a significant 
impact on his life.  However, there was no evidence that a person of ordinary fortitude would 
have suffered injury from seeing the flies in the bottle.  Instead of asking whether it was 
foreseeable that the defendant’s conduct would have injured a person of ordinary fortitude, 
the trial judge had applied a subjective standard, taking into account Mr. Mustapha’s 
“previous history” and “particular circumstances”, including a number of “cultural factors” 
such as his unusual concern over cleanliness, and the health and well-being of his family.  
The Supreme Court said that it was an error to apply a subjective standard. The judgment has 
clarified that in personal injury claims in Canada, when the evidence before the court is that a 
person of ordinary fortitude would not have suffered injury, the plaintiff's action will fail. 
 
(b) Australia. 
 
In Tame v New South Wales341, the plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle collision 
with a Mr. Lavender. Each driver was subjected to a blood test. Mrs. Tame was free of 
alcohol. Mr. Lavender had a level of 0.14. By an unhappy mistake, a police officer recorded 
the plaintiff’s blood alcohol content on a report as 0.14. The error was corrected within a 
month but a copy of the uncorrected report had gone off to the insurers. A year later, the 
plaintiff learnt of the error from her solicitor and began to worry that people might believe 
she had been drinking heavily before the accident and that this would have a detrimental 
effect on her reputation. She became obsessed by the error and developed a psychotic 
depressive illness. She sued for the psychiatric injury allegedly suffered. 
The High Court upheld the Court of Appeal’s decision, stating that it was not 
reasonably foreseeable that a person of normal fortitude would sustain psychiatric injury from 
a clerical mistake of the kind involved in the accident report form.  
The majority rejected the notion that the normal fortitude of a plaintiff needs to be 
established as a separate independent test of liability. Nonetheless, it was accepted that the 
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notion of ‘ordinary fortitude’ in many cases will have continuing relevance as a convenient 
means of determining whether a risk of psychiatric injury  is foreseeable342, or a postulate 
which assists in the assessment, at the stage of breach, of the reasonable foreseeability of the 
risk of psychiatric harm.343 
A further case in recovery for psychiatric injury in Australia is Gifford v Strang Patrick 
Stevedoring Pty Ltd.344 In the course of his employment, Mr Gifford was killed when a 
forklift reversed over him, crushing him to death immediately. His estranged wife and 
children were informed of the accident later the same day. They did not see the deceased's 
body. The Gifford children did not live with the deceased but maintained a close and loving 
relationship with him, with Mr Gifford visiting them almost daily.  
In that case the High Court, in what represents the demise of proving closeness of 
relationship, ruled that an employer owes a duty of care to avoid psychiatric injury to the 
children of its employees. The majority confirmed that absence of normal fortitude was 
irrelevant.   
 
1.14 Bystanders. 
 
Psychiatric injury suffered by bystanders unconnected with the primary victim would 
not ordinarily be reasonably forseeable. Some dicta in Alcock, however, suggested that there 
may be other circumstances in which a mere bystander will be owed a duty of care. The 
precise nature of these circumstances is not entirely clear since the language used by different 
members of the House of Lords is not the same.345 Lord Keith346 contemplated the possibility 
that a bystander who suffered psychiatric illness after witnessing a ‘particularly horrific’ 
catastrophe close to him (therefore suggesting propinquity to the catastrophe) might be 
entitled to claim damages from the person whose negligence caused the catastrophe. Lord 
Oliver talked of circumstances of such horror as would be ‘likely to traumatize even the most 
phlegmatic spectator.’ 347 Lord Ackner, in similar words, referred to a situation ‘that a 
reasonably strong-nerved person would have been so shocked.’ To illustrate the use of his 
                                                            
342 At 62 per Gaudron J. 
343 At 189 per Gummonw and Kirby. 
344 (2003) 214 CLR 269. 
345 For some interpretations see, David Oughton and John Lowry, ‘Liability to bystanders for negligently 
inflicted psychiatric harm.’ (1995) 46 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 18, 23. 
346 At 397. 
347 At 416 on the basis of ‘circumstances of such horror as would be likely to traumatise even the most 
phlegmatic spectator.’ 
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principle, he gave the example of a petrol tanker crashing into a school and bursting into 
flames as one in respect of which a reasonably strong-nerved person may suffer psychiatric 
illness.348 
Jones has pointed out that it is not clear how a bystander could be regarded as being 
foreseeably affected in these hypothetical circumstances when their Lordships concluded that 
relatives of the primary victims who were present in the stadium were not within the 
reasonable contemplation of the defendant in Alcock as they watched the catastrophic events 
at Hillsborough unfold. He also points out the uncertainties in relation to what amounts to a 
sufficiently ‘horrific event’ and to the peculiarities that a specific event must have to satisfy 
the test. Is it the number killed or injured?349 The age of the primary victims (children 
conferring the status of greater horror)? The amount of blood or the number of limbs strewn 
around the scene?350 Certainly, Lord Ackner’s speculation did not explain how could it be 
acceptable for relatives to be denied compensation on the basis of the lack of strength of the 
emotional tie when, in some circumstances, even a bystander may be entitled to claim.351 
In McFarlane v. EE Caledonia Ltd.352 a painter on the Piper Alpha oil rig, while off 
duty and resting in his living accomodation on board of a support vessel nearby, suffered 
psychiatric harm when he witnessed, the atrocious conflagration and collapse of the rig after 
a series of massive explosions. He witnessed the explosions for almost two hours before he 
was evacuated by helicopter. 167 men died in the accident, including three rescuers. The 
closest the plaintiff came to the disaster was 100 meters, when the vessel moved towards the 
rig to render assistance. 
At first instance, Smith J held that the plaintiff was owed a duty of care on the ground 
that he was a participant in the event who had been in fear for his life. In the Court of Appeal 
it was held that a person was a participant who feared injury to himself if: (a) he was in the 
actual area of danger created by the event, and escaped physical injury by chance or good 
fortune; (b) he was not actually in danger, but because of the sudden and unexpected nature 
of the event he reasonably thought he was; or (c) he was not originally within the area of 
danger but came into it later, in which case if he came as a rescuer he could recover. The 
                                                            
348 At  403. 
349 In relation to the number of victims, Woollard stresses that the law would be an ass if it allowed a plaintiff to 
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plaintiff did not qualify under any of these heads. The support vessel was never close enough 
to the scene to be within the actual area of danger353 and the plaintiff was not a rescuer either. 
He had been part of the non-essential personnel on the rescue vessel. He was not actively 
involved in the rescue operation, and although he provided some minor assistance, it was 
considered too peripheral to be regarded as rescue effort.354  
In spite of the fact that the plaintiff was not in the position of a rescuer, he did, 
however, fear, as an employee of the defendants, for the safety of the victims on the rig as his 
workmates. In Dooley and Mount Isa355 this had been previously held to be another 
sufficiently close non-familial relationship for the recovery of the nervous shock. However, 
neither the trial court or the Appeal Court appear to have considered this relationship with the 
victims as a possible basis for the plaintiff’s claim.356 
In Alcock, Lord Keith357, Lord Ackner358 and Lord Oliver359 had left the door open for 
allowing recovery for bystanders who view scenes of exceptional horror.360 So, if the plaintiff 
in McFarlane did not have any relationship whatsoever with the victims, he was, at the very 
least, a bystander to their plight, which was undeniably horrendous. Therefore, the plaintiff 
alternatively submitted that he could recover as a bystander, based on the exceptionally 
horrific nature of the events in question.  
Contrary to the obiter dicta in Alcock, however, the Court held that witnessing at close 
range the ‘horrific catastrophe’ of the Piper Alpha oil rig disaster was not sufficient for a 
bystander to succeed. Stuart Smith LJ held that  
both as a matter of principle and policy the Court should not extend the duty to those who are mere 
bystanders or witnesses of horrific events unless there is a sufficient degree of proximity, which 
                                                            
353 The decision was taken despite the fact that evidence accepted by the trial judge showed that the heat was 
intense, the noise was deafening, the sea was on fire, the captain of the vessel admitted that the ship came very 
close to being in danger, and that officers in the control room had fallen to the floor when a fireball came 
towards the ship. Oughton and Lowry, above n 338, 20. 
354 In fact this seems to have been crucial to the fate of the case. The plaintiff, together with other –non-essential 
personnel, was urged to take shelter in or behind the helicopter hangar. Mr. McFarlane did not  do so. Instead, 
he went on deck to watch the conflagration. He was not involved in the rescue operation, except when he helped 
to move blankets for the expected casualties, and possibly assisted two walking injured as they arrived on the 
Tharos in a dazed state. 
355 (1970) 125 CLR 383. Handford refers that that decision of the Hight Court of Australia has never been 
questioned in that jurisdiction and that decisions elsewhere suggest that the Australian view may well receive 
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requires both nearness in time and place and a close relationship of love and affection between plaintiff 
and victim.361  
 
The assertion insisted on two pre-conditions to a successful action. First, temporal and 
spatial proximity to the catastrophe. Secondly, a close relationship of love and affection 
between the plaintiff and the primary victim, consequently circumscribing severely the 
number of potentially successful litigants. 
Oughton and Lowry point out that, if a relationship of love and affection exists, the 
plaintiff is no longer a mere bystander, since, by definition, a mere bystander is someone who 
does not have such a relationship with the primary victim.362 Besides, the statement was in 
contradiction with a number of sources which indicated that there was no reason, in principle, 
why a duty of care should not be owed to a spectator.363 In the light of those sources, it 
appeared that Stuart-Smith LJ was wrong in principle to hold that no duty of care could be 
owed to a mere bystander.364  
Although Stuart-Smith made no specific mention to any precedent, it has been 
submitted that the only conceivable authority for what he said might come from Lord Porter’s 
famous speech in Bourhill.365  However, his references to the expectations of the ‘ordinary 
frequenter of the streets’ and ‘the incidents that may from time to time occur in them’, were 
expressed in relation only to ‘the driver of a car who causes the noise of a collision and the 
sight of injury to others’, and not in relation to a great catastrophe such as the explosion of 
the Piper Alpha oil rig. On the contrary, their Lordships in Alcock were having in mind 
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precisely an event significantly different in degree and severity to suggest the occasion in 
which a mere bystander may successfully bring an action.366 
It has been suggested that a possible implication of that decision is that no event can 
ever be horrific enough for a mere bystander to recover for psychiatric illness.367 Handford 
believes that the retreat in McFarlane from the possibility contemplated in Alcock was a 
retrograde step. There is no doubt, he says, that the Piper Alpha disaster reached the scale of 
horror contemplated by the House of Lord’s example of a petrol tanker careering out of 
control into a school full of children and bursting into flames.368 
A significant difference, however, should be made between the bystander, defined as 
the ‘unwilling witness of injury caused to others’, and ‘the goulishly curious spectator’369 
who forms part of the crowd which inevitably gathers out of curiosity in the event of an 
accident, and which seems to increase in proportion with its gravity. According to Brennan J., 
in Jaensch v. Coffey,370 such a bystander may properly be regarded as the author of his own 
shock. The first one is confronted with a tragic event because of his coincidentally proximate 
location at the time of the accident. The second one, approaches to the scene in order to look, 
and this constitutes a novus actus interveniens which breaks the chain of causation between 
the defendant’s negligence and the psychiatric injury.371 Accidental bystanders and morbid 
excitement seekers do not in any way contribute to the salvation of those in hardship, nor are 
they in any way related to the victim, therefore falling outside the ambit of the defendant’s 
liability.372 
 
1.15 Rescuers. 
1.15.1 Generally. 
 
The courts have traditionally taken a sympathetic view of claims by rescuers to be 
compensated for injuries sustained in the course of dealing with hazards created by the 
negligence of others. But, is it different if the rescuer is a professional, who is specially 
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trained and paid to deal with particular types of danger, whether arising from negligence or 
not?373 And if the damage sustained is psychiatric rather than physical harm, does that 
constitute a substantially different circumstance? 
 White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police374 was the third case to reach the 
House of Lords arising out of the Hillsborough disaster. This time five police officers sued 
their employer for post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of their experiences when tending 
to the victims of the disaster. The officers were on duty at the time and became involved in 
various ways in the immediate aftermath of the tragic events375: two helped carry the dead 
and injured at the stadium; two tried unsuccessfully to resuscitate injured spectators at the 
stadium; and one assisted at a mortuary to which the dead were taken. None of them had been 
in any physical danger at any time. 
 Their claim was based on two grounds- first, that they had a relationship with the Chief 
Constable analogous to that of employer and employee and second, that they were  rescuers, 
and as such, were primary victims and therefore not subject to the Alcock control 
mechanisms.  
At first instance, Waller J dismissed all the claims. He held that no employer-employee 
duty arose to protect a secondary victim police officer from mental injury unless he could be 
categorised as a rescuer. The learned judge held that, among the five officers, only White 
could be considered as a rescuer, but he was a professional rescuer and strong policy 
considerations dictated that he should not be able to recover when a bystander could not. He 
could not be put in a more advantageous position than a bystander. Traumatised professional 
rescuers not placed in personal peril by the accident were not to be assisted by the common 
law. Relief was restricted to civilian rescuers and professionals physically endangered. His 
general conclusion was that it was ‘unattractive’ and not ‘just and reasonable’ that any of the 
officers or members of the emergency services should recover when a bystander could not; in 
                                                            
373 Michael Jones, ‘Compensating Professional rescuers’. (1988) 104 Law Quarterly Review 195, 196. 
374 [1999] 2 AC 455. Rogers explains the rather confusing situation that the case, at the Court of  Appeal level 
and before Waller J, is known as Frost v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire, though no Frost was a plaintiff at 
any hearing. So Frost was presumably a plaintiff in one of a number of other claims which were not selected for 
trial as test cases. W.V. H. Rogers, ‘Psychiatric trauma: ‘Thus far and no further’- in fact not quite so far as 
hitherto.’ (1999) 7 Torts Law Journal, 1, 1. 
375 One of the most intimately involved was an Inspector White, who had been present at the ground at the time 
of the incident and who assisted near the affected pens, rendering emergency treatment to victims and dealing 
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other words, it was an application of the American rule that public servants are paid to do the 
job and suffer the dangers of that job.376 
Jones suggests that this is probably gut-reaction common sense, but ultimately it  is a 
matter of policy377, since ‘probably most fires are attributable to negligence, and in the final 
analysis the policy decision is that it would be too burdensome to charge all who carelessly 
cause or fail to prevent fires with the injuries suffered by the expert retained by public funds 
to deal with those inevitable, although negligently created occurrences.’378 
The Court of Appeal, in a two to one majority decision, dismissed the appeal of the 
officer who had been at the mortuary, but allowed the appeals of the four officers at the 
stadium on the grounds that they had a right of action because their injury was caused by the 
antecedent negligence of the chief constable and they fell within the special category of 
rescuers (not subject to Lord Wilberforce’s restrictions). The chief constable appealed. 
In the House of Lords, the case involved a re-examination of the primary/secondary 
classification of Page v. Smith379 as well as the consideration of whether, or how, it should 
apply in the context of claims of employees against their employers for negligently exposing 
them to the risk of psichiatric harm and claims by rescuers who suffer such harm as a result 
of the horror of the event.380  
Civilian rescuers who suffer psychiatric injury were generally governed by Chadwick v 
British Transport Commission.381 In 1967, a train crashed 200 meters away from the home of 
Mr. and Mrs. Chadwick. Ninety people died and many more had serious injuries. Mr. 
Chadwick immediately went to the scene and voluntarily took an active part throughout the 
night in rescue operations. Because he was quite small, he was asked to crawl into the train 
wreckage to administer injections to injured passengers and to aid persons trapped in the 
mangled cars. Afterward he fell into a deep depression, spent six months in a psychiatric 
hospital, and eventually committed suicide. His widow’s fatal accident action was succesful. 
The theory of liability was that Mr. Chadwick was a rescuer, and the ambit of liability for 
                                                            
376 Simon Allen, ‘Rescuers and employees – primary victims of nervous shock.’ (1997) New Law Journal 158, 
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rescuers who suffered psychiatric injury was broader than that for other victims. The Court 
held that in the event of a serious accident, it was reasonably foreseeable that someone might 
endeavour to rescue the victims and suffer psychiatric injury in the process.382 Injury by 
shock to a rescuer, physically unhurt, was reasonably foreseeable, and the fact that the risk 
run by a rescuer was not exactly the same as that run by the victim did not deprive the rescuer 
of his remedy.383 
Chadwick represented a serious obstacle for the majority in White because they were 
denying liability to the police officers who were rescuers at Hillsborough. The hurdle was not 
trivial since the law had long recognised the moral imperative of encouraging citizens to 
rescue persons in peril. Those who altruistically exposed themselves to danger in an 
emergency to save others were favoured by the law and this was unanimously accepted.   
In spite of that, the majority in the House decided to reinterpret the Chadwick case, 
stating that rescuers should not be given special treatment when they had not objectively 
exposed themselves to danger or reasonably believed that they were doing so.384 Their 
Lordships indicated that the whole issue was just a matter of categories: rescuers were 
secondary victims and, accordingly, the ordinary Alcock restrictions should apply: proof of 
ties of love and affection between plaintiff and accident victim; proximity in time and space; 
and direct perception of the disaster or its immediate aftermath. It is not difficult to see that, 
according to these requirements, most, if not all rescuers, will inevitably fail on the first 
point. 
The decision was not only a result of their conviction that a recognition of their claims 
would substantially expand the existing categories in which compensation could be recovered 
for pure psychiatric harm but, mainly, that the awarding of damages to them would stand 
uneasily with the denial of the claims to bereaved relatives by the decision in the Alcock case. 
It has been said that, lurking beneath the surface of the judgments was an uneasiness that, if it 
were acceptable to compensate the police officers as a result of their involvement at 
Hillsborough, the spectators whose claims were denied by the House of Lords in Alcock 
would have had a rough deal.385 
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That uncomfortable feeling clearly emerges through Lord Steyn’s view that to admit 
this group would lead to the ‘unedifying spectacle that, while bereaved relatives are not 
allowed to recover as in Alcock, ghoulishly curious spectators, who assisted in some 
peripheral way in the aftermath of a disaster, might recover.’386 
Lord Hoffmann also thought that the more important reason for not extending the law 
to ‘rescuers’ who were not within the range of foreseeable physical injury was that  
‘the result would be quite unacceptable to the ordinary person because...he would think it unfair 
between one class of claimants and another, at best not treating like cases alike and, at worst, favouring 
the less deserving against the more deserving. He would think it wrong that policemen, even as part of a 
general class of persons who rendered assistance, should have the right to compensation for psychiatric 
injury out of public funds while the bereaved relatives are sent away with nothing.’387 
 
 Rogers argues that the decision marks a departure from what has been a tenable view 
of the law. He remarks that for over 60 years it has been accepted in England that where A 
puts B in danger, C a person who comes to the rescue of B, may be owed a duty of care by A 
and, unless the intervention is wholly foolhardy, cannot be met by pleas of volenti non fit 
injuria, a break in the chain of causation, or contributory negligence.388  
It is easy to agree with Lomax and Treece who argue that White is more a 
condemnation of the decision in Alcock than a bad decision in its own right.389 In any event, it 
is clear that in White the firm tendency that the courts had to respond positively to negligence 
claims advanced by those who have rendered assistance to accident victims came into 
collision with the judicial impulse to limit the range of circumstances in which recovery 
could be made for psychiatric injury.  
Another aspect that has been pointed out is the fact that, in 1982, the Law Lords in 
McLoughlin were convinced that there would be few claims for mental injury and that they 
would be for modest amounts. By the time of White, however, Lord Steyn had concluded that 
this assumption had been falsified by the growth of claims for psychiatric damage in the last 
10 years. He cited Professor Mullany390 when he said that there was a growing appreciation 
that the scope for psychiatric suits was much wider than traditionally perceived. That 
conclusion was reinforced by the Law Commission’s Report and the number of claims 
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arising from the Hillsborough disaster. In short, there was a sense that ‘if you allow it they 
will come.’391 
 
1.15.2 Who is a rescuer? 
 
When grasping the issue in White, intuitively, the first question should be: who, in law, 
is a rescuer? And surprisingly, the definition of who is a rescuer in the eyes of the law is not 
entirely clear, even though rescuers’ cases have had a relatively long history.392 
Before White, there was no attempt of definitions.393 In the Court of Appeal, Rose LJ 
pointed out that the determination whether a particular plaintiff was a rescuer or not was a 
question of fact to be decided in the light of the circumstances of the case. He noted that 
some relevant criteria were: (a) the character and extent of the initial incident caused by a 
tortfeasor; (b) whether that incident has finished or is continuing; (c) whether there is any 
danger continuing or otherwise to the victim or to the plaintiff; (d) the character of the 
plaintiff’s conduct, in itself and in relation to the victim; (e) how proximate in time and space 
the plaintiff’s conduct is to the incident.394 Mullany and Handford criticize this last 
consideration. The aftermath principle, they say, has not produced happy results when 
applied to actions by relatives and resort to it in this context seems unfortunate.395 
It is generally accepted that a situation of danger or emergency is required to determine 
whether the conduct of the rescuer was reasonable in the circumstances. The courts have not 
expressed any opinion on the magnitude or gravity of the accident required to be considered 
sufficient to cause legally recognised psychiatric illness.396 Injuries resulting from exposure 
to unnecessary risk cannot give rise to a claim.397 The courts have justified this conclusion by 
saying that if the effort was foolhardy, rash, or needlessly reckless, therefore, the rescue 
attempt was not foreseeable and no duty was owed.398 It is not necessary to prove the 
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existence of actual danger.399 It is sufficient if the rescuer reasonably believes that someone is 
in danger or in a state of emergency that requires immediate attention. 
An involvement in the rescue process is also required. Again, the degree of 
involvement to be classified as a rescuer will have to be determined on a case by case basis. 
This was one of the factors which Stuart-Smith L.J. considered to be material in McFarlane 
when he held that helping to move blankets for the expected casualties, and possibly assisting 
two walking injured as they arrived on the Tharos in a dazed state was not enough.  
A Canadian case, Bechard v. Haliburton Estate,400 shows the flexibility of the 
involvement concept. There, the plaintiff was the occupant of a vehicle struck by a 
motorcycle that had run a stop sign. The injured cyclist was left lying in the road, where he 
was run over and killed by another vehicle. The plaintiff saw the second vehicle approaching 
and unsuccessfully attempted to warn the driver by screaming and waving arms. She suffered 
amnesia at the scene and a later post-traumatic neurosis. The plaintiff’s action was successful 
against both the cyclist’s estate and the negligent second motorist. Justice Griffiths, 
delivering the judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal, categorized the plaintiff as a 
rescuer.401 The fact that the plaintiff’s actions were not tending to the injured victim lying in 
the road, but attempting to direct traffic away from him to ensure that he suffered no further 
injury before help arrived, did not prevent the court from considering that he was performing 
a function analogous to a rescuer. 
The rescue attempt does not need to be successful. This is understandable because it is 
often difficult to know in advance if a rescue effort will yeld positive results, as where 
children are lost in the wood, or miners are buried in a mine. If there is a reasonable chance 
of saving life or avoiding injury, the common law cannot deny recovery to those hurt during 
these attempts for fear that they may be discouraged  from their heroic acts.402  
In Chester v Council of the Municipality of Waverley403, Evatt J. said that the rescuer ‘is 
not debarred from recovery because in the light of after knowledge it is plain that his attempt 
at rescue could never have aided the victim of the defendant’s primary negligence’404; and 
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one of the police officers at Hillsborough, who unsuccessfully tried to resuscitate spectators 
who were already dead was, nonetheless, categorised as a rescuer.405 
This conception, of course, is completely different from Rose L.J’s narrow definition of 
a rescuer in Duncan v British Coal Corp.406 The plaintiff worked at a mine as a pit deputy 
when a fellow worker was crushed to death. He attended the accident and attempted to revive 
his colleague but was unsuccessful. Rose L.J. found that the police officer was not a rescuer 
because ‘he was not sufficiently involved in the crushing incident or its immediate aftermath’ 
(because he had arrived at the scene four minutes after the accident took place!) 
 And he added, 
What he did was proximate in time to the trapping of the deceased, but he was not geographically 
proximate when that incident occurred. When he arrived at the scene, there was no danger to him or the 
deceased…he was outside the area of risk of physical or psychiatric injury when the deceased was 
injured and he was not exposed to any unnecessary risk of injury when he attended the scene.407 
 
In White v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire408, Lord Steyn, trying to define the 
category and reinterpreting Chadwick, said that in order to limit the concept of rescuer to 
reasonable bounds ‘the plaintiff must at least satisfy the threshold requirement that he 
objectively exposed himself to danger or reasonably believed that he was doing so.’ He 
believed that the limitation of actual or apprehended dangers was what proximity in that 
special situation required and that it would be an unwarranted extension of the law to uphold 
the claims of the police officers.  
Lord Hoffmann also emphasised that a rescuer must have put himself within the area of 
physical danger before he can recover damages for psychiatric injury. He said that there was 
not any logical reason why the normal treatment of rescuers on the issues of foreseeability 
and causation should lead to the conclusion that, for the purpose of liability for psychiatric 
injury, they should be given special treatment as primary victims when they were not within 
the range of foreseeable physical injury and their psychiatric injury was caused by witnessing 
or participating in the aftermath of accidents which caused death or injury to others.  
This emphasis on the zone of physical danger led Handford to say that the House of 
Lords in White put the clock back more than fifty years. Liability for psychiatric injury 
should not be restricted by reference to the possibility of physical danger and such an 
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approach is open to the same criticisms in its restrictive guise as it was when used to expand 
liability. 409 
Until White, it was clear that what characterized a rescuer was his involvement in 
rendering assistance to somebody who was in danger (or when he reasonably believed he 
was). The one who needed to be in danger was the one who needed help, not the rescuer. It 
did not matter if Mr. Chadwick was in fact in some physical danger at various points during 
the night. What mattered was that the victims were. According to the traditional view, if 
someone is drowning and from the deck or a boat in the most comfortable position I throw a 
rope, I still am a rescuer, regardless the fact that I have not, at any moment, put my life or 
body integrity at risk. The favour of the law is extended to somebody who is unselfish 
enough to act when he could refrain from doing so. The civil law would punish bystanders 
for failure to act in those circumstances. The common law does not go that far, but gives him 
the whole recognition of the law for that altruistic action, even if it does not imply any risk.  
If the person can manage, by his own efforts to go ashore and I cure his wounds, give 
him some water, give him a blanket or whatever other assistance that the circumstances 
required, no matter how active I may be, or how helpful those measures are to make the 
victim feel more confortable, I am still not a rescuer, because the danger is not existing 
anymore. For the lack of a better word, I could say that I am a helper or aid giver. This seems 
to be the core of Lord Griffiths’s distinction between ‘rescue in the sense of immediate help 
at the scene of the disaster, and treatment of the victims after they are safe.’410 What is pivotal 
in the concept is the function: somebody who is trying to take another out of danger. And 
public policy requires a wide definition of that function. Mr. Chadwick did not fall out of the 
category because he did not attempt to get the victims out of the wreckage. On the broad 
view, his function was to keep them alive in order to gain time until another rescuer, better 
equipped, could successfully (or not) do that. 
The determination of the existence of the danger should be subjective-objective; that is, 
what the rescuer reasonably believes. If the person is already dead, but I believe that my 
resuscitating efforts might still work, I still am within the boundaries of the rescue 
category.411 On the other hand, if he has been dead for a week, no matter how strong my 
beliefs are, or how powerful my faith is that supernatural force is going to backup my efforts, 
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the unreasonableness of the action puts me out of the category. The danger objectively does 
not exist and could not be reasonably taken as existing. 
However, in White the majority reinterpreted Chadwick as standing for the requirement 
that rescuers who suffer psychiatric injury in the course of a rescue must prove that they were 
in physical danger. In doing so, the difficulty seems to have shifted from who is a rescuer? to 
what was the zone of danger?412  
The artificiality and arbitrariness of this control device was pointed out by Lord Goff in 
his powerful dissent. Suppose, he says,  that there was a terrible train crash and that there 
were two Chadwick brothers living nearby, both of them small and agile window cleaners 
distinguished by their courage and humanity. Mr A Chadwick worked on the front half of the 
train, and Mr B Chadwick on the rear half. It so happened that, although there was some 
physical danger present in the front half of the train, there was none in the rear. Both worked 
for 12 hours or so bringing aid and comfort to the victims. Both suffered PTSD in 
consequence of the general horror of the situation. On the new control mechanism now 
proposed, Mr A would recover but Mr B would not. To make things worse, the same 
conclusion must follow even if Mr A was unaware of the existence of the physical danger 
present in his half of the train.413 
It is certainly not difficult to agree with those who believe that there is a degree of 
artificiality in trying to force all possible situations into two categories414, or who consider 
that the primary/secondary distinction represents a straitjacket into which all actions for 
emotional distress must be forced, no matter how unsuitable.415 
Another aspect that has not been sufficiently explored by the commentators is the fact 
that the zone of  danger, or physical danger requirement, to be coherent, has to have an active 
role in the causation of the mental distress. For instance, in McFarlane, Stuart-Smith LJ 
stated that plaintiffs may recover for psychiatric injury sustained through fear of physical 
injury if they were in the actual zone of physical danger, or even if they were not, because 
they reasonably thought that they were. On the facts of the case, he ruled that the plaintiff did 
not satisfy either of these objective tests. However, Hilson acutely points out that the 
plaintiff’s case really seems to have failed, more than anything, because the evidence did not 
sufficiently support the fact that he was subjectively in fear of his own safety. In a logical 
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order, this should have been the first question. If the answer was negative, there would have 
been no need to proceed to examine either of the two objective tests. What his Lordship 
actually did was to ask the two objective tests first and the question of whether McFarlane in 
fact feared for his life was not really formulated as a crucial test in the same way.416 
The danger with addressing the objective element as two tests, but not including the 
subjective element as a test, the author submits, is that subsequent courts might be tempted to 
address simply the objective element. If, for example, a court decides that someone was in the 
zone of danger, then it might automatically conclude that he was in fear for his own safety. 417 
In other words, a person who, in spite of being in the zone of danger does not fear for 
himself, might still be categorised as primary victim, simply because of where he is located 
and not on the basis of what gave rise to the shock.  
That is why Hilson submits that instead of following Lord Lloyd’s approach and 
concluding that someone is automatically a primary victim if he is within the zone of danger, 
the courts should adopt Lord Oliver’s ‘fear for one own’s safety’ approach and look at the 
evidence of how the psychiatric injury arose. If it arose solely out of fear for the plaintiff’s 
own safety, then there ought to be recovery as a primary victim.418 The author suggests that 
the test should be subjective (that is, the plaintiff would have to provide evidence that he was 
in actual fear for his own safety) and then objective in that the courts should proceed to ask 
whether it was reasonable to hold such fear. This is unfair to a victim that has already been 
penalised by the facts. The test should be objective, creating a presumption on favour of the 
plaintiff who was in the zone of danger at the time of the accident, that that fear existed. It 
should be the defendant’s duty to destroy that presumption (which, in fact, will be extremely 
difficult). 
In any event, it seems possible to reduce everything to just one question: was the 
plaintiff in reasonable fear for his own life? This will cover the necessary subjectivity to 
justify the assumption that the fear played an active role in the injury, and also would satisfy 
the objective element by requiring reasonableness in the fear that was felt. 
Professor Todd believes that perhaps problems can be solved without major dificulties 
simply by asking whether the plaintiff reasonably believed that he or she was in danger.419 
This is apparently the same thing that we are proposing, but is not. If the cause that triggers 
the psychiatric harm is the fear, what the court must determine is if the plaintiff was in fear, 
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not if he believed he was in danger and, if that is the case, if that fear was reasonable. The 
question about the existence of the danger leaves us half way, because even if that danger 
actually exists, the plaintiff, because of a particular phlegm, may still not feel fear. In that 
case, he could not claim having suffered psychiatric harm based on a fear that did not exist. 
To add some complexity to the situation, we can imagine that the moment of the fear 
and the moment of the rescue action might not be necessarily coincidental. Let us imagine 
that, because of the release of adrenaline, because he is only thinking about the victim, or for 
whatever other reason, the rescuer does not fear for his life at the moment of the action. 
However, as soon as he puts the victim safely on the floor, he looks back, sees the size of the 
flames, or the hight of the building where he has jumped from, or the strength of the current 
of the river where he courageously swam with the victim in his arms, and panics. Should this 
rescuer be out of the contemplation of the law because he did not fear for his life at the 
moment of the rescue? Of course, this is mere theorisation, because in an objective dangerous 
circumstance, to prove that the plaintiff did not actually fear for his safety should be 
extremely hard. 
 
1.15.3 The fireman’s rule. 
 
It has been submitted that the degree of danger to be considered sufficient to cause 
legally recognised psychiatric illness should be determined on an objective basis and not 
according to the type of rescuer.420 In Ogwo v Taylor421 the House of Lords allowed the claim 
of a fireman against a non-employer defendant for personal injury and confirmed that where 
physical injury is suffered by a professional rescuer the defendant cannot successfully argue 
that the risk is inherent in the plaintiff’s employment in order to avoid liability. Lord Bridge, 
delivering the only speech in the House, considered that there was no reason whatever why 
they should be held at a disadvantage as compared to the layman entitled to invoke the 
principle of the so-called ‘rescue cases’. 
Lord Hoffmann, in White v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police422, following 
Ogwo v. Taylor423 rejected the fireman’s rule, saying that he did not believe ‘that someone 
should be unable to recover for injury caused by negligence, in circumstances in which he 
would normally be entitled to sue, merely because his occupation required him to run the risk 
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of such injury.’ However, he thought it was legitimate to take into account the fact that, in the 
nature of things, most professional rescuers would be from occupations in which they are 
trained and required to run such risks and which provide for appropriate benefits if they 
should suffer such injuries.  
Lord Goff also referring to the position of people such as policemen or firemen, who 
might be thought to be less prone to suffer psychiatric injury at the sight of the sufferings of 
others than members of the general public, said that in Ogwo v Taylor it was held that the 
American fireman’s rule424 had no place in English law. Therefore, unlike Waller J, he would 
not think it necessary to identify a class of ‘professional’ rescuers to which special rules 
apply. 
Professor Todd, based on the fact that Ogwo was not a case of psychiatric injury, 
believes that there are grounds for making a distinction between professional rescuers who 
claim in relation to physical injuries and those who do it in respect of psychiatric injuries. 
Foreseeability, in this last case would be doubtful. Police officers, firemen, and other 
professional rescuers, that is, people in constant contact with everyday tragedies and human 
suffering should be regarded as persons with extraordinary phlegm,425 hardened to events that 
would cause emotional distress to ordinary people.426 The ‘ordinary fortitude’ requirement in 
those cases would be higher (for that particular class), but recovery would probably still be 
possible for catastrophes able to shock even those of extraordinary phlegm (9/11 would 
probably be one of those cases).  
Causation arguments would also appear to have some force here.  The fact that 
professional rescuers will to some extent have become hardened to witnessing horrific events 
may make it more difficult to prove causation, and the fact that they are likely to have 
witnessed several such events may make it more difficult to attribute psychiatric illness to a 
specific event.   
 
1.16  Employees. 
                                                            
424 Under the justification that the purpose of the firefighting profession is to confront danger, in the United 
States, a number of jurisdictions have adopted this rule. It establishes that a professional firefighter may not 
recover damages from a private party for injuries he sustained during the course of extinguishing a fire. He can 
apply for benefits under the relevant’s workers’ compensation statutes, but he cannot sue for damages at 
common law. Danuta Mendelson, ‘Quo Iure? Liability to rescuers in the tort of negligence.’ (2001) Tort Law 
Review, 138. 
425 Hilson believes that because there is unlikely to be floodgates problem with either rescuers or employees, it 
may be sensible to exclude them from the need to satisfy the requirement of ordinary phlegm. Hilson, above n 
96, 55. 
426 Todd, above n 314, 350. 
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Handford submits that, since most of the accidents that end up in the courts occur either 
in a transport context or at work, it seems logical enough that employees should be, next to 
relatives of the dead and injured, the largest potential category of psychiatric injury 
sufferers.427 
In Frost, it was argued, as an alternative to the rescue claim, that the relationship of 
employer and employee was a long-standing basis for a duty of care with respects to matters 
of safety and, therefore, the defendant owed the plaintiffs a duty of care arising from their 
service as police officers when acting under his direction and control. The  plaintiff relied on 
four cases: Dooley v Cammell Laird & Co. Ltd.428; Galt v British Railways Board429; Wigg v 
British Railways Board430 and Mount Isa Mines Ltd. V Pusey431 
In Dooley v. Cammell Laird & Co. Ltd.432 a crane driver successfully sued his 
employers for damages for psychiatric injury after a load fell off a crane he was driving 
crashing down into the hold of a ship. A defective rope which snapped, releasing a sling, and 
for which the defendants were responsible, was the cause of the accident, and the plaintiff 
had every reason to believe that the falling load had flattened his workmates. 
Galt concerned a reasonably foreseeable injury by shock in the form of a heart-attack 
sustained by a train driver who, coming around a bend at speed, saw two railway workers on 
the track ahead of him. Neither worker was injured, but the plaintiff was awarded damages as 
against his employers for his condition, which was the result of their negligence in allowing 
the situation to arise. 
In Wigg, a train driver successfully sued his employers for damages for psychiatric 
injury sustained as a result of witnessing the distressing sight of a passenger who had been 
killed while attempting to board after the guard negligently gave the starting signal. 
 In Mount Isa, two employees who were testing a switchboard were severely burned by 
an intense electric arc caused by their negligence. The defendant had not properly instructed 
them in their duties. The plaintiff ran to the scene and saw one of the electricians severely 
burned. The plaintiff aided him and assisted in carrying him to an ambulance. The electrician 
died about nine days later. For about four weeks the plaintiff continued working without any 
apparent impairment of his health, but thereafter he developed a serious mental disturbance. 
                                                            
427 Peter Handford, ‘Psychiatric injury at the workplace’ (1999) 7 Tort Law Review, 126, 128. 
428 [1951] 1 Lloyd's Law Report 271 
429  [1983] 133 N.L.J.870 
430 The Times, 4/2/86 
431 [1970] 125 CLR 383. 
432 [1951] 1 Lloyd's Law Report 271. 
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In Frost, the majority in the Court of Appeal, accepting the argument that conventional 
employer’s liability principles could apply, upheld the claims of two police officers. Rose and 
Henry LJJ held that the plaintiffs were primary victims, since they had been directly involved 
in the course of their employment in the consequences flowing from their employer’s 
negligence. 
 In the House of Lords, Lord Hoffmann said that out of the three English cases 
mentioned, only Dooley had been reported in full. On the contrary, the reasoning in Galt had 
been condensed to a single sentence and that of Wiggs was also abbreviated. He held that 
they all were pre-Alcock decisions and in accordance with the law as it was thought to be at 
the time. There was no reference to the control mechanisms, which had not yet been invented. 
His Lordship maintained that that was a view which might well have prevailed, but the 
subsequent retreat from principle in Alcock meant that all of them had either to be given up as 
wrongly decided or explained on other grounds. In relation to Mount Isa, he said that only 
one of the judges found it necessary to discuss the principles of liability for psychiatric injury 
and he expressly refrained from considering whether it could be based upon the employee 
relationship. He also referred to Lord Oliver’s attempted rationalisation of the three English 
cases by saying that in each, the plaintiff had been put in a position in which he was, or 
thought he was about to be or had been, the immediate instrument of death or injury to 
another. He mentioned Robertson v Forth Road Bridge Joint Board433 as well, declaring his 
agreement with Lord Hope who had adopted Lord Oliver's explanation of the English cases 
and rejected a claim for psychiatric injury by employees who had witnessed the death of a 
fellow employee in the course of being engaged on the same work. Lord Hoffmann regarded 
that as a rejection of the employment relationship being in itself a sufficient basis for liability. 
He finally referred to Walker v Northumberland County Council434 where an employee 
recovered damages for a mental breakdown held to have been foreseeably caused by the 
stress and pressure of his work as a social services officer. However, his Lordship said that 
the employee in Walker was in no sense a secondary victim. His mental breakdown was 
caused by the strain of doing the work which his employer had required him to do.435 
Lord Steyn said that ‘it is a non sequitur to say that because an employer is under a 
duty to an employee not to cause him physical injury, the employer should as a necessary 
                                                            
433 [1995] S.C. 364. 
434 [1995] 1 All ER 737 
435 At 506. 
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consequence of that duty (of which there is no breach) be under a duty not to cause the 
employee psychiatric injury.’436 
Lord Griffiths said that the law of master and servant was not a discrete and separate 
branch of the law of tort, but was to be considered in relation to actions in tort generally. He 
agreed that the employer argument should be rejected, because if the approach suggested by 
counsel was right it meant that the police would be entitled to recover damages whereas 
spectators and others on duty in the ground who were exposed to the same horror and risk of 
psychiatric injury would not. He maintained that, on the contrary, one would expect the 
police to be at a disadvantage because they are trained to deal with catastrophic incidents and 
reasonably well compensated under the terms of their service if they do suffer injury in the 
course of their duties.437  
Lord Goff (in dissent) made a distinction that he thought would avoid what otherwise 
might be regarded as an unacceptable distinction between employees on the one hand, and 
relatives on the other. The distinction was between cases in which the employee has in the 
course of his employment been involved in the event which resulted in the other's physical 
injury or death (or its aftermath), and cases in which he has incidentally witnessed that event 
and its outcome. He said that the police who became involved in the aftermath of the disaster 
could claim as employees and were distinct from other interveners who could claim only if 
they qualified as rescuers.438 
 
1.17 Occupational stress. 
 
A new form of liability, although not based on ‘shock’ induced injury and already 
described as the next growth area in psychiatric illness,439 relates to claims involving stress 
resulting from the pressure of work. A peculiarity of this type of harm is that the 
primary/secondary classification seems unable to cater meaningfully for occupational stress 
claimants, since they are not necessarily exposed to foreseeable danger.  
                                                            
436 At 497. 
437 At 464. 
438 At 483. 
439 Mullany, above n 81, 107. A different opinion suggests that the variability inherent within the contractual 
and occupational context means that clear lines of liability are difficult to predict and, therefore, it is unlikely 
that litigation following Walker will be able to take up the impetus generated by the case or act as a deterrent to 
overburding employers. Alan Sprince, ‘Recovering damages for occupational stress: Walker v Northumberland 
County Council.’ (1995) 17 Liverpool Law Review 189, 189. 
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Walker v Northumberland County Council440 was the first case in which an employee 
was awarded damages for psychiatric injury suffered as result of work related stress. 
Mr. Walker managed four teams of social workers who were responsible for child 
abuse cases in the area of Northumberland. During the early 1980s the population increased 
and this resulted in a rise in the incidence of child abuse cases. As the work pressure 
increased, he suffered a severe ‘nervous breakdown’. He had no previous history of mental 
disorders. When he returned to work, four months later, it was agreed with his employers that 
he would receive assistance as long as it was considered necessary. The support was not only 
soon withdrawn but he now also had to deal with the paperwork that had built up in his 
absence. Once again he started suffering from symptoms of stress and he received medical 
advice to take sick leave. He finally suffered a second mental breakdown which left him 
incapable of either returning to a similar job in social services or others which would involve 
considerable responsibility. He was dismissed by his employers on the grounds of permanent 
ill-health. 
The Court of Appeal in Petch v Customs and excise Commissioners441 had accepted 
that the duty to provide a safe system of work extended to the protection of an employee’s 
mental health. Colman J applied the same principle, adding that there is no logical reason 
why risk of psychiatric damage should be excluded from the scope of an employer’s duty of 
care. He held that the first breakdown was unforeseeable, but not the second one. He thought 
that the mental illness and the lasting impairment of his personality which Mr Walker 
sustained in consequence of the first breakdown was so substantial and damaging that the 
magnitude of the risk that he would have might sustain a mental breakdown of some sort 
should have been regarded as relatively large. 
The decions in Walker broke new ground in the sense that it clearly extended the law’s 
protective reach beyond work-related physical harms and made actionable for the first time 
mental harm suffered by workers as a result of carelessness on the part of their employers.442 
This approach was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Hatton v Sutherland443 which 
is now considered the leading case on liability for work stress. In an extensive judgment, 
clearly intended to regulate work stress claims in England, Hale LJ said that, although there 
are no special control mechanisms applying to claims for psychiatric (or physical) injury or 
                                                            
440 [1995] IRLR 35 (QBD). 
441 (1992) ICR 789. 
442 Lesley Dolding and Richard Mullender, ‘Law, Labour and mental Harm’ (1996) 59 Modern Law Review 
296, 298. 
443 [2002] ICR 613. 
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illness arising from the stress of doing the work which the employee is required to do, those 
claims do require particular care in determination, because they give rise to some difficult 
issues of foreseeability and causation and in identifying a relevant breach of duty. She also 
said that the threshold question is whether this kind of harm to this particular employee was 
reasonable foreseeable and that foreseeability depends upon what the employer knows about 
the individual employee. Factors likely to be relevant are the nature and extent of the work 
done and whether there are signs from the employee of impending harm to health. 
The House of Lords unanimously upheld those principles in Barber v Somerset County 
Council.444 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
444 [2004] ICR 457. 
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CHAPTER 2:  THE CIVIL LAW 
 
1. Damage. 
 
Professor Markesinis submits that the common lawyer, unlike the civil lawyer, rarely 
asks himself the question, what damage is redressable in a tort law action? since his system, 
for some time at any rate, has not concentrated on damnum but on injuria. The reasons for 
that seem to be historical, since the award of damages used to be wholly within the province 
of the jury, which gave no reason for its findings. These findings were unquestionably within 
the jury’s area of competence, if the defendant’s behaviour was wrongful. Only where the 
damage was part of the wrong could the judges formulate rules in terms of damage. So the 
task of fixing the boundaries of liability had to be achieved through those concepts over 
which the judge had exclusive control, such as duty and remoteness. 445 
Despite the fact that all European codes require a plaintiff to have incurred loss for an 
action for damages to succeed, in general, none of them has attempted a detailed legal 
definition of the term ‘damage’. Art. 1382 of the French civil code, for instance, merely 
refers to the dommage and to the tortfeasor’s obligation to compensate for it, without any 
other precision. This legislative vagueness has always been understood by the Cour de 
Cassation as reflecting the drafter’s wish to allow compensation for all kinds of loss, 
irrespective of their nature –pecuniary/non-pecuniary- and of their origin –damages to 
property, personal injury or infringement of purely economic interests. From the beginning of 
the 19th century, it was therefore established that judges could not discriminate between 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss: both are compensable, provided they are certain, personal 
and legitimate.446 
 Despite the lack of legislative precision, there is a certain consensus that damage, in its 
broader sense is any loss, or unfavourable change that a person suffers in relation to his 
legally protected interests, whether they have financial implications or not. The mere 
infringement of a right does not necessarily represent damage.  
One of the few existing legal definitions of the notion of damage is contained in § 1293 
of the Austrian Civil Code: ‘Damage is called every detriment which was inflicted on 
someone’s property, rights or person.’ It is under discussion whether damage is a legal or a 
                                                            
445 Basil Markesinis and Simon Deakin . Tort Law (2008) 722. 
446 Suzanne Galand-Carval, ‘Non- pecuniary loss under French law’ in W.V. Horton Rogers (Ed) Damages for 
non-pecuniary loss in a comparative perspective (2001) 87. 
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natural term. Austrian scholars, in general, consider it a legal term as defined by the civil 
code. 
Most civil law countries do not have a list of reparable harms. Rather than draw up a 
list or inventory of the kinds of damage they will hold reparable, the judges have been 
concerned to define the notion of ‘reparable harm’ by identifying its general and permanent 
characteristics, such as certainty of damage447 and legitimacy of the interest affected.448 
It has been pointed out that the danger of this method is that it may lead to an extended 
law of delict directed to repairing every loss to everyone. This could be reinforced by the 
relaxation, on another front, of the limiting factor of the requirement of fault. 
An exception in the civil law system is the German civil code which gives a list of 
reparable harms and, to a lesser extent, the Swiss Code of Obligations. 
In civil law, the classic distinction is between material and moral damage. Material 
damage can be defined as injury to the patrimony, that is to say, to the pecuniary interests of 
the injured party.449 Moral damage is injury that does not directly bring an economically 
appraisable patrimonial loss, but consists in the perturbation of the plaintiff’s feelings, which 
can only be measured in a subjective way. 450 
Sometimes, however, it is not easy to isolate alleged moral damage as purely moral, for 
it may have financial repercussions. For instance, if somebody casts doubts on someone’s 
professional honor, that will certainly cause moral damage, but it may also cause patrimonial 
damage if there is a subsequent reduction on the number of customers.451 It follows that when 
an injury, independently of its origin, does exercise an influence, even indirectly, on the 
patrimonial sphere of the plaintiff, it must be considered as material damage. Thus, all 
disturbances of the conditions of life resulting in an unfavorable economic situation arising 
otherwise than from the plaintiff’s reduced capacity for work, are generally considered to be 
material damage. 
                                                            
447 Geneviève Viney, Traité de Droit Civil. Les obligations. La responsabilité: Conditions. (1982) 338. 
448 Nour-Eddine. Terki, Les obligations. Responsabilité civile et Régime Géneral (1982) 171. 
449 ‘El daño material consiste en el menoscabo patrimonial sufrido por la víctima y comprende tanto el 
desembolso efectivo como la ganancia frustrada o que se haya dejado de obtener.’ Ricardo de Ángel Yágüez, 
Comentario del Código Civil, Tomo 8 (2000) 387.  
‘Il peut d’abord consister en une perte subie –damnum emergens- se traduisant par un appauvrisement de la 
victime, telle que la destruction ou la détérioration d’un bien, une privation de jouissance ou encore les dépenses 
inutiles qu’a dû exposer la victime.’ Patrice Jourdain, Les principes de la responsabilité civile (1992) 114. 
For some historical references about the evolution of the notion of damage in French law: Olivier Descamps, 
Les origines de la responsabilité pour faute personelle dans le code civil de 1804 (2005) 289. 
450 For a variety of definitions in Argentinian law: Carlos Parrellada, ‘El daño moral’ in Aída Kemelmajer de 
Carducci (Ed.) Responsabilidad Civil. (2007) 346. 
451 Angel Yaguez, above n 442, 390. 
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Handford452 submits that one of the most interesting contrasts between the common law 
and the civil law is to be found in their attitudes to the recovery of damages for injured 
feelings and mental distress. In the common law, there has always been marked reluctance to 
allow any such claim –an attitude summed up a century ago by Lord Wensleydale in Lynch v 
Knight453: ‘Mental pain and anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend to redress, 
when the unlawful act complained of causes that alone.’ He also suggests that the civil law 
offers a refreshing contrast to the common law, not only because of its wholehearted 
acceptance of claims for injury to feelings and other non-pecuniary loss, but also because of 
its orderly appearance in comparison to the patchwork quilt of the common law.454 
Compensation for non-pecuniary loss is subjected to different restrictions: in contract 
law, some European countries, like Germany, Greece, and the Netherlands exclude its 
compensation in money while in tort law, most legal systems limit compensation for moral 
damage to cases of injury to the person (body, privacy or reputation).  
In France, the question whether the law should compensate for pure moral damage has 
been the subject of high controversies in the past. The main arguments against it were that no 
payment of money could be adequate for moral suffering; that it was shocking to mix money 
with suffering because true and deep suffering is silent, and that affection and honor cannot 
be measured in financial terms.455 The issue, however, was finally settled by the Court of 
Cassation in the sense of admitting reparation for moral damage.456 At the present, the 
distress which a person suffers on the loss of a loved one is compensated without even asking 
if the painful experience actually occasioned psycho-pathological symptoms. The Supreme 
Court of Spain, expressing the same level of protection, held that ‘un doloroso vacío’ (a 
painful emptiness), suffices and even owners of unlawfully killed animals have right to 
compensation for the sentimental value of the loss. 
The flexibility of French tort law in relation to claims for non-material damage can be 
seen in a 1995 Cour de Cassation judgment. A woman was hit by a car while cycling and, as 
a consequence, remained in a vegetative state. The defendant argued that the victim was not 
                                                            
452 Peter Handford, ‘Moral damage in Germany’ (1978) 27 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 849. 
453 (1861)9 H.L. Cas 577 at 598. 
454 Handford, above n 445,  851. 
455 For strong criticism: Paul Esmein, ‘La commercialisation du préjudice moral’. Dalloz 1954. Chronique, 113 
et ss. G. Ripert, ‘Le prix de la doleur’. Dalloz, 1948. Chronique, p. 4 et ss. Boris Starck, Droit Civil. 
Obligations, n° 114. A. Weill et F Terré, Droit Civil. Obligations. n° 614. Gabriel Marty et Pierre Raynaud. 
Droit Civil. Obligations. n° 382. Viney, above n 440, n° 266. 
456 It is generally accepted that the compensability of moral damage was first admitted by the decision of the 
Full Court of the Court of Cassation on June 15, 1833, accepting the argument of Procureur-Général Dupin. 
Michel Cannarsa, ‘Personal injury compensation in France’ in Marco Bona and Philip Mead (Eds.) Personal 
injury compensation in Europe (2003) 194.  
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entitled to compensation for non-material injury because she was absolutely incapable of any 
feeling, whether pain or a sense of diminution arising out of aesthetically pitiable state, or any 
appreciation of the loss of life’s pleasures and worries. The Cour de Cassation reversed the 
decision of the Court of Appeal and ruled that personal compensation (including pain and 
suffering, aesthetic damage and loss of amenity) does not become irrecoverable simply 
because the injured person is not able to feel, as ‘no head of damages can be excluded simply 
because the victim is in a vegetative state’.457 Therefore, under the law as it now stands, a 
permanently comatose victim is fully compensated for his non-pecuniary loss. 
The Cour de Cassation has presumably based its decision in the line of reasoning of the 
Cour d’Appel de Bordeaux. In effect, in a 1991 decision, this court had said that where the 
victim is apparently bereft of consciousness and, in any event, cannot give expression to it, it 
cannot be inferred from that fact that he cannot feel the injuries. Protection of the victim’s 
rights dictates that they are to be assessed not by reference to the feelings of loss, which that 
person is supposed to have, but by reference to feelings commonly felt as a result of a similar 
injury by persons able to give expression to their will. Otherwise, the person would be 
deprived of a part of his rights, without there being however any absolute certainty of a total 
absence of suffering or feeling of anything connected to pain, to aesthetic detriment or loss of 
amenity.458  
In Austria, in 1993, the Supreme Court ruled that the injured person may recover 
damages for non-pecuniary loss even if he is comatose. The court’s argument is that although 
the claimant is not sensitive to pain he is entitled to claim compensation because of the severe 
impairment of his personality.459 
In Germany, a significant change in the interpretation of the courts in relation to 
comatose plaintiffs has taken place. Until 1992, damages granted to victims unable to 
perceive the loss of their physical or mental capacity due to the severity of their injuries were 
                                                            
457 X. v Societé Transport Agglomeration Elbeuvienne. Cour de cassation, 2ème chambre civile, 22 February 
1995. Commentary by Mazeaud, (1995) Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Civil.  S. Gromb, ‘De la conscience dans 
les états végétatives et de l’indemnisation’. Gazette du Palais, 3 July 1991, p. 7. 
458 Salabert v Malaganne. Cour d’Appel de Bordeaux, 18 april 1991. For a discussion of moral damage for 
persons in vegetative state in Argentinian law: Parrellada, above n 453, 379; Jorge Mosset Iturraspe,  ‘Daño 
moral causado a personas privadas de conciencia o razón. Los padres como damnificados directos.’ 
Jurisprudencia Argentina, 1992 -V-559; Matilde Zavala de gonzalez, ‘Las personas sin discernimiento y las 
personas jurídicas como sujetos pasivos del daño moral’. Jurisprudencia Argentina, 1985-I-794; Alfredo Orgaz, 
El daño resarcible. (1960) 247. Jorge Nunez, ‘Estado de vida vegetativo y daño moral’. Jurisprudencia 
Argentina. 1987-I-783. 
459 Ernst Karner and Helmut Koziol, ‘Non-pecuniary loss under Austrian law’ in W.V. Horton Rogers (Ed) 
Damages for non-pecuniary loss in a comparative perspective (2001) 9. Ivo Greitzer, ‘Personal injury 
compensation in Austria’ in Personal InjuryCompensation in Europe., in Marco Bona and Philip Mead (Eds.) 
Personal injury compensation in Europe (2003) 30.  
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regarded as a form of symbolic atonement. The sums granted were significantly lower 
compared to cases where victims were fully aware of their injuries, but after a leading case in 
1993, a comatose plaintiff became entitled to substantial compensation for his non-pecuniary 
loss. The Supreme Court on that occasion held that damage to the personality and the loss of 
personal quality as a consequence of severe brain damage represented in themselves non-
material harm which was to be compensated for independently of whether the person affected 
felt the impairment. Damages should be more than just symbolic, because they reflect a loss 
of personality and human dignity.460 
In Switzerland, after having denied any right to reparation because the victim was 
incapable of feeling pain and suffering, the courts have now recognised this right, ‘but 
without enthusiasm’.461  
Some controversial issues remain, like the degree to which compensation can be 
awarded in respect of the sentimental value of things, such as pets or other objects of little 
market value but of great importance for the personal well-being of the owner, or others who 
might also have enjoyed it. Austria and specially France recognize compensation for non-
pecuniary damage in relation to things.  
In 1962, the owner of a race horse called Lupus was awarded 150.000 francs462 for the 
grief he suffered as a result of the horse’s death. In the same year, the owners of a dog 
recovered (under article 1.385 C.C.) for grief as well as material loss occasioned by the death 
of their pet.463 Encouraged by these latter decisions, a car owner, in 1966, sought damages in 
delict to assuage his grief at the damage to his vehicle, but the court decided against him.  
In Austria, however, if property is damaged, the person responsible has to pay for the 
sentimental value only if he acted with malicious intent or gross negligence. On the other 
                                                            
460 Ulrich Magnus and Jörg Fedtke, ‘Non-pecuniary loss under German law’ in W.V. Horton Rogers (Ed) 
Damages for non-pecuniary loss in a comparative perspective (2001)113. Paul Kuhn, ‘Personal injury 
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and Philip Mead (Eds.) Personal injury compensation in Europe (2003)  229. 
461 Pierre Tercier, ‘La réparation du tort moral en cas d’inconscience totale et définitive de la victime’. (1972) 68 
Revue Suisse de Jurisprudence 245. Douglas Hornung, ‘Personal injury compensation in Switzerland’ in 
Personal InjuryCompensation in Europe Marco Bona and Philip Mead (Eds.) Personal injury compensation in 
Europe (2003) 506. 
462 To have an idea of what that sum represented at the time we can rely on Tunc’s commentary that it was equal 
to three months’ salary of a regular worker (56 hours a week.) Dalloz, 1987, IR, 72.  
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death of a horse gives right to compensation (14 Janv. Dalloz 1962, 199. Juris-classeur Periodique with note of 
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criticised by Le Tourneau, La responsabilité civile (1982)190. For an exhaustive treatment of the subjet: Jean-
Pierre Marguénaud, L’animal en droit privé. (1992) 482 et ss. Jacques Dupichot, Des préjudices réfléchis nés de 
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hand, according to § 1325 of the Austrian Civil code, in relation to personal injury, the 
tortfeasor has to compensate for pain and suffering even if the degree of his fault is very 
small. Two reasons are given to justify the distinction: a) the lower rank of immaterial 
interest for property and b) the absence of objective evidence to indicate the extent of the 
harm. 
The reason why compensation in money for non-patrimonial damage is more restricted 
than for patrimonial damage is that the first one depends on individual conditions and, 
therefore, it is hardly measurable unless some objective clues are given.464 This is seen as a 
serious disadvantage in the sense that, since the parties are quite unable to anticipate, even in 
broad terms, what the court may hold to be the appropriate damages, the defendant is in a 
position to put pressure on the victim to accept an unfavourable compromise or face 
prolonged and expensive legal proceeding where the result is a matter of chance.465 
The lack of specific rules governing the assessment of non-patrimonial damage has led 
to a somewhat irrational process where the only limit is ‘the wisdom of the court’. Some 
rationalization has been tried to be established by some Courts through internal judicial 
tariffs, like in France les barèmes d’indemnisation.466 Also a vague orientation has been 
introduced in some codes. A good example is art. 932 of the Greek Civil Code, under which 
the satisfaction for moral damage has to be reasonable. Professor Kerameus explains that 
reasonableness is taken to correspond to all circumstances accompanying the particular case, 
and that Greek courts often enumerate the circumstances that, as a rule, influence their 
judgement, like the financial situation and social position of the tortfeasor.467 This, however, 
is a criteria not shared by the Austrian Supreme Court which holds the opinion that social 
position, cultural requirements and financial situation are of no relevance.468 
In general, it could be said that when immaterial damage is calculated, the common 
opinion is that the nature, gravity or seriousness and endurance of the harm, as well as the 
lasting consequences of the injuries have to be taken into account. 
 
 
                                                            
464 Koziol, above n 452, 12. 
465 Genevieve Viney, Introduction a la responsabilite (1995) 63. 
466 For some criticism of the use of barèmes:Le Tourneau, above n 456, 342. 
467 Konstantinos D. Kerameus, ‘Damages under Greek Law’ in Ulrich Magnus (ed.) Unification of Tort Law: 
Damages 110. 
468 Koziol, above n 452, 13. 
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1.1 The principle of full compensation.469 
 
In civil law the basic rule concerning material damage is  restitution in integrum; that 
is, the victim must be compensated for his whole loss. It covers all material injury to the 
bodily integrity of a person and to his property, including material loss (for instance, loss of 
financial support) sustained by dependent third parties as a consequence of the death of, or 
physical injury to, the primary victim. It also covers non-material damage, such as injury 
resulting from direct interference with the right of personality, for instance damage to one’s 
reputation by defamatory statements; injury consequential on interference with a person’s 
bodily integrity, such as pain and suffering, aesthetic damage or loss of amenity by the 
primary victim, as well as bereavement or pain and suffering by persons suffering from the 
death or injury to the physical well-being of the primary victim regardless of the proximity of 
their relationship.  
For many authors, the principle of full compensation comes from art. 1382 in itself.470 
The Cour de Cassation (the French Supreme Court), interpreting that provision, has laid 
down the following principle: ‘…the salient feature of civil liability is restoration, in so far as 
is possible, of the balance which has been upset by the damage and to put the victim back, at 
the expense of the person responsible, in the situation where he would have been had the 
harmful act not occurred.’471 
What is substantial on the principle of full compensation is that the rate of 
compensation is determined by the damage caused, and only by this. That implies that the 
nature of the loss is irrelevant and, also, that the amount of damages does not depend on the 
degree of fault on the part of the wrongdoer, but exclusively on the extent of the loss. 
Therefore, even if only slight negligence has been assessed, the amount of damages to be 
awarded will not be diminished. 
A significant exception is § 1324 of the Austrian Civil Code which establishes that the 
extent of compensation depends in general on the degree of fault. Only in the event of 
wilfulness or grave negligence will full compensation be recognised (including non-
pecuniary damage). Otherwise, lost profits and immaterial damage will not be compensated. 
                                                            
469 For an extensive analysis of the difficulties found by the Courts in the application of this principle in France: 
Viney, above n 458, 87; in Spain, Angel Yaguez, above n 453, 397. 
470 Sólyom submits that the drafters of the code leave no doubt as to the extensive interpretation of that 
provision: ‘cette disposition embrasse dans sa vaste latitude tous les genres de dommages…’and adds that 
practice on the grounds of that provision, from the very beginning, adjudged the profit lost, and from 1833 ever 
more decidedly also the moral damage. L. Sólyom,‘The decline of civil law liability.’ (1980) 97. 
471 Civ. 2è civ. 28 october 1954, Juris-Classeur Périodique. II. 8765. 
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The inflexibility of this regulation has been criticized because, in many cases, the loss of an 
expected profit is a more hurtful and heavier damage than the loss of an already existing 
asset. However, Professor Koziol believes that the importance of § 1324 is minimized by the 
Supreme Court in holding the opinion that the loss of profits is an actual loss in those cases in 
which the plaintiff definitely would have made the profit.472 
 
1.2 The scope of protection in France. 
 
The general provisions of arts. 1382 and 1383 do not contain any a priori limitations in 
relation to the scope or nature of protected rights or interests. Those articles refer to fault as a 
primary source of liability without limiting, or even mentioning, the rights or interests that the 
system aims to protect. In principle, all rights and interests are protected and it would be 
unacceptable for a French lawyer to refer to protected rights in an exclusionary sense 
(meaning that there are some other rights which remain unprotected). The idea of protected 
rights or interests under French law is related to the characteristics that it must have in order 
to be recoverable: it must be certain (this includes the loss of a chance), it must actually exist, 
and it must be personal to the plaintiff.473 
The notion of certainty of harm must not be confused with that of actual harm, 474  that 
is to say the harm that has already been realized. Naturally, actual harm is the most certain of 
all, but not the only one. Some kinds of damage, like permanent reduction of working 
capacity, extend their effects into the future; therefore, they are not rendered any less certain. 
The articles mentioned ut supra do not contain any a priori limitations in relation to the 
class of protected persons either. There is no exclusion, and no need to prove the existence of 
any duty of care towards the plaintiff as in the common law. Any plaintiff who is able to 
prove damage, fault and causation may claim full compensation. Not even the State will have 
any particular privilege. All rights or interests, which are protected under French law against 
infringements by individuals, are equally protected against the acts of public authorities.475 
Since French law does not provide an a priori limitation as to protected interests it has 
been up to the courts to decide which interests are to be protected and which not, based 
exclusively on the interpretation of the word dommage in art. 1382 C.C.476 In that sense, 
                                                            
472 Koziol, above n 452, 8. 
473 Le Tourneau, above n 456, 167 et ss. 
474 François Terré. Droit Civil. Les obligations. (2005), 692 et ss. 
475 Walter Van Gerven, Torts: Scope of Protection (1998) 59. 
476 Cees Van Dam, European Tort Law (2006) 143. 
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French courts showed one of the most prolific, creative and expansive tendencies in the 
whole civil law world in relation to the heads of recoverable damage. In case of personal 
injuries, for instance, they continuously discover new types of harm. Thus, after damages for 
grief, pain and suffering and aesthetic harm, the courts allowed damages for loss of amenity, 
for impairment of the pleasures of childhood, for diminution of sexual prowess, for gloom 
due to the prospect of impending death and so on. This permanent increasing liability with 
constant relaxation of its conditions is criticised by some academics, who believe that is 
going to increase the cost of insurance to excessive or intolerable levels. 
Contrary to German law, to claim for loss of maintenance, French law does not require 
that the deceased had had an obligation to maintain the plaintiff. It is sufficient that the 
deceased, in fact, maintained him. It is not necessary to prove family relationships of a formal 
type (blood or marriage). Also, if a causal connection can be shown, a business partner or an 
employer can claim damages for the loss suffered. 
In the case of death, the question of who can sue for non-pecuniary loss cannot be 
answered by the over-simple solution of limiting the right of action to the blood relations or 
marriage. It has long been said that the family could not be considered to have the monopoly 
of grief, and that in certain circumstances the sincerity of the sorrow experienced by more 
distant relatives cannot be doubted. Today, it is accepted that blood relationship in the direct 
line and the relation of marriage both raise a presumption of grief or moral suffering on the 
part of the plaintiff in the case of the death of a parent, son, daughter, or spouse. This 
presumption can assist the plaintiff in the matter of proof, but it is not an irrebuttable 
presumption.477 
On the other hand, certain persons who can claim neither relationship by marriage nor 
blood relationship in the direct line, may have a claim in damages if they can convince the 
court of the sincerity of the grief that the victim’s death has caused them. However, in these 
cases, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff.478 The reported cases show that it has become 
rather frequent for distant relatives (aunts, uncles, cousins) to ask for, and get, damages for 
                                                            
477 For instance, it was held by the Cour de Cassation that a wife could not get damages for moral suffering 
when the defendant established that she was intending to divorce from her husband when the accident occurred. 
Cour de Cassation, première chambre civile, 1.7.10.1992. Memetan, ‘La réparation du préjudice d’affection ou 
la pierre philosophale’. Gazette du Palais, 78.2 Doctrine 400. Melennec., ‘L’indemnisation du quantum 
doloris.’, Gazette du Palais, 1974.2 Doctrine 958. 
478 Recent cases, however, seem to show that the Supreme Court supports distant relatives. In 1994, for 
example, a claim of an aunt and uncle was dismissed on the ground that they had not established the existence of 
specific emotional links with the primary victim. The case went to the Supreme Court and quashed. For many 
authors, it seems to mean that mere quality of aunt and uncle is now enough to get damages for moral suffering. 
Terré, above n 467, 700; Le Tourneau, above n 456, 179. 
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moral suffering. The Bellet Commission pointed out that in 1979 the average number of 
relatives compensated for their moral suffering in fatal cases had risen to 5.3 and that it was 
not infrequent to see cases where damages were awarded to ten relatives.479 
There is some hesitation about the transmissibility of the victim’s action in the cases of 
instantaneous death. The principle is that any action which the victim, had he lived, would 
himself had against the author of the damage is transmissible and forms part of the decedent’s 
estate. The problem is that if, ex hypothesi, there was no time for the suffering to come into 
existence, the idea of any transmissible moral damage sounds unreasonable.480 A decision of 
the Court of Cassation in 1943 upheld the claim of a mother and daughter who brought an 
action in damages for moral harm suffered by their husband and father before his 
instantaneous death.481  
Some doubts also initially surrounded the issue of moral damage on the part of the 
relatives of the victim in cases where he survives the injuries. Le préjudice d’affection 
(pretium affectionis) that is, the moral suffering that relatives experience as a consequence of 
the victim’s personal injury, was only compensated on fatal cases. At the beginning, the 
Court of Cassation was unwilling to accept this extension of moral damage, limiting 
compensation to cases of fatal accidents. The position was hard to justify. In many cases, the 
grief and suffering experienced is as cruel, and very frequently, even more lasting than when 
the victim dies. Is not difficult to imagine common traffic tragedies where a young person 
becomes paraplegic leading the whole family into a permanent state of grief. Later the Court 
admitted that it could be compensated in personal injury cases, providing it was extremely 
serious. After a decision, in 1946, awarding damages to the father of a little girl permanently 
crippled as the result of an accident the Cour de Cassation settled the question. That last 
requirement has now disappeared so that moral suffering of the relatives is compensated in all 
personal injury cases. The awards are almost automatic: in particular, there is no need for the 
claimants to show that they have suffered a nervous shock. Moreover, they do not have to 
establish the existence of their préjudice d’affection. According to the Cour de Cassation, 
this loss is presumed, at least as far as near relatives are concerned.482  
 
 
                                                            
479 Galand-Carval, above n 439, 93. 
480 Herman Cousy and Dimitri Droushout, ‘Non-pecuniary loss under Belgian law’ in W.V. Horton Rogers (Ed) 
Damages for non-pecuniary loss in a comparative perspective (2001 38. 
481 Civ., Jan. 18, 1943 D.C. 45 (note L. Mazeaud) 
482 Galand-Carval, above n 439, 90. 
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1.3 The scope of protection in Germany. 
1.3.1 Generally. 
 
In Germany, the question of protected interest stands oddly apart from other civil law 
system. In the German Civil Code there is no general delictual principle covering all 
intentional and negligent harm of whatever kind, as there is in most civil codes. Prof. 
Zweigert states that the draftsmen who were working on the German civil code were tempted 
to follow the great model of the French civil code including a general clause, which would 
impose liability in damages whenever harm was unlawfully, and culpably caused. At the 
time, it was thought that it would be impossible to secure sufficient protection against 
unlawful acts by attaching liability to particular types of tortious behaviour, since they might 
not cover all proper cases. 483 
Modelled on that idea, the first draft of the BGB laid down the following provision: 
§ 704 (1) ‘Where a person commits an unlawful act, whether intentionally or negligently,…which 
harms another, …that person shall be required to compensate the other for the damage thereby caused.’ 
 
That article, differently from its French model, included the notion of unlawfulness 
which German law had inherited from the Roman law notion of injuria.  
The first draft code did not meet with favour. A second draft repudiated that model as 
too widely phrased, and reached a compromise solution instead.484 The new drafters decided 
to avoid the profuseness of the English law of torts and the casuistry of the special types yet 
stopping short of taking the crucial step of admitting a great general clause like art. 1382 of 
the French civil code.485 It was believed that a general clause would empower the courts too 
much, which would be inconsistent with the German view of the judicial function.486 As the 
draftsmen themselves explained (Protokoll II), fears existed that unless the Code laid down 
fixed standard the courts might ‘produce outgrowths such as one finds in many French 
decisions.’  
                                                            
483 Konrad Zweigert  & Hein. Kötz, An introduction to comparative law (1977) 599 
484 For an extensive treatment of this aspect, see Patrick Mossler, ‘The discussion on general clause or numerous 
clausus during the preparation of the German Civil Code’ in Elto J. H. Schrage (Ed) Negligence. The 
comparative legal history of the Law of Torts. 2001, 361-398. 
485 It has been pointed out that the more casuistic approach to tort law –well known to Common lawyers- was 
also the method adopted by Roman law and this, it must be recalled, formed part of the legal heritage of most 
Germany. Basil Markesinis and Hannes Unberath, The German Law of torts. A comparative treatise. (2002) 25. 
486 Jan Smits, The making of European Private Law  (2002) 232. 
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The result was no one general rule, as in the French model, but three general clauses 
with different heads of tortious liability:487 
 
§ 823. Liability in damages. 
 
(1) A person who, intentionally or negligently, unlawfully injures the life, body, health, freedom, 
property or another right of another person is liable to make compensation to the other party for the 
damage arising from this.  
(2) The same obligation attaches to a person who infringes a statutory provision intended for the       
protection of others. 
 
 
§ 826. A person who wilfully causes damage to another in a manner contra bonos mores is bound to 
compensate the other for the damage. 
  
Intention and negligence are defined in substantially the same way as in the common 
law. To base an action on § 823, a plaintiff should prove that there was a violation through 
human contact of one of the enumerated rights or interests, namely life, body, health, 
freedom, property, or ‘another right’. Markesinis points out that this approach, in essence, 
does for German law what the notion of duty of care does for the common law, though it is 
done in a pre-determined (and thus arguably clearer) manner.488 
 
1.3.2 Injury to life. 
  
 Injury to life occurs where someone dies as a result of the defendant’s behaviour. This 
may result from the direct killing of a person or from an injury to his body or health. Direct 
killing gives no right of compensation to the person killed, but only to certain third parties 
who depended on him for their maintenance.489 To a certain extent, it is surprising that the 
loss of someone’s life, arguably his most valuable asset, is excluded from legal protection. 
This paradox has not gone unnoticed in either side of the Atlantic. In France, Viney-Jourdain 
                                                            
487 Professor Handford believes that in this sense, German law stands out from civil law systems, and is more 
akin to the common law. Above n 445, 875.  
      The provisions on liability for unlawful conduct are to be found at the end of Book Two, which is devoted to 
the Law of Obligations. Hence, much of the surprise of the common lawyer, the law of tort is not treated as an 
independent area of law in either the legal literature or the universities of Germany, but always forms just one 
part of books and courses devoted to the law of obligations. Norbert Horn, Hein Kötz and Hans Leser, German 
private and commercial law: an introduction. (1982) 147. Frederick Holding and Peter Kaye, Damages for 
personal injuries. A European perspective. (1993) 65. 
488 Markesinis above n 478, 43. Rudolf Hubner, A history of Germanic Private Law. (2000) 578.  
489 Kwame Opoku, ‘Delictual liability in German Law.’ (1972) 21 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 232.  
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have pointed out how a fatal accident suffered by a child, in extreme cases, could cost the 
person liable a very small amount of money, while simple wounds could justify huge 
damages to compensate the costs of caring, or an inability to work.490 In the United States, 
Dan Barrett has referred to this particular question under the suggesting title of ‘Cheaper to 
kill than to maim’. 491 
Von Bar maintains that, in spite of the fact that it could be accepted that victims do 
suffer when death occurs, most European laws draw no consequences from that.492 
Apparently, the only exception is Portugal, where the courts have decided that loss of life is 
damage in itself and that the claim for compensation and the deceased’s claim for damages 
for pain and suffering are inheritable by the heir in addition to his own claim for damages for 
pain and suffering and other loss. Although instantaneous death is not compensable, if the 
victim survives, even if it is only for a short time, a claim for moral damage for the sense of 
fear suffered before bodily injury or death is applicable. If the injury results in a reduction of 
life expectancy, and the victim is aware of it, the emotional strain also must be 
compensated.493 
In Germany, compensation for loss of life as such will be limited to certain relatives. 
Who qualifies as a relative, whether for patrimonial or non-patrimonial loss, is a question not 
free from disputes and it is generally linked to questions of causation (or, sometimes, to the 
scope of the duty). The general rule, according to § 844 is that only persons whom the 
deceased had a statutory duty to maintain have a right to compensation. 
§ 844 Third-party compensation claims in the case of death. 
(1) In cases where death is caused, the person liable in damages must reimburse the costs of a 
funeral to the person under a duty to bear these costs. 
(2) If the person killed, at the time of the injury, stood in a relationship to a third party on the 
basis of which he was obliged or might become obliged by operation of law to provide 
maintenance for that person and if the third party has as a result of the death been deprived of 
his right to maintenance, then the person liable in damages must give the third party damages 
by payment of an annuity to the extent that the person killed would have been obliged to 
provide maintenance for the presumed duration of his life; the provisions of section 843 (2) 
to (4) apply with the necessary modifications. Liability in damages also arises where the third 
party at the time of injury had been conceived but not yet born. 
                                                            
490 Geneviève Viney and Patrice Jourdain, Les conditions de la responsabilité. (1998) n. 254. 
491 Dan Barret, Cheaper to kill than to maim. A patient’s guide to medical malpractice in Texas. (2002) 
492 Christian Von Bar, The common European law of torts (2000) 62. 
493 Karner and Koziol, above n 452, 11. Ulrich Magnus and Jörg Fedkte, ‘Non-pecuniary loss under German 
law’ in Damages for non-pecuniary loss in a Comparative Perspective. (2001) 114. Non-pecuniary loss under 
Dutch law in Damages for non-pecuniary loss in a Comparative Perspective..(2001) 161. Miquel Martin-
Casals, Jordi Ribot and Josep Solé Non-pecuniary loss underSpanish law. Damages for non-pecuniary loss in a 
Comparative Perspective.  (2001) 202. 
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German law makes a distinction between loss of support, regulated in § 844, and loss of 
services, which is treated separately in § 845. Since similar rules apply to both, and cases 
tend to overlap Professor Markesinis doubts that anything is really gained by this distinction 
between loss of support and loss of services.494 
According to § 844 only those persons to whom the victim owed a statutory duty to 
provide support will be allowed to sue (like spouses, direct relatives and adopted children). 
The right of maintenance should exist at the time of the injury. In contrast with French law, 
the fact that the plaintiff was actually maintained by the deceased is irrelevant.495 As a result 
of this, a stepson does not have a right to compensation, even though his stepfather 
maintained him for many years as his own child. Also, a bride who loses her future husband 
one week before the marriage will not have a right to compensation for loss of maintenance, 
since the obligation to provide support starts from the day of marriage.496 
Particular difficulties arise in relation to claims for future maintenance (in cases of 
death of children). A hard balance has to be reached between avoiding what could be mere 
speculative maintenance at the time of the accident, and the danger of the claim becoming 
time-barred if only made after the child is in conditions to provide financial support to his 
parents. A procedural device has been developed in German law to reconcile these concerns, 
allowing a declaratory judgment at the time of the trial, with no fixed amount until the parent 
would actually become entitled to claim maintenance from the child. 
 
1.3.3 Injury to body. 
  
 Injury to body includes every adverse effect on corporeal well-being attributable to 
external factors; that is, all disturbances of a person’s physical integrity. These interferences 
will, in many cases, involve injury to health. Injury to health may take the form of a 
disturbance of the internal functioning of the body, (such as internal infections, gastro-
enteritis, bacterial infection, inhalation of poisonous fumes, etc.) through either physical or 
mental causes. Therefore, both entail an encroachment of the physical well-being of a person. 
Mere mental stress does not suffice, but in exceptional cases psychological disorder may be 
                                                            
494 Markesinis, above n 478, 927. 
495 A woman has to be legally married to the man she has been living with, or she will have no claim on his 
death, even if he has been looking after her for years in a marital kind of way; much less does any claim vest in 
the person who suffers loss because the death of his contractors prevents or delays the performance of his 
contract. Horn, above, n 491, 155. 
496 Van Dam, above n 469, 326. 
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qualified as a violation of health. Nervous shock is an injury to health within § 823, I BGB 
provided it results in medically recognisable physical or psychological effects.497 
Van Dam believes that there is no reason to elaborate the difference between the right 
to bodily integrity and the right to health, because it is generally accepted that most types of 
damage to a person’s body commonly constitutes an impairment of his health.498 Von Bar 
also thinks there is no need to know how to distinguish between injuries to the body and 
injuries to health since liability arises in all cases where the consequences of an act can be 
defined as one or the other.499 He also agrees with Van Dam that most types of damage to a 
person’s body commonly also constitute an impairment of his health. It is doubtful, he says, 
that one can exist without the other and, if, in exceptional cases, a bodily injury is deemed not 
to constitute an impairment of his health, the starting point is probably wrong. Professor 
Markesinis, however, emphasises that terminological precision dictates the use of two words 
(body and health) to describe any adverse interference with the person without consent.500 
The extension of the body’s protection can be deduced from a High Court decision 
treating the accidental destruction of frozen sperm deposited in a sperm bank as amounting to 
physical harm.  
In 1987, at the age of 31, the plaintiff had to undergo surgery for cancer of the bladder. 
Knowing that infertility would result from the operation, he requested the hospital to take 
sample of his sperm and put them into frozen storage. Some time after the operation the 
plaintiff got married and, since he and his wife wished to have children, he requested that his 
wife be impregnated with a sample of his sperm. He was then informed that through a 
mishap, the samples had been destroyed.501 
The Supreme Court (BGH 9 November 1993, NJW 1994, 127) held that, if components 
are removed, for the purpose of preserving bodily functions, in order to be subsequently 
reunited with it, then the view taken of § 823, I as affording comprehensive protection of 
physical integrity whilst preserving the right of self-determination of the holder of the right, 
must lead to the result that those components, even when separated from the body, retain 
functional unity with it, from the point of view of the protective purpose of the provision. It 
thus appears necessary to regard damage to or destruction of such separated body parts as a 
bodily injury within the meaning of § 823, I and § 847, I of the Civil Code. 
                                                            
497 Werner Ebke and Mathew Finkin, Introduction to German Law. (1996) 202. 
498 Van Dam, above n 469, 146. 
499 Von Bar, above n 486, 70. 
500 Ibid, 45. 
501 For a similar case in the common law, but reaching the opposite conclusion, see Yearworth v North Bristol 
NHS Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 37. 
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The judgment gives a broad interpretation to the concept of bodily injury within the 
meaning of § 823, I and § 847 of the Civil Code. It construes the right to one’s body as a 
legally formulated part of the general personality right (Persönlichkeitsrecht) and views as an 
injury to the body, mentioned expressly in § 823, I alongside the injury to health, any 
unauthorized interference, not covered by the consent of the holder of the right, in that 
person’s physical integrity. It is said that what is protected by § 823, I is not the material 
substance, but the existentially determined scope of personality which materializes in how 
one feels physically. § 823, I protects the body as the basis of personality. 
The decision emphasises the need for judicial adjustment to medical advances that 
enable components to be removed from the body and to be reincorporated in it later, like skin 
and bone parts intended for transplantation in the person’s own body, of eggs removed for 
fertilization and of blood donation intended for oneself.  
Van Gerven, commenting on this judgment, points out that four situations and 
corresponding legal solutions are distinguished: (i) parts of the body, such as a lock of hair or 
a tooth, which have become permanently severed from the body, and have thus become 
goods subject to normal rules on personal property; (ii) separated parts, such as donated 
blood or organs, destined to be integrated into someone else’s body, which enjoy for the time 
being only the protection afforded to personal property unless in the circumstances of the 
case the general personality right (Persönlichkeitsrecht) take precedence; (iii) parts of a 
person’s body, such as skin, blood or egg-cells, although removed from the body, which are 
destined to be reintegrated into that person’s body, and therefore treated as remaining part of 
the functional unity of the body and so continue to enjoy the same legal protection as the 
body; and (iv) organic matter, such as sperm, which is definitively separated from the body, 
but is destined to be used to perform a typical bodily function, like procreation. In this last 
situation, the Supreme Court held that § 823, I and § 847, I of the Civil Code should be 
applied, by analogy with situation (ii).502 
Under the same heading, the German Supreme Court has also held that the transmission 
of the aids virus constitutes an injury to health, even when it has not yet developed into HIV. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
502 Van Gerven, above n 468, 148-9. 
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1.3.4 ‘Another right’. 
 
The expression ‘another right’ is rather vague. However, it is certainly not meant to 
include all kinds of rights or legitimate interests for otherwise the intention of the drafters of 
the German code not to provide for a general tort, as in article 1382 of the French civil code 
would be defeated. Although the list of protected interests is not closed, the courts have 
always interpreted that expression as referring to ‘absolute rights’, that is, those which can be 
asserted against everyone (contrary to contractual rights, for instance, which exist only 
towards the contracting party) and ‘real rights’ (property, possession, servitudes, etc.). The 
Bundesgerichtshof (the highest court of civil and criminal litigation) has also recognised a 
general interest of personality as an absolute right.503  
In van Gerven’s opinion, the provision in § 823, I whereby other rights are protected 
against unlawful and culpable invasions is vague and imprecise enough to have tempted the 
courts into interpreting it as covering the particular interest of the plaintiff when there was no 
other way of achieving a reasonable result. One of those cases is the so-called ‘general right 
of personality’, (Persönlichkeitsrecht)504 regarded since 1954 as one of the other rights 
protected.505 
The origin of the extension of § 823, I is the Schacht case.506 The plaintiff was the 
attorney of Dr. Schacht, who had been Economic Minister under Hitler. The defendant was a 
weekly journal which had published an article objecting to Dr. Schacht’s founding a bank. 
The attorney had been instructed by Dr. Schacht to send to the defendant, in his capacity as 
Dr. Schacht’s attorney, a letter demanding that certain corrections be made. The defendant 
left out parts of the letter and published the rest under the heading ‘Letters to the Editors’ 
thereby creating the wrong impression that the attorney had acted in a private capacity, 
supporting Dr. Schacht and expressing his own, personal views  rather than those of his 
client. The Court held that the publication had to be corrected. The reasons given by the 
Federal Supreme Court were that the defendant had violated the plaintiff’s general right of 
                                                            
503 Kurt Markert, Tort liability for the physical consequences of emotional disturbance resulting from harm or 
peril to another under Anglo-American and German law. Thesis, New York, 1959. [microform]  
504 The Persönlichkeit, familiar concept to civil lawers, has no equivalent in the common law. It is an abstraction 
which comprises attributes such as amongst others, honour, integrity, image, name, privacy and autonomy. Van 
Gerven, above n 468, 96. 
505 Until then the only protection in the field covered in English law by defamation lay in the fact that 
Beleidigung (insulting words or conduct) was a criminal offence, and thus anyone guilty under the appropriate 
paragraphs of the Criminal  Code could be sued for damages under § 823, II –though only for actual, not for 
general, damage. Hilary Cartwright,  ‘The law of obligations in England and Germany.’  (1964) 13 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 1325. 
506 For an English translation, see Markesinis, above n 478, 294-298 (case 19). 
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personality by publishing the letter in that manner and presenting a false picture of the 
author’s personality.507 
This is now the legal basis on which claims for damages are made when one’s honour 
is impunged, one’s reputation besmirched or one’s privacy invaded.508 The recognition of a 
‘general right of personality’ as one of the ‘other rights’ in § 823, I has been described as the 
most important change in tort law since codification. Although its classification alongside the 
expressly listed rights in that provision is not self evident, German courts have consistently 
interpreted the protected rights in § 823, I to be absolute rights, thus entitling the holder of 
these rights to invoke them erga omnes.509 
 
1.4 Psychiatric harm in civil law. 
 
One type of injury that gives rise to considerable difficulties in the common law is 
nervous shock. On the contrary, the question of compensation for psychiatric injury has never 
been debated as such in France. The discussion of this issue would be considered superfluous 
in the context of art.1382 of the civil code that establishes liability for all damages. The 
French courts, by submitting all claims for negligently inflicted damage whether moral or 
material, to the general principles of liability under art. 1382 C.C. show no reluctance at all to 
allow an equal treatment for psychiatric and physical injury claims. 
Compensation for non-pecuniary loss is deeply rooted in the French legal tradition and 
it is widely felt among both judges and scholars that it performs the fundamental function of 
expressing society’s acknowledgement of what is currently called the ‘eminent dignity of the 
human dignity.’ 
The French conception of the dommage moral is so wide that there is no legal obstacle 
for pure psychological disorders, provided they are medically ascertained. An interesting 
example of this can be found in a recent case of the Cour de Cassation (criminal division). A 
young girl had been repeatedly raped by her father when she was still a minor and as a result, 
had given birth to a child. The girl sued her father in damages, in her own name and on behalf 
of her child. It was held that the child, who was aware of his origin and was consequently 
                                                            
507 Werner Ebke and Mathew Finkin, Introduction to German Law. (1996) 201. 
508 Horn, above n 481, 147. 
509 Martin Vranken, Fundamentals of European Civil Law (1997) 134. 
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suffering acute psychological disorders, could be compensated for his ‘severe psychological 
trauma.’510 
In Germany, courts have not faced similar difficulties as the ones that exist in the 
common law to state liability for shock injury. There is a well established principle that 
damages are not limited to physically ascertainable injuries but also comprise impairment of 
health due to psychological impact.  
In view of the broad scope of protection of personal interests provided by § 823, I, it 
has virtually never been maintained since the enactment of the Civil Code, that a ‘physical 
impact’ or some similar element should be required to grant relief. The interest of a person’s 
health, expressly stated in that paragraph, has been construed by the courts to include the 
entire sphere of bodily integrity, bodily as well as mental and emotional reactions. 
Since negligence under German law denotes the nature of certain conduct in an 
objective sense, it is not necessary to establish that harm to the particular plaintiff was 
foreseeable in order to hold liable a defendant who is found to have acted contrary to the 
standards of care. In the absence of something similar to the Palsgraf doctrine, the German 
courts had no legal basis to establish a rule that conduct by which someone was harmed or 
endangered was not a wrong toward another, who was shocked by the effect of that act. 
Recovery could only be denied on the theory that there was no ‘adequate’ causal connection 
between the act and the shock. Thus, a commentator points out that the shock injury problem 
under German law has always been one of legal or adequate causation, rather than of personal 
fault and foreseeability.511 Causation through psychic reaction is normally established when 
there is sufficient certainty that the psychic mediated consequences would not exist without 
the initial tortious act.512 
However, in a case decided in 1931, the Supreme Court held that a mother could 
recover damages for shock injury due to the death of her child, who had been killed by the 
defendant negligently driving his car. The court pointed out that the issue in that case was not 
one of liability for indirect damage, which would only be recoverable in situations covered by 
§§ 844, 845 BGB. Indirect damage, it was said, is that to a person’s property or monetary 
interests, where such person was not directly affected by the act, as, for instance, in the case 
of bodily harm to someone employed by another. ‘But in the case of personal damage it has 
                                                            
510 Cour de Cassation, Chambre Criminelle, 4.02.1998, (1999) Dalloz, 445 et seq. note D. Bourgault-
Coudevylle. 
511 Markert, above n 497, 47. 
512 Ulrich Magnus, ‘Remarks on psychic causation’ in  Magnus and Spiers (Eds.) European Tort Law. Líber 
Amicorum for Helmut Koziol ( 2000) 174. 
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never been contended that the harm must be a direct one. If there is sufficient evidence that 
the result was adequately caused by the defendant’s conduct and that the act was negligent, 
the plaintiff should have a right of action. That the death of a child by an accident might 
emotionally upset and shock the child’s mother and cause bodily harm to her cannot be 
considered a highly extraordinary result. It is also reasonable to assume, that such a result 
was foreseeable. It is not material that the defendant could know that the child’s parents were 
still alive. He should have foreseen only that the parents might be shocked and that the shock 
might impair their health. It is no unreasonable extension of the scope of personal fault to 
assume, that this was within the area of reasonable foresight.’513  
 In another Supreme Court’s decision the child’s mother, who was not a witness of the 
accident that killed her son, but arrived soon after it had occurred,514 sustained a nervous 
breakdown and needed medical treatment. The judgment maintained that ‘When a mother 
sustains a nervous shock and illness as a result of her child’s death, it cannot properly be 
argued that this was merely an indirect consequence of the act. The case of physical injury to 
the plaintiff herself is not comparable to the case of a possible monetary loss of someone as a 
result of another’s death. The mother’s injury is a direct consequence of the defendant’s 
negligence, just as the death of the child. If the child had been accompanied by his mother 
and had been killed before her eyes, nobody would have any doubt that her shock was 
immediately and directly connected with the accident. That the plaintiff in the present case 
was not on the scene when the child was killed, is, however, irrelevant in determining 
liability. This view is consistent with the principle of adequate causation. It is not unlikely 
that a mother sustains bodily injury from a shock as a result of her child’s death. Such result 
is within the natural course of events.’515  
The cases before the Supreme Court involved only parent-child and husband-wife 
relationships, where the shock was due to the child’s or spouse’s death. An intermediate court 
held that a shock to a parent occasioned by a slight injury to his child was not adequately 
caused by the defendant negligently injuring the child. Whether an apprehension of death to a 
child or spouse may be considered an adequate cause of shock injury, however, has not yet 
been decided by the highest instance in Germany. 
                                                            
513 Reichsgericht, Sept. 21, 1931, 133 RGZ 270. Markert, above n 497, 46. 
514 In German law, a secondary victim need not have witnessed the accident; communication by a third party is 
sufficient to find liability. This approach has been followed in several cases. Cf. Basil Markesinis, A 
comparative Introduction to the German Law of Torts. (1994)124. 
515 Rechsgericht, Jan 8, 1940, 162 RGZ 321. Apud Markert above n 497, 47. 
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An argument against recovery for emotional distress is the theory called ‘normal risks 
of life’ (theorie vom allgemeinen Lebensrisko) which proposes that there is a limit to liability, 
assuming that civil law cannot protect victims from harm which is inevitably linked to human 
existence, like that of a person who suffers nervous shock from witnessing a car accident on 
the street.516 According to this formula, a tortfeasor incurs no liability save to the extent that 
the level of common risks has been exceeded. Conceived as a corollary of the postulate that 
liability be limited to the risks which the particular rule was intended to reduce, this formula 
specifically limits a tortfeasor’s liability to injury only which falls beyond the common risks 
of life.517 The receptivity of this theory by the courts, however, is in doubt. In effect, in 1969, 
the plaintiff suffered a severe nervous shock upon witnessing how her fiancé was struck 
down by a drunk driver and was killed instantaneously before her eyes. Although she only 
suffered negligible physical injuries she could recover adequate damages for nervous 
shock.518 
In Germany, evidence of a medically recognisable illness is necessary to entitle a 
plaintiff to compensation for psychiatric injuries.519 The reactions must be serious and lasting. 
Minor impairments of sleep do not suffice. In 1971, the Supreme Court held that ‘liability for 
harm physically occasioned… must be limited to cases where the man in the street and not 
only a medical practitioner, would describe it as injury to…health…Injuries which are 
medically ascertainable but do not amount to a shock to the system must go 
uncompensated…No claim can be made in the normal case of deeply felt grief…’520  
§ 823, I requiring injury to health represents a serious obstacle for most claimants. 
Therefore, there are only two circumstances in which mental suffering will be compensated: 
a) when it results from a true violation of a person’s body; b) in default of that, if it manifests 
itself as mental illness; that is, a traumatic injury which exceeds the level of pain, grief and 
despair usually encountered in situations of tragedies (for instance, a mental depression, or 
changes in personality). If the victim does manage to overcome this hurdle, he must 
                                                            
516 A commentator doubts whether the facing of horrifying scences which the observer cannot avoid to observe 
and which make him ill should be regarded as normal daily risks or whether these are costs of (especially) 
modern traffic and/or  modern technology which should not be externalised but be borne by those who created 
the risk and benefit from it. Magnus, above n 506, 170. 
517 John G. Fleming, ‘Distant shock in Germany (and elsewhere).’ (1972) 20 American Journal of Comparative 
Law, 491. 
518 The Supreme Court, however, has recently reaffirmed that ‘a tortfeasor is liable for the psychological effects 
of an accident for which he is reponsible and is relieved of liability only in cases where the adverse 
psychological consequences can reasonably be said to be just part of the normal hazards of life, for then there is 
no connection of unlawfulness between the act and the neurosis’. BGH, 9 april 1991. Apud, Van Gerven, above 
n 468, 92. 
519 Magnus, above n 506, 170. 
520 Markesinis, above n 478, 110. 
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subsequently bypass the test of the adequate cause (Adäquanztest) and, in the case of 
secondary victims, prove that the indirect violation could have been foreseen. Markesinis 
claims that this reliance on the Adäquanztest shows the tendency of German law (and modern 
civil law in general) to use normative concepts of causation in cases where common lawyers 
would more evidently have recourse to the notion of duty of care.521 
The psychic reaction of the victim must not constitute an evidently unreasonable kind 
of reaction to the incident. The severity of the incident that triggered off the shock is an 
important criterion when judging whether the injury thus sustained can be regarded as a 
reasonable reaction to the event. A shock due to the witnessing of the death of one’s dog,522 
the witnessing of minor damages to personal property, or to police investigations which were 
initiated by false allegations do not suffice.523 Janssens sees a very contrasting difference 
between this requirement and the French liberal attittude towards granting damages for the 
anguish felt, e.g. when one’s dog loses an eye in a dogfight, or rolls of film containing 
sentimental pictures disappear in a photoshop through negligence.524 
The reasonability of the reaction is by no means influenced by the fact whether the 
plaintiff was physically proximate at the time of the accident. Physical proximity under 
German law is, therefore no prerequisite.525 On the other hand, the severity of the incident 
that triggered off the shock is an important criterion when judging whether the injury thus 
sustained can be regarded as a reasonable reaction to the event.526 
A mental predisposition or anomaly of the victim is generally of no consequence in 
regard to the responsibility of the tortfeasor; the ‘thin skull rule’ extends to psychiatric injury 
cases.527 The Supreme Court, in a case where the plaintiff committed suicide three years after 
a car crash, held that his psychological condition was a result of the accident, regardless of 
his tendency towards depression and sadness. Magnus notes that even if there were a causal 
connection between the suicidal act and the initial injury sustained, the tortfeasor would not 
                                                            
521 Markesinis, above n 478, 122. 
522 Neither when the allegedly shock-injury was caused by a small good-natured dog which was barking at the 
plaintiff. The court denied that the harm was ‘adequately’ caused by the defendant’s dog, since it was totally 
undangerous, so that it was highly extraordinary that harm of any kind could be inflicted under the 
circumstances. Reichsgericht, Dec. 9, 1907, (1908) Das Recht. Apud, above n 496, 26. Also when severe and 
permanent mental damage results after harsh but not unusual dispute. Magnus, above n 505, 171. 
523 However, Markert refers cases where redress was allowed to a plaintiff who had suffered emotional distress 
resulting in a heart attack when wrongfully imprisoned by a police officer (Reichsgericht, Dec. 21, 1917, 91 
RGZ 347) and to a civil servant who sustained a nervous disease as a result of a permanently bad and violent 
treatment by his superior (Reichsgericht, Feb. 11, 1913. Das Recht 1133. Markert, above n 496, 26. 
524 Janssens, above n 109, 99. 
525 Markesinis, above n 478, 104. 
526 Janssens, above n 109, 98. 
527 Magnus, above n 506, 174. 
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be held liable for any economic loss arising from the suicide itself.528 However, the courts 
have limited liability in cases of victims instrumentalizing an injury in pursuit of a neurotic 
desire for maintenance and security (so-called Rentenneurose).529 The amount of 
compensation granted may be lower if a mental predisposition would have led to similar 
results without the accident in question. 
Where the psychiatric injury arises from an injury to a third person the courts normally 
require a close personal relationship between the shocked victim and the third person.530 
Under the German legal system only near relatives (children, parents and spouses) of the 
direct victims qualify for compensation. However, this rigid categorization has not found full 
aplication as damages have been awarded to the fianceé, life-partner of the victim and 
nasciturus. Mere friends, acquaintances or, in general, those who do not have a personal 
relationship with the victim, do not qualify and are excluded from recovery. Suggestions have 
been made, however, to create a possibility for bystander recovery when the accident was 
particularly gruesome or was caused intentionally rather than negligently.531 
In The Netherlands, since the horrific circumstances of the so called taxi-bus case, a 
more flexible approach is developed. A 5-year old girl was, while riding her bicycle close to 
her home in a residential quarter, overrun by a bus that actually rode over the girl’s head. Her 
mother was immediately warned by one of her neighbours and found her daughter with her 
face turned to the ground. First, the mother ran back to her house to call an ambulance; then 
she hurried back to the site of the accident. There she tried to turn her daughter’s head to look 
her in the face. While doing so, she experienced that her hand disappeard into the skull of the 
child and she noticed that the substance next to the girl’s head was not, as she assumed, her 
vomit, but appeard to be the girl’s brains. The mother consequently suffered severe mental 
illness. 
According to Dutch law these cases concerning ‘nervous shock’ are problematic, 
because the legislator has explicitly decided that under Dutch law there is no claim for non-
pecuniary damages subsequent to death of a relative. For a long time the question was, under 
which circumstances this decision would leave space for a claim concerning psychiatric 
illness in case of loss of a relative. 
                                                            
528 Ibid. p. 87. For a similar case in the common law, but different result, see Corr v IBC Vehicles Ltd. [2008] 1 
AC 884. 
529 The term refers to a neurotic reaction which is exclusively motivated by the victim’s wish to get a rent and to 
be protected against difficulties and necessity to earn money by himself. Magnus and Fedtke, above n 453,110. 
Janssens , above n 109, 88. Magnus, above n 506, 174. 
530 Ibid, 171. 
531 Janssens, above n 109, 98. 
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That was the first occasion in which a right to compensation of non-pecuniary damages 
was awarded to a mother who lost her child in a traffic-accident. The Supreme Court decided 
that the act committed towards the child, in those circumstances, must also be regarded as 
tortious towards the mother. However, according to the Supreme Court, a distinction should 
be made between the consequences of the child’s death, for which no non-pecuniary damages 
may be awarded, and the consequences of the confrontation with the accident, for which 
damages may indeed be awarded.  
At the present, the legislature is reconsidering its decision regarding the ban of non-
pecuniary damages in case of loss and serious injury of a relative. They are working on a 
proposal that grants certain relatives (including the parents of a deceased child) a fixed 
amount of non-pecuniary damages of 10.000 Euros. 
 
1.5 Conclusions.  
 
The extensive research developed along this chapter clearly indicates that, despite the 
proliferation of cases in which the issue of psychiatric harm has been considered, dissected 
and analysed by the highest courts of many jurisdictions in the common law, and the fact that 
in many instances this type of loss is now recoverable where once was refused, too much 
uncertainty still remains. After analyzing hundreds of decisions in five different common law 
jurisdictions, and reading about all the reasons and arguments in favour of the categorization 
of psychiatric harm as a special area of the law, this researcher is still reluctant to accept that 
a person should not have a right to his or her psychological integrity as he or she has to his or 
her body, or that there is any sensible basis for treating psychiatric damage as less deserving 
of the law's protection.   
From the comparative point of view, it has been shown that in Germany, victims of 
psychiatric injury must meet the criteria of § 823 I BGB, which demand evidence of an injury 
to health. As most claimants cannot meet this demand,
 
German law consequently appears 
significantly restrictive.  
Because recovery for psychiatric harm is rather more limited in German law than in 
most other civil law countries, the jurisdiction that probably appeals for more attention is 
France. In French law, there are no statutory provisions dealing specifically with the issue of 
damages for psychiatric injury. ‘Dommage’ is not qualified in article 1382. Consequently, 
damages for psychiatric harm is by no way excluded by the Civil Code. The fundamental 
principle of the general regime of civil liability is total reparation, according to which the 
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balance upset by the injury must be re-established. The control mechanism against unlimited 
loss in the civil law lies not in the type of loss but in the factual determination of whether the 
loss is a direct, certain and immediate result of the negligence. The simplicity and efficiency 
with which the French system deals with psychiatric harm should be taken as an invitation for 
the reflection whether the time has not arrived for the common law system to discard all 
artificial distinctions and simply adopt a foreseeability test with traditional negligence control 
mechanisms such as fault and causation. The French law system and its derivatives provide 
the strongest empirical evidence that the absence of a formal rule precluding or excessively 
limiting psychiatric harm will not inevitably descend into cataclysmic chaos. 
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           PART II: ECONOMIC LOSS. 
 
Introduction. 
 
There is no easy definition of economic loss. It has been said that, in one sense, all 
loss is economic, in that the victim is complaining that something that belongs to her or him, 
be it the victim’s body, car, or house, is worth less as a result of the wrongdoer’s 
commissions or omissions, and as a result of which the victim wants compensation in the 
form of money. However, the term ‘economic loss’ in the law of torts is generally used as 
opposite to personal injury or physical damage to property. A commentator has more 
distinctly defined pure economic loss as ‘the financial harm arising out of wrongful 
interference with plaintiff’s contractual relations or with his or her non contractual 
prospective gain.’1 
Tort law has consistently struggled to find a satisfactory response to claims for pure 
economic loss suffered due to negligence. Whilst it is accepted in the common law that such 
losses will be treated differently from claims for physical damage, the exact boundaries 
remain a matter of dispute. Common law courts find a number of valid reasons for 
distinguishing negligence claims for pure economic loss from negligence claims for personal 
injury or damage to property. One could think (at least, a civilian would do so) that to isolate 
economic loss from physical harm is already enough. However, that is only the first stage of 
the analysis. The system still requires identifying significant differences among several 
categories of cases.  
A brief overview of this area of the law reveals that economic loss can result from an 
infinite variety of factual situations. There are, however, several clear categories in which 
certain duty issues stand out: misstatements, relational economic loss, defective products or 
building structures, among others (the classic distinction by Feldthusen recognizes five 
categories of claim) plus a series of isolated cases without other connection than the simple 
fact that they represent financial losses.2 I have chosen three of them (together with a residual 
category) with the conviction that they represent a solid starting point for analysis and 
discussion of the law. It is expected that these different categories grouped around common 
policy concerns will illuminate better why recovery should be limited and thereby explain the 
rational development of this area of the law. In that sense, the purpose of the first part of this 
                                                            
1 Mario Rizzo, ‘A theory of economic loss in the law of torts’. (1982) 11 Journal of Legal Studies 281. 
2 Bruce Feldthusen, Economic Negligence. The recovery of pure economic loss. (2000) 
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chapter is to describe how common law courts try to articulate and justify that substantial 
difference between claims for personal injury and property damage and claims for economic 
loss in which they believe.  
On the second part, there is a complete different starting point. The civil law 
jurisdictions of France and the countries that follow its pattern make no distinction between 
physical and economic damage. French law contains no independent category for pure 
economic loss as the courts do not distinguish between different heads of damage. Loss of 
any type is recoverable wherever fault, damage and a direct and immediate causal connection 
between the two are established.  Thus, in principle, pure economic loss is recoverable. 
However, whilst recovery in French law is far more generous than in the common law, it 
should not be assumed that liability will be unlimited. The courts have, in practice, severely 
restricted it through the use of causative devices and a normative understanding of the notion 
of damage requiring proof that the loss caused by the fault of the defendant, is certain, 
immediate and direct. So much so that, Professor Durry, referring to pure economic loss 
involving ricochet damage in the case of fatal injuries, was prepared to admit that French law 
follows a well-known dialectical pattern: in theory it allows extensive compensation but in 
practice it limits it to a closed list of relatives.3 The system works perfectly well in avoiding 
the threat of unlimited liability and is certainly a wakeup call to the reflection of whether the 
common law should not change its focus entirely to a concern with causation as the limiting 
factor. 
German law, in contrast, starts from a position of non-recovery. Pure economic loss is 
not an interest protected by § 823, I of the civil code. Nevertheless, the courts, reasoning by 
analogy, have developed the ‘right to an established and operative business’ or utilized other 
paragraphs of the BGB to permit recovery, for example § 823, II (breach of a statute designed 
to protect another) and § 826 (deliberate harm to another contrary to bonos mores), as well as 
the notion of ‘contract with protective effects for third parties’. 
Whilst the German concept of protected interest is closer to the position in the 
common law, in that an established rule of non-recovery has been attenuated by 
jurisprudence, the emphasis remains on the establishment of bases for recovery rather than a 
satisfactory justification for the exclusion of claims. 
In spite of the fact that I have mainly concentrated on French and German law, some 
other countries are also contemplated. 
                                                            
3 Georges Durry, (1976) Revue Trimestrièlle de Droit Civil 132, 134. 
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Although the ideal comparison would be with equivalent categories of the ones 
already consolidated in the common law, the fact of the absolute absence of the notion of 
‘economic loss’ in some cases and the completely different approach in others, did not allow 
me to do that. Instead, I have chosen to refer to some typical situations, such as the cable 
cases, auditor’s liability and others that have received special consideration from the civil law 
courts. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE COMMON LAW 
 
2. 1 The rule in Hedley Byrne v Heller. 
 
2.1.1 Background. 
 
When can an action be maintained for negligence in the use of words? Is there ever a 
legal duty, except when created by contract, to be careful in the use of language?  
It is settled law that where negligent words cause physical injury, the law that applies 
can be found in the general principles of ordinary negligence.4 If, for example, a statement is 
negligently made that a wall is safe, and others rely upon that and suffer injury when the wall 
collapses, this will give rise to a claim in negligence.5 But the problem that focuses our 
attention now is when a misstatement causes not physical, but economic loss. The situations 
that arise are almost exclusively in the context of commercial dealings. 
In a strict sense, words are acts. However, the common law has always circumscribed 
more closely the scope of liability for negligent statements than for negligent acts.6 But, what 
are the intrinsic differences between words (spoken or written) and other acts, which justify a 
different treatment? 
It has been submitted that even if the law recognizes that there may be such a thing as 
a duty to be careful in the use of one’s tongue, it does not necessarily follow that the duty 
should be held to be as universal and as far-reaching as the duty to be careful in the use of 
one’s axe. On the one hand, negligence in the use of tangible objects is, in the great majority 
of instances, much more likely to cause serious damage than negligence in the use of 
language. On the other hand, a duty to be careful on ordinary occasions in the use of language 
is a more burdensome restriction on humanity.7 
The difference might justify the imposition of a duty of care in the use of words in a 
more restricted class of cases, but it would not justify the view that no duty of care in the use 
of language should ever be imposed under any conceivable circumstance. 
Another judicial caution in this area recognizes that liability for negligent words, 
usually involving economic harm, can have a ripple effect which may lead to liability in an 
indeterminate amount, for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.8 
                                                            
4 Stephen Todd, The Law of Torts. (2009) 199. 
5 M.A. Jones, ‘Negligently inflicted psychiatric harm: is the word mightier than the deed?’ (1977) 13 
Professional Negligence 113. 
6 Jane Swanton, ‘Concurrent liability in Tort and Contract’ (1996) 10 Journal of Comparative Law 32. 
7 Jeremiah Smith, ‘Liability for negligent language’ (1900) 14 Harvard Law Review 195. 
8 Ultramares Corp v Touche, Niven and Co 255 NY 170: 174 NE 441 at 444 (1931). 
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A negligent misrepresentation is a negligently arrived at erroneous conclusion of fact 
uttered under such circumstances that the utterance would not have been made by an ordinary 
prudent person unless he or she had first used due care to ascertain the truth. The negligence 
consists not merely in arriving at the wrong conclusion but also in speaking under such 
circumstances that a reasonable man would have felt himself constrained not to speak unless 
he had investigated the facts.9  
In the nineteenth century, claims of misrepresentation were limited to the intentional 
tort of deceit, which required proof of actual fraud, as opposed to mere negligence, in the 
making of the statement. The law of contract was the main avenue of recovery, naturally 
limited to situations in which consideration had passed between the parties in privity with one 
another.10 
In England, the courts refused to recognize a cause of action for negligent 
misrepresentation. The House of Lords, in 1889, had precluded any development of the 
action through its decision in Derry v. Peek.11 In that leading case, which ‘embodied into 
English law the strongest form of nineteenth-century laissez-faire’,12 it was held that the 
action could not be maintained against a defendant who had made his statement in good faith, 
even though his honest belief in the truth of what he said was an entirely unreasonable one. 
Judged by the low standard of commercial morality which at that time commended, there 
could be no fraud without dishonesty and credulity did not amount to dishonesty.13 
In Derry v. Peek, the directors of a tramway company stated in their prospectus that 
they had the right to use steam power. They knew, but did not mention that the approval of 
the Board of Trade was required and they expected that there would be no question of its 
being refused. The consent was never obtained, and the stock was worth less than if the 
company had had the right to use steam. Sir Henry Peek, a stockholder who had purchased on 
the faith of the prospectus, sued the directors for deceit in making the above positive 
representation.   
At first instance, Justice Stirling gave judgment for the defendants on the ground that 
an innocent but negligent statement, however unreasonable it might be, was not sufficient to 
support an action for deceit. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment holding that acting 
                                                            
9 (Note) ‘Tort liability for negligent language’. (1928) 28 Columbia Law Review, 216. 
10 Feldthusen, above, n 2, 23. 
11 (1889), 14 App.Cas. 337 (H.L). 
12 Robert Stevens, ‘Hedley Byrne v. Heller: Judicial creativity and doctrinal possibility.’ (1964) 27 Modern Law 
Review, p. 121. 
13 A.M. Honoré, ‘Hedley Byrne & Co., Ltd. v. Heller & Partners, Ltd’. (1964-65) 8 Journal of the Society of 
Public Teachers Law 294. 
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honestly but unreasonably in this way might ground liability. The directors had negligently 
made a false statement of fact for which they were liable, although they had not done so with 
any fraudulent intent. Sir James Hannen said: ‘It appears to me that nothing can morally 
justify a man in stating a thing as a fact, as existing at present, because he expects that it will 
exist in the future.’14 The court was therefore prepared to consider this a form of legally 
recognizable carelessness.  
In a note on this case, Sir Frederick Pollock welcomed the decision of the Court of 
Appeal saying that ‘the law is rapidly tending towards the enforcement (contrary, no doubt, to 
old authorities and to some recent ones) of a general duty to be careful, as well as to abstain 
from willful harm, in statements as well as in acts.’15  
Pollock was unduly optimistic in his prophecy, for it took the law exactly seventy-five 
years to reach the conclusion that he supported in 1889.16 He could not imagine that in the 
following year, the House of Lords would unanimously reverse the decision of the Court of 
Appeal and hold that however negligent the directors might have been in misstating the facts 
in the prospectus, they could not be held liable for the tort of deceit if they had not known 
that their statement was untrue, or concerning the truth of which they were indifferent. Later, 
that year in another article entitled Derry v Peek in the House of Lords, Pollock criticized this 
decision in strong terms, saying that ‘the House of Lords had dangerously relaxed the legal 
conception of honesty in the statement of facts, and that it would do no good, to say the least, 
to commercial morality.’17 In the years following that decision, he used the case notes section 
of the Law Quarterly Review to mount a sustained and uncompromising crusade against it18, 
appealing ‘to every tribunal which is at liberty to disregard it’.19 ‘Derry v. Peek’, he 
lamented, ‘is now law, though bad law,’20 for it ‘encourages practices which may easily go to 
the very verge of fraud.’21 
                                                            
14 At 584. Pollock thought that this was really the main point of judgment which had been reversed in the House 
of Lords. He said it was difficult to believe that the House of Lords in its judicial capacity would regard it as 
morally justifiable to say that I have a hundred pounds at the bank when I mean that I have not any such sum, 
but have reason to hope that my banker will give me credit to that extent. Frederick Pollock, ‘Derry v. Peek in 
the House of Lords’. (1889) 5 Law Quarterly Review, 421. 
15 (1889) 5 Law Quarterly Review 103. 
16 Arthur L. Goodhart, ‘Liability for innocent but negligent misrepresentations’. (1964) 74 Yale Law Journal, p. 
289. 
17 Pollock, above n 14, 422. 
18 Neil Duxbury. Jurists and Judges. An essay on influence. (2001) 86. 
19 Frederick Pollock, ‘Derry v. Peek in the House of Lords.’ (1889) 5 Law Quarterly Review, 410. In 1893, in a 
letter to Holmes he called Derry v Peek ‘my enemy’, in M de Wolfe,  The Pollock-Holmes letters: 
Correspondence of Sir Frederick Pollock and Mr. Justice Holmes, 1874-1932. (1942), Vol. 1, 49. 
20 Frederick Pollock (1892) 8 Law Quarterly Review, p. 7. 
21 Frederick Pollock (1893) 9 Law Quarterly Review, p. 202. 
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In the course of his judgment, Lord Bramwell said that: ‘To found an action for 
damages there must be a contract and breach, or fraud.’22 It is this statement which caused the 
courts in subsequent cases to adhere to a restrictive principle even though this case had dealt 
only with the fraud aspect of the director’s misstatement, and had not even considered what 
their position might be in negligence.23 In his speech, Lord Herschell said: 
 
First, in order to sustain an action of deceit, there must be proof of fraud, and nothing short of that will 
suffice. Secondly, fraud is proved when it is shewn that a false representation has been made (1) 
knowingly, or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false.24 
 
In what is considered the early leading article on the subject, Smith submits that 
taking the facts to be as they were understood by the Law Lords, the decision of the House of 
Lords seems to be correct. The action, though brought under the modern forms of procedure, 
was, in substance, the old action on the case for deceit, and it was so treated by the counsel on 
both sides and by the judges.25 In such an action the plaintiff alleges that the defendants have 
consciously falsified; i.e. that they have stated what they did not believe to be true. He cannot 
maintain this allegation by showing merely that they have stated what they ought not to have 
believed.26 An action of deceit based on fraud cannot be supported by proof of negligent 
misrepresentation.27 
The question remained whether the plaintiff would have succeeded if he had sued for 
negligence, alleging a duty on the part of the defendant to use reasonable care. The decision, 
                                                            
22 At 374. 
23 Robby Bernstein,  Economic loss. (1998) 536. 
24 At 360-361. The last idea was expressed by Lord Blackburn in the House of Lords some years before Derry v 
Peek: ‘If when a man thinks it highly probable that a thing exists, he chooses to say he knows the thing exists, 
that is really asserting what is false –it is positive fraud.’ Brownlie v Campbell, 5 App. Cas. 925, 953. 
25 However, Reed argues that since Burrowes v. Locke (1805) 10 Ves. 407 it became common to describe 
negligently made misstatements as ‘legal fraud’, to distinguish that ‘fraud’ which made a misrepresentation 
actionable from the ‘fraud’ which meant dishonesty. It was the former definition that the Court of Appeal 
attempted to apply to actions for deceit. To the objection that the House of Lords were correct to reject the 
equitable notion of fraud, for deceit was a purely legal action, he argues that s. 25 (11) of the Judicature Act 
1873 provided that where there is conflict between law and equity with reference to the same matter, equity 
should prevail; and equity had long recognised that it had a concurrent jurisdiction with law over ‘fraudulent’ 
misstatements. The argument, however, was not put to their Lordships. C M Reed, ‘Derry v. Peek and 
negligence.’ (1987) 8 Journal of Legal History, p. 73. Smith also submits that it was long understood that, 
whatever might be the rule at law, a remedy for negligent misrepresentation would be allowed by courts of 
equity in all cases falling within their jurisdiction. Jeremiah Smith, above n 7, 191. 
26 Anson disagrees with both Courts to the existence of an honest belief. He submits that the directors stated that 
as true which they knew not to be true, though they believed it would certainly and very shortly be true. William 
R. Anson, ‘Derry v Peek in the House of Lords’. (1890) 6 Law Quarterly Review, 73. In fact, it appeared from 
the evidence of the directors that some of them had read the Act, and others were not sure whether they had read 
it or not. They knew that there were some conditions as to consent, but supposed that the necessary consents 
were so sure to be given that they might be considered as practically given, and it was not worthwhile to 
mention them. Pollock, above n 14, 420. 
27 Smith, above n 7, 185. 
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being as it was, a reflection of an era, would probably not had led to a different result had the 
action been phrased in negligence.28 Lord Herschell, who gave the principal opinion, 
assumed that an action for negligence could not have been maintained. Smith, however, 
argues that this assumption was, at the most, a mere dictum, because the point was not, and 
could not have been, there decided for it was not before the court. The only question was 
whether the action for deceit would lie.29 Fridman agrees, saying that Lord Herschell did not 
discuss anywhere the question of an action for negligence, except when he spoke of lack of 
reasonable grounds of belief (that is, negligence), and this was only because such conduct 
was material to the question whether in itself (without evidence or proof of actual fraud) it 
was sufficient to found an action for deceit.30 
In any event, the implication that no action would lie in negligence for 
misrepresentation causing financial harm was certainly assumed by bench and bar and the 
case was so interpreted in England31 and in the United States32, and whatever the merits of 
that decision33, the fact remains that it was an effective barrier to granting a remedy for 
negligent misstatements for more than seventy years. 
Three years later, in Le Lievre v. Gould34, a surveyor had provided a builder with 
some certificates as to the progress made at various stages in the building of some houses. 
The plaintiff, as the builder’s mortgagee, advanced some money to him from time to time on 
the faith of these certificates. Due to the surveyor’s negligence, the certificates contained 
untrue statements as to the progress of the buildings, but there was no fraud on his part. The 
Court of Appeal held that the surveyor was not liable to a third party to whom it was shown, 
and who relied on it in taking a mortgage.  
Lord Esher said that ‘in the absence of contract, an action for negligence cannot be 
maintained when there is no fraud.’ Bowen L.J. rationalized the policy underlying this view 
by explaining that the law of England ‘does not consider that what a man writes on paper is 
                                                            
28 Lawson says that the forms of actions had already gone in 1889 and it seems that similar cases would still, 
apart from statute, be decided in the same way even if brought in negligence. Frederick Henry Lawson, ‘The 
duty of care in negligence: a comparative study.’ (1947) 22 Tulane Law Review, 111. 
29 Idem, p. 186. 
30 G H L Fridman, ‘Negligence by words’ (1954) 32 Canadian Bar Review  641. 
31 Stevens, above n 12, 133. 
32 William L. Prosser, Handbook of the law of torts (4th ed. 1971), p. 699-700 
33 Williston submitted that the law of misrepresentation as laid down in Derry v Peek was hopelessly 
inconsistent with the law governing misrepresentation when relied on as the basis of warranty or estoppel 
considering a just ground of reproach to the law when a harmonious doctrine could not be developed.  Samuel 
Williston,  ‘Liability for honest misrepresentation’. (1911) 24 Harvard Law Review, 435. 
34 [1893] 1 Q.B. 491 (C.A). 
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like a gun or other dangerous instrument; and, unless he intended to deceive, the law does 
not, in the absence of contract, hold him responsible for drawing his certificate carelessly.’35  
Goodhart has said that the comparison of a piece of paper on which something is 
written with a gun was not a particularly happy one; as a writing may be just as dangerous as 
any weapon; as many persons have discovered at their cost.36 On the same point, Professor 
Seavey said that words may be as dangerous as guns, and gave the example that arsenic 
labeled salt is more dangerous than dynamite labeled dynamite.37 Smith submitted that the 
argument is beside the real issue, because no one contends that the utterance of non-
defamatory language belongs to the class of extra-hazardous acts where the actor is held to 
the liability of an insurer; like the keeper of a tiger. He concludes that disclaiming such a 
rigorous rule, the question is whether there may not be in some cases a duty to use reasonable 
care in the utterance of language.38 
Bowen L.J. went on to say that:  
Derry v Peek decided that in cases like the present (of which Derry v Peek was itself an instance) there 
is no duty enforceable in law to be careful. Negligent misrepresentation does not amount to deceit, and 
negligent misrepresentation can give rise to a cause of action only if a duty lies upon the defendant not 
to be negligent, and in that class of cases, of which Derry v Peek was one, the House of Lords 
considered that the circumstances raised no such duty.39 
Fridman submits that the comparison with Derry v Peek was unjustified. In effect, he 
argues that the persons sued in Derry v Peek were directors of a company, with which the 
plaintiff entered upon a contractual relationship by the purchase of shares. In other words, 
there was an element of contract about the whole affair. In Le Lievre v Gould, on the other 
hand, there was not the slightest evidence of any contractual relationship existing between the 
plaintiff and the defendant. Deceit, he says, though an action in tort, in many ways 
approximates to an action for rescission of contract and damages for fraudulent 
misrepresentation. That is why in Derry v Peek, in view of the contractual aspects of the case, 
fraud, not merely negligence, was a necessary element in the plaintiff’s case. But why should 
this have been so in Le Lievre v Gould, which was a case of pure tort since there is no 
juridical connection between the tort of negligence and an action for breach of contract.40 
                                                            
35 At 502.  
36 Goodhart, above n 16, 291. 
37 W Seavey, ‘Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co.: Negligent misrepresentations by accountant’. (1951) 67 Law 
Quarterly Review, 472. 
38 Smith, above n 7, 190. 
39 At 501. 
40 Fridman, above n 30, 645. 
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The facts of Le Lievre v Gould have been described as ‘rather obscure’.41 Seemingly, 
the main difference with Candler v Crane, Christmas and Co and others of the kind is that 
the precise transaction for which the certificates would be relied on was not known to the 
defendant.42 However, it has been submitted that the purpose for which a builder might use a 
certificate could hardly be unconnected with obtaining payment or raising a loan from a third 
party.43 
The first effort to curb the impact of Derry v Peek was Nocton v Ashburton.44 In that 
case, a solicitor advised the plaintiff to release part of a mortgage, so that the security became 
insufficient and he suffered loss. The trial judge found as a fact that the defendant had not 
acted fraudulently, but simply negligently and so he was constrained by Derry v Peek. The 
House of Lords, however, held Nocton liable for breach of a fiduciary obligation owed as a 
solicitor to client. 
No doubt Pollock in his campaign had been active behind the scenes. In a letter to 
Holmes he rejoices:  
Haldane asked me last week to a tobacco talk of Derry v Peek and the possibility of minimizing its 
consequences. The Lords are going to hold that it does not apply to the situation created by a positive 
fiduciary duty such as a solicitor’s, in other words, go as near as they dare to saying it was wrong, as all 
in Lincoln’s Inn thought at the time.45 
 
In fact, Haldane L.C., presiding, held that in the absence of fraud, a solicitor still owed 
a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary duty towards those with whom he is not in contractual relations. 
He referred to various situations in which liability had been imposed on defendants for their 
negligent acts or omissions which had injured the property or persons of others, and then he 
continued: 
Although liability for negligence in word has in material respects been developed in our law differently 
from liability for negligence in act, it is nonetheless true that a man may come under a special duty to 
exercise care in giving information or advice…Whether such a duty has been assumed must depend on 
the relationship of the parties, and it is at least certain that there are good many cases in which that 
relationship may be properly treated as giving rise to a special duty of care in statement.46 
 
Gordon finds that Lord Haldane’s dicta were very vague and suggests that what those 
‘special relations’ could be was never explained. In fact, how far he had intended to go is not 
                                                            
41 Honoré, above n 13. 
42 Feldthusen, above n 2, 25. 
43 Honoré, above n 13, 288. 
44 [1914] A.C. 932. [1914-15] All E.R. Rep. 45 (H.L.). 
45 De Wolfe, above n 19, 215. 
46 At 948. 
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entirely clear and led to different interpretations in the Hedley case.47 Gordon believes that 
the actual decision in Nocton v Ashburton  laid down no new law and supplied no authority 
for making fiduciary relations parallel to contract as a basis for damages for negligent 
statements. Although he recognizes that Lord Haldane made obiter suggestions that fiduciary 
relations could found liability for such negligence, he submits that there were no decisions to 
support that view.48  
It has been suggested that the Haldane doctrine represents a teutonic graft on the body 
of the common law. In effect, § 676 of the German civil code establishes that there is no 
liability for mistaken advice or recommendation apart from contractual relations. 
Nevertheless, it also establishes some exceptions: when the person giving advice or making a 
recommendation has expressly or impliedly contracted to take care in doing so or where there 
is a relation equivalent to contract. This is present in particular in the case of fiduciary 
relationships which normally exist when there is a permanent business connexion between 
the parties. There can also be liability in tort for knowingly giving false information or for 
violating the duties of one’s office.49 
At any rate, and whatever Lord Haldane may have intended, a few years later it was 
this idea of special relationship, coupled with the concept of assumption of responsibility, 
which was going to be at the core of all the speeches in the House of Lords in Hedley Byrne v 
Heller.50 
But, prior to Hedley Byrne came the decision of the Court of Appeal in Candler v 
Crane, Christmas & Co.51  In that case, the plaintiff had responded to an advertisement in a 
newspaper by a tin mining company seeking further capital. He was prepared to invest 
₤2,000, but before doing so he wished to be satisfied concerning its financial position. The 
managing director of the company put him in contact with the company’s accountants who, 
knowing for what purpose they were required, showed him the accounts which they had 
drafted. Unfortunately the accounts had been carelessly prepared, and were grossly defective. 
Relying on the accounts, the plaintiff invested ₤2,000 in the company and lost the whole 
                                                            
47 Lord Devlin thought that he was intending to limit his references to traditional fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary 
relationships [1963] 2 All E.R. 575 at p. 606, but Lord Reid could see no logical stopping place. At p. 583. 
48 D M Gordon, ‘Hedley Byrne v Heller in the House of Lords’ (1964-1966) 2 University of British Columbia 
Law Review, 113, 119. 
49 Honoré, above n 13, 296. Viscount Haldane studied in Göttingen and this might explain the similarity 
between ‘fiduciary relationship’ as laid down in Nocton v Lord Ashburton and the culpa in contrahendo 
doctrine. Cf. von Bar ‘Liability for information and opinions causing pure economic loss to third parties: a 
comparison of English and German case law.’ In B S Markesinis (Ed.) The gradual convergence. Foreign ideas, 
foreign influences and English law on the eve of the 21st century (1994) 98, 121. 
50 Stevens, above n 12, 27. 
51 [1951] 2 K.B. 164, [1951] 1 All E.R. 426 (C.A.). 
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amount when the company became insolvent. After discovering that the accounts which he 
had been given provided a completely false picture of the position of the company, indicating 
a flourishing business instead of one which in truth was on the verge of failure, the plaintiff 
brought an action against the accountants claiming damages for negligence.  
Lloyd-Jacob J. dismissed the action, holding that the accountants were under no duty 
of care to the plaintiff. The Court of Appeal also rejected, in a divided decision, the plaintiff’s 
claim. Cohen L.J. and Asquith L.J., following Derry and Le Lievre, held that a false statement 
carelessly, but not fraudulently, made by one person to another, though acted on by that other 
to his detriment, was not actionable in the absence of any contractual or fiduciary relationship 
between the parties. As there was no contract or fiduciary relationship in these circumstances, 
unlike in Nocton v Ashburton, the defendant had no duty of care to the plaintiff on the basis 
of the existing authority. 
Asquith L.J. pointed out that it might not be logical to draw a distinction between 
negligent acts and negligent words, but that the distinction could be explained by the different 
histories of the two forms of liability.52 He also thought that Donoghue v Stevenson53 seemed 
not to have abolished those differences. Negligent misstatements were still governed by 
Derry v Peek and by Le Lievre v Gould.54 The proximity test laid down by Lord Atkin in 
relation to physical harm was not applicable to negligent misstatements. ‘Although Lord 
Atkin’s definition of a neighbour has been applied outside its limited ambit’, he said, ‘it has, 
however, never been applied where the damage complained of was not physical.’55 Asquith 
L.J. argued that had Lord Atkin intended to introduce any changes in the law relating to 
misrepresentations, he would have not referred to Le Lievre with implicit approval.56 He 
finally suggested that the apparent anomaly might be explained on the ground that the 
damage could be traced more easily in one case than in the other. 
                                                            
52 At 195. 
53 [1932] AC 562, [1932] All ER 1 (HL). 
54 Fridman argues that, by affirming Le Lievre, the Court of Appeal were returning to a stage in legal thought 
when confusion about the scope of the tort of negligence still abounded, for Le Lievre expressly overruled the 
only case in which the problem of liability for negligent statements was treated tortiously, without any confusion 
with contractual liability. This was the decision of Chitty J. in Cann v Willson (1888) 3 Ch. 39. Fridman, above 
n 30, 645. 
55 Ibidem. 
56 At 189-190. In Hedley Byrne & Co. v Heller & Partners, Ltd. [1964 A.C.] Lord Pearce also said that 
‘Donoghue v Stevenson was, in fact, dealing with negligent acts causing physical damage, and the opinions 
cannot be read as if they were dealing with negligence in word causing economic damage. Had it been otherwise 
some consideration would have been given to problems peculiar to negligence in words.’ At 536. Fridman 
criticises Asquith’s L.J. interpretation, submitting that to say that Donoghue v Stevenson did not overrule Le 
Lievre v Gould is as pointless as to say that the latter case sustained and confirmed the earlier. Fridman, above n 
30, 652. 
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Seavey argues that if the principle in the Donoghue case does not apply to the facts in 
the Candler case, it must be because of the nature of the interest and not the means used to 
invade it, since in both cases the means which resulted in the harm was the misrepresentation 
(representing as harmless a beverage which in fact was dangerous). Although admitting that 
the courts have not given the same protection to purely economic interests as has been 
afforded to the interest in the physical security of the person or things, Seavey emphasizes 
that there is no intrinsic reason why the rules should be different and that neither Asquith L.J. 
nor Cohen L.J. gave a satisfactory explanation. If the explanation is an historical one, he says, 
there is no reason for a distinction today.57 
It is also strange that, after Asquith’s L.J. insistence on the difference between 
physical injury and financial loss, he ended up giving the example (purporting to apply it in 
an economic loss case such as Candler) of a marine hydrographer who carelessly omits to 
indicate on his map the existence of a reef whereby a liner is wrecked. ‘Is the unforunate 
cartographer’, he says, ‘to be liable to her owners in negligence for some millions of pounds 
damages?’58 
But it was the brilliant dissent by Denning L.J., a ‘masterly analysis’ requiring little, if 
any, amplification or modification in the light of later authority, in Lord Bridge’s words,59 
which made the case memorable.  
After referring to the ‘timorous souls who were fearful of allowing a new cause of 
action’60 and expressing the opinion that ‘a country whose administration of justice did not 
afford redress in a case of the present description would not be in a state of civilization’, he 
argued that there was a duty of care in regard to the representations made by persons such as 
accountants, surveyors, valuers, and analysts, whose profession and occupation it is to 
examine books, accounts and other things61, and to make reports on which other people –
other than their clients- rely in the ordinary course of business.62 The reason why these 
                                                            
57 Seavey,  above n 37, 473. 
58 Fridman asks, why should that be so? If a sailor, he says, reasonably acts on a statement (that is, a 
representation of fact) in a map, and suffers damage because of it, should not the mapmaker (and his employer if 
any) be held liable in damages? He concludes that it is legally and socially desirable that there should. This 
would be in line with Denning’s L.J. proposition that the duty is owed because those persons are in a profession 
that requires special knowledge or skill. Fridman, above n 30, 657. With subtle humour, Goodhart comments 
that it is arguable that, in that sentence, the adjective unfortunate might be applied more suitably to the owners 
of the ship than to the negligent cartographer. A.L. Goodhart, ‘Liability to third persons for defective accounts.’ 
(1951) 67 Law Quarterly Review 176.  
59 In Caparo Industries plc v Dickman. [1990] 2 AC 605, at 623. 
60 At 188. 
61 Denning explained (at 180) that professional persons ‘are not liable, of course, for casual remarks made in the 
course of conversation, nor for other statements made outside their work, or not made in their capacity.’  
62 At 179. 
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particular persons should be made liable is that they have special knowledge or skill on which 
others depend. Because of the confidence the public places in them, those people should 
exercise greater care than the ordinary man in the street. For them, fraud ought not to be the 
only ground of liability; negligence, too should render them under the obligation to 
compensate.63 
In his speech, Lord Denning made it clear that he did not believe that the duty existed 
in all circumstances, but that it was restricted to those specific transactions for which the 
accountants knew that their accounts were required. He said: 
I do not think, he said, that the duty can be extended still further so as to include strangers of whom 
they have heard nothing and to whom their employer without their knowledge may choose to show their 
accounts. Once the accountants have handed their accounts to their employer they are not, as a rule, 
responsible for what he does with them without their knowledge or consent…64 
 
 He next considered the question to whom they were liable: 
…They owe the duty, of course, to their employer or client; and also I think to any third person65 to 
whom they themselves show the accounts, or to whom they know66 their employer is going to show the 
accounts, so as to induce him to invest money or to take some other action on them.67 
 
It has been submitted that, on this point, the judgment of Denning L.J. was out of step 
with the law of negligence in regard to things. Elsewhere, the duty of care is owed to those 
who it is reasonably possible to foresee will be affected by one’s negligent act or omission. In 
that sense, Fridman suggests that the clause ‘or to any person who they can reasonably 
foresee will be shown the accounts so as to be induced to invest money, etc.’ should follow. 
That would enable the wider principle of tort liability to come into play, and would bring 
negligently made statements in the same category as negligently driven motor cars or cycles, 
exploding once for all the fallacy of not treating such a statement as a thing as dangerous as a 
loaded gun or a rickety chair.68 
 
 
                                                            
63 Fridman, above n 30, 655 
64 At 179. 
65 Although Denning L.J. referred to ‘any third person’ in the singular, it is clear that the House of Lords in 
Caparo accepted that an auditor may owe a duty of care to a class of third parties, if he knows that the client 
will show them the audited accounts, and that they will rely on them. M Davies, ‘The liability of auditors to 
third parties in negligence.’  (1991) 14 University of New South Wales Law  Journal 177. 
66 Walker remarks that it is worth observing that the expression ‘or ought to know’ is expressly omitted. ‘The 
bold spirits have conquered: Hedley, Byrne & Co. v. Heller’ (1964-65) 3 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 100. 
Davies points out that the composite phrase ‘knew or ought to have known’ is often used, but it is not often used 
with much precision. Sometimes, ‘ought to have known’ appears to be a simple afterthought, others the whole 
phrase is used as a synonym of  reasonable foreseeability. Davies, ibid. 186. 
67 At 180-181. 
68 Fridman, above n 30, 656.  
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2.1.2 Lord Denning’s dissent at the House of Lords. 
 
Thirteen years later, in 1964, Lord Denning’s L.J. dissent received the strong 
endorsement of the House of Lords when Hedley Byrne v Heller and Partners Ltd.69 was 
decided. 
 The plaintiffs, Hedley Byrne, were a firm of advertising agents placing orders on 
behalf of a client, Easipower Ltd. for television and newspaper advertising on terms under 
which the plaintiffs could be held personally liable for the payment. Becoming concerned 
about Easipower’s credit-worthiness, the plaintiffs instructed their own bankers to look into 
Easipower’s financial position. The plaintiff’s bank telephoned the defendants, Easipower’s 
bankers, and subsequently wrote to them asking ‘in confidence and without responsibility’ 
whether Easipower were considered trustworthy to the extent of £100,000 per annum. The 
reply, given with a disclaimer of responsibility, said that the customer was a respectably 
constituted company, considered to be good for its normal business engagements. Relying on 
that information the plaintiffs entered into a business transaction with the company which 
shortly afterwards went into liquidation, causing the claimants substantial financial loss. They 
brought an action against Hellers for negligence, alleging that, carelessly, a false impression 
as to the credit of the company had been given. 
At the trial Mc Nair J. held that in law no greater duty lay upon the defendants than 
the general duty of honesty, which was in fact satisfied and therefore the cause was 
dismissed. 
The Court of Appeal concluded that Hedley, Byrne & Co. v Heller was 
indistinguishable from the prior binding authorities of Le Lievre v Gould and Candler v 
Crane, Christmas and dismissed the appeal. For the Court, there was no liability for 
misrepresentation, apart from deceit, contract, fiduciary relations and (perhaps) physical 
harm. 
Honoré, with subtle irony, says that, according to that, you may be liable if you tell 
lies, break promises, abuse confidence or say that the ice is safe when it is not. If you merely 
say that a company or an investment is sound, when unknown to you, it is on the point of 
liquidation or worthless, you are not liable, however careless you may have been.70 
In the House, although the case was resolved on the basis of the disclaimer of 
responsibility, it was discussed at length, if there had been no disclaimer of responsibility, 
                                                            
69 [1964] A.C. 465, [1963] 2 All E.R. 575 (H.L.) 
70 Honoré, above n 13, 285. 
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would Hellers have owed a duty of care to Hedley Byrne? All the Lords unanimously stated 
that a duty of care could arise outside a contract or fiduciary relationship if the parties were in 
sufficient proximity. In the words of Lord Hodson, 
…apart from fiduciary relationships…there are other circumstances in which the law imposes a duty to 
be careful, which is not limited to a duty to be careful to avoid personal injury or injury to property but 
covers a duty to avoid inflicting pecuniary loss.71 
 
More specifically, Lord Devlin felt that, 
There is ample authority to justify your Lordships in saying now that the categories of special 
relationships, which may give rise to a duty to take care in word as well as in deed, are not limited to 
contractual relationships or to the relationships of fiduciary duty, but include also relationships 
which…are equivalent to contract; that is, where there is an assumption of responsibility in 
circumstances in which, but for the absence of consideration, there would be a contract. 72 
 
Lord Devlin was reluctant to go further in offering any guidelines about when or how 
this special relationship might be inferred because he considered that there was in the speech 
of Lord Shaw in Nocton v Lord Ashburton and in the idea of a relationship that is equivalent 
to contract all that is necessary to cover the situation that arose in the Hedley case. Lord Shaw 
had in turn borrowed the phrase from Sir Roundell Palmer’s argument in Peek v Gurney73. In 
spite of its credentials, Gordon questions whether the phrase describes anything that can 
exist. Consideration, he says, is the very essence of the contract; take away consideration, and 
what is left? A most bare promise –Hamlet without the prince.74 Weir also thought that the 
concept of ‘special relationship’ on which the duty is said to depend, may yet have a great 
future, but it is a dangerous one in so far as it tempts one to categorisation, to say that, for 
example, publisher/reader might be a special relationship whereas barrister/client might not. 
Such categories, he said, are a tolerable means of stating the law, but a very bad way of 
developing it, as the fateful categories of occupier’s liability have surely shown.75 
Perhaps, because of that conceptual vagueness, there is considerable force in the 
opinion that the term ‘special relationship’ in Hedley Byrne was used as ‘no more than a label 
for the circumstances which will give rise to the duty’76, or that ‘the special relationship test 
turns out to be no real test at all. At best it is merely a conclusory label, and a misleading one 
at that.’77 Ultimately, the special relationship test collapses into either reliance or assumption 
                                                            
71 [1961] 3 All E.R. 575, 598. 
72 Idem at 610. 
73 [1821] L.R. 13 Eq. 29, 97 (Ch). 
74 Gordon, above n 48, 136. 
75 Tony Weir, ‘Liability for sintax’, 21-22 (1963-1964) Cambridge Law Journal, 216, 217. 
76 B Coote, ‘The effect of Hedley Byrne’ (1966-67) 2 New Zealand Universities Law Review 266. 
77 Feldthusen, above n 2, 37 
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of responsibility approaches. It does not accurately summarize many of the relevant 
considerations and it has also produced confusion with the very different ‘fiduciary 
relationship’. It is inherently vague, provides little or no guidance to commercial parties or 
litigants, and may be used to justify almost any decision whatsoever. 
In any event, Feldthusen recognises that one advantage of describing the duty of care 
as based on a special relationship is that it emphasizes the need for some degree of 
proximity, some antecedent relationship more circumscribed that one based on foreseeability 
alone.78 
Goodhart has pointed out that neither the word proximity nor the phrase special 
relationship has any precise meaning. The duty of reasonable care depends on proximity, but 
on the other hand, as Lord Atkin said in Donoghue v Stevenson79, proximity is a relationship 
which means that you must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can 
reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour.80 Goodhart concludes that it is a 
form of circumlocution to say that reasonable care depends on proximity, and that proximity 
is a relationship which is based on reasonable care. It disguises the essential point that in 
every case the question is one fact: has the defendant shown reasonable care in the 
circumstances? This cannot be answered by the vague word proximity. The same 
circumlocution is found in the phrase special relationship. The duty to be careful depends on 
the special relationship, but the relationship is a special one because it is based on the premise 
that the circumstances demand special care.81 
Hedley Byrne suggests that the duty would be imposed on a person who, in a 
‘business context’82 gives information or advice to another who relies on it. Todd submits 
that a basic requirement is that it is reasonable for the plaintiff to rely on what the defendant 
says.83 It will not be reasonable for the plaintiff to rely on the defendant’s statement unless it 
was made on a ‘serious occasion’.84 Accordingly, a statement made on a social or an informal 
                                                            
78 Idem, 40. 
79 [1932} AC 562, [1932] All ER 1 (HL). 
80 [1932] A.C. at 580. 
81 Goodhart, above n 16, 298. 
82 Per Lord Reid at 812. Weir, one of the critics of Hedley Byrne, adds that the information or advice must be 
given not just ‘in a business context’ but in the context of the defendant’s business. You must do properly 
anything you are paid to do, even if it is not your job; if what you do is part of your job, you must do it properly 
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not liable for doing it improperly. Tony Weir, ‘The developer and the clerk’ 2 (1982) Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 440, 441. 
83 Todd, above n 4, 205. 
84 Peter Cane, ‘The metes and bounds of Hedley Byrne’ (1981) 55 Australian LawJournal, 870. 
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occasion is unlikely to be actionable.85 In that sense, a case that has been called aberrant is 
Chaudry v Prabbhakar86 where a friend who advised on the purchase of a car was held liable, 
although he was not an expert mechanic nor was in the used-car business.87 The authorities 
appear to be clear that there is no liability for kerbstone comment given at a social gathering. 
The law seems also to be unlikely to impose liability upon a bystander who, when asked for 
directions, carelessly misdirects the inquirer on his way, even if the latter thereby misses 
some important appointment.88 
In his speech, Lord Pearce referred to a business transaction whose nature makes clear 
the gravity of the inquiry and the importance and influence attached to the answer.89 Coote 
suggests that this is going back to the question whether the circumstances were such that the 
representor could be taken to be assuming responsibility for his answer.90 
  Lord Denning said that  
A scientist or expert is not liable to his readers for careless statements in his published works for he 
publishes simply for the purpose of giving information and not with any transaction in mind at all.91 
 
Honoré submits that no one suggests that a duty to take care in giving information or 
advice rests on one whose opinion is asked on a social occasion. Some people who are hard 
up try to save money and trouble by buttonholing a doctor at a cocktail party and asking him 
how to cure his asthma. If the doctor’s natural courtesy impels him to reply and his words can 
be discerned above the babble or through the alcoholic haze, he can hardly, apart from deceit, 
be held legally responsible.92 
Gordon remarks that sometimes the situation could be dubious in cases where 
discussions are partly social, but involve business too. It is common, he says, for many 
people to insist on mixing the two, when, for business reasons, maintain social contacts that 
they dislike, and they will make the most of them.93 
Lord Reid said: 
A reasonable man, knowing that he was being trusted or that his skill and judgment were being relied 
on, would, I think, have three courses open to him. He could keep silent or decline to give the 
information or advice sought: or he could give an answer with a clear qualification that he accepted no 
                                                            
85 Todd, above n 4, 200. 
86 [1989] 1 W.L.R. 29. 
87 John Hodgson, ‘Hedley Byrne - A new sacred cow?’ 4 (1995) Nottingham Law Journal, 1, 12. Cane also 
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responsibility for it or that it was given without that reflection or inquiry which a careful answer would 
require: or he could simply answer without any such qualification. If he chooses to adopt the last course 
he must, I think, be held to have accepted some responsibility for his answer being given carefully, or to 
have accepted a relationship with the inquirer which requires him to exercise such care as the 
circumstances require.94 
 
It could be asked why, in a case such as Hedley, if the advice was gratuitous and, so 
there was no duty to give it at all, how could there be a duty not to give it negligently. The 
question is that while the law may favour the Good Samaritan, it can hardly exempt him from 
a duty of care when, having undertaken the task95, he makes matters worse, and in many 
cases of careless misrepresentation the plaintiff will reasonably rely upon the defendant and 
thus not get alternative advice from elsewhere.96 
In considering the proximity of relationship required, Lord Devlin said: 
I shall therefore content myself with the proposition that wherever there is a relationship equivalent to 
contract, there is a duty of care. Such a relationship may be either general or particular. Examples of a 
general relationship are those of solicitor and client and of banker and customer. For the former Nocton 
v Lord Ashburton has long stood as the authority and for the latter there is the decision of Salmon J. in 
Woods v Martins Bank Ltd., which I respectfully approve. There may well be others yet to be 
established. Where there is a general relationship of this sort, it is unnecessary to do more than prove its 
existence and the duty follows. Whereas in the present case what is relied on is a particular relationship 
created ad hoc, it will be necessary to examine the particular facts to see whether there is an express or 
implied undertaking of responsibility. I regard this proposition as an application of the general 
conception of proximity. Cases may arise in the future in which a new and wider proposition, quite 
independent of any notion of contract, will be needed.97 
 
As can be seen, Lord Devlin offered only two examples of a general relationship 
automatically giving rise to an assumption of responsibility: solicitor and client, and banker 
and customer. Stevens suggests that from the authorities cited to support these, it looks 
probable that they are limited to cases where there was in fact a contract or the parties were in 
the process of making a contract. Nocton was an action by a client against his solicitor, but 
not having been pleaded in contract, and fraud not having been proved, the court resorted to 
the doctrine of fiduciary relationship in order to hold the defendant liable. In Woods v 
Martins Bank, it was held that a bank manager was liable to a potential customer of a bank 
                                                            
94 At 583. 
95 In an article published in 1947, Paton, with incredible prescience, said: ‘it would be in keeping with the spirit 
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for the negligent advice he gave before the account was opened. Again, the apparent basis of 
the decision was a fiduciary relationship.98 
It has been submitted that this approach, however, would create some difficulties. In 
effect, the term special relationship suggests there are particular relationships (buyer-seller, 
buyer-broker, civil servant-citizen, for example) which can be identified in advance as special 
relationships. Under this approach, one party would always owe a duty of care to the other in 
a special relationship. Thus, once an appellate court has decided, for example, that a real 
estate broker owed a duty of care to a prospective home buyer, that relationship would have 
been identified as special. In subsequent cases all the lower courts would have to do is 
identify the relationship by precedent, and recognize a duty regardless of the other 
circumstances. Yet, Hedley Byrne itself cannot be so explained. If banker-client were a 
special relationship, that relationship would not vary with disclamatory language, although 
liability might. 99 
Stevens agrees that even when it has been established that a special relationship could 
exist between the plaintiff and the defendant, this does not automatically ensure that a duty of 
care is owed.100 In fact, this was much in issue in Hedley Byrne.  
Lord Reid concluded that in circumstances such as those, a banker in the position of 
Hellers, owed not only a duty to be honest, but also a duty of care.101 Stevens submits that it 
is difficult to see that a duty to be honest is any more than a duty not to be deceitful, which 
was, after all, established in Derry v Peek.102 Honoré suggested that the House of Lords has 
created a new duty of honesty quite different from that required by the tort of deceit as 
defined in Derry v Peek.103 
Lord Morris, on the other hand, emphasized that this was casual rather than deliberate 
advice, and concluded that there was much to be said for the view that if a banker gives a 
reference in the form of a brief expression of opinion in regard to creditworthiness he does 
not accept, and there is not expected of him, any higher duty than that of giving an honest 
answer.104 
Lords Morris and Pearce chose to put emphasis on the liability of persons exercising 
some special skill or judgment. Both of them cite with approval the dictum of Lord 
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Loughborough in Shiells v Blackburne105 that if a man gratuitously undertakes to do a thing 
to the best of his skill, where his situation or profession is such as to imply skill, an omission 
of that skill is imputable to him as gross negligence. 
Lord Morris, in particular, following the guidance given by Lord Haldane in 
Nocton106 and repeated in Robinson v National Bank of Scotland107 said that: 
…it should now be regarded as settled that if someone possessed of a special skill undertakes, quite 
irrespective of contract, to apply that skill for the assistance of another person who relies on such skill, a 
duty of care will arise. The fact that the service is to be given by means of, or by the instrumentality of, 
words can make no difference. Furthermore if, in a sphere in which a person is so placed that others 
could reasonably rely on his judgment or his skill or on his ability to make careful inquiry, a person 
takes it on himself to give information or advice to, or allows his information or advice to be passed on 
to, another person who, as he knows or should know, will place reliance on it, then the duty of care will 
arise.108 
 
With similar expressions, Lord Pearce said: 
If persons holding themselves out in a calling or profession take on a task within that profession they 
have a duty of skill and care. In terms of proximity one might say they are in particular close proximity 
to those who they know are relying on their skill and care although the proximity is not contractual.109 
 
2.1.3 Voluntary assumption of responsibility 
 
At the present, it looks like the most considerable body of judicial and academic 
opinion agrees that one of the key elements to the recognition of the duty of care is the 
voluntary assumption of responsibility. 
The concept, however, has been subject to sustained critical analysis by academic 
commentators.110 One of the strongest is probably Kit Barker who has pointed out that one of 
the difficulties is that judges often use the same or similar language to give expression to 
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what are different ideas. Sometimes, they mean that the defendant has impliedly promised the 
plaintiff that he will take care in his conduct; sometimes that the defendant has exercised a 
degree of choice of some kind; and sometimes the phrase has also been interpreted to mean 
no more than the defendant has voluntarily ‘acted’.111 
An additional difficulty is the fact that the concept often appears in tandem or in 
association with the concept of reliance. This complicates the determination whether the 
ideas are important individually or only when they are combined. Are voluntary assumptions 
only significant when they are relied upon, or on the contrary, is reliance only relevant when 
it is a response to a voluntary assumption?112 
Barker has identified three completely different models of liability which he describes 
as the model of promise, choice and voluntary action. On the first model, the defendant 
makes an implied promise of care to the plaintiff. A clear example of this model is the speech 
of Lord Devlin in Byrne where he refers to an assumption of responsibility in circumstances 
in which, but for the absence of consideration, there would be a contract.113 
Whittaker suggests that an ‘assumption of responsibility’ is peculiarly inappropriate 
for serving as a basis for the imposition of a duty in tort.114 In fact, a model of negligence 
based upon promises is strange to common lawyers because it blurs the sharp division of 
functions as between the law of contract and the law of torts which they are used to 
assume.115 It has also been pointed out that this model seems to focus more on the subjective 
defendant’s intentions and duties in tort are imposed as a matter of law. Assumed duties are 
the province of contract.116 Coote illustrates the situation saying that a person driving a motor 
car along a road is subject thereby to a duty of care to other road users and to adjoining 
owners and occupiers. But while it is true that the driver has a choice whether to drive the car 
or not, it is not for him to decide whether he assumes those various duties of care. They are 
duties imposed by law on any driver of a motor car.117 
Another aspect that has been remarked is that promises cease to provide a viable 
explanation of negligence liability as soon as duties of care are extended to relations in which 
there has been no direct communication or dealing between the parties or their respective 
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agents. In effect, existing contractual principles do not imply promises between parties who 
have never directly communicated or dealt.118 
In Smith v Eric S. Bush119 the plaintiff sued a firm of surveyors in respect of a 
negligent house valuation report which the firm had prepared on the instructions of the 
building society which was proposing to grant a mortgage to the plaintiff to finance his 
purchase of the house. He had paid a valuation fee to the building society and was provided 
with a copy of the report by the society. Relying on the report, he purchased the house and 
subsequently discovered that because the report had not identified a defect in the house he 
was put to extra expense. It was held that a person may still be liable under Hedley Byrne 
despite having expressly disclaimed liability for negligence 
Lord Griffiths said that the voluntary assumption of responsibility is not a helpful or 
realistic test of liability and remarked the obvious fact that it is extremely unlikely that an 
express assumption of responsibility will ever occur. He recognized that a finding of an 
assumption of responsibility will often be based on a fiction and pointed out that the notion 
will refer to those circumstances in which the law will deem the maker of a statement to have 
assumed responsibility for his work.120 In his opinion, the assumption of responsibility can be 
seen to be a fiction which expresses a conclusion that a duty of care is to be imposed. It is not 
a test which can be used to reach that conclusion and it says nothing about the circumstances 
which lead to the conclusion. In other words, it is totally unhelpful. 
Stanton notes the particular context in which the discussion in Smith v Eric S. Bush 
had occurred: the supposed voluntary nature of the duty recognized by Hedley Byrne had 
been argued to mean that an explicit denial of responsibility in the form of a disclaimer 
resulted not in the availability of a defence, but in there being no duty of care and thus no 
need for a defense. Besides, counsel said, the provisions of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 
1977 were directed to the control of defences and were irrelevant to cases in which no duty 
existed.121 
Also Lord Roskill confessed his difficulties with the notion of voluntary assumption 
of responsibility. He declared that he could only understand it if it meant no more than the 
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existence of circumstances in which the law would impose a liability on a person making the 
allegedly negligent statement to the person to whom that statement is made. But, in that case, 
he recognized the concept did not help to determine in what circumstances the law will 
impose that liability or its scope.122 
In the 1990’s, Lord Goff, through his speeches in three cases gave the notion of 
voluntary assumption of responsibility a renewed centre-stage role. 
In Spring v Guardian Assurance plc123, he said that the source of the duty of care 
owed by the writer to the subject of a reference lay in the principle derived from Hedley 
Byrne v Heller, viz. an assumption of responsibility by the defendants to the plaintiff in 
respect of the reference, and reliance by the plaintiff upon the exercise by them of due care 
and skill in respect of its preparation.124 He also quoted Lord Devlin in Hedley Byrne when 
he said that the essence of the matter was the acceptance of responsibility.125 It has been 
submitted that the introduction of the concept may seem out of place in Spring since neither 
the arguments of counsel nor the judgments of the lower courts referred to it.126 Accordingly, 
Lord Goff said that his speech had to be regarded as being of limited authority.127 
 It has also been pointed out that, in one sense, Spring was the wrong case in which to 
attempt a revival of  the concept of ‘assumption of responsibility’ since the assumption of 
responsibility in that case was not voluntary but arose out from a statutory obligation.128 
In Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd.129 Lord Goff referred to the criticism of Lords 
Griffiths and Roskill who considered the concept of ‘assumption of responsibility’ as being 
‘unlikely to be a helpful or realistic test in most cases’. Lord Goff said that in most cases 
concerned with liability under the Hedley Byrne principle in respect of negligent 
misstatements, the question that frequently arose was whether the plaintiff fell within the 
category of persons to whom the maker of the statement owed a duty of care and therefore, 
the problem of containing the extent of the duty of care within reasonable bounds was at 
issue, but where such difficulty did not exist, there was no reason why recourse should not be 
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had to the concept, in particular, considering that it had been adopted, in one form or another, 
by all of their Lordships in Hedley Byrne. 
He then expressed his conviction that if a person assumed responsibility to another in 
respect of certain services, there was no reason why he should not be liable in damages to that 
other in respect of economic loss which flows from the negligent performance of those 
services.130  
In a caustic comment, Stanton remarks that this is equivalent to saying that we are to 
use a concept which is recognized as being unhelpful in difficult cases.131 
On the same line of criticism, Bernstein says that it would seem that Lord Goff is 
suggesting that, for the purposes of the application of the principle of voluntary assumption 
of responsibility, a distinction should be drawn between cases in which there is a real concern 
as to the indeterminacy of the possible members of the class of potential plaintiffs (where the 
concept would be of small assistance) and cases where that concern does not exist (where the 
notion would be of great assistance). If, in fact, he did intend to draw this distinction, 
Bernstein submits that it is surprising that Lord Goff went to so much trouble to formulate a 
principle which was expressly stated by him to be of limited application, had the clear 
potential to cause confusion in future cases and was completely unnecessary because the 
Caparo approach was a perfectly adequate tool for analyzing the three decisions in 
Henderson, Spring and White v Jones.132 
In any event, in White v Jones133, Lord Goff insisted on the notion of assumption of 
responsibility as a principle, rather than a conclusion reached by applying other principles, 
but this time extending Hedley Byrne to apply to negligence by the testator’s solicitor towards 
an intended beneficiary. In effect, after recognizing the difficulties in holding, on ordinary 
principles, that a solicitor assumes any responsibility towards an intended beneficiary under a 
will which he has undertaken to prepare on behalf of his client, he concluded that an 
extension of the ordinary principle in Hedley Byrne should be made for the special 
circumstances of the case.134 
In Commissioners of Customs & Excise v Barclays Bank plc (fully discussed later at 
p. 224) the House of Lords considered again the possibility of ‘voluntary assumption of 
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responsibility’ as a test. From that case, it is apparent that it is no more than a label; probably 
a helpful channelling for judicial thought, but of little value as a test in itself.  
 
2.1.4 The choice model. 
 
The ‘choice model’ finds its best example in Lord Reid’s speech in Hedley Byrne 
where, after referring to the freedom to act of a person (the advisor in the particular case), he 
said that if he chooses to act, he must be held to have accepted some responsibility for his 
answer being given carefully, or to have accepted a relationship with the inquirer which 
requires him to exercise such care as the circumstances demand.135 
In this case, it has been submitted the expression means no more than the defendant’s 
actions were voluntary and that he was conscious of them, but in others, it means that the 
defendant has not just chosen to act, but has chosen a legal obligation or duty.136 There is also 
a composite version of this model where the defendant chooses to induce a reliance 
relationship through his words or actions. A good example is Lord Bridge’s speech in Caparo 
where he said: 
…the defendant knew that his statement would be communicated to the plaintiff, either as an individual 
or as a member of an identifiable class, specifically in connection with a particular transaction or 
transactions of a particular kind…and that the defendant would be very likely to rely on it for the 
purposes of deciding whether or not enter on that transaction or on a transaction of that kind.137 
 
2.1.5 The voluntary action model. 
 
On this model liability is imposed, not because the defendant has promised or chosen 
anything, but simply because he has acted in circumstances in which he was free from 
internal incapacities, or illegitimate external constraints.138 According to Barker, this is the 
weakest model, so weak that it is openly admitted that the assumption of responsibility is 
deemed, not real. He also points out that if a voluntary action is deemed, and consists in no 
more than voluntary conduct, it is quite clearly a fiction. For that reason he concludes that to 
continue to refer to the concept whilst diluting its meaning is no solution and suggests that it 
would be better to stop talking about voluntary assumptions altogether.139 
A good example of this model appears in Lord Oliver’s speech in Caparo: 
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Voluntary assumption of responsibility is a convenient phrase but it is clear that it was not intended to 
be a test for the existence of the duty for, on analysis, it means no more than that the act of the 
defendant in making the statement or tendering the advice was voluntary and that the law attributes to it 
an assumption of responsibility if the statement or advice is inaccurate and is acted upon. It tells us 
nothing about the circumstances from which such attribution arises.140 
 
2.1.6 Reliance. 
 
Another concept that has sometimes been considered as the touchstone of liability 
under the Hedley Byrne principle is reliance. Some of the speeches in that case seem to 
indicate that this was in fact the basis of the defendant’s duty of care. Lord Reid, for instance, 
referred to the responsible man who knows that he is going to be trusted, or that his skill and 
judgment is being relied on.141 Lord Morris explained how a duty of care would arise when a 
person who possesses a special skill applies it for the assistance of another who relies upon 
such skill142 and the idea was repeated by Lord Hodson: 
If, in a sphere in which a person is so placed that others could reasonably rely upon his judgment or his 
skill or upon his ability to make careful enquiry, a person takes it upon himself to give information or 
advice to, or allows his information or advice to be passed on to another person who, as he knows, or 
should know, will place reliance upon it, a duty of care will arise.143 
 
There is no need to show that the representor actually intended the representee to rely, 
as long as it would be reasonable for him to rely in the circumstances, but it is necessary for 
the representee to show that he was aware of the statement and actually relied on it. 
However, there have also been some doubts in relation to the role of reliance. Again, 
this is a term which is capable of more than one meaning and the courts have commonly 
failed to define the sense in which they are using it.144 White v Jones145, the leading case for 
disappointed beneficiaries, for instance is a clear example indicating that it is not necessary 
that the plaintiff rely on the defendant to exercise care. On the contrary, in Spring, Lord Goff 
stated that reliance is essential. It has been submitted that he may have meant only that 
reliance or trust could provide evidence that there was a voluntary assumption of 
responsibility146 or that he was using the term in a broad sense to indicate little more than an 
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assumption that the other person will perform a task carefully.147 If there is any reliance at all, 
it certainly is different from the typical situation where the plaintiff actually relies on the 
statement. In Spring, it might be simply preferable to describe the plaintiff as reasonably 
depending on his employer to take care in giving the reference. 
Looking for some consistency it has been said that where the claim is based on 
negligent misstatement, it is likely that the causative mechanism will be reliance. Where the 
negligence consists of a negligent act or omission, the necessary causative link may be 
established without reliance.148 
Cane argues that the reason why reliance figures so largely in the formulations of the 
duty principle in Hedley even if it is not important as a legal limitation of liability is because 
the notion of reasonableness is tacked on to reliance –the reliance must be reasonable and 
reasonably foreseeable by the defendant. Reasonableness in this context may be seen as a 
conclusory term embracing all the factors which go together to justify the imposition of 
liability on a defendant whose advice was relied upon to the detriment of the plaintiff.149 
In any event, after White v Jones the probability of reliance being used as a useful test 
for the recognition of a duty of care in misstatement cases seems to have been inevitably 
reduced. 
An additional difficulty of all these tests is that they still require a policy 
determination as to what should be the scope of liability. Lord Pearce acknowledged this 
when he stated: 
How wide the sphere of the duty of care in negligence is to be laid depends ultimately upon the court’s 
assessment of the demands of society for protection from the careless of others.150 
 
2.1.7 The requirement of special skill or knowledge. 
 
In general, liability for negligent misstatements affects mainly those who are in the 
business of giving information or advice. The question is whether it should be restricted to 
such kind of defendants.151  
Lord Denning, in his dissent in Candler v Crane Christmas and Co152, stated that the 
persons subject to a duty of care in giving information or advice included ‘those analysts, 
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whose profession and occupation it is to examine books, accounts and other things.’153 By 
this view, a duty of care could only arise where it is part of the business of the person to give 
advice.154 
In Hedley Byrne v Heller, Lords Hodson, Morris and Pearce seem to approach the 
subject not in terms of professions in the narrowest sense of learned professions, but at least 
in terms of the profession of special skill or competence. Lord Reid, on the contrary, ascribed 
the obligation to any reasonable man who knows he is being trusted or that his skill and 
judgment are being relied on. Lord Devlin did not limit the liability to persons professing 
skill either. He spoke, in fact, of professional relations as raising a general presumption of 
responsibility for statements and advice, but he did not exclude the possibility of ad hoc 
relationships giving rise to responsibility in particular cases. According to this, it has been 
suggested that so far as the House of Lords is concerned, authority was evenly balanced so 
that the judges in later cases would have a choice.155 
Fridman regrets the fact that another senior and important judicial body, the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council, a few years after the House of Lords showed clear signs of 
willing to extend and enlarge the scope of the law of negligence, appears to have repented of 
the earlier liberalization of the law and to have retreated somewhat from the position 
occupied by the House of Lords in the Hedley Byrne case.156 
He was referring to the case of Mutual Life & Citizens’ Assurance Co. v Evatt.157 In 
that case, the Privy Council held that special skill was a requirement for the existence of a 
duty of care in making statements. 
The issue was decided by a bare majority of the Privy Council on a demurrer 
dismissed by both the Supreme Court of New South Wales and the High Court of Australia. 
The plaintiff’s allegations were that he had sought investment advice from an insurance 
company which was a co-subsidiary of another company (H.G. Palmer Ltd.) where he 
intended to invest. The insurance company negligently advised that its co-subsidiary was a 
sound investment, which it was not. Acting on that advice, Mr. Evatt invested and lost his 
money. 
In the High Court, the majority had held that it was not important that the defendant 
was not in the business of giving investment advice. Barwick C.J. said: 
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In my opinion, the elements of the special relationship to which I have referred do not require either the 
actual possession of skill or judgment on the part of the speaker or any profession by him to possess the 
same. His willingness to proffer the information or advice in the relationship which I have described is, 
in my opinion, sufficient.158 
 
In the Privy Council, the majority took an opposite view, holding that the negligent 
gratuitous giver of advice or information could only be subject to a duty of care where the 
advice was both given ‘in the ordinary course of the adviser’s business or profession’ and 
was of the kind which required some special skill which the recipient of the advice knew the 
adviser claimed to have because he engaged in that business or profession, or where the 
advice was given with an undertaking to take such special care. 
Lord Diplock, giving the opinion of the majority, said that in Hedley the reference and 
discussion of ‘such care as the circumstances require’ presupposed 
…an ascertainable standard of skill, competence and diligence with which the advisor is acquainted or 
had represented that he is. Unless he carries on the business or profession of giving advice of that kind 
he cannot be reasonably expected to know whether any and if so what degree of skill, competence or 
diligence is called for, and a fortiori…he cannot be reasonably held to have accepted the responsibility 
of conforming to a standard of skill, competence or diligence of which he is unaware, simply because 
he answers the enquiry with knowledge that the advisee intends to rely on his answer.159 
 
It should be noted that the majority do not go so far as to hold that the adviser must 
posses some special qualification or be a member of some calling or profession. It is 
sufficient if he claims or holds himself out to have skill or competence in the subject matter 
of the advice, but the holding out must relate to some recognized kind of business in which 
advice of the kind is given.160 Lindgren agrees and says that apart from authority, one would 
have thought that a profession of skill and qualification would have been relevant only to 
such matters as the reasonableness of the adviser’s reliance and the issue of the degree of skill 
which an adviser would have to show once it was decided that he was subject to a duty of 
care at all. But one would not have thought ‘professionalism’ a prerequisite of the existence 
of the ‘special relationship’ which implies a duty of care.161 
Two passages in Hedley Byrne from the speeches of Lord Reid and Lord Morris 
seemed to express that where a person is so placed that a reasonable man might expect his 
advice to be reliable if carefully given, any advice offered in a serious context must be 
carefully given. The majority interpreted these words to mean that both Lord Reid and Lord 
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Morris, despite the language they had used, really intended that the existence of a duty of care 
should be restricted to people who carried on the business of giving advice or normally 
undertook to give advice of a certain kind. 
It has been submitted that, in suggesting how the dicta of Lords Reid and Morris 
should be read, the majority were giving effect to the adage that one’s words do not mean 
what one says they mean, they mean what someone else says they mean.162 Steven’s irony is 
related to the fact that Lord Reid and Lord Morris actually formed the minority in the Evatt 
case. In a powerful article, Glasbeek qualifies as astounding the fact that judges can actually 
tell their fellow members of a bench what they meant by certain statements.163 
Lord Reid and Lord Morris felt necessary to reply that they were ‘unable to construe 
the passage from our speeches cited in the judgment of the majority in the way in which they 
are there construed.’ 
The skill principle has been criticized as being too narrow and inflexible. The 
minority lamented that the majority abandoned a flexible approach saying that: 
In our judgment it is not possible to lay down hard-and-fast rules as to when a duty of care arises in this 
or in any other class of case where negligence is alleged. When in the past, judges have attempted to lay 
down rigid rules or classifications or categories they have later had to be abandoned.164  
 
Lords Reid and Morris considered it unnecessary and undesirable to limit the scope of 
the duty in the way proposed by the majority and felt that the duty of care should normally 
arise where advice is given on business occasion or in the course of business activities. 
This ‘course of business principle’ has been used in subsequent English cases to reject 
the special skill requirement and to establish, instead, that although the advice need not have 
been given by professional adviser, it must at least have been given in a business context.165  
Cane suggests that even to restrict liability to business contexts is to close the 
categories of duty at a point short of where the minority in Evatt would, since the spirit of 
their judgment seems to be that a duty of care might arise in any situation where advice is 
given and relied upon, provided the reliance was reasonable. The case of a businessman 
giving advice in the course of his business would be but an application of this principle.166 
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It has been argued that there seems to be nothing incongruous about fixing a man who 
is in a position of knowledge with a duty to be as careful about giving advice in respect of 
that knowledge as a reasonable man in that situation could be expected to be. It should not 
matter whether the advice was given as part of the everyday business practice of the 
adviser.167 The minority expressed this idea, stating that: 
It must be borne in mind that there is here no question of warranty. If the adviser were to be held liable 
because his advice was bad then it would be relevant to inquire into his capacity to give the advice. But 
here and in cases coming within the principles laid down in Hedley Byrne the only duty in question is a 
duty to take reasonable care before giving the advice. We can see no ground for the distinction that a 
special skilled man must exercise care but a less skilled man need not do so. We are unable to accept 
the argument that a duty to take care is the same as a duty to conform to a particular standard of skill. 
One must assume a reasonable man who has that degree of knowledge and skill which facts known to 
the inquirer (including statements made by the adviser) entitled him to expect of the adviser, and then 
inquire whether such a reasonable man could have given the advice which was in fact given if he had 
exercised reasonable care. 
 
Liability may attach to the giving of opinions, advice or information. In fact, advice is 
usually based on information and the Privy Council held in Evatt that information-gathering 
by the adviser from sources other than the advisee was subject to the skill principle in the 
same way as the advice itself.168 
It has been submitted that it is fairly clear that the ratio decidendi of the majority is 
unsound: there is no reason in law why only those who claim skill need take care, and it is not 
true in fact that carelessness can only be detected where skill is usually deployed.169 To limit 
the duty of care to those occasions where advice is not only given as part of a business, but 
also to those where special skill is needed to formulate it, is to excessively and unnecessarily 
restrict the duty of care owed in the giving of advice.170 Nor is it justifiable in principle: 
enough other relevant factors may be present in any one case to lead a court unavoidably to 
the conclusion that a reasonable man in that situation would assume responsibility for the 
resulting loss.171 
Many courts free from this case as authority felt that the minority judgment contained 
a more useful and flexible formulation of the assumed responsibility principle. 
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In Australia, in L. Shaddock & Associates Pty. Ltd. v Council of the City of 
Parramatta (N°1)172, two of the judges (Gibbs C.J. and Stephen J.) of the High Court 
expressed criticisms of the judgment of the majority the majority of the Privy Council in 
Evatt but held that it was unnecessary to choose between the majority and the minority views. 
They took the view that, on the facts of the case, the defendant did have ‘special skill’, but 
the decision of the Full Court of Western Australia in Mohr v Cleaver173, following the 
majority of the Privy Council, has reopened the debate.174 
In England, preference for the minority judgment has been expressed twice in the 
Court of Appeal in Esso Petroleum Co. v Mardon175 and in Howard Marine & Dredging Co. 
v A. Ogden & Sons (Excavations) Ltd.176 
In Canada, in Queen v Cognos the Supreme Court and Iacobucci J., in particular, 
explicitly rejected any approach that would restrict the duty of care to “…‘professionals’ who 
are in the business of providing information and advice…”177 However, modern cases 
continue to list special skills as a necessary element for recognition of a duty of care.178 
Academics have pointed out that special skill is not precisely the same as ‘in the business or 
profession’, which has been rejected outright in Canada. It differs from the simple business 
requirement in that special skill or expertise is the key; Evatt may have intended to preclude a 
duty of care with respect to bare information communicated in the course of the defendant’s 
business.179 In other words, the issue seems to be still unresolved. 
 In New Zealand, according to Professor Todd, the decision in Evatt has been 
interpreted in such a way as to deprive it of any real significance and in the Court of Appeal it 
was read as a case decided on its own particular facts.180  
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2.1.8 To whom does the duty extend. 
 
 One of the central issues in negligence liability is the determination of the class of 
persons to whom a duty of care may be owed. An often quoted answer to this question is 
Cardozo’s C.J. speech in Palsgraf v Long Island R.R. Co.181: ‘The orbit of the danger as 
disclosed to the eye of a reasonable vigilance would be the orbit of the duty.’ But this related 
to physical loss. In relation to pure economic loss, the foreseeability test would be 
insufficient.182 The possible liability which might result from communication of a statement 
to remote plaintiffs is so great and may be so far out of proportion to the fault involved that 
there is a general agreement that a more restricted rule is necessary in the case of economic 
loss than where there is tangible harm to property.183  
The issue about to whom, other than to the other party to the contract is the defendant 
liable has most frequently arisen in the context of the potential liability of company auditors 
to shareholders and other investors who relied on the company audit. For many decades the 
privity defence in the area of accountant’s liability was the strength of the practical arguments 
supporting the Ultramares decision184 where Judge Cardozo noted: 
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect a theft or forgery 
beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount 
for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. The hazards of a business conducted on these terms 
are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the implication of a duty that 
exposes to these consequences.185 
 
 The foundations for the modern law in relation to claims by third parties against 
accountants can be considered as laid in Lord Denning’s dissent in Candler186 where he said 
that accountants, exercising a calling which required knowledge and skill, owed a duty to use 
care in the work, not only to their clients, but also to any third person to whom they showed 
their accounts and reports, or to whom they knew their clients were going to show them, 
when they knew that person would consider them with a view to the investment of money or 
taking other action to his gain or detriment. The duty only extended to those transactions for 
which the accountants knew their accounts were required.187 
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Cane has described Denning’s view as the convergence of two different aspects: to 
whom is the duty of care owed, and in respect of what transactions. The answers to that were: 
a) the very person(s) to whom the defendant knows the statement will be relayed; and (b) in 
respect of the very transaction for which the defendant knows his statement will be 
required.188  
In the leading case of Caparo Industries plc v Dickman189 the issue was whether 
auditors could be liable to claimants who had purchased shares in a company on the strength 
of accounts which had negligently misstated its financial position.  
The English Companies Act stipulates that a corporation must hire an auditor, 
appointed by the shareholders, to prepare a report on the corporation’s annual financial 
statements. The Act requires the report to state whether the corporation has prepared the 
relevant information in accordance with the Companies Act and whether the financial 
statements give a true and fair view of the company’s affairs.190 The annual accounts and an 
auditor’s report on them for each publicly listed company are available to a member of the 
public whether or not he or she is a shareholder, by searching the register, upon payment of 
any prescribed fee. A publicly listed company is also obliged to send the accounts to all 
persons entitled to receive notice of general meetings. Apparently then there are two main 
groups of persons who might seek to rely on a publicly available auditor’s report. First, non-
shareholders who seek guidance to assist them in deciding whether or not to invest in a 
certain company. Second, existing shareholders who, as individuals, seek guidance as to 
whether to increase, retain or reduce their investment, and, as a class or group, will use the 
report as a basis for measuring the conduct of the directors in prosecuting the company’s 
affairs.191 
Immediately after the release of the annual financial statement, prepared by the 
accounting firm, Touche Ross, Caparo began purchasing shares in a public company, Fidelity 
p.l.c. Following receipt of the audited statements in its capacity as a shareholder, Caparo 
purchased more shares and ultimately took over the company. The plaintiff then alleged that 
Fidelity’s accounts were inaccurate and misleading and that the auditors had been negligent 
in carrying out the audit. The case went to the House of Lords on the preliminary issue of 
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whether the auditors owed Caparo a duty of care either as a potential investor, or as an 
existing shareholder of Fidelity. 
There are two aspects of Caparo which are of importance. One is in relation to the 
liability of auditors to persons who might rely on audited accounts. The other one is the wider 
question of the test to be used to establish the existence of a duty of care whenever there is a 
claim in tort for negligence causing economic loss. This case introduced, as elements 
demonstrating the existence of a duty of care, foreseeability of damage, a relationship 
characterised by the law as one of proximity, and circumstances such that the court considers 
it ‘fair, just and reasonable’ to impose a duty. It was the application of this revised test for 
duty which enabled the House of Lords to find on the facts of Caparo that auditors owed no 
duty of care to shareholders in the company who used information in the audited reports of 
the company to decide to purchase further shares.192 
Another specific aspect that was subject of discussion was whether it made a 
difference that the claimants were already shareholders at the time that they made, in reliance 
on the negligently audited accounts, their purchases of further shares.193 The trial judge held 
that the auditors owed no duty of care to Caparo, whether they were regarded as potential 
new investors or as existing shareholders. The Court of Appeal, by a majority, partially 
reversed this decision, finding that the auditors owed Caparo a duty of care once Caparo had 
become a shareholder in Fidelity, though not before that time. 
In the House of Lords, one of the main speeches was delivered by Lord Bridge. He 
considered that the salient feature of cases such as Hedley Byrne, Candler and Smith v Bush 
was that the defendant giving advice or information was fully aware of the nature of the 
transaction which the plaintiff had in contemplation; knew that the advice or information 
would be communicated to him directly or indirectly; and that he knew that it was very likely 
that the plaintiff would rely on that advice or information in deciding whether or not to 
engage in the transaction in contemplation. But he said that the situation was entirely 
different where a statement is put into more or less general circulation and may foreseeably 
be relied on by strangers to the maker of the statement for any one of a variety of purposes 
which the maker of the statement has no specific reason to anticipate.194 He believed that to 
hold the maker of the statement to be under a duty of care in respect of the accuracy of the 
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statement to all and sundry for any purpose for which they may choose to rely on it is not 
only to subject him, in the classic words of Cardozo C.J., to ‘liability in an indeterminate 
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class’; it is also to confer on the world 
at large the quite unwarranted entitlement to appropriate for their own purposes the benefit of 
the expert knowledge or professional expertise attributed to the maker of the statement.195 
Thus, he disposed of the first part of the plaintiff’s claim.  
Then he dealt with the second part, that is, that once that the plaintiff became a 
shareholder, the auditors did owe the plaintiff a duty of care because he was no longer an 
unidentified member of the public but was a member of an identifiable class which stood in a 
relationship of proximity with the company’s auditors. He considered that the annual 
accounts of a company can be relied on in all sorts of ways and for many purposes. Lord 
Bridge admitted that one of the auditor’s functions is to give his opinion in relation to 
whether the company’s accounts give a true and fair view of the company financial position 
and this, he said, undoubtedly establishes a relationship between the auditors and the 
shareholders. However, he concluded that that does not necessarily mean that a duty of care 
was owed in law by a public company’s auditors to individual shareholders for investment 
decisions that they might make in reliance on the company’s audited accounts.196  
After making the distinction between the capacity of a shareholder exerting his rights 
in a general meeting and his capacity as an investor he said: 
It is never sufficient to ask simply whether A owes B a duty of care. It is always necessary to determine 
the scope of the duty by reference to the kind of damage from which A must take care to save B 
harmless…Assuming…that the relationship between the auditor of a company and its individual 
shareholders is of sufficient proximity to give rise to a duty of care, I do not understand how the scope 
of that duty can possibly extend beyond the protection of any individual shareholder from losses in the 
value of the shares which he holds. As a purchaser of additional shares in reliance on the auditor’s 
report, he stands in no different position from any other investing member of the public to whom the 
auditor owes no duty.197 
 
Lord Roskill, in harmony with all their Lordships, rejected the Anns single prima facie 
test of reasonable foreseeability. In his words: 
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The submission that there is a virtually unlimited and unrestricted duty of care in relation to the 
performance of an auditor’s statutory duty to certify a company’s accounts, a duty extending to anyone 
who may use those accounts for any purpose such as investing in the company or lending the company 
money, seems to me untenable. No doubt it can be said to be foreseeable that those accounts may find 
their way into the hands of persons who may use them for such purposes or, indeed, other purposes and 
lose money as a result. But to impose a liability in these circumstances is to hold, contrary to all the 
recent authorities, that foreseeability alone is sufficient…198 
 
The second main speech was delivered by Lord Oliver who, contrary to the opinion of 
the Court of Appeal, denied there was any logic in distinguishing shareholder-investors from 
investor at large. Indeed, such a distinction, in his view, was unreasonable and produced 
entirely capricious results. He illustrated this, by pointing out how this distinction would have 
left the loss Caparo sustained as a result of its initial purchase of shares irrecoverable, while 
losses sustained as a result of subsequent purchases could be recovered. Lord Oliver found 
this result particularly odd considering the fact that all share purchases were made on the 
basis of the same information.199  
In relation to the purpose of the statutory act, he said that he found no ground for 
believing that, in enacting the statutory provisions, Parliament had in mind the provision of 
information, for the assistance of purchasers of shares.200  
It has been submitted that judges should refrain from making assertions about what 
Parliament had in mind when those assertions can readily be rebutted.201 When introducing to 
the House of Commons the first Companies Act to require independent auditing of the 
accounts of public companies, the Cabinet minister responsible for the Act stated its purpose 
by saying that ‘we are bound to endeavour so to amend the law as to ensure the fullest 
information being given to all those who desire to take part in companies or invest their 
capital…’202 
After considering the speeches in Hedley Byrne in some detail, His Lordship stated 
that: 
What can be deduced from the Hedley Byrne case, therefore, is that the necessary relationship between 
the maker of a statement or giver of advice (‘the adviser’) and the recipient who acts in reliance upon it  
(‘the advisee’) may typically be held to exist where (1) the advice is required for a purpose, whether 
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particularly specified or generally described, which is made known, either actually or inferentially, to 
the adviser at the time when the advice is given; (2) the adviser knows, either actually or inferentially, 
that his advice will be communicated to the advisee, either specifically or as a member of an 
ascertainable class, in order that it should be used by the advisee for that purpose; (3) it is known, either 
actually or inferentially, that the advice so communicated is likely to be acted upon by the advisee for 
that purpose without independent inquiry; and (4) it is so acted upon by the advisee to his detriment.203  
 
By applying this test, Lord Oliver was, for the same reasons as Lord Bridge, in no 
doubt that the auditors owed no duty of care to the plaintiff as an investor or as a shareholder. 
The decision, which represented a screeching halt in the expansionist tendency in the 
U.K.204, brought a sense of relief in the professional circle205; but met mixed reception from 
academic commentators, ranging from approval206 to concern.207 Quite unexpectedly, the 
editorial column of Accountancy, the official magazine of the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants, admitted that it was unjust that third parties should have no redress against 
negligent auditors.208 The House of Lords’ view, that the purpose of the statutory requirement 
that company accounts be certified by an auditor is to allow shareholders as a body to 
exercise informed control of the company and not to ensure that investment decisions are 
made on the basis of sound information, was described in the editorial as ‘naive’, ‘narrow’ 
and ‘Victorian’. ‘The law’s view of auditors’ responsibilities’, they say, ‘is now out of step 
with commercial reality. The ability to rely upon audited accounts is an essential feature of 
modern commercial life. Particularly in the case of a public company…audited accounts are 
used barely at all by shareholders acting en bloc to control the company and its management, 
but they are used by a wide range of creditors and individual or corporate investors.’209 
The courts in Canada, Australia and New Zealand have all taken the same or similar 
approach to that adopted in Caparo.210 
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206 Weir describes the decision as quite right, arguing that Caparo was not an investor that was investing in 
Fidelity p.l.c., ‘it was buying it, taking it over. Caparo was a predator…with a turnover of over ₤150m. it is 
among the top 500 manufacturing companies in Britain…Caveat predator is a sound and moral rule.’ Tony 
Weir, ‘Statutory auditor not liable to purchaser of shares’ (1990) Cambridge Law Journal, 212, 214  
207 Marshall, on the contrary, describes the approach as unduly restrictive. Marshall, above n 197, 481. 
208 Accountancy, March 1990, p. 1. 
209 Ibid. 
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 2.1.9 Hedley Byrne in other common law jurisdictions. 
 
a) Canada 
 
The issue of whether an auditor’s duty of care extended to shareholders or other 
investors was addressed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Hercules Managements Ltd.  v 
Ernst & Young.211 In so doing, the Court considered the test developed by Dickson J some 20 
years earlier in Haig v Bamford212 (where the question of how much further the courts were 
willing to extend the duty of care was left open) as well as the decision of the House of Lords 
in Caparo v Dickman. 
The defendants were accountants who had been hired by two related companies to 
perform annual audits of their financial statements and to provide audit reports to the 
companies’ shareholders. In 1989 the companies went into receivership. After that, the 
plaintiffs, who were shareholders of the companies, brought an action alleging that the audit 
reports were negligently prepared. They also argued that, in reliance on those reports, they 
had made further investments and consequently suffered financial loss, and claimed 
compensation for the losses they had sustained in the diminished value of their existing 
shares. The Supreme Court rejected both of these claims. 
Two main issues were in question: a) whether the auditors owed shareholders a duty 
of care in relation to investment losses they suffer as a result of reliance on the audit reports; 
and b) whether a derivative action was the proper method of proceeding with the claim, as an 
alleged harm to the corporation does not give individual shareholders a personal cause of 
action.213 
The Supreme Court, unanimously, decided that investors should generally not be 
permitted to recover against a company’s auditor when financial reports are prepared for the 
company. The ambit of the duty should be restricted to losses suffered in the context of the 
purpose for which the audits were prepared. The position of the Court was essentially similar 
to the one taken by the House of Lords in Caparo, requiring that (a) the defendant knew the 
identity of either the plaintiff or the class of plaintiffs who would rely on the statement, and 
(b) the reliance losses claimed by the plaintiff stem from the particular transaction in respect 
                                                            
211 [1997] 146 DLR (4th) 577. 
212 (1976) 72 D.L.R. (3d) 68 (S.C.C.) 
213 Michael Deturbide, ‘Liability of auditors. Hercules Managements Ltd. et al. v Ernst & Young et al.’ (1998) 
77 Canadian Bar Review 260, 261. 
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of which the statement at issue was made.214 As in Caparo, the claims were considered to fall 
outside the statutory purpose for which the statement had been prepared. 
Also as in Caparo, the Court considered that the purpose of an audit report is to 
provide shareholders with reliable information to enable them to make decisions as to the 
manner in which they want the corporation to be managed, rather than to assist individuals 
shareholders in making personal investment decisions. 
La Forest J., speaking for the Court, said that, in Canada, the established approach to 
the existence of a duty of care is the two-part test enunciated by Lord Wilberforce in Anns v 
Merton London Borough Council.215 This represents a single, unified test for all cases of 
negligence. The notion of a distinct nominate tort of negligent misrepresentation, in which a 
different test is applied, was explicitly rejected.216 Applying it to the facts of the case, La 
Forest J. had no hesitation in holding that a prima facie duty of care was owed by the 
defendant to the plaintiff, not only because it was reasonably foreseeable217 by the defendant 
that the plaintiff would rely on the financial statements in conducting its affairs and that the 
plaintiff might suffer harm if those statements had been negligently prepared, but also 
because reliance by the plaintiff on the audited statements was reasonable on the facts of that 
case.  
Having found a prima facie duty to exist, La Forest J. proceeded to the second part of 
the test. In that sense, he analyzed the policy reasons for limiting liability under step two. 
After considering the benefits of imposing broad duties on auditors and its deterrence effect 
on negligent conduct, La Forest J., however, thought that this was outweighed by the socially 
undesirable consequences to which the imposition of indeterminate liability on auditors might 
lead.218  
                                                            
214 Per La Forest J. at 590. 
215 [1978] AC 728. In doing so, the Court moved away from Caparo, but only to come back to it by 
incorporating, within the framework of the Anns test, most of the principles developed by Caparo to limit the 
ambit of the duty of care. Lara Khoury, ‘The liability of auditors beyond their clients: a comparative study.’ 
(2000-2001) 46 McGill Law Journal, 413, 438. 
216 Chris Gosnell, ‘English Courts: The restoration of a common law of pure economic loss.’ (2000) 50 
University of Toronto Law Journal, 135, 148. 
217 Feldthusen submits that in Canada, in the context of economic loss, proximity had usually been treated 
unreflectively as more or less synonymous with foreseeability. Above n 4. Phegan argues that Canadian Courts 
have never displayed enthusiasm for the elevation to the level of prominence and decisiveness accorded it by the 
High Court of Australia. The more specific requirements, on which the Canadian Supreme Court based its 
conclusions, he says, are not ingredients of proximity but rather means by which policy concerns that are 
extrinsic to simple justice –but are, nevertheless, fundamentally important- may be taken into account in 
assessing whether the defendant should be compelled to compensate the plaintiff. Colin Phegan, ‘Reining in 
Foreseeability: Liability of Auditors to Third Parties for Negligent Misstatement’ (1997) 5(2) Torts Law Journal 
15. 
218 At 593. Whether such consequences are aptly described as social or would be more accurately described as 
economic is open to question.  Phegan, above n 217, 123. 
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Rafferty has welcomed Hercules Managements, saying that is important because it 
confirms the supremacy in Canada of the Anns test for determining the duty of care even in 
the familiar area of negligent misstatement. He also finds of particular interest La Forest J.’s 
conclusion that proximity in this context is based on foreseeable and reasonable reliance. For 
the first time, he says, the Supreme Court has clearly set out the basis for the Hedley Byrne 
duty of care, signaling a rejection of the popular theory that the true foundation for Hedley 
Byrne is the defendant’s voluntary assumption of responsibility.219 
Taking a different view, Feldthusen submits that the reasoning in Caparo is to be 
preferred becaused the House of Lords clearly recognized the distinction between the 
questions of justifying liability, and the questions of practical limitations. He points out that 
what is missing in Hercules is any justification for the result. In his opinion, reasonable 
reliance reduces to foreseeability and concludes that what is missing from the judgment is an 
acknowledgment that one cannot impose tort liability on another simply by choosing to rely 
on the other to protect one’s interests.220 
What is fair or just, he asks, about holding that a party who supplies professional 
services under contract owes a duty of care to anyone else who might foreseeably rely on the 
information or advice? Holding one party liable, he continues, is expensive and stigmatizing. 
 
(b) Australia. 
 
Although the High Court of Australia had built a body of decisions on negligent 
misstatements applied to other classes of defendants, it was not until Esanda Finance 
Corporation Limited v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (Reg)221 that it had the opportunity to rule 
on auditor’s liability.222 
In this case, the plaintiff claimed damages from a firm of accountants (PMH) in 
respect of its losses incurred through having lent money to a company (Excel Finance 
Corporation) relying on a certification negligently prepared. 
The case was based on the existence of the Australian Accountancy Standards and the 
claim that the reliance upon the audited accounts was reasonably foreseeable. The standards 
                                                            
219 Nicholas Rafferty, ‘Recent Professional negligence decisions from the Supreme Court of Canada.’ (1998) 14 
Professional Negligence, 67, 74. 
220 Feldthusen, above n 2, 45. The Idea of information and advice as valuable commodities is probably taken 
from William Bishop, ‘Negligent misrepresentation through economists eyes.’ (1980) 96 Law Quarterly 
Review, 360. 
221 (1997) 142 ALR 750. 
222 Phegan, above n 217, 3. 
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required auditors to consider the position of persons who were likely to be the prime users of 
the financial statements, which included present and potential providers of equity or loan 
capital and creditors. The plaintiff alleged that it was a member of that class in relation to 
Excel and, as a consequence, it was owed a duty of care. All six judges ruled that the claim 
was insufficient to found a cause of action in negligence. 
The Court considered that the Accountancy Standards were not concerned to create a 
duty, but to develop the concept of materiality for the purpose of indicating what should be 
included in financial statements. The standards may be a guide to the appropriate standard of 
care once a duty is imposed, but they do not create a duty.223  
In relation to the other point, using almost identical criteria as the ones enunciated in 
Caparo, Brennan CJ said: 
The uniform course of authority shows that mere foreseeability of the possibility that a statement made 
or advice given by A to B might be communicated to a class of which C is a member, and that C might 
enter into some transaction as the result thereof and suffer financial loss in that transaction, is not 
sufficient to impose on A a duty of care owed to C in the making of the statement or the giving advice. 
In some situations, a plaintiff who has suffered pure economic loss by entering into a transaction in 
reliance on a statement made or advice given by a defendant may be entitled to recover without proving 
that the plaintiff sought the information or advice. But, in every case, it is necessary for the plaintiff to 
allege and prove that the defendant knew, or ought reasonably to have known, that the information or 
advice would be communicated to the plaintiff, either individually or as a member of an identified class, 
that the information or advice would be so communicated for a purpose that would be very likely to 
lead the plaintiff to enter into a transaction of the kind that the plaintiff does enter into, and that it would 
be very likely that the plaintiff would enter into such a transaction in reliance on the information or 
advice and thereby risk the incurring of economic loss if the statement should be untrue or the advice 
should be unsound. 
 
 The speeches of McHugh J. and Gummow J. were strongly influenced by the decision 
of the Supreme Court of California in Bily v Arthur Young and Co.224 Both of them set out a 
number of policy considerations which they believed should influence the court in 
determining whether an auditor should owe a duty of care to a third party. McHugh J., in 
particular, expressed the opinion that the primary question, from the public points of view, is 
who is the more efficient absorber of the losses which inevitably will be passed on to the 
public. He thought that the auditors’ capacity to better absorb the loss was a matter which 
could quite properly have been put in argument in support of imposing liability on the 
auditors.225   
In support of a confined scope of liability Mc Hugh J set out a number of factors 
relevant to the existence of duty: 
                                                            
223 Per McHugh at 788. 
224 (1992) 834 P 2d 745. 
225 At 784. 
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a) The risk of reduction in supply of services. Indeterminate liability is difficult to 
insure against. Increased insurance cost (or no insurance) will lead to the closure of smaller 
firms, selective withdrawal of services and reduction in standards resulting from cost cutting 
of overheads and staff.226  
b) Most investors have the capacity to avoid the risk which they seek to have auditors 
bear. They normally have the resources to protect themselves, thus averting what would 
otherwise be a heavy cost burden on the system of corrective justice.227 
c) Creditors and shareholders are entitled to share the benefits of any recovery made 
by a liquidator or receiver from the auditor. A creditor or shareholder granted a right to sue 
the auditor directly stands to gain a double advantage not necessarily justified when 
compared with other creditors or shareholders.228 
d) The primary wrongdoer is ordinarily the corporate body, not the auditor. The 
auditor is left to foot the bill even though on a comparative basis the auditor may bear only a 
minor and secondary responsibility for the plaintiff’s loss.229 
e) Problems of proof of actual reliance pose formidable practical obstacles and also 
create possibilities of unreliable, exaggerated and even fraudulent claims. An assertion of 
actual reliance is easily made in retrospect.230 
 
(c) New Zealand. 
 
In New Zealand, the Court of Appeal in Scott Group Ltd. v McFarlane231 debated the 
extent of the duty of care. Auditors had been negligent in understating a company’s bank 
overdraft and overstating its revenue reserves and undistributed profits. The profits of 
subsidiary companies were reflected twice in the same set of accounts and consequently, the 
total value of shareholders’ funds had been overstated. At the time of signing the audit report, 
the auditors had no knowledge of any intention on the part of any other person to formulate a 
takeover offer for the company. The plaintiff had been showing an interest in taking over the 
company (Duthie) for some time, but this was kept strictly confidential. Thus, the auditors 
had no knowledge that the accounts would be shown to the Scott group or to any other entity 
for the purpose of a takeover bid. The plaintiff company made a takeover offer and found 
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upon that takeover that the shares did not possess as much asset-backing as appeared from the 
balance sheet. Subsequently they brought an action claiming damages for negligent 
misrepresentation. 
The claim was based on the fact that the defendants were aware or ought reasonably 
to have foreseen that the accounts were likely to be relied upon by the plaintiff as an 
intending purchaser of the shares. 
The Court considered that a duty existed, but had not been breached, as the plaintiff 
had not discharged the burden of proof on the question of damages.  
The majority denied that reasonable foreseeability was too broad a test of liability for 
economic loss caused by words.232 They were persuaded that liability should be brought 
within the mainstream of negligence. Restrictive tests in the negligent misstatement area had 
simply brought complexity to the law.233 Woodhouse J., in particular, thought that the 
requirement of foreseeability coupled with the difficulties of proving causation provided 
adequate protection against excessive liability.234 However, it has been suggested that, 
although it might appear on the surface as if Woodhouse J. was advocating a single test of 
foreseeability of plaintiff as the basis of liability for economic loss as well as physical loss, 
his Honour’s notion of foreseeability in Scott Group was much more restrictive than that 
employed in the ordinary run of physical loss cases.235 
He also said that the duty existed even though the defendant had ‘no direct knowledge 
of Scott Group Ltd. or that a take-over from any quarter was contemplated’236 on the basis 
that the accounts were freely available to the public. A need to establish knowledge of the 
very identity of those proposing to act upon advice would seem not merely an extremely 
stringent but an almost fortuitous test of responsibility.237 
Cooke J. said that, as the defendants knew  that the state of the company’s finance 
were such as to make it vulnerable to a takeover bid, there was a virtual certainty that in such 
an event the accounts would be relied on by an offeror. In these circumstances there was a 
sufficient degree of proximity between the parties and the accountants owed a duty of care to 
the offeror. 
                                                            
232 Witting suggests that it is likely that the New Zealand courts today would be more carefully consider the 
purpose element in such a case. Christian Witting, Liability for negligent misstatements. (2004) 192. 
233 At 574. 
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Richmond P., dissenting, denied relief on the ground that, at the time the certificate 
was given, the most that could be said was that there was a general possibility that someone 
might take the company over. Mere foreseeability of reliance on company accounts for the 
purposes of a takeover bid was not enough. In his opinion, the requirement of the special 
relationship was central to the duty of care. He said: 
I do not think that such a relationship should be found to exist unless, at least, the maker of the 
statement was, or ought to have been, aware that his advice or information would in fact be made 
available to and be relied on by a particular person or class of persons for the purposes of a particular 
transaction or type of transaction.238 
 
Feldthusen has suggested that Cooke J., in his characterization of the facts of the case 
as one in which the defendants ought to have known that their accounts would be relied upon 
in a particular transaction, seems to be somehow dealing with the benefit of hindsight. In that 
sense, he believes Richmond P. is more realistic in characterizing the case as one in which ex 
ante the defendant had no particular transaction in mind, and hence one in which the 
defendant faced potentially indeterminate liability to any foreseeable plaintiff.239 
For more than twenty years Scott Group remained a source of uncertainty but, finally 
in Boyd Knight v Purdue240 the question was settled. An investor claimed against an auditor 
who was required by the Securities Regulation to produce a report. He alleged that the report 
in the prospectus was wrong and that with due care the auditors would have discovered the 
inaccuracies. The Court recognised a duty of care to investors but the action failed because 
there was not enough evidence that he had read and relied upon the report. 
Dawson submits that in holding that reliance on the misstatement is required before 
liability is made out the case does not break new ground because, after all, it is reliance that 
provides the necessary causal connection between a defendant’s misrepresentation and a 
plaintiff’s loss. However, he continues, the case is troubling in suggesting that reliance cannot 
be inferred from the circumstance of a material omission from the audit report coupled with 
the purchase of securities. Dawson suggests that Purdue had done precisely what any small 
investor who is not expert in reading financial statements would have done. They would not 
be expected to examine the financial statements in any detail, but only to look what the 
auditors had said and to content themselves with the view that the auditors had given a clean 
report.241 
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In spite of the criticisms, for the time being, it seems clear that New Zealand is also in 
favour of Caparo. 
 
2.2 Relational economic loss. 
2.2.1 Generally. 
 
The expression relational economic loss describes a harm which arises as a 
consequence of a physical injury to a third party or damage to the third party’s property.242 In 
other words, the plaintiff suffers economic loss because of some relationship which exists 
between the plaintiff and the injured party.243 
Where a careless act or omission causes a claimant to sustain personal injury or suffer 
direct damage to property, the common law has always allowed him to recover damages for 
resultant economic loss. Consequential loss in property damage cases is recoverable without 
any difficulty.244 Thus, hospital, medical and other such costs are retrievable. Similarly, loss 
of income and profits are allowed. Normally, these losses must follow directly from physical 
injury or physical damage to the property of the person suing and not from an injury to 
someone else. The rationale for allowing such recovery is that the fear of indeterminate 
liability is restricted by the necessity of the plaintiff’s having to establish some personal 
injury or physical damage, however slight and however fortuitous.245 
However, where the interest which has been interfered with is of a purely financial 
nature unconnected with damage to the plaintiff’s person or property246, the law of negligence 
has traditionally displayed a reluctance to provide any redress.247 The logic of this position, 
says Markesinis, may not be immediately obvious; nor, indeed, is it shared by many other 
legal systems. Why should recovery for economic loss be made to depend upon the fortuitous 
event that it is sustained through the medium of physical or property damage?248 Part of the 
reason for this reluctance may well be historical, but it is also founded on a pragmatic 
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ground: the fear of imposing a ‘liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time 
to an indeterminate class.’249  
A further factor, suggested by Professor Fleming, is ‘a fancied anxiety not to trench 
upon the sphere of contract and its basic philosophy that a claim to economic advantage must 
trace its source to a promise for consideration’.250 The declining of the influence traditionally 
exercised by contract law in precluding recovery in tort for purely economic loss has been 
emphasised by Rafferty.251 In effect, some of the decisions on pure economic loss are plainly 
motivated by the court’s view that the law of contract puts too many obstacles before the 
plaintiff, and that the law of negligence should be used to evade these obstacles. The 
requirement of privity, in particular, is seen as worthy of evasion. Blom, however, suggests 
that problems in using negligence in this way are becoming apparent, especially the inaptness 
of negligence to take account of the whole complex of rights and duties that parties have 
deliberately set up by contract to fix their rights and responsibilities, and that the law (leaving 
consumer protection to one side) should therefore respect.252 
Stevens believes that one reason why the courts have been forced to ‘stop short’ and 
deny all plaintiffs a cause of action is because, so far, no regulator has been found by which 
liability for pure economic loss could be determined.253  
Atiyah submits that some scepticism may be felt about the validity of the floodgate 
argument since, at various stages in the past, the courts have been reluctant to allow new 
types of action for fear of ‘opening a wide field’ and time after time this fear has been 
                                                            
249 Per Cardozo CJ in Ultramares Corporation v Touche (1931) 255 NY 170, 179. Or, as Bishop puts it, 
allowing recovery in such cases would place too great a burden on enterprise. W. Bishop, ‘Economic loss in 
tort.’ (1982) 2 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 1. Atiyah emphazises that in Cattle v Stockton and in Weller v 
Foot and Mouth Disease Research Institute it is clear that the judges were alarmed at the possible repercussions 
of allowing claims for purely pecuniary loss. He reminds us that Widgery J. in the Weller case said that if the 
plaintiffs had been entitled to recover there for their loss of profits, there was no obvious reason why butchers 
who had suffered from the outbreak of foot and mouth, and even carriers who transported meat and others more 
remotely affected, might not be entitled to claim for their losses. Patrick Atiyah, ‘Negligence and economic loss’ 
(1967) 83 Law Quarterly Review, 248, 270. The weakness of economic interests is clear when compared with 
e.g. the interest in physical security. It has been suggested that this kind of comparison makes sense when one 
considers that one can jettison the cargo, but not the passenger, to save a ship; or detain property, but not its 
owner, as security for a debt. Tony Weir, A casebook on tort (3rd ed. 1974) 469. The reference to the cargo and 
the passenger does not seem appropriate. The example is only valid in relation to conflict of interests (property v 
life), but it does not give any support to the justification of compensation of physical but not economic loss. 
250 Fleming, The law of torts, (4th ed, 1971) 164. Joost Blom, ‘Economic loss: curbs on the way ahead?’ (1986-
1987) 12 Canadian Business Law Journal, 275. 
251 Nicholas Rafferty, ‘Recovery in tort for purely economic loss: contract law on the retreat.’ (1986) 35, 
University of New Brunswick Law Journal, 111. 
252 Joost Blom, ‘Economic loss: curbs on the way ahead?’ (1986-1987) 12 Canadian Business Law Journal, 
275, 293. 
253 L.L. Stevens, ‘Negligent acts causing pure financial loss: policy factors at work.’ (1973) 23 University of 
Toronto Law Journal, 431, 451. 
164 
 
 
 
disproved by subsequent events, Donoghue v Stevenson254 being the best-known example.255 
In fact, in itself, floodgates is a weak argument, since extensive liabilities are just as likely to 
arise in certain cases of physical damage like in some pollution or products liability cases.256 
Another reason is the court’s reluctancy to overburden business and other activity 
with the cost of all potential economic losses resulting from substandard conduct.257 
It is also suggested that it may be more efficient to have these economic losses borne 
by those who incur them initially than to shift them to the activities which produce them. 
After all, potential pecuniary losses are usually viewed as ordinary business risks which 
businessmen must take into account in their plans.258 
Finally, the law tends to discourage a multiplicity of law suits. Instead, several claims 
are channelled into one action whenever is possible. Pursuant to this policy, the courts, which 
may have rejected the independent right of action for financial loss flowing from physical 
damage or injury to another person, do permit a parasitic claim for pecuniary loss when it 
springs from physical damage of some sort to the claimant.259 
The exclusionary ruled has also been based on a preference for contract over tort as a 
means of protecting financial interests. It is said that people should try to cover economic 
losses by contracting directly with potential tortfeasors or, in case this is not possible, through 
insurance.260 
All these policy factors, however, have not prevented the courts from gradually 
moving to provide protection where they felt there was sufficient guarantee that liability 
could be controlled and would not get out of hand. 
 
2.2.2 The exclusionary rule. 
 
From at least 1875 in England until the mid-1960s, the common law recognised a firm 
exclusionary rule precluding recovery for all but exceptional cases of relational economic 
loss.261 Cattle v Stockton Waterworks Co.262 is the leading historical antecedent barring 
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recovery of purely economic loss in negligence actions. In Cattle, the defendant waterworks 
company negligently laid and maintained a water pipe under a turnpike road. Unknown to 
anyone, the pipe leaked and a large amount of water accumulated in the soil. The owner of 
the road’s soil and the adjoining land had contracted to have the plaintiff Cattle construct a 
tunnel under the road for a fixed sum. Cattle began his work and removed the soil, which 
caused an increase in the flow of water and obstructed the work. Cattle completed the job, but 
at an increased cost. He then unsuccessfully sued the defendant to recover his excess costs. 
The Court of Queen’s Bench grounded its denial of recovery on the absence of any 
proximately caused physical injury.263 
Although the court expressed a desire to allow recovery, the fear for an indeterminate 
liability was stronger. It has been suggested that here, perhaps for the first time, the oft-cited 
spectre of indeterminate liability was used to deny liability in what the court appears to have 
considered an otherwise deserving claim.264 In the words of Blackburn J. the court concluded 
that: 
 
In the present case the objection is technical and against the merits, and we should be glad to avoid 
giving it effect. But if we did so, we should establish an authority for saying that, in such a case as 
Fletcher v Rylands, the defendant would be liable, not only to an action by the owner of the drowned 
mine, and by such of his workmen as had their tools or clothes destroyed, but also to an action by every 
workman and person employed in the mine who, in consequence of its stoppage, made less wages than 
he would otherwise have done. And many similar cases to which this would apply might be suggested. 
It may be said that it is just that all such persons should have compensation for such a loss and that, if 
the law does not give them redress, it is imperfect. Perhaps it may be so. But, as was pointed out by 
Coleridge J. in Lumley v Gye courts of justice should not ‘allow themselves, in the pursuit of perfectly 
complete remedies for all wrongful acts, to transgress the bounds which our law, in a wise 
consciousness of its limited powers, has imposed on itself, of redressing only the proximate and direct 
consequences of wrongful acts.’ In this we quite agree. No authority in favour of the plaintiff’s right to 
sue was cited, and, as far as our knowledge goes, there was none that could have been cited.265 
 
Courts that have interpreted Cattle have found it to require that plaintiffs suffer 
physical harm to a proprietary interest before they can recover in negligence actions. Some 
academics, however, upon examining the case (together with the American version of it, 
Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v Flint266) submit that it becomes apparent that it did not 
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create the absolute rule that bars recovery for economic loss when there is no physical 
property damage. On the contrary, the decision rested on an absence of proximate caused 
injury. Nevertheless, courts have continued to assert that the case stands for the much broader 
proposition that recovery for purely economic loss is barred per se.267  
The other case, described by the House of Lords as foundational in this branch of the 
law,268 took place two years later. In Simpson & Co. v Thomson, Burrell269, a Mr. Burell was 
the owner of two ships which collided at sea, resulting in the total loss of one of them. The 
accident was entirely due to the negligence of the other ship. The plaintiff was the insurer of 
the sunken ship and paid its full value to Mr. Burell as the owner of the lost ship. Then, it 
sought to recover from the same Mr. Burell as the owner of the negligent ship. It was held by 
the House of Lords that the plaintiff could not found the alleged right on subrogation of the 
rights of the owner of the lost ship because that would have amounted to Mr. Burell suing 
himself. But the plaintiff argued that he also had an independent right of action derived from 
the fact that any injury or loss sustained by the ship would indirectly fall upon him as a 
consequence of his contract, and that this interest was such as would support an action by the 
plaintiff in his own name against a wrongdoer. 
The argument was rejected. Lord Penzance pointed out that the implications of that 
argument were that, 
…where damage is done by a wrongdoer to a chattel not only the owner of that chattel, but all those 
who by contract with the owner have bound themselves to obligations which are rendered more 
onerous, or have secured to themselves advantages which are rendered less beneficial by the damage 
done to the chattel, have a right of action against the wrongdoer although they have no immediate or 
reversionary property in the chattel, and no possessory right by reason of any contract attaching to the 
chattel itself, such as lien or hipothecation.270 
 
The non-recovery rule has led sometimes to a wrongful classification of some 
economic loss as physical loss. This can be specially seen in some defective foundation 
building cases as a consequence of the court’s desire in the particular category of case to 
allow recovery, while at the same time wanting to avoid the appearance of creating a further 
exception to the exclusionary rule. Another difficulty is that it is not always easy to decide 
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whether or not the economic loss is truly consequential on physical damage (like in Spartan 
Steel).271 
It has been suggested that, in practice, the rigorous application of the rule can lead to 
capricious results, since it is frequently a matter of pure chance whether the financial loss is 
suffered by the person in the contractual relationship who also suffered the physical injury, or 
is suffered by another, but equally innocent party rendering it totally irrecoverable. 
Capricious in practice, even the historical support of the rule is suspect, since neither trespass 
nor the old action of assumpsit, the sources of negligence, were in origin confined to physical 
loss.272 
The exclusionary rule remained in spite of the generalization of liability which 
occurred after Donoghue v Stevenson.273 After Hedley Byrne, some commentators thought 
that the inescapable implication was that the dogmatic rule was finally exorcised from the law 
of negligence.274  
Professor Fleming said at the time: 
…since responsibility cannot be any less for what a man does than for what he says, the recent opening 
of the door to claims for financial loss due to negligent misrepresentation cannot help but strike a fatal 
blow also at those decisions in the past which had accepted the false premise that the law of negligence 
made no allowance whatever to claims for purely economic loss.275 
 
Atiyah, on the other hand, submits that atractive as it may seem at first sight, this is 
clearly untenable. Plainly, he says, Hedley Byrne has not overturned the great mass of case-
law which would be needed to arrive at this conclusion.276 
In Weller & Co. v Foot and Mouth Disease Research Institute277 it was clear that the 
force of the old authorities was as strong as ever. The plaintiffs were auctioneers in a 
livestock market and they sought to recover the financial loss they suffered when their market 
was forced to close because of an epidemic caused by the escape of a virus from the 
defendant’s premises.  
It was conceded by the defendants that the loss to the plaintiffs was foreseeable. The 
plaintiffs argued that since the loss was foreseeable the defendants owed them a duty of care.  
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Widgery J. rejected the argument, and held that the mere fact that the plaintiff’s loss 
was foreseeable was not a sufficient ground for saying that the defendants owed a duty of 
care and that the earlier cases did not depend on the distinction between physical damage and 
pecuniary loss, but on the absence of a duty to take care.  
He observed that: 
 ‘[In] an agricultural community the escape of foot and mouth disease virus is a tragedy which can 
foreseeably affect almost all businesses in that area. The affected beasts must be slaughtered, as must 
others to whom the disease may conceivably have spread. Other farmers are prohibited from moving 
their cattle and may be unable to bring them to market at the most profitable time; transport contractors 
who make their living by the transport of animals are out of work; dairymen may go short of milk, and 
sellers of cattle feed suffer loss of business’.278 
  
Widgery J. finally added that the Hedley Byrne decision did not alter in any way the 
fundamental rule that where negligent acts were concerned; there could be no recovery for 
pure economic loss. The world of commerce he said,  would come to a halt and ordinary life 
would become intolerable if the law imposed a duty on all persons at all times to refrain from 
any conduct which might foreseeably cause detriment to another.279 
Harvey points out that the judge was content to say that foreseeability of economic 
harm does not automatically give rise to liability, but he did not say what more the law does 
require to establish a duty to avoid economic loss. He concludes that the unfortunate result of 
this has been that Weller’s case is frequently taken as authority for the much wider 
proposition that pure economic loss is always irrecoverable in negligence.280 
Atiyah suggests that apart from the fact that in many of the previous cases the matter 
was clearly put on the ground that economic loss was ‘of a kind which the law does not 
regard as recoverable’, and not on the ground of absence of duty, it is merely a semantic 
quibble to treat the question as dependent on one point rather than the other. If there was no 
duty to take care in the earlier cases, he says, then it could be only because there was no duty 
to take care to avoid financial loss.281 
It might be thought that persons with a contractual interest in property damaged or 
destroyed by the defendant’s negligence would be in a better position, this for the reasons that 
there will be greater determinacy in the number of claims and thus an enhanced ability to 
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calculate the size of losses.282 However, in Candlewood Navigation Corp. Ltd. v Mitsui OSK 
Lines Ltd. (The Mineral Transporter)283 it was clear that claimants in this category would 
have no better luck than their counterparts who had no contractual interest in property. It has 
been submitted that, as a general rule, permitting recovery would generate a considerably 
larger class of potential litigants and might increase the costs of transacting insurance because 
the uncertainties involved. That is, restricting recovery to contractual relational loss will not 
address the relevant practical concerns.284 
In Candlewood, the claimant was the time-charterer of a ship. Under the charter 
arrangement, the risk of loss or damage to the ship was in the other party. The ship was 
damaged as a result of the defendant’s negligence but the claimant was required to pay for the 
charter while the vessel was under repair and lost certain profits. Losses were claimed. The 
Privy Council noted that the time-charterer had no proprietary or possessory interest in the 
vessel. The interest was merely in the contract itself. The fact that the claimant did not get 
what it bargained for under the contract did not mean that it could sue the defendant. The 
contract of hire was not with the defendant. Their Lordships held that, in any case where a 
defendant damaged physical property, judicial expedience dictated that the range of possible 
liability had to end somewhere. Otherwise there might be claims by all persons the delivery 
of whose goods might be delayed by a collision. This would open up an exceedingly wide 
new range of liability.285 Some limit or control mechanism had to be imposed on the liability 
of a wrongdoer towards those who have suffered economic damage in consequence of his 
negligence.286 
In the words of Lord Fraser: 
The plaintiff’s argument, if accepted, would have far-reaching consequences, which would run counter 
to the accepted policy of the law. If claims for economic loss by sub-charterers are to be admitted, why 
not also claims by any person with a contractual interest in any goods being carried in the damaged 
vessel, and by any passenger in her, who suffers economic loss by reason of the delay attributable to the 
collision? An exceedingly wide, new range of liability would open up.287  
 
His Lordship described the relational exclusionary rule as a pragmatic one dictated by 
necessity.288 In other words, in order to avoid the creation of a rule of law whereby a person 
who damages another person’s property can be held liable, not only to that person, but also to 
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all third parties for all of the consequences of that damage, the common law developed an 
exclusionary rule to limit the scope of the defendant’s duty of care in this type of case to the 
person or property directly injured.289 
The case was preceded by the authority of La Societé Anonyme de Remorquage à 
Hélice v Bennetts290 where the plaintiffs unsuccesfully sued to recover from the defendant as 
damages the amount of towage remuneration which they would have earned if they had 
completed the towage contract. The contract came to an end when a steam tug belonging to 
the plaintiffs came into collision with the defendant’s steamship under tow, the collision 
resulting from the negligence of the defendant’s servants. No damage was caused to the tug 
or its equipment by the collision.  
In Leigh & Sillivan Ltd. v Aliakmon Shipping Co. Ltd.291 the question was whether the 
plaintiff, who had a contractual right to certain goods, were owed a tortious duty, which 
would sound in damages, where the goods were damaged in transit at sea. 
The House of Lords reaffirmed the notion that in order to enable a person to claim in 
negligence for loss caused to him by reason of loss or damage to property, he must have had 
either the legal ownership of or a possessory title to property concerned at the time when the 
loss or damaged occurred. Contractual rights to the property are not enough if the buyer is to 
sue in negligence. 
The plaintiff argued that a claim in negligence should be open to buyers who were, 
prospectively, though not presently, legal owners of the property concerned. The House could 
see no reason why this would represent an exception to the consolidated authority of no 
recovery. Lord Brandon said that there is a long line of authority for a principle of law that, in 
order to enable a person to claim in negligence for loss caused to him by reason of loss of or 
damage to property, he must have had either the legal ownership or a possessory title to the 
property concerned at the time when the loss or damage occurred, and it is not enough to 
have had only contractual rights in relation to such property .292 
In a very powerful article, Markesinis submits that this is a remarkable declaration to 
the effect that however questionable a legal rule may be, however much the circumstances 
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may have changed since its inception, it must remain fossilised and immutable.293 He 
proceeds by criticising Lord Brandon, who stated that ‘the rule [he likes] is simple to 
understand and easy to follow.’294 If a rule is bad or inappropriate, says Markesinis, should it 
still be applied just because ‘it is simple to understand and easy to follow’?295 
Clarke suggests two reasons to put that judgment into question. (a) The principle of no 
recovery is based on the fear of floods of litigants, but this seems unlikely. (b) It is odd, he 
says, that one rule (insurable interest) allows the CIF buyer to protect his interest in the goods 
by contracting insurance, but another rule, denies him (and his insurer) a tort action against 
the person who does the damage. It is particularly odd, he concludes, in so far as both rules 
are rules of public policy designed to draw clear lines between interests that merit protection 
by the law and interests that do not.296  
The same author points out another inconsistency. The buyer may wonder, he says, 
why the lender who has security on goods, but then finds that the carrier has wrongfully 
delivered them to the borrower, can sue the carrier in conversion (see The Jag Shakti [1986] 
A.C. 337). The buyer may also wonder why he can sue the carrier who is careless on 
delivery, but not the carrier who is careless on stowage.297 On a similar line of argument, 
Cane asks why should purely economic loss be irrecoverable if consequent on damage to the 
property of a third party, but recoverable in certain circumstances if unrelated in any way to 
property damage?298 
Markesinis suggests that The Aliakmon is not, in itself, a leading case. He submits that 
the case was used as a medium to bring some order to the post-Junior Books chaos in the area 
of pure economic loss, but that the choice could not have been more unfortunate. He 
concludes that the attempt to return the law to the days when economic loss was never 
compensated unless it accompanied personal injury or damage to property is also very 
unfortunate.299 
The anomalies in the area of economic losses have always been subject of particular 
remarks from commentators. The classical theory allowed the recovery of economic losses 
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consequential on physical damage to a person or his property, but did not allow the recovery 
of pure economic losses; that is, those arising independently of any physical damage or those 
arising in consequence of damage to a third party’s  property. Stanton300 points out how 
generations of law students have been forced to grapple with the facts in Spartan Steel & 
Alloys Ltd v Martin & Co. (Contractors) Ltd.301  
In that case, the defendant’s employees negligently damaged an underground 
electricity cable, whilst digging up a road. As a result, the powers supply to the claimants’ 
factory was interrupted for more than half a day. During the time it took to restore the power, 
the claimants had had to pour the molten metal out of their furnace to prevent the metal 
solidifying and damaging it.  
The plaintiff claimed to have suffered three types of injury: property damage, 
consequential economic loss and pure economic loss. First, when the furnaces went off, the 
molten metal in the process of production solidified prematurely and, although it had 
managed to reclaim the steel that was being cast when the power went off, it had recovered it 
in a way that meant that it was worth less than what was paid for it. In addition, the plaintiff 
had suffered consequential economic loss in respect of the profit that would have been 
realized had the melt been completed and sold. In the third place, in the absence of electricity 
the plaintiff was unable to produce four other melts which it would have produced in the 
ordinary course of events. 
The plaintiff’s claim, under three different heads were: 
(a) ₤368 for the reduction in value of the metal in the furnace at the time the 
electricity supplied failed; 
(b) ₤400 for the profit which the plaintiff would have made if that particular melt had 
been properly completed; 
(c) ₤1,767 for loss of profit on four further melts which could have been put through 
the furnace during the period when the power was cut off. 
The Court of Appeal allowed the recovery of the loss in value from the metal that 
could not be kept hot enough to use further, and the loss of profit on that metal, but not the 
further loss claimed from the production that would have taken place while the power was 
cut. 
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Lord Denning repudiated the doctrine of ‘parasitic damages’, for it conveyed the idea 
of damages which ought not in justice to be awarded, but which somehow had been allowed 
to get through by hanging on to others. He maintained that the question of recovering 
economic loss was one of pure policy.302  
‘The more I think about these cases, the more difficult I find it to put each into its proper pigeon-hole. 
Sometimes I say: ‘there was no duty’. In other I say: ‘The damage was too remote’. So much so that I 
think the time has come to discard those tests which have proved so elusive. It seems to me better to 
consider the particular relationship in hand, and see whether or not, as a matter of policy, economic loss 
should be recoverable.’303 
 
Lord Denning’s approach was criticized by Stephen J. in Caltex because of the great 
uncertainty that would result in the law if the sole criterion for recovery of economic loss was 
to be ‘a matter of policy’ determined by the individual judge. He said that to apply 
generalized policy considerations directly, in each case, instead of formulating principles 
from policy and applying those principles, derived from policy, to the case in hand, was to 
invite uncertainty and judicial diversity.304 
The House of Lords during a short period also has cast considerable doubt on the 
appropriateness of employing policy considerations in legal reasoning.305 In McLoughlin v 
O’Brian306, for instance, Lord Scarman regarded policy considerations as being non-
justiciable and Lord Roskill in Junior Books said that, although it cannot be denied that 
policy considerations have from time to time been allowed to play their part in the tort of 
negligence, its scope is best determined by considerations of principle rather than of 
policy...307 
In any event, the first loss was characterised as a physical loss. The loss of profit on 
that melt was considered economic loss ‘truly consequential on the physical damage’308 or 
the ‘immediate consequence’309 of the material damage and, therefore, recoverable because it 
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had piggybacked on to the physical damage. The third head of claim was rejected because it 
consisted of economic loss independent of the physical damage (pure economic loss). 
Smith has said that statements that classify losses as an immediate or direct 
consequence without producing a criteria for the decision (when is direct or when is indirect 
or when it is directly consequential) is only a conclusion, and not the reason for reaching it . 
Therefore, he submits that physical damage is only relevant when it can take the place of a 
special relationship in setting limits to recovery. The physical damage must in itself be 
recoverable. Physical damage which is in itself too remote cannot serve as a limiting factor. It 
must limit recovery to a limited class, a limited amount, arising within a specifiable time. If 
the economic loss is such that other people could suffer the same kind of economic loss 
without the presence of any physical damage, then it cannot be a relevant factor in setting 
limits on recovery. This explains why the presence of physical damage in Spartan Steel was 
not sufficient to allow recovery. The same kind of loss of profits could have been suffered by 
a firm not having any physical damage resulting from the loss of power. The link between the 
physical damage and the economic loss must be such that only people suffering that kind of 
physical damage can suffer that kind of economic loss. In other words, the physical damage 
must be a necessary condition for the suffering of the economic loss. Only then the economic 
loss will be limited in such a way as not to be too remote.310 
Dissenting, Edmund-Davies L.J .felt unable to draw a distinction between loss of 
profits, resulting from being unable to complete the processing of materials and loss of profits 
resulting from being unable to carry out the process at all, since both were equally 
foreseeable and equally the direct consequences of the defendant’s negligence. He would 
have imposed responsibility for an economic loss provided that it is a reasonably foreseeable 
and direct consequence of failure in a duty of care.311 
 
2.2.3 Relational loss in other common law jurisdictions. 
 
(a)    Australia. 
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Departing from the exclusionary rule, a wider approach was taken by the High Court 
of Australia in Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v The Dredge Willemstead312 and Perre v 
Apand Pty. Ltd.313 
In Caltex the defendant, while dredging a shipping channel, negligently broke an 
underwater pipeline that carried petroleum products from the Australia Oil Refinery (AOR) 
to the plaintiff´s oil terminal. Caltex, which distributed crude oil from the refinery by means 
of the pipeline, which belonged to AOR, not to the plaintiff, sued for the additional costs of 
transporting oil to the terminal by ship and road while the pipeline was being repaired.  
Although the trial judge dismissed the action, the High Court of Australia refused to 
apply the exclusionary rule and allowed Caltex to recover this purely economic loss. Four 
members of the Court agreed that application of the normal Donoghue principle to purely 
economic loss would raise problems of indeterminate liability, and each attempted to 
formulate a more limited test for recovery of economic loss. 
It is not easy to extract any clear ratio from the four judgments, but the tests 
formulated by Gibbs J. and Mason J. being in similar terms have been cited as the dominate 
one.314 According to it, a defendant will be liable for purely economic loss if he knew or 
ought to have known that the plaintiff as a ‘specific individual’ rather than merely as a 
member of a ‘general’315 or ‘unascertained’316 class of persons, would be likely to suffer 
economic loss as a consequence of his negligent conduct. 
Markesinis points out that this deals with the problem of indeterminate liability, and 
could have led to a different result in Spartan Steel if the plaintiff had been the only user 
affected by the rupture of the cable. However, he says, the ‘known plaintiff’ exception, in 
general, creates the paradox that the more extensive the harm caused by the defendant, the 
less likely he is to be liable.317  
The test has provoked different opinions. MacGrath thinks that, to a certain extent, it 
has striven in one way or another to achieve an administratively manageable balance between 
the desire to compensate the innocent plaintiff and the reluctance to subject the inadvertent 
defendant to an inordinate liability which is punitive in effect.318 He recognizes, though, the 
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difficulty of translating the rather vague concept of proximity into manageable practical rules 
which will afford the public some means of ‘predetermining their liability or freedom 
therefrom’.319 
It has been submitted that the test is deficient in two aspects: a) the uncertain nature of 
the test will give rise to serious practical difficulties in its application to new fact situations 
and creates the potential for a very wide ambit of liability; b) it prevents efficient distribution 
of economic loss without attracting any significant advantages in terms of deterrence and loss 
prevention. The decision will have little deterrent effect.320 
After the judgment of Candlewood Navigation by the Privy Council, Roberts thought 
that Australian State Courts had to assess the degree, if any, to which the Gibbs/Mason ratio 
had been weakened.321 
Hogg believes the test of liability imposed by the High Court was very narrow. Not 
only has the defendant to have the knowledge or means of knowledge of the plaintiff as a 
specific individual, she says, but also other additional features are required which could be 
put either in terms of the physical proximity between the plaintiff’s property and the property 
of the third party which was damaged, or in terms of the joint or common venture in which 
the third party and the plaintiff were engaged.322  
Cane, however, suggests that the distinction between expenses incurred and benefits 
not received is not as strong analytically as Professor Hayes maintains, and also that it 
imposes an unnecessary limitation on recovery for purely economic loss if one accepts the 
‘specific’ or ‘individual’ foreseeability test proposed by Gibbs and Mason J.J.323 
The Privy Council in Candlewood Navigation refused to adopt the approach in Caltex. 
However, in Perre v Apand Pty Ltd.324 none of the members of the High Court suggested that 
Caltex was wrongly decided and two of them (McHugh and Hayne JJ) expressly approved it. 
Canada did not welcome it either but some lower courts in New Zealand decided to follow 
it.325  
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(b) Canada. 
 
Canada has expressed a greater willigness to allow recovery for pure economic loss 
than courts in the United Kingdom and the United States. However, the unfortunate lack of 
unanimity in the reasoning of the Supreme Court with respect to the fate of the exclusionary 
rule and differences of opinion made it hard to identify how far that rule was to be relaxed 
and the issue was not unequivocally been settle until 1997. 
In Canadian National Railway Co. v Norsk Pacific Steamship Co, The ‘Jervis 
Crown’326 a barge collided with a bridge owned by the federal government and managed by 
Public Works Canada. As a result of the accident, which caused extensive damage to the 
bridge, it was closed for several weeks. The bridge carried a railway track that served mainly 
the plaintiff, who had to reroute traffic while the bridge was closed. In addition to the 
Crown’s claim for damage caused to the bridge, three railway companies, who had a 
contractual right to use the bridge, sued the owner of the tug for economic losses which they 
suffered as a result of not being able to use it. The lower courts allowed these claims and the 
case went to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
The Supreme Court held, by a narrow majority that the exclusionary rule was not part 
of Canadian law. The decision confirmed what was already apparent, that is, that the 
Supreme Court was not inclined to follow the English courts’ lead and reaffirmed the 
traditional approach. The judgment provided a comprehensive survey of relevant issues, 
however, contrary approaches split three ways within the majority which made it difficult to 
discern a clear ratio and the state of the law remained obscure. McLachlin J delivered the 
main majority judgment. (L'Heureux-Dubé and Cory JJ concurring) The dissent was 
delivered by La Forest J (Sopinka and Iacobucci JJ concurring). The seventh Justice, 
Stevenson J. disagreed with the reasoning in both judgments favouring the liability to a 
‘known plaintiff’ rule derived from Caltex. This test was clearly satisfied on the facts of the 
case since Norsk had actual knowledge of the use which CNR made of the bridge. 
McLachlin J, began her approach saying that the case required the Court to confront 
squarely the vexed question of the extent to which damages for pure economic loss may be 
recovered in tort at common law. After reviewing the developments in other jurisdictions, her 
Honour identified two different approaches to the problem of defining the legal parameters of 
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support from the developments since Spartan Steel including Caltex and Junior Books. 
326 [1992] 1 S.C.R. 1021. 
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common law rules: the bright-line exclusionary approach as applied in Murphy; and the 
proximity based, case-by-case approach as applied in Anns. Her Honour essentially adopted 
the Anns test,327 stating that the incremental approach to the problem of determining the 
limits for the recovery of pure economic loss which had been previously adopted by the 
Supreme Court in Kamloops328 should be confirmed.329 She stated that proximity was the 
controlling concept which avoids the spectre of unlimited liability. The requirement of a 
relationship of proximity, however, was not considered the ultimate determinant of liability. 
Her Honour saw proximity as a necessary but not sufficient condition of liability which can 
be negated by policy. She remarked that proximity was not a test but a broad concept capable 
of subsuming different categories, an umbrella covering a number of disparate circumstances 
in which the relationship between the parties is so close that it is just and reasonable to permit 
recovery in tort. McLachlin J thought that the complexity and diversity of the circumstances 
in which tort liability may arise defy identification of a single criterion capable of serving as 
the universal hallmark of liability.  
Having established this framework and applying it to the facts, her Honour  found that 
there was sufficient proximity on a number of factors related to Canadian National Railways’ 
connection with the property damaged: (a) the plaintiff users of the bridge were parties 
physically threatened by the tugboat owner’s negligence, being frequent users of the bridge; 
(b) the plaintiff’s property was in close proximity to the bridge; (c) CNR's property could not 
be enjoyed without the link of the  bridge, which was an integral part of its railway system; 
(d) CNR supplied materials, inspection and consulting services for the bridge; (e) the plaintiff 
was the preponderant user of the bridge. She concluded that CNR's obligations to Canada 
brought their relationship into the joint venture category recognised in such cases as 
Greystoke. As there were no overwhelming policy reasons to deny recovery, CNR was 
entitled to recover. Finally, McLachlin J characterised her approach as fair and flexible, 
unfettered by absolute rules based on different categories of loss.  
La Forest J presented a judgment entirely inconsistent with a general theory approach 
distinguishing his approach to limiting liability from McLachlin J's from the outset. Instead 
of treating all economic loss as a homogenous group, his Honour was concerned to deal with 
the peculiarities of relational economic loss. His Honour said that the issue was not whether 
                                                            
327 Basil Markesinis, ‘Compensation for negligently inflicted pure economic loss: some Canadian views’. (1993) 
109 Law Quarterly Review, 5, 7. 
328 In Kamploops (City) v Nielsen (1984) 10 D.L.R.(4th) 641, a case dealimg with the liability of a public 
authority for the economic loss brought about by its failure to exercise its statutory powers, the Supreme Court 
choose to follow the path chartered by Lord Wilberforce in Anns. 
329 At 368. 
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economic losses are recoverable in tort (which they are indeed in certain cases). The issue, 
rather, was whether a person who contracts for the use of property belonging to another can 
sue another who damages that property for losses resulting from his or her inability to use the 
property during the period of repair. In taking this approach, La Forest J acknowledged his 
debt to the work of Feldthusen who argued that all economic loss is not identical and can be 
divided up into five distinct categories, each presenting unique policy considerations. La 
Forest J adopts Feldthusen's argument that the fifth category – (contractual) relational 
economic loss – should be barred by an exclusionary rule. This is because of the important 
differences between contractual relational economic loss and other pure economic loss. He 
stated that a distinct approach to contractual relational economic loss cases was justified both 
on policy grounds and on precedent. In policy terms, contractual economic loss cases have a 
number of specific characteristics that differentiate them from other pure economic loss 
cases. First, the property owner's right of action already puts pressure on the defendants to act 
with care. Imposing further liability cannot reasonably be justified on the grounds of 
deterrence. Second, a firm exclusionary rule does not necessarily exclude compensation to 
the plaintiff for his or her loss. Rather, it simply channels to the property owner both potential 
liability to the plaintiff and the right of recovery against the tortfeasor. Third, perfect 
compensation in these cases is almost always impossible because of the ripple effects which 
are of the very essence of contractual relational economic loss. These effects are often absent 
in other economic loss cases. It is in this sense that the solution to cases of this type is 
necessarily pragmatic: the whole exercise in this kind of situation involves drawing a line 
amongst those who are undeniably injured by the tortfeasor who was undeniably at fault. 
Fourth, contractual relational economic loss cases, typically, involve accidents, an aspect of 
fundamental importance with respect to tests of liability founded on the foreseeability of an 
individual plaintiff or an ascertained class of plaintiffs. Applying the exclusionary rule to 
CNR's claim, La Forest J identified an exception for joint venture cases. However his Honour 
did not think that CNR was engaged in a joint venture with Canada because under the 
contract, CNR was not required to contribute to Canada's loss. La Forest J also rejected 
CNR's argument that it had an alternative interest in the bridge by virtue of the ‘transferred 
loss’ doctrine. He held that such loss only occurs where the risk of property damage has 
passed, but the right to the property has not. CNR's loss was not transferred because it never 
assumed the risk of property damage. It followed that CNR had nothing more than a 
contractual right to use the bridge. Finally his Honour examined CNR's alternative means of 
protection. He concluded that CNR was clearly in the best position to guard against the loss it 
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suffered. La Forest J observed that both CNR and Canada were sophisticated contracting 
parties; well aware of the risk of bridge failure and the losses this could cause CNR and held 
that CNR should have built the price of insurance for loss into its contract with Canada.  
Summarizing, it could be said that McLachlin J adopted an Anns-style test as the 
mechanism for controlling indeterminate liability. The touchstone of this was the concept of 
proximity. McLachlin J explicitly rejected strict rules based on different types of damage. La 
Forest J, by contrast, isolated relational loss from other sorts of claims, and exhibited a 
pragmatic preference for certainty in decision making.330 He considered proximity a 
formulation too vague to offer any assistance to a presiding judge. His control mechanism 
was based on the type of damage suffered. However, not only did his Honour embrace the 
physical/economic damage distinction underlying the exclusionary rule, he made it far more 
sophisticated. La Forest J's entire approach was concerned with breaking economic loss itself 
into different subsets which further regulate recovery. 
In Bow Valley Huskey (Bermuda) the Supreme Court took the opportunity to clear up 
the uncertainty created by its decision in Norsk. Two companies named Husky Oil and Bow 
Valley decided to pursue a drilling opportunity off the coast of Canada. One of Bow Valley's 
subsidiaries therefore contracted with Saint John Shipbuilding for the construction of a 
drilling rig. In order to take advantage of offshore financing Husky and Bow Valley 
incorporated an offshore company, Bow Valley Husky Ltd ("BVH"), to which they 
transferred ownership of the rig before construction began. Husky and Bow Valley then 
entered into four year leases of the rig for drilling. These required that they pay BVH day 
rates even in the event that the rig was out of service. Due to negligence by both Saint John 
and BVH a fire broke out on the rig and it was out of service for several months. Husky and 
Bow Valley sued for their wasted hire costs as well as additional expenses including food and 
equipment costs.  
As lessors using the rig, Husky and Bow Valley might ordinarily have recovered 
under the exclusionary rule as having a possessory interest in the rig. However, it was 
common ground that, under maritime law concepts, these particular leases did not give 
possession. All they gave Husky and Bow Valley was a contractual right to services from 
BVH, which supplied both the rig and (indirectly through a separate entity which ran the rig 
operations) the workers. The duty in issue was not a simply duty not to damage the bridge, 
but a duty to inform the rig’s owner of the fact that a cladding used as a component of the rig 
                                                            
330 Feldthusen, above n 2, 196. 
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was flammable. An appropriate warning would have alerted the rig’s owner of the need to 
install a ground fault breaker system that would have prevented a fire started by an electrical 
fault. It was the spread of this fire that led to the rig’s damage. 
The Court held unanimously that the claim should fail. Applying the two-stage test of 
duty, the Supreme Court held that users of the rig such as the plaintiffs were foreseeable 
victims if a fire damaged the rig, and thus were owed a prima facie duty of care. Moving on 
to the second stage, that of policy, the Court held that to impose a duty on the defendants 
would be to create a problem of an indeterminate liability. The lead judgment was delivered 
by McLachlin J with La Forest J concurring. Her analysis of the contractual relational 
economic loss issue in the case is also accepted by the other judgment, delivered by Iacobucci 
J (Gonthier, Cory and Major JJ concurring). The judgment puts an end to the uncertainty 
created in Norsk. The decision is clear and allows recovery in limited, identifiable sets of 
exceptional circumstances, identified by La Forest J as (a) cases of ‘transferred loss’; (b) 
cases where there was a common adventure between the claimant and the property owner and 
(c) shipping cases involving the law of general average. The Court refused to grant recovery 
on any arbitrary case-by-case basis, such as might have been encouraged in the past on one 
reading of Norsk. 
Feldthusen, while in agreement with the result in Bow Valley is critical of the 
reasoning that led to it. He argues that the case should have been resolved at stage one of the 
two-stage test. The duty to warn of the flammability of the rig was owed only to its owner, 
who was the party capable of taking preventive measures to avert the fire hazard. According 
to him, there was no prima facie duty to warn users.331 In support of the Supreme Courts’ 
approach Klar argues that the question was not whether the defendants owed a duty to warn 
the plaintiff’s, but whether the duty to warn the rig’s owner could be extended so as to protect 
other users as well. He submits that McLachlin J’s argument was that the owners had a prima 
facie duty of care to all foreseeable victims to either manufacture the rig competently, or to 
issue warnings to the appropriate persons, and that these foreseeable victims included the 
rig’s users.332 
  
 
 
                                                            
331 Bruce Feldthusen, ‘Liability for pure economic loss: yes, but why?’ (1999) 28 University of Western 
Australia Law Review, 84, 104. 
332 Lewis Klar, Tort Law, 2003, 246. 
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2.3 Defective products or building structures. 
2.3.1 Generally. 
 
In the 70’s, during the era of expansionism of the tort of negligence that culminated in 
Anns v Merton London Borough Council,333  in areas of the law where the old reasons for 
denying liability no longer seemed to apply, or where the old reasons had never been very 
clear, plaintiff’s lawyers thought that it would be worthwhile trying to obtain a favourable 
result in cases in which previously they would not have bothered. One of those areas was 
pure economic loss, or in particular economic loss is in relation to defective products or 
defective premises. 334  
The main issue here is trying to determine whether a builder is liable in tort to a 
subsequent purchaser of a building with whom the builder is not in contractual privity, for the 
cost of repairing defects arising out of negligent construction. 
Martin submits that, as in the early development of negligence law pure economic loss 
was considered unrecoverable; it is not surprising that the first recognition of liability, for 
building defects was premised on the categorization of the defects as a material physical 
damage.335 In Dutton v Bognor Regis Urban District Council336 the Court of Appeal held that 
a house damaged because it had been built on a rubbish tip constituted a physical injury, and 
damages were thus recoverable under the foreseeability principles of Donoghue v 
Stevenson.337 So, what in fact constituted an economic loss claim was characterized as 
physical damage. The Court of Appeal, in the desire to impose liability on the Council ended 
up blurring the issue.338 
Counsel for the defendants argued that, although the Council might be liable if the 
ceiling fell down and injured a visitor, they would not be liable simply because the house was 
diminished in value. In a famous passage, Lord Denning M.R. responded:339 
 
                                                            
333 [1978] A.C. 728. 
334 David Howarth, above n 128, 29. 
335 Robyn Martin, ‘Defective premises-the Empire strikes back’ (1996) 59 Modern Law Review, 116, 117. 
336 [1972] 1 Q.B. 373. 
337 [1932} AC 562, [1932] All ER 1 (HL). 
338 Marianne Giles and Erika Szyszczak, ‘Negligence and defective buildings: demolishing the foundation of 
Anns? (1991) 11 Legal Studies, 85, 90. Following Dutton v Bognor Regis UDC, Anns characterized the plaintiff 
loss as ‘material, physical damage’ even though Lord Denning had, extra judicially, in The discipline of the Law 
(1997) 255-261, made it clear that this was a mis-description –presumably to help a ‘deserving’ plaintiff. Basil 
S. Markesinis and Simon Deakin, ‘The random element of their Lordships’ infallible judgment: an economic 
and comparative analysis of the tort of negligence from Anns to Murphy. (1992) 55 Modern Law Review 619, 
621.  
339 At 396. 
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I cannot accept this submission. The damage done here was not solely economic loss. It was physical 
damage to the house. If Mr. Tapp’s submission were right, it would mean that if the inspector 
negligently passes the house as properly built and it collapses and injures a person, the council are 
liable: but if the owner discovers the defect in time to repair it –and he does repair it- the council are 
not liable. That is an impossible distinction. They are liable in either case. 
 
Certainly, the economic loss which results directly from the avoidance of threatened 
physical harm demands recovery no less than when the physical harm materializes. The 
majority in Bryan v Maloney340 recognized this saying that: 
It is difficult to see why, as a matter of principle, policy or common sense, a negligent builder should be 
liable for ordinary physical injury caused to any person or to other property by reason of the collapse of 
a building by reason of inadequacy of the foundations but be not liable to the owner of the building for 
the cost of remedial work necessary to remedy that inadequacy and to avert such damage! 
 
A few years later, Dutton was affirmed by the House of Lords in Anns v Merton 
London Borough Council341 but limited by a new test. The loss recoverable was the amount 
of expenditure necessary ‘to restore the dwelling to a condition in which it is no longer a 
danger to health and safety of persons occupying and possibly (depending upon the 
circumstances) expenses arising from necessary displacement…’342 
Hayes suggests that to a sympathetic onlooker, this test could be seen as a valiant 
attempt to balance two opposing forces. On the one hand, there was a need to limit tort claims 
in this type of situation, whilst on the other there was the desire to provide a remedy in 
compelling circumstances. The net result, he says, was that, under Anns, a plaintiff could 
bring a successful claim if he could show that there was an ‘imminent danger’ to his health 
and safety due to the defective condition of the building.343  
Cane believes that was sensible. He reasons that, if a personal injury or physical 
damage to other property occurred as a result of the defect, the injured person or the owner of 
the damaged property would be entitled to recover damages in tort against a person whose 
negligence caused the defect. In the case of personal injury, he says, prevention is certainly 
preferable to an award of damages for injury which has occurred; and in case of damage to 
property, it is economically wiser to spend X now to avoid the need to spend X later plus pay 
damages for the cost of repairing the other damaged property.344 There is no doubt that, as a 
matter of policy, the law should provide incentives for the plaintiff to mitigate the danger of 
                                                            
340 (1995) 128 Australian Law Report at 173. 
341 [1978] A.C. 728. 
342 [1978] A.C. 728 per Lord Wilberforce at 759. 
343 John A. Hayes, ‘After Murphy: Building on the consumer protection principle’ (1992) 12 Oxford Journal of  
Legal Studies, 112, 114. 
344 Cane, above n 298, 206. 
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the defect in order to further both the goals of accident prevention and economic efficiency. 
In that sense, it has been said that the builder should not be ‘insulated’ from liability because 
of the current owner’s mitigation of the danger which the builder negligently created in the 
first place.345 
Harris refers to two capricious distinctions contained in Lord Wilberforce’s speech. 
First, he says, the categorization of the damage as material or physical implied that a latent 
defect must have manifested itself in some way –through cracking or the like. This was 
capricious, he suggests, for it would mean that if potential danger were discovered through a 
survey without there being such physical manifestations there would be no liability. 
Secondly, he believes that the reference to the danger to health or safety as being ‘present’ or 
‘imminent’ was also capricious for it would mean no recovery if a latent defect was 
discovered posing danger only in the distant future, and no recovery if a building actually 
collapsed without injuring anyone.346 A similar argument was developed by Lord Bridge in 
Murphy v Brentwood347, who maintained that a requirement of imminent danger to persons or 
other property raised the difficult problem of the deteriorating product which is not yet a 
danger, but which will become one with time and with increasingly expensive repair costs.348 
Hayes points out that the test required the law to draw a line between resident and 
non-resident owners, since the latter could not legitimately claim that there was any danger to 
their health and safety.349 He also adds that the situation which arose in Department of the 
Environment v Thomas Bates & Son350 suggested that the test required a distinction to be 
drawn between a static situation, where no danger would exist unless the plaintiffs acted in a 
way which would create such a danger, and a situation in which the internal defects in the 
structure were themselves sufficient to create a danger.351 
                                                            
345 Winnipeg Condominium Corporation Nº 37 v Bird Construction Co. (1995) 121 Dominium Law Reports (4th) 
at 214. 
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Peabody Donation Fund v Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co. Ltd. [1985] A.C. 210 at 242. His Lordship had 
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In any event, the fact that the relevant damage was classified as ‘material, physical 
damage’, led to a straightforward application of Donoghue v Stevenson.352 Stychin suggests 
that recovery could properly be justified on a different basis, as a less straightforward 
application of Donoghue v Stevenson, but unfortunately Lord Wilberforce failed to take that 
path, paving the way for the House of Lords to repudiate both the approach and the result.353  
 An even bolder step, allowing recovery without risk of injury to health or other 
property, was taken in Junior Books v Veitchi,354 at the time, an important decision of the 
House of Lords, perceived by the House itself to constitute a significant change in the law.355 
 In that case, the defendants were engaged as sub-contractors to lay a floor in a factory 
being constructed by the principal contractors for the plaintiff. Two years later the floor 
began to crack needing to be replaced and the plaintiffs claimed that it was the result of the 
careless manner in which it had been laid. There was no allegation that the defects posed a 
threat to person or property. The plaintiff sought to recover the cost of replacing the floor; 
book storage costs; machinery relocation expenses; lost profits on the temporary closing of 
the factory; contractual liability to employees and investigation costs associated with the 
flooring replacement. 
 For some obscure reasons, the action was brought against the sub-contractors, with 
whom there was no contractual relationship, instead of against the builder for breach of 
contract.356 
Martin suggests that the House of Lords took the ‘stich in time saves nine’ argument 
one stage further. It was better to repair premises even before they were allowed to become a 
threat to safety, and the law should encourage repair by compensating building owners for the 
repair costs.357 The damage was realistically categorised as pure economic loss. 
The House of Lords decided, with Lord Brandon dissenting, that the plaintiff could in 
theory recover compensation for all these kind of losses in an action in tort. There was no 
requirement that the economic losses be linked to actual or potential personal injury, or 
damage to other property of the plaintiff. 
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The test adopted to define the scope of the duty of care to avoid causing economic loss 
was Lord Wilberforce’s in Anns v Merton London Borough Council. In doing so, their 
Lordships (at least four of them) made the strong affirmation that the scope of the duty of 
care in economic loss situations is to be determined by the same approach used in all other 
negligence cases. No longer were judges supposed to view economic loss claims more 
sceptically than other negligence claims, or apply a test which incorporated the assumption 
that economic losses were not to be recovered except in very special circumstances.358 
The dissenting judgment of Lord Brandon was significant. Much of his argument 
concerned the boundaries between tort and contract and inroads into privity. 
But Junior Books was short-lived. Doubts about the decision quickly began to be 
expressed culminating in its comprehensive rejection in D & F Estates Ltd. v Church 
Commissioners for England359 In a changing political and economic climate the case has 
been all but discredited in England, restricted to its narrow facts360, and its statements in 
obiter dicta not followed. It has been said that it is unlikely that the case will be regarded as 
authority for anything in England in future after its dismissal by the House of Lords in 
Murphy.361 
In D & F Estates Ltd. v Church Commissioners for England362 the House of Lords 
retreated from (without overruling)  Junior Books, denying recovery to a claim for pure 
economic loss arising out of a defect of quality which presented no danger to the health or 
safety of persons, or damage to other property. The return to orthodoxy that would culminate 
with Murphy v Brentwood District Council363 had begun. Contract remained the primary 
route for the recovery of pure economic loss: the law of negligence would rarely provide a 
substitute for the assistance of third parties or those whose contracts do not provide for 
recovery.364 It was considered that to recognize a duty would be to impose on the builders, for 
the benefit of those with whom they had no contractual relationship the obligation of one who 
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warranted the quality of the plaster ‘as regards materials, workmanship and fitness for 
purpose’.365 
The previous view was flatly rejected by Lord Bridge: 
‘If the hidden defect in the chattel is the cause of personal injury or of damage to property other than the 
chattel itself, the manufacturer is liable. But if the hidden defect is discovered before any such damage 
is caused, there is no longer any room for the application of the Donoghue v Stevenson principle. The 
chattel is now defective in quality, but is no longer dangerous. It may be valueless or it may be 
incapable of economic repair. In either case the economic loss is recoverable in contract by a buyer or 
hirer of the chattel entitled to the benefit of a relevant warranty of quality, but is not recoverable in tort 
by a remote buyer or hirer of the chattel.’ 
 
A theory not embraced with enthusiasm, (rather used as a possible explanation of 
Anns), which the House was at that stage unwilling to overrule without further arguments was 
the theory of the complex structure. According to this, it was arguable that in complex 
structures, or complex chattels, one part of a structure or chattel might, when it caused 
damage to another part of the same structure or chattel, be regarded in the law of torts as 
having caused damage to ‘other property’ for the purpose of the application of Donoghue v 
Stevenson principles.366 Thus, if owing to the defendant’s negligence, part A was defective 
and caused damage to part B, then the owner would not be regarded as having suffered 
economic loss. Rather he would have suffered damage to property within the principle of 
Donoghue v Stevenson.367 
The theory was considered quite unrealistic and its limitations were later recognized in 
Murphy. When a house is built from the foundations upwards, a single integrated unit is 
created and it is an artificial argument to maintain that the foundations are one piece of 
property and, when they fail, they cause damage to ‘other’ property (walls, floors, etc.)  a 
single indivisible unit of which the different parts are essentially independent…any defect in 
the structure is a defect in the quality as a whole.’368 
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However, His Lordship would be prepared to accept that a distinct item incorporated 
in a structure which because of its defect caused damage to the building structure might 
suffice. He gave the example of a defective central heating boiler exploding and causing 
damage to the building.369 Lord Keith gave a similar example of a defective electrical wiring 
that had been installed by one sub-contractor and caused a fire which destroyed the building. 
Those examples,370 together with the one given by Lord Jauncey371 made it unclear 
whether the complex structures approach has still any life left in it.372  
Markesinis has also pointed out that in the examples given, the existence of an action 
appears to depend upon the factor that responsibility for the separate parts of the building 
rests with different persons. Thus, it is not clear whether it is also necessary to have regard to 
the degree of integration of the subcontractor’s work into the whole, or the feasibility of 
physically separating the different components.373  
 
2.3.2 The decision in Murphy v Brentwood District Council.374 
 
In Murphy, the plaintiff bought a newly built house. The Local Authority approved 
plans for foundations on advice of independent consultant engineers. The design was 
defective, providing insufficient steel reinforcement of the foundations and a few years later 
serious cracks appeared in the walls. It did not appear that the structures posed an imminent 
risk of collapsing. In fact, the new buyer occupied the house with his family without 
bothering to make any repairs. The owner sold the house for £ 35.000 less than its market 
value instead of spending the £ 45.000 needed to repair the foundations. He claimed that the 
council was negligent and sought to recover that amount and other losses and expenses. 
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The House of Lords was mainly concerned with the liability of a local authority. It 
only addressed builder liability, on the assumption that the authority’s liability could be no 
greater than that of the builder whose fault was the primary cause of the damage.375 There is 
no attempt in the judgments of Lords Keith, Bridge and Oliver to draw any distinction 
between the liability of the builder (for constructing a defective house) and that of the local 
council (for failing to check what the builder had done). In fact, Lord Oliver maintained that 
‘the liability of the local authority and that of the builder are not…logically separable’.376 
Some commentators, however, have argued that the two issues, although obviously 
related, need not be decided identically. 377 Markesinis suggests that the effect of restricting 
the tort liability of the builder of a defective structure is quite different (and allegedly, less 
justifiable) from restricting the liability of a public, regulatory authority.378  
Feldthusen stresses the importance of analyzing economic loss in terms of discrete 
categories of claim, focusing upon the underlying policy issues raised by each category.379 
The House of Lords unanimously held that a local authority (or a builder) owed no 
duty of care, that they should not be responsible in torts for defects that merely cause loss of 
value and, therefore, that Anns should be overruled together with Dutton v Bognor Regis and 
‘all decisions subsequent to Anns which purported to follow it’.380 In England, members of 
the public are no longer entitled to compensation if a local authority negligently fails to 
protect them against construction industry negligence. The law returned to a restrictive 
position towards allowing claims in tort for economic loss. 
Feldthusen submits that the dominant theme which explains the decision in Murphy is 
judicial conservatism. He suggests that it is implicit in many of the speeches that the Law 
Lords believe that courts trying modern negligence cases ought not to venture beyond the 
necessary extensions of precedents decided 50 years ago and that all policy initiatives be 
effected by legislation rather than by the creation of new tort duties. He maintains that some 
obiter dicta in Murphy are reactionary to the point where they threaten to overturn or retard 
many modern developments in products liability and public authority law.381 
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In any event, Lord Keith’s campaign against Anns joined by Lord Brandon, together 
with a generational change in the House of Lords presaged of the demise of Anns. All Law 
Lords who sat in Anns retired during the 1980’s, including Lord Wilberforce himself (in 
1982) so Lord Keith could reign sovereignly over the House as a senior member.382  
Some explanations of Murphy (and its judicial hostility to Anns) stress the significance 
of the rise of Thatcherite values (self-help and laissez-faire). Others thought judges were 
suffering from America-phobia, believing that American citizens spent most hours of most 
days suing one another, to the exclusion of all productive activity and to the discredit of their 
legal system.383 
Lord Bridge asserts that claims in respect of economic loss are only legitimate if the 
plaintiff can show reliance on the defendant within the Hedley Byrne principle.384 A 
convincing argument indicates that the purpose of a control factor such as reliance is to 
prevent the defendant being liable for an indeterminate amount to an indeterminate class for 
an indeterminate period. If there are other ways of averting this danger it seems pointless to 
require reliance by the plaintiff on the defendant. In Murphy there was no problem of 
indeterminacy. Firstly, there was no risk of liability to an indeterminate class because the 
defendant could only ever have been liable to the person owning the property when the cause 
of action arose and liability would have been limited to the value of the house.385 Secondly, 
there was no risk of liability in an indeterminate amount because the amount of liability will 
always be limited by the reasonable cost of repairing the dangerous defect in the building and 
restoring that building to a non-dangerous state.386 Moreover, the burden of proof will fall 
upon a plaintiff to demonstrate a serious risk to safety.387 Finally, there was little risk of 
liability for an indeterminate time because the contractor will only be liable for the cost of 
repair of dangerous defects during the useful life of the building388 and, over time, it will be 
increasingly difficult for a plaintiff to establish that deterioration is caused by the negligence 
of the defendant builder.389 
The main issue in Murphy appeared to be trying to determine what sort of damage the 
owner had suffered. The question whether defective premises constitute a physical damage or 
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a pure economic loss received in Murphy a definite answer: any defect, dangerous or 
otherwise, amounted to a pure economic loss and could not be classified as physical damage. 
Lord Bridge, for instance, said that: 
‘If a builder erects a structure containing a latent defect which renders it dangerous to persons or 
property, he will be liable in tort for injury to persons or damage to property resulting from that 
dangerous defect. But, if the defect becomes apparent before any injury or damage has been caused, the 
loss sustained by the building owner is purely economic. If the defect can be repaired at economic cost, 
that is the measure of the loss. If the building cannot be repaired, it may have to be abandoned as unfit 
for occupation and therefore valueless. These economic losses are recoverable if they flow from breach 
of relevant contractual duty, but…in the absence of a special relationship of proximity they are not 
recoverable in tort.’ 
 
The House of Lords found the artificial determination of the defect/damage distinction 
in Anns unacceptable. A defect remained a defect no matter how dangerous, and could not be 
reclassified as damage.390 
All defects, whatever degree of seriousness, represented a pure economic loss and, as 
such, not recoverable.391 Their Lordships rejected the ‘danger to health’ theory as illogical 
and lacking in all principle and affirmed that no sensible disticntion could be drawn between 
a mere defect of quality and a supposedely dangerous defect.  
For Lord Bridge392, analyzing the loss as purely economic was important because the 
recovery of such losses was, in the absence of reliance in the Hedley Byrne sense or of a rare 
Junior Books type relationship, the function of contract law. No reason is given for this 
assertion.393  
Lord Oliver said that the categorization of the damage in Anns had served to obscure 
not only the true nature of the claim but, as a result, the nature and scope of the duty upon the 
breach of which the plaintiffs in that case were compelled to rely.394 
Lord Keith adopted a passage of Deane J. of the High Court of Australia in 
Suthershire Council v Heyman:395 
‘The only property, which could be said to have been damaged in such a case, is the building, itself. 
The building itself could not be said to have been subjected to ‘material, physical damage’ by reason 
merely of the inadequacy of its foundations since the building never existed otherwise than with its 
foundations in that state. Moreover, even if the inadequacy of its foundations could be seen as physical, 
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material damage to the building, it would be damage to property in which a future purchaser or tenant 
had no interest at all at the time when it occurred’. 
 
Howarth submits that the new orthodoxy is empty of content. We are told, he says, 
that Anns is wrong, the local authorities and builders should not be liable for negligently 
reducing the value of a house, and, moreover, the two stage test for the existence of a duty of 
care is inadequate. But all we are offered in substitution is a three-stage test that inserts 
between Lord Wilberforce’s two stages a third stage called ‘proximity’, something that even 
the judges admit is too vague to define. Since nobody knows what ‘proximity’ means, he 
concludes, it can be asserted in every case to require whatever result is convenient.396 
Feldthusen also regrets the absence in Murphy of any compelling justification for the 
dramatic change in English law. The criticism of Anns, he says, was rooted in judicial 
conservatism: the imminent risk rule in Anns was novel and novel rules of that sort are the 
province of Parliament.397 
In Anns398 Lord Wilberforce had said that the amount of expenditure necessary to 
restore a dwelling to a condition in which it is no longer a danger to health or safety was 
recoverable. This notion of damages as ‘preventive’ compensation did not survived in 
Murphy either. The House regarded as illogical the distinction between breach of a duty to 
prevent physical harm and breach of a duty to prevent eonomic loss, because the loss was 
economic in either event. The possibility that liability for economic loss incurred in repairing 
dangerous defects might encourage safety was either ignored or dismissed peremptorily. 399 
Lord Bridge stated that, 
If a dangerous defect in a chattel is discovered before it causes any personal injury or damage to 
property, because the danger is now known and the chattel cannot be safely used unless the defect is 
repaired, the defect becomes merely a defect in quality. The chattel is either capable of repair at 
economic cost or it is worthless and must be scrapped. In either case the loss sustained by the owner or 
hirer of the chattel is purely economic. It is recoverable against any party who owes the loser a relevant 
contractual duty. But it is not recoverable in tort in the absence of a special relationship of proximity 
imposing on the tortfeasor a duty of care to safeguard the plaintiff from economic loss. There is no such 
special relationship between the manufacturer of a chattel and a remote owner or hirer.400 
 
He thought that those principles were equally applicable to buildings.  
O’Dair submits that it is important to question one of the central assumptions of 
Murphy, namely that the same principles must apply to chattels and premises. He maintains 
that even if it is true that on discovering the defect the owner of a defective chattel can avert 
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all danger by discarding it, this is not usually true of the owner of defective premises. He 
concludes that Mr. Murphy was able to move because he was insured, otherwise, he says, he 
would presumably have had to remain in a house which was subject to leaking sewage and 
the threat of a fractured gas main due to its defective foundations.401 
Lord Bridge, however, was prepared to consider one case of possible preventive 
damages being awarded: 
If a building stands so close to the boundary of the building owner’s land that after discovery of the 
dangerous defect it remains a potential source of injury to persons or property on neighbouring land or 
on the highway, the building owner ought, in principle, to be entitled to recover in tort from the 
negligent builder the cost of obviating the danger.’402 
 
No reason was given for this exception. Markesinis asks why should expenditure 
incurred to avoid legal liability to a third403 party on the highway or on the neighbouring land 
be recoverable when similar expenditure designed to avert physical injury to the occupiers of 
the property is not?404 Similar doubts are raised by O’Dair, who asks why, if the owner is 
entitled to spend money so as to avert the danger of liability to his neighbours, is he not 
entitled to spend money so as to avoid liability to his visitors.405 No doubt, the logic of a rule 
permitting recovery of repairs costs for dangerous defects to avert liability to persons on 
neighbouring land, but precluding recovery where the expenditure removes the owner’s 
potential liability as an occupier to persons actually on the defective premises arising from 
the self-same hazard is, at best, obscure.406 
Winfield suggests that it could perhaps be justified on the basis that the building 
would constitute a nuisance in respect of which the adjoining landowner would be able to 
obtain an injunction requiring repair or demolition. Alternatively, he says, it may represent a 
rather broader principle whereby the plaintiff may recover the cost of removing a danger 
which threaten others and for which the defendant is responsible.407 
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Markesinis suggests that Murphy also cast doubt on the ‘complex structure’ theory.408 
However409, the situation seems to be that, although the theory was doubted by Lord 
Bridge410 and condemned by Lord Oliver411 it nevertheless seem to have survived if one is to 
judge by the series of ‘complex structures’ examples which Lord Bridge412, Keith413and 
Jauncey414 were willing to accept as capable of giving rise to liability in the event of 
‘spreading loss’.415 
 
2.3.3 Murphy in other Commonwealth jurisdictions. 
 
By the end of the 80’s the law concerning defects in products or structures which 
manifest themselves before accident-caused damage occurs to persons or property was 
described as an ‘authoritative chaos’.416 
In 1990, Feldthusen maintained there was authority in the House of Lords for three 
entirely different rules, and equal uncertainty in the courts below. a) Anns v Merton417 held 
that the plaintiff could recover in negligence if the product posed an imminent risk of 
accident-caused damage to other persons or property; b) Junior Books v Veitchi418 might have 
been taken to stand for the proposition that one could recover the cost of remeding even non-
dangerous defects from a non-privity party. There followed a rash of decision distinguishing, 
reinterpreting and disapproving Junior Books; c) D & F Estates seemed to endorse the rule 
that the action in negligence was restricted to cases in which the defect actually caused 
damage to other persons or property, but purporting to follow that decision, the Court of 
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Appeal in Department of the Environment v Thomas Bates & Son Ltd.419 seemed to endorse 
the imminent risk rule again.420 
While in England some author believes Murphy v Brentwood421 certainly clarified the 
law422 in other Commonwealth jurisdictions it has been considered a deeply disappointing 
decision and has not been followed. 
  
(a) Canada 
 
The rejection began in Canada with Winnipeg Condominium Corp v Bird 
Construction.423 The facts were fairly simple. The defendant was a general contractor 
responsible for the construction of a 15-storey building. Bird subcontracted the masonry 
work. The building was completed in 1974 and the plaintiff became the owner in 1978. In 
1982 cracks began to appear in the stone cladding on the building. In 1989, a storey-high 
section of the cladding, approximately 20 feet in length, fell from the ninth storey. No injury 
or property damage resulted. Following the advice of engineers consultants, Winnipeg Condo 
replaced the entire cladding at the cost of 1.5 million dollars. The plaintiff sued the 
contractors, the architects and the subcontractor who had installed the cladding. Bird and the 
subcontractor responded with a motion to strike out the claim as disclosing no cause of 
action.  
At the trial court, Galanchuk J. dismissed the motion and Bird appealed successfully at 
the Court of Appeal where it was held that recovery was precluded by the principle of caveat 
emptor and by compelling policy concerns, as set out by the House of Lords in D & F Estates 
Ltd. v Church Commissioners for England.424 
On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada faced a choice between two sharply 
contending lines of authority: a) the ‘dissenting Rivtow principle’ which would allow the 
recovery of anticipatory repairs at least where they were undertaken to eliminate a source of 
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danger and b) the opposing line of authority that found its source in D & F Estates and which 
would deny recovery for anticipatory repairs.425 
In Rivtow Marine Ltd v Washington Iron Works426 a majority had found that the cost 
of repair of a defective crane was not itself recoverable, although other losses were subject to 
claim in negligence based on the defendant’s failure to warn the plaintiff that the crane was 
dangerous. However, in a vigorous dissent which subsequently attracted considerable 
attention from the judiciary throughout the Commonwealth, Laskin J. would have allowed the 
plaintiff to recover the cost of repairing the dangerously defective crane. He said that since a 
manufacturer was unquestionably liable for physical damage caused by its defective products, 
it should equally be liable for the economic losses incurred in rendering its products safe. In 
his own words: 
‘If physical harm had resulted, whether personal injury or damage to property (other than to the crane 
itself), Washington’s liability to the person affected, under its anterior duty as a designer and 
manufacturer of a negligently-produced crane, would not be open to question. Should it then be any less 
liable for the direct economic loss to the appellant resulting from the faulty crane merely because the 
likelihood of physical harm, either by way of personal injury to a third person or property damage to the 
appellant, was averted by the withdrawal of the crane from service so that it could be repaired?’427 
 
The basic rationale behind the majority approach that product defect economic loss 
may only be recovered in contract unless the defect manifests itself in an accident is that 
product quality claims cannot be considered divorced from the terms of the contract. In 
effect, in the majority’s opinion, to recognize in that case a tortious claim would be to create 
a contractual warranty flowing from the manufacturer to the ultimate consumer. Since the 
claim was contractual in origin, it could not be enforced against the manufacturer by a 
stranger to the manufacturer’s contractual relationships.428 
Ritchie J. maintained that: 
‘The liability for the cost of repairing damage to the defective article itself and for the economic loss 
flowing directly from the negligence, is akin to liability under the terms of an express or implied 
warranty of fitness and as it is contractual in origin cannot be enforced against the manufacturer by a 
stranger to the contract.’429 
 
The basic rationale behind Laskin’s dissent was deterrence, a point ignored or 
trivialized by the House of Lords in Murphy.430 
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The high water mark for this Rivtow principle finally came in Winnipeg Condo, clearly 
underpinning La Forest J.’s decision whilst adopting the reasoning of Laskin J. The issue to 
be resolved was framed succinctly by La Forest J. at the start of his judgment for the Supreme 
Court: 
‘May a general contractor responsible for the construction of a building be held tortiously liable for 
negligence to a subsequent purchaser of the building, who is not in contractual privity with the 
contractor, for the cost of repairing defects in the building arising out of negligence in its 
construction?431 
 
And in a central passage of his judgment, he said: 
‘If a contractor can be held liable in tort where he or she constructs a building negligently and, as a 
result of that negligence, the building causes damage to persons or property, it follows that the 
contractor should be held liable in cases where the dangerous defect is discovered and the owner of the 
building wishes to mitigate the danger by fixing the defect and putting the building back into a non-
dangerous state. In both cases, the duty in tort serves to protect the bodily integrity and property 
interests of the inhabitants of the building’.432 
 
Moreover, as a matter of policy, he says, the law should provide incentives for the 
plaintiff to mitigate the danger of the defect in order to further both the goals of accident 
prevention and economic efficiency. The builder should not be ‘insulated’ from liability 
because of the current owner’s mitigation of the danger which it, the builder, negligently 
created in the first place. 
Rafferty considers La Forest’s reasoning in favour of granting relief in respect of 
dangerous defects is persuasive. However, he recognizes there will be difficulties in future 
cases in determining just when a building constitutes a ‘real and substantial danger’ to its 
inhabitants and in distinguishing between buildings that are dangerous as opposed to merely 
substandard. He concludes that, in practice, this latter distinction may prove impossible to 
draw.433 
Todd agrees that the distinction between dangerous and shoddy may not be easy to 
draw. He points out that, although the danger in Winnipeg was clear enough, the answer to 
that question may frequently be quite uncertain. Inquiries into that matter are likely to be 
artificial and unrewarding, neither seeming sensible that a remedy might be excluded in cases 
where the element of danger is unclear.434 
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            (b) Australia. 
 
In Australia, the High Court in Bryan v Maloney435 also declined to follow Murphy 
returning to ‘a nostalgic era of pragmatic, policy based decision making’.436  
Bryan v Maloney was a typical foundations case with progressive cracking appearing 
in the walls of a dwelling house.437 Mrs. Maloney bought a house. The purchase turned out to 
be disastrous when foundations were later found to be defective causing extensive damage. 
The defendant, Bryan, was an inexperience professional builder who had built the house 
under a contract with its first owner, his sister-in-law some years before. The plaintiff 
inspected the house three times before purchasing it and, noticing no cracks or other defects, 
believed the house to be solid and properly built. Six months after the purchase, cracks began 
to appear in the walls of the house. Mrs. Maloney sued the builder. It was agreed, among 
other things, that Mr. Bryan was negligent in building the house with inadequate footings and 
that the damage (economic loss) was a foreseeable consequence of Mr. Bryan’s negligence. 
The issue before the High Court was solely whether Mr. Bryan owed Mrs. Maloney, as a 
subsequent purchaser of the house, a duty of care under the law of negligence. Unlike 
Winnipeg, the defects were expressly stated not to be dangerous, but merely quality defects 
reducing the value of the property.  
The majority in the High Court held that the relationship between a builder and a 
subsequent purchaser of residential property was sufficient to attract a duty on the part of the 
builder to take care to avoid reasonably foreseeable economic loss.  
Brennan C.J. in his dissent would have found the builder liable had the defects been 
dangerous as in Winnipeg, which he expressly approved. In his view, the imposition of 
warranties of that kind on one person in favour of another, when there is no contractual 
relationship between them, is contrary to any sound policy requirement. It has been submitted 
that, arguably, this is so for two reasons. First, the open market and contracts can better 
reflect quality through the price at which goods or buildings are bought and sold. Second, the 
appropriate forum for determining whether houses should be more expensive (by the 
inclusion of mandatory warranties) is parliament, not the court.438 
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On its facts, Bryan v Maloney widened the scope of damage for pure economic loss to 
embrace defects which are both structural and latent. Conceptual support for the decision was 
found in the concept of proximity, (general) reliance and assumption of responsibility.439 
After Bryan, there were concerns whether the same principle should apply to 
commercial buildings or to buildings with mixed commercial and residential purposes.440 Its 
application to commercial premises had been considered on numerous occasions by several 
intermediate courts and the decisions indicated a restrictive approach to the question of a 
builder's liability to subsequent purchasers for latent defects in construction. These courts 
have generally preferred to construe the High Court's decision strictly as a determination 
more reflective of its particular facts (in relation to residential dwellings), rather than as one 
applicable to a broad category of cases. 
Finally, in Woolcock v CDG441, the question was in issue before a differently 
constituted High Court. An engineer designed a warehouse for a developer who later sold it 
to a new owner. Soon, it became apparent that the building was suffering substantial 
structural distress and the owner decided to sue the engineer. The matter was treated as 
requiring an answer to a substantial question of law; namely, whether the respondents owed 
the appellant a duty of care.  
A consideration of whether the distinction between purchasers of commercial and 
residential premises should be maintained in determining a builder's duty of care for pure 
economic loss required the High Court in Woolcock to ascertain whether there was good 
reason, in terms of principle or policy, to confine the decision in Bryan. It was noted that in 
Bryan v Maloney, significant attention was given to the notion of proximity, and since the 
doctrine of proximity had been rejected by the High Court in 2001, the significance of Bryan 
v Maloney had been diminished.  
The majority of the High Court, focusing on the question of vulnerability, confirmed 
that no duty of care was owed, and that neither the principles applied in Bryan v Maloney, nor 
those principles as developed in subsequent cases supported Woolcock's claim. Whilst Kirby 
J provided a lone dissent, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ, in finding for the 
respondents, provided a joint judgment holding that the facts alleged did not show that the 
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owner could not have protected itself from the economic consequences of the defendant’s 
negligence, by obtaining a warranty from the vendor against defects in the building or by an 
assignment of any rights of the vendor against third parties. 
Although the defect in Woolcock was non-dangerous, the distinction between 
dangerous and non-dangerous defects played no role in the reasoning supporting the decision.  
Whilst Bryan v Maloney has not been entirely overruled, it seems that the High Court 
is yet to clarify the liability of builders to subsequent owners under the ordinary laws of 
negligence. If anything, the issue has been further complicated by recent decisions and the 
shift from reliance on proximity to vulnerability has arguably added little to the question of 
when a duty of care will be owed. The High Court declined to extend the principle in 
Maloney to chattels, and so the law in Australia remains unsettled in this respect. 
According to Wallace, Bryan seems destined for an uneasy future, requiring at least 
clarification, or perhaps even revision, of its rationale if unacceptable anomalies or dificulties 
of application in many real life situations are to be avoided.442 
At any event, the decision in Bryan v Maloney has now been superseded in most 
states and territories by statutory schemes for protection of successive owners of dwellings.443 
Some presumably anomalies that could result when tort trespasses in the realm of tort 
have been noted in Zumpano v Montagnese.444 What would the position be if the builder did 
not undertake the responsibility of constructing footings which would be adequate during the 
ordinary lifetime of the house, or if he had warned the proprietor of the inadequacy of the 
proposed footings and nevertheless been instructed to proceed, or if there was a disclaimer or 
limitation clause?445 
The facts of the case were relatively straight-forward. The Zumpanos were 
professional builders. In 1985, they built a family home for their own occupation, but after a 
little over a year, they sold the house to the Montagneses. In 1991, they discovered through a 
plumber who had been engaged by them to attend the property that a boundary trap had not 
been installed by the builders' original plumber when the house was constructed. The owners 
sued the builders in negligence for the cost of installing the boundary trap and reinstating the 
landscaping. The evidence in respect of the boundary trap was that the builders had left it to 
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their sub-contracting licensed plumber to perform the necessary works, namely to supply all 
waste and vent pipes and make the sewerage connection. 
The trial judge affirmed the liability of the vendors in negligence. However, in the 
Court of Appeal Tadgell and Phillips JJA. held that there was no negligence by the builders 
and they were not to be held liable for the default of their sub-contractor as there was no 
evidence that the builders should have checked that the boundary trap was installed by the 
plumber. i.e. it was reasonable to rely on the plumber and the inspector of the authority who 
inspected the plumber's work. Their Honours rejected the argument that the builders had a 
non-delegable duty as that duty usually related to cases involving safety issues. Their 
Honours also indicated that the builders could not be liable under the Bryan v Maloney 
principle for the negligence of their independent contractor.  
Brooking J.A. said that the material difference in facts between Zumpano and Bryan 
was that “the expressed rationale of the Bryan majority had depended on the original builder 
having contracted with (and so having relied on by) the first owner…”, whereas in the 
Zumpano case, the plaintiff builders were professional builders building the house for their 
own occupation. It may therefore be inferred from the decisions that, where a builder erects a 
house “otherwise than under a contract” he cannot be expected to assume overall 
responsibility for the actions of the independent contractor. 
He also identified a large number of questions that were not answered in Bryan v 
Maloney, such as the kinds of buildings covered by it, the type of defects and the significance 
of the terms of the contract between the builder and the first owner, suggesting that it was a 
decision that should be reconsidered in the future. 
Bernstein submits that, whilst Brooking J.A. is correct in stating that the High Court’s 
decision in Bryan v Maloney does not provide the answers to the questions that he has 
identified, this is not a valid reason for suggesting that the decision ought to be reconsidered 
by the high Court. He believes that Bryan was intended to be restricted to those cases in 
which the defect created by the builder, architect, engineer or local authority was latent and 
would not reasonably have been discovered on an intermediate inspection. Thus, he argues 
that the other variations on a theme identified by Brooking JA in Zumpano will be able to be 
resolved quite easily by judges in due course when appropriate fact-situations present 
themselves for decision.446 
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Duncan Wallace considers all three judgments in Zumpano of the greatest value in all 
jurisdictions on the independent contractor point and it represents, in his view, the best and 
most thoroughly researched discussion in any common law jurisdiction, of this very 
important concept in the context of claims in negligence for defective buildings.447 
 
(c) New Zealand 
 
The New Zealand Court of Appeal faced in Invercargill CC v Hamlin448 almost the 
same issue as had confronted the House of Lords in Murphy, i.e. classic failure of inadequate 
foundations, resulting in movement and cracking, some of it progressive and at intervals, and 
jamming of doors, with a significantly later date after the earlier damage when a prudent 
purchaser would ultimately have realised that something worse than normal settlement and 
weather changes were responsible.449 
The plaintiff had bought a piece of land in the south of New Zealand. The seller was a 
builder who also contracted with him to build a house. The foundations, that had been 
inspected and approved by the council building inspector, were defective and major cracks 
appeared some years later. As the builder was no longer in business, the action proceeded 
against the local authority for the recovery of the economic loss which consisted in the 
diminution in value of the house. 
The facts gave rise to two important issues: (1)could a local authority be liable for 
latent defects contributed to, or caused by, the careless acts or omissions of building 
inspectors in carrying out inspection of houses under construction?; and (2) when did such 
liability arose, when the damage occurred or when it was reasonably discoverable?450 
The Court of Appeal, in a remarkable display of forceful unanimity, refusing to follow 
the decision of the House of Lords in Murphy, held that the council was liable in negligence 
to the plaintiff. In arriving at this decision, the court laid great stress on the policy issues 
which affect house building in New Zealand and which, they said, pointed to reliance by 
house owners on councils to ensure compliance with building codes and full recognition of 
that reliance by local authorities.451 The reliance in question was a general reliance, rather 
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than a specific reliance along the lines of Hedley Byrne established on the facts of a particular 
case; the average prudent purchaser would expect that the by-laws and regulations of the 
council would have been complied with.452 
Cooke P. commented on the divergence between the Commonwealth jurisdictions:453 
‘While the disharmony may be regrettable, it is inevitable now that the Commonwealth jurisdictions 
have gone on their own paths without taking English decisions as the invariable starting 
point…Whatever may be the position in the United Kingdom, homeowners in New Zealand do 
traditionally rely on local authorities to exercise reasonable care not to allow unstable houses to be built 
in breach of bylaws. The linked concepts of reliance and control have underlain New Zealand case law 
in this field from Bowen454 onwards.’455 
 
Richardson J. identified several factors that distinguished the position in New Zealand 
from the one that existed in England: the high proportion of occupier-owned housing in New 
Zealand; the fact that much housing construction was undertaken by small scale cottage 
builders for individual purchasers; the existence of significant governmental support for 
private home building and home ownership; the existence of governmental regulation of the 
building industry through building bylaws and the fact that it is not common for house buyers 
to commission engineering or architectural examinations or surveys.  
Another fact of significant relevance was that the New Zealand Parliament had 
enacted the Building Act in 1991 which dealt specifically with building regulations and 
controls. If the Parliament had chosen not to bring the law into line with Murphy then, it did 
not look appropriate that a judicial decision should do it.  
It has been pointed out that many of those features, distinctive of the New Zealand 
housing market, could equally be attributed to the English situation at the time. But, whether 
in fact New Zealand housing conditions differed sufficiently from the English situation so as 
to justify differing law was not the issue. What mattered was held to be not the conditions 
themselves, but the ‘perception’ of those conditions in New Zealand.456 
In relation to the limitation period, the Court of Appeal held, by a majority of four to 
one, that a cause of action arose when the defects were discovered or could have been 
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discovered by reasonable diligence. Thus, the decision of the House of Lords in Pirelli v 
Oscar Faber.457 
The defendant appealed to the Privy Council, arguing that the line of New Zealand 
authority relied upon by the Court of Appeal had been based on the English cases of Dutton 
and Anns. As those cases had been found by the House of Lords to be wrongly decided, then 
New Zealand authority was intrinsically flawed.  
The dilemma was set: were the Privy Council to agree with the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal, their decision could be interpreted as undermining the House of Lords in Murphy. To 
overturn the decision of the lower court would be to impose on New Zealand, and on other 
jurisdictions subject to the Privy Council, principles of law which have been clearly and 
consciously rejected by New Zealand and other commonwealth courts.458 
Toby remarks that it was fortuitous that between the time of the Court of Appeal’s 
decision and the time of the hearing in London of the Privy Council appeal both the Supreme 
Court of Canada in Winnipeg and the High Court of Australia in Bryan v Maloney had 
occasion to consider building negligence cases declining to follow Murphy.459 
In a luminous judgment460 Lord Lloyd, delivering the decision of the Privy Council, 
confirmed that the Court of Appeal judgment was entirely in accordance with the law as it 
had developed in New Zealand over the last 20 years. He stated that:  
‘The ability of the common law to adapt itself to the differing circumstances of the countries in which it 
has taken root is not a weakness, but one of its great strengths. Were it not so, the common law would not have 
flourished as it has, with all the common law countries learning from each other.’461 
 
And then he continued saying that it was the function of the board to ensure that when 
the New Zealand Court of Appeal purported to apply settled principles of English common 
law, it applied those principles correctly. 
‘But in the present case the judges in the New Zealand Court of Appeal were consciously departing 
from English case law on the ground that conditions in New Zealand are different. Were they entitled to do so? 
The answer must surely be ‘yes’. 462 
 
One special reason why this particular branch of the law was unsuited to the 
imposition of a single monolithic solution was the fact that there was already divergence in 
other common law jurisdictions such as Canada and Australia. Tobin points out that the board 
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cited the decision of Winnipeg and Bryan v Maloney, not to cast doubt on Murphy, but to 
show that more than one view was possible.463 
In relation to the limitation period, the Privy Council accepted the injustice of the 
application of the Pirelli test.  The board, citing an article by Stephen Todd, confirmed that 
once it was appreciated the loss incurred was economic then many difficulties surrounding 
the limitation issue went away. The element of loss necessary to support a claim for 
economic loss did not exist so long as the market value of the house was not affected. It was 
only when the market value of the house suffered that all the elements necessary to support 
the plaintiff’s claim came into existence.464 
With Invercargill the issue for New Zealand is settled by its highest court: both public 
and private defendants are liable in tort where they assist in the creation of a latent defect in a 
building. 
For some authors, in these decisions, the courts of New Zealand, Canada and 
Australia have taken a consumer-protectionist, plaintiff-oriented approach to this area of law 
and they have highlighted the policy argument in favour of the Anns principle.465 In any 
event, Winnipeg, Invercargill and Bryan v Maloney all cast serious doubt on the viability of 
Murphy466 and each of these courts could be said, as Laura Hoyano suggested, to be bold 
spirits.467 
In the recent decision of Rolls-Royce New Zealand Ltd v Carter Holt Harvey 
Limited468 the relationship between tort and contract came before the Court of Appeal 
together with the issue whether a duty ought to be recognised in the case of commercial 
properties. In that case Genesis made a contract with Carter Holt Harvey to build an industrial 
plant. Genesis subcontracted some of the work to Rolls Royce. There was no direct 
contractual relationship between Carter Holt and Rolls Royce. Both contracts contained 
limitation of liability clauses. A clause in the contract between Genesis and Carter Holt 
enabled the latter to require Genesis to take proceedings against Rolls Royce to enforce the 
contractual obligations existing in the subcontract for Carter Holt's benefit. Therefore, a claim 
in contract was available to Carter Holt, albeit an indirect one. However, when Rolls Royce 
failed to perform Carter Holt chose to sue Rolls Royce in negligence, giving rise to a tortious 
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claim across a contractual matrix. It also claimed, on the basis of Hedley Byrne, that Rolls 
Royce owed a duty to take care in making statements and giving advice about the plant. The 
main damages sought were for loss of profit from not being able to sell electricity. 
The Court of Appeal held Rolls Royce owed Carter Holt Harvey no duty of care as 
pleaded and struck out the claim except in so far as it could be repleaded to relate to 
allegations of actual physical damage and to allegations of there being a special relationship 
between them. The Court noted that here there were no allegations of physical damage, latent 
defects or dangerous defects. The contractual matrix figured highly in the duty of care 
inquiry, along with other policy factors pointing in the same direction. The Court noted that 
the parties were sophisticated commercial parties with equality bargaining power, they should 
be able to look after their own interests and there should be no need for court interference. 
Besides that, Carter Holt Harvey had chosen not to enter a direct contract with Rolls Royce 
and the contractual structure was very detailed. In such circumstances, liability would not be 
recognised in Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada and most of the United States. 
Whether a duty of care in tort will arise in a commercial context involving a 
contractual matrix looks increasingly unlikely in New Zealand. As this case confirms it will 
certainly not arise where the duty in tort is pleaded as a duty to take reasonable care to ensure 
that contractual obligations are performed under a contract to which the plaintiff is not a 
party. The Court of Appeal has expressed in no uncertain terms its reluctance to go down this 
route.469 
Todd submits that looking at the matter broadly there is no doubt that the decision is 
right and that this is a typical case where the remedy must be sought in contract and contract 
alone. He recognises that the objections to a negligence duty are real and compelling; 
however, he calls the attention to the need to reconcile the present case with Hamlin v 
Invercargill where he feels there is no tidy solution.470 
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2.4    Residual categories of claims. 
2.4.1 Disappointed beneficiaries. 
 
One particular variety of pure economic loss is the so-called disappointed legatees or 
frustrated beneficiaries. In White v Jones471, a testator (Mr. Barratt) had a will drawn up after 
a family quarrel excluding his two daughters from his inheritance. However, within a few 
months the parties were reconciled, and Mr Barratt gave instructions over the phone to his 
lawyer to prepare a new will, which would leave each daughter a legacy of £ 9,000. 
Unfortunately the solicitors waited several months before carrying out these instructions, and 
before any substantial work had been done Mr Barratt had died, as a result of a fall while on 
holiday.  The beneficiaries brought an action in negligence against the solicitor, to recover the 
money they would have received under the will.  
It was held that a solicitor retained to draw up a will, but who fails to do so before the 
testator's sudden death, may owe a duty in tort to disappointed beneficiaries, with the result 
that they can claim the value of their lost legacies from the solicitor if they can establish fault. 
The claim posed a number of conceptual difficulties, mainly that: (a) the solicitor’s 
contractual duty was owed only to his client, the now dead testator; (b) the plaintiffs’ action, 
being founded on economic loss, could succeed only on the basis of some form of application 
of Hedley Byrne; yet, there was no obvious assumption of responsibility towards them and, 
still less obviously, any corresponding reliance on their part; (c) if liability were to be 
imposed, establishing clear and manageable limits to such liability would be extremely 
difficult. 
 The earlier factually similar case in the daughter’s favour was Ross v Caunters472, but 
that was a merely first instance decision and in the light of the restrictive attitude towards 
liability for pure economic loss taken by the House of Lords in Caparo and Murphy, there 
was much doubt about whether it would survive a direct challenge. There were many reasons 
why a negligent solicitor should be liable, in particular, the ‘strong impulse for practical 
justice’ to remedy the fact that the only persons who might have a valid claim (the testator 
and the estate) had suffered no loss and the only persons who had suffered a loss (the 
disappointed beneficiaries), had no claim. Another point, emphasized by Cooke J in Gartside 
                                                            
471 [1995] 1 All ER 691, HL 
472 [1980] Ch 297. 
208 
 
 
 
v Shefffield Young & Ellis473 was the role played by solicitors in society as, in practice, public 
relies on them to prepare effective wills. 
Lord Goff, after summarising the conceptual difficulties, held that the Hedley Byrne 
principle should extend in cases such as White, this is, that the assumption of responsibility 
by the solicitor towards his client should extend in law to the intended beneficiary. 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson observed that, although reliance is an essential element in a 
case based on negligent misstatement or advice, it was not necessary in the case of a special 
relationship if careless conduct can be foreseen as likely to cause and does in fact cause 
damage to the plaintiff. 
 Lord Mustill, in a strong dissent (with Lord Keith concurring) said that legal fault 
cannot exist in a vacuum; the person who complains of it must do so by virtue of a legal right 
and that the purpose of the courts when recognising tortuous acts and their consequence is to 
compensate those plaintiffs who suffer actionable breaches of duty, not to act as a second-line 
disciplinary tribunals imposing punishment in the shape of damages. He said that for the duty 
to arise, there had to be an element of reciprocity in the relationship between the parties, close 
to a bilateral relationship. Even if there was not technically a contract, each side had to do 
something. In that sense, in his opinion, White lacked all such reciprocity. It was a one-sided 
relationship which was insufficiently like a contract for there to be recoverable economic 
loss. 
 Lord Keith said that Hedley Byrne provided a narrow exception to the rule against 
recovery of economic loss, an exception that depended on the presence of reliance and a 
‘close relationship’ of ‘proximity’ between plaintiff and defendant. Since there was neither 
reliance nor ‘close relationship’ between the beneficiaries and the solicitor, he would have 
found for the defendant. 
There is a certain consensus that White v Jones does make clear at least three crucial 
principles: (a) a duty to avoid economic loss is confined to special relationships within which 
the defendant has assumed responsibility for protecting the plaintiff’s economic welfare; (b) 
such a relationship will arise only where the plaintiff is readily identifiable as an individual or 
a member of a class of persons for whom the defendant undertakes responsibility in the 
performance of a particular task; (c) extended Hedley Byrne relationships are not confined to 
negligent misstatements and careless advice. Provision of services may create a special 
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relationship in appropriate conditions. Reliance is not an essential ingredient of a special 
relationship.474 
Potentially, White could have launched a significant expansion of the ambit of 
professional liability for economic losses to a non-client, but it has not done so. Instead, it has 
served as an authority for the courts to focus such liability on cases where there is, as Lord 
Goff put it, a ‘lacuna in the law’. Such expansion of the law proposed by the majority through 
the notion of ‘assumption of responsibility’ has been considered intellectually troublesome 
and not likely to appeal to academic lawyers because of the inherent vagueness of the notion. 
It has been suggested that deciding the case on classic tort principles might have produced a 
more sound doctrinal basis for the decision, or even better would have been the contractual 
explanation.475 However, many believe that to invoke contract in White would result in 
running the very real risk of blurring the distinction between tort and contract altogether.476 
 
2.4.2 Employment references. 
 
Another variety of pure economic loss which cannot easily be categorised is the 
liability resulting from inaccurate and negligently prepared employment references. In Spring 
v Guardian Assurance plc477, the plaintiff, who had been an insurance representative for the 
defendant, was dismissed from his position of sales director and office manager. He 
subsequently sought to sell insurance products for another firm. Under the rules of the 
regulatory body LAUTRO478 the defendant was required to supply a reference.  In 
consequence of the unfavourable reference supplied (described by the trial judge as the ‘kiss 
of death’) the other company declined to appoint the plaintiff.  He brought an action against 
his former employers on several grounds including negligent misstatement, malicious 
falsehood and breach of contract.  
The House of Lords held that an employer who gives a reference in respect of a 
former employee owed that employee a duty to take reasonable care in its preparation and 
would be liable to him in negligence if he failed to do so and the employee thereby suffered 
economic damage. 
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Lords Slynn, Lowry and Woolf held that a duty of care arose under the three-part test 
set out in Caparo because (1) it was foreseeable that the harm would occur, (2) the parties 
were in sufficient proximity, and (3) it was ‘fair, just and reasonable’ to impose a duty of 
care. As establishing foreseeability and proximity was relatively easy, the real issue arose 
over the third criterion. The public policy arguments were essentially of two kinds: first, 
whether recognising a new duty situation would undermine the law of defamation; second, 
whether the imposition of liability would produce undesirable effects on the quality and 
supply of references.479  
In relation to the first aspect, Lord Slynn pointed out that the rule in defamation was 
established before modern developments in the law of negligence, and that the two torts do 
not cover the same ground. The essence of a claim in defamation is, he stated, that a person’s 
reputation has been damaged, whereas a claim that a reference has been given negligently is 
essentially based on the fact that a job has been lost.480 The majority agreed that the existence 
of a remedy in defamation or injurious falsehood was irrelevant to the availability of a 
remedy in negligence.  
Regarding the concerns that imposing a duty of care on employers in respect of 
references would lead them to refuse to give references, or that they may give them but 
reduce the amount of negative, critical information supplied in them, the majority was not 
impressed (only Lord Keith, in dissent, accepted the argument). Lord Goff, in particular, said 
that although the recognition of a duty of care might have some inhibiting effect on the way 
in which references are expressed, he suspected that such an inhibition already exists because 
employers are often unwilling to indulge in unnecessary criticism of their employees.481 Lord 
Slynn thought that while the quantity of references might decrease, the quality and value 
would be greater, and it was not clear that it was more ion the public interest to have more 
references than to have fewer, more careful references.482 
On a different approach, Lord Goff looked to Hedley Byrne and the voluntary 
assumption of responsibility for the source of the duty of care.483 The duty claimed, however, 
was one owed to the person about whom it was written, not the person to whom it was sent. 
Therefore, it represented an extension of the Hedle yByrne principle that could be justified on 
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the basis that an employee relies on his employer to carry out this service with appropriate 
care and that his financial prospects were significantly in the hands of that person. However, 
as counsel had not argued the case on this basis, he considered his speech of limited 
authority.  
The question of reliance is also problematic because the direct reliance on the 
statement was by the new employer who rejected the claimant, although, some suggest that 
there was commonly an element of reliance by the plaintiff, who will have asked for the 
reference or will at least know that it is likely to be given.484 In any event, to distinguish the 
type of situation in Spring from one where the plaintiff actually relies on the statement, it has 
been suggested that it may be preferable to describe the plaintiff as reasonably depending on 
his employer to take care in giving the reference.485  
Fears that Spring will fatally undermine the defence of qualified privilege in 
defamation have been considered questionable. That defence is as broad as it is partly 
because defamation is a tort to which strict liability applies; it is not necessary to prove fault. 
Following Spring, the defence of qualified privilege will continue to protect employers who 
do not act carelessly.486 
 
2.4.3 Freezing injunctions. 
 
 In Commissioners of Customs & Excise v Barclays Bank Plc,487 the plaintiff obtained 
a freezing injunction against a customer of the bank, and notified the bank. The bank through 
‘operator error’ made payments out of the account frozen by the injunction.  Due to the 
negligence of the bank, substantial sums were lost and the plaintiff claimed for damages 
The issue tested in Barclays was whether Barclays Bank owed a duty in tort not to 
cause the Customs & Excise Commissioner economic loss by allowing payments to be made 
out of their clients' accounts which were subject to a freezing order.  
The House of Lords unanimously decided that there was no duty of. In the House of 
Lords, all five of their Lordships giving substantive speeches, unanimously, reversing the 
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decision of the Court of Appeal held that, as a matter of policy, Barclays did not owe a duty 
of care to Customs.  
The House considered the three tests for liability for economic loss: (1) ‘voluntary 
assumption of responsibility’; (2) the three-fold test stated by Lord Bridge in Caparo; and (3) 
an incremental ‘test’, based on the observation of Brennan J in Sutherland Shire Council v 
Heyman,488 which looks to established categories in which liability has been accepted. After 
some consideration, the House did not think it necessary to a identify a single test for the 
existence of a duty of care. 
Lord Bingham did not think that the notion of assumption of responsibility, even on 
an objective approach, could aptly be applied to the situation which arose between the 
Commissioners and the Bank on notification to it of the orders.  He said that, of course it was 
bound by law to comply, but it had no choice. It did not assume any responsibility towards 
the Commissioners as the giver of references in Hedley Byrne (but for the disclaimer) and 
Spring, the valuers in Smith v Bush, the solicitors in White v Jones and the agents in 
Henderson v Merrett may plausibly be said to have done. He also thought that the Caparo 
threefold test itself provided no straightforward answer to the vexed question whether or not, 
in a novel situation, a party owes a duty of care and that the incremental test was of little 
value as a test in itself, and was only helpful when used in combination with a test or 
principle which identified the legally significant features of a situation. In his opinion, the 
majority (or majority outcomes) of the leading cases were in every or almost every instance 
sensible and just, irrespective of the test applied to achieve that outcome. This was not to 
disparage the value of and need for a test of liability in tortious negligence, which, he said, 
any law of tort must propound if it was not to become a morass of single instances. But it did, 
in his opinion, concentrate too much attention on the detailed circumstances of the particular 
case and the particular relationship between the parties in the context of their legal and 
factual situation as a whole.  
In relation to the threefold test, foreseeability was relatively unproblematic, but the 
question of proximity was unclear. Lord Rodger held that there was no proximity, Lord 
Walker implied that it was present, Lord Mance said that the parties were in a ‘most 
proximate relationship’ and Lord Hoffman did not address the issue. Thus, everything came 
down to whether the imposition of a duty was ‘fair, just and reasonable’ in all the 
circumstances.     
                                                            
488 (1985) 157 CLR 424, 481. 
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Lord Bingham mentioned several reasons that could favour the imposition of a duty 
of care saying that, 
‘the Commissioners submitted that the orders were made by the court and notified to the Bank to 
protect their interests; that recognition of a duty would in practical terms impose no new or burdensome 
obligation on the Bank; that the rule of public policy which has first claim on the loyalty of the law is 
that wrongs should be remedied (X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633, 663, 
749); that, since there are no facts here which would found a claim for effective redress in contempt, the 
Commissioners will otherwise be left without any remedy, that a duty of care to the Commissioners 
would not be inconsistent with the Bank's duty to the court; and that there would, in such a case, be no 
indeterminacy as to those to whom the duty would be owed. These are formidable arguments and I am 
not surprised that the Court of Appeal accepted them. But I have difficulty in doing so, for six main and 
closely associated reasons.’489 
 
However, he rejected them for, among others, the following reasons: (a) the Mareva 
jurisdiction has developed as one exercised by court order enforceable only by the court's 
power to punish those who break its orders. The documentation issued by the court does not 
hint at the existence of any other remedy. The only duty owed by a notified party is to the 
court; (b) it cannot be suggested that the customer owes a duty to the party which obtains an 
order, since they are opposing parties in litigation and no duty is owed by a litigating party to 
its opponent; (c) that a duty of care in tort may co-exist with a similar duty in contract or a 
statutory duty, and I would accept in principle that a tortious duty of care to the 
Commissioners could co-exist with a duty of compliance owed to the court. But I know of no 
instance in which a non-consensual court order, without more, has been held to give rise to a 
duty of care owed to the party obtaining the order, and one would have to ask whether a 
similar duty is owed by the subject of a search order; (d) that no comparative jurisprudence or 
material from any Commonwealth jurisdiction was referred in support of the Commissioners’ 
argument; (d) it seemed to him, in the final analysis, unjust and unreasonable that the Bank 
should, on being notified of an order which it had no opportunity to resist, become exposed to 
a liability which was in this case for a few million pounds only, but might in another case be 
for very much more. For this exposure it had not been in any way rewarded, its only 
protection being the Commissioners' undertaking to make good (if ordered to do so) any loss 
which the order might cause it, protection scarcely consistent with a duty of care owed to the 
Commissioners but in any event valueless in a situation such as this.  
Lord Hoffman thought that there was a compelling analogy with the general principle 
that the law of negligence does not impose liability for mere omissions. He said that it was 
true that the complaint was that the bank did something: it paid away the money, but the 
                                                            
489 [2006] 4 All ER 256 at 267 
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payment was alleged to be the breach of the duty and not the conduct which generated the 
duty. The duty was generated ab extra, by service of the order. The question of whether the 
order could have generated a duty of care was comparable with the question of whether a 
statutory duty can generate a common law duty of care and the answer is that it cannot. 
Lord Rodger said that the policy of the law is that a third party, such as a bank, which 
is notified of a freezing order, must not knowingly undermine the court's purpose in granting 
the order. If this is all that the court which makes the order can demand, it would be 
inconsistent to hold that, by reason of the selfsame notification, the applicant could 
simultaneously demand a higher standard of performance from the bank - and then claim 
damages for the bank's failure to achieve it. Notification imposes a duty on the bank to 
respect the order of the court; it does not of itself generate a duty of care to the applicant. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE CIVIL LAW. 
 
2.1 Economic loss in Germany. 
2.1.1 Generally. 
 
As we have already shown in the previous chapter, the German legislative deliberately 
choose not to follow the neminem laedere general principle established in the French code. 
The extreme generality and flexibility of art. 1382 CC, which contributed to its popularity 
with almost all modern legislators, struck the Germans as very dangerous. For them, such an 
amorphous conception of liability not only invited litigation, it also placed far too heavy a 
burden on the shoulders of the judges. In German tort law, liability is only attached in certain 
typical situations of wrongful invasions of protected rights or legal interests (Rechtsgüter), a 
solution traditionally associated with Roman law and common law. In effect, in both of these 
systems, there was a list of actions that a person could bring against the one who had injured 
him. 
 The protective scope of tort law which creates liability towards everyone is limited to 
rights which are considered to be fundamental such as life, body, health, freedom, property or 
‘other right’ of the victim. A clearly policy choice has been made by the drafters of the BGB 
to leave pure economic loss (reiner Vermögensschaden) as such outside the list of interests 
protected by § 823(1). In German law, as a basic rule, pure economic loss is not recoverable 
in tort. In this sense, both German and English law share a fundamental reluctance to allow 
tort claims based on interferences that do not result in material damage to a piece of property. 
Economic loss can be compensated under § 823(1) only if it flows from an injury to one of 
the legal interests specified in that provision.490 On the contrary, if culpable behaviour causes 
the victim only pure economic harm unrelated to any personal injury or damage to his 
property or the invasion of any ‘other right’, no claim can arise.491 As is generally the 
position in common law, only the subject of the proprietary right himself can sue, not a third 
party suffering consequential loss. 
                                                            
490 Christian Von Bar, The Common European Law of Torts, Vol. II (2000) 161. 
491 By contrast, the Austrian Supreme Court accepts claims of actual diminution of value of property. In a recent 
case, the plaintiff’s house was put to risk by excavations in the foundations of a neighbouring property. In 
assessing damages for negligence, the Court took into account the loss value caused to the house by the threat of 
future damage to it, calculating it as the difference between what a fictional buyer would have paid for the house 
not knowing about the problem, minus the actual market value of the house. Efstathios Banakas, ‘Tender is the 
night: economic loss-the issues’ in Banakas (ed), Civil liability for pure economic loss (1996) 19. 
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Although rights of property are specifically mentioned in § 823(1) of the German civil 
code, there is a considerable debate trying to explain the basis of the link of unlawfulness 
between the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s damage when the invasion of the 
plaintiff’s property rights is only indirect.  
The typical factual situations is well represented by the so-called cable cases where 
contractors negligently damage electricity cables and as a result the claimant’s manufacturing 
operations are interrupted for a period of time suffering economic losses. Liability under § 
823(1) arises in cases like that if material damage is inflicted on property, irrespective of 
whether such damage was a direct consequence of the negligent act or occurred only through 
a causal chain. If, on the other hand, all that happens is that the machinery stops and the 
factory’s output is reduced, the factory cannot claim the loss of profits since only an 
economic loss (reiner Vermögensschaden) has been caused. 
A considerable consensus has been achieved today in Germany that this statutory 
structure no longer responds adequately to the changed social and economic conditions of 
present times. The emphasis on land and tangible property as the main basis of economic 
welfare, though prevalent when the BGB was drafted, now seems outmoded. It is considered 
that there are significant signs, economic and legal, that suggest that nowadays rights and 
financial claims have moved into the centre of private wealth.492 
The distinction between consequential loss upon physical damage to property and 
pure economic loss is not very convincing from the point of fear for the floodgates either, as 
can be shown from an Austrian case. A person, when cutting a tree, interrupted the neutral 
conductor of a circuit line thereby causing an excess voltage in the power supply system, 
which caused damage to the plaintiff’s electrical appliances.493 No doubt, that excess voltage 
may cause much higher damage to electrical appliances than may result from a loss of 
production, if a great number of expensive devices are affected (a whole neighbourhood or 
maybe even a city). 
In 1964, the German Supreme Court decided a typical cable case where, because of 
the negligently cut that affected some egg incubators of the plaintiff, instead of the expected 
3.000 chicks, only a few were produced and they were unsalable. It was held that the loss of 
                                                            
492 Michael Coester and Basil Markesinis, ‘Liability of financial experts in German and American law: An 
exercise in comparative methodology.’ (2003) 51 American Journal of Comparative Law 275, 278. 
493 Bernd Schilcher and Willibald Posch, ‘Civil liability for pure economic loss : an Austrian perspective’ in 
Banakas above n 491, 170. 
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income flowing from this damage to the eggs was recoverable from the defendant under § 
823(1) BGB.494 
The Court reasoned that if something requires the constant supply of water, electricity 
or the like in order to retain its substance and keep it from spoiling, any disturbance of the 
supply has the effect (in the legal sense) of annihilating that thing if it destroys it by cutting 
off the supply. Such things include all products which need an electrically-maintained 
constant temperature (heating or cooling) in order not to spoil. If such products are spoiled as 
a result of electricity cables being culpably severed and this reduces or destroys the sales 
value of the product, the material loss simply constitutes consequential damage arising out of 
property damage which is to be compensated for under § 823(1) BGB. The position is 
different where the power cut does not cause things to be destroyed, but merely causes the 
production of particular products to be temporarily interrupted. That is pure economic loss 
(reiner Vermögensschaden).495 
  
2.1.2 Economic loss and the ‘right of an established and operating business’ 
(Recht am Gewerbebetrieb). 
 
 A clear expression of the desire of German law to mitigate the basic reluctance to 
compensate pure economic loss can be seen in the creation by the Reichsgericht496 first and 
the expansion by the Bundesgerichtshof later, of a sort of general right that relates to the 
running of a business. The German Supreme Court, intending to protect commercial 
enterprises against the infliction of certain types of rather vaguely defined interferences with 
their economic interests, developed a judge-made right which can be described as the interest 
of the owner of an existing business in that business as a going concern. (Recht am 
Gewerbebetrieb). The recognition of this right is subject to there being an established 
business (meaning that it has the resources to be carried out), as well as to the condition of 
                                                            
494 BGHZ 41, translated by R. Bray in Walter Van Gerven, Tort Law. Scope of Protection. (1998) 225. 
495 On the contrary, the Swiss Supreme Court usually compensates for ‘distant damage’ in cases of cable cutting. 
In order to arrive at this result the Court created Passende Schutznormen (adequate protective provisions). Thus, 
in the case of a water pipe damaged by the army and in the case of a cable damage by a building constructor, art. 
239 of the Swiss Criminal Code was regarded to be a protective provision in favour of the client. According to 
this provision ‘the threat to, interference of, or endangering of the operation of a device or plant for the public 
supply of water, light, power and thermic energy’ is punishable. In the opinion of the Supreme Court, the single 
client is also protected by this provision. Cf. Bernd Schilcher and Willibald Posch, above n 495, 174. Also Franz 
Werro, ‘Tort liability for pure economic loss: a critique of current trends in Swiss law’ in Banakas (Ed) above n 
491. Pure Economic Loss in Europe. Bussani and Palmer (Eds.) (2003)198. von Bar, above n 490, 38, note 188. 
496 The German Supreme Court until 1945. 
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being active, that is, not simply dormant.497 The concept only includes commercial business, 
excluding professional activities or crafts. Business interests, therefore, had been elevated to 
a rank similar to that of property right. The most recent case law, however, has cut down the 
scope of compensation to business harm ‘integral or related to business’; that is, the conduct 
of the defendant must in some way be directed against the business as such, and not simply 
affect rights or legal interests which can be detached from the enterprise without difficulty 
such as personnel, equipment, stock, etc.498 The recognition of this new ‘other right’ has not 
gone without criticism and many authors believe, not only that this right conflicts with the 
basic structure of German tort law, but also that its creation was superfluous, since in most 
cases another basis could have been found to reach the same result.499 
The court’s intention to keep matters within manageable bounds was expressed 
through the requirement that the interference with the established and operating business be 
‘direct’ before it can become actionable under that heading. The lack of definitions of the 
notion of ‘direct interference’ by the decisions of the courts resulted in serious difficulties in 
drawing the line between direct and indirect interference. In the case of such complex legal 
term as enterprise, the difficulties became so particularly great that it has been suggested that 
the requirement should be abandoned and that instead the effect of that interference upon the 
sphere of activity should be decisive. This appears to be connected with the acceptance of a 
teleological theory propounded by Rabel, according to which one must take account of the 
protective function of the rule which imposes the duty to make compensation.500 
The Supreme Court has pointed out that the question as to when interference with the 
right in an established and active commercial or industrial enterprise is direct cannot be 
answered by references to the purely linguistic distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ nor 
by relying on the doctrine of causality alone, or the absence of so-called intermediate causes. 
The Court refers to Larenz who had argued that whether an interference is direct must be 
determined teleologically, i.e. in the sense that the act of interference must have the purpose 
of restricting the commercial or industrial activity, and that, consequently, the purpose must 
disclose the direction towards inflicting damage upon the commercial or industrial enterprise. 
                                                            
497 Van Gerven, above n 494, 39. 
498 Jacques Herbots, ‘Economic loss in the legal systems of the continent in Michael Furmston (Ed) The law of 
tort (1986), 147. Markesinis suggests that this formula is nothing but an empty shell of words and that the courts 
should attempt more openly to weigh the reciprocal interests rather than to indulge in the creation of opaque 
formulae. B S Markesinis, The German Law of Obligations. Volume II. The Law of Torts: A comparative 
introduction. (1997), 62. 
499 Van Gerven, above n 494, 230. 
500 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law (1998), 602. 
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However, the Bundesgerischtshof expressed its disbelief of this theory by saying that the 
limitations of this suggestion become immediately obvious when the interference is due to 
negligence. 
a) In a leading case, directly related to the expansion of the notion of  ‘other rights’ to 
include the right to an established and operating or active business (Recht am Gewerbetrieb), 
the Supreme Court of Germany (BGH) had to decide the claim of a company that could not 
operate for some time because someone negligently working with  an excavator had damaged 
an electricity cable in the neighbourhood of the company’s premises. The plaintiff claimed 
that the power cable formed part of its business from an economic point of view and that the 
defendant, through his negligence, had interfered illegally and culpably with its business and 
should be liable for the loss caused by the interruption of production. The defendant argued 
that the plaintiff’s business had been only indirectly affected by the cutting of the cable and 
that only direct interference would rendered him liable. 
The Supreme Court held that the claim should fail. The reasons given were that direct 
interference with the right in an existing commercial or industrial enterprise, against which § 
823(1) provides a remedy is only that which is somehow directed against the enterprise as 
such. Therefore, just as an injury to an employer or the destruction of or damage to a lorry 
belonging to an enterprise is not specifically connected with the enterprise, the cutting of the 
cable by the defendant or his employee operating the excavator was not so connected either. 
The supply of electric current by a cable and the right to receive it, said the Court, did not 
constitute an essential element of an established and active commercial or industrial 
enterprise but rather constituted a relationship based on the duty to supply energy on the part 
of the supply companies, which is of the same nature as the relationship with other consumers 
of electricity. If such rights or interests were included, then contractual rights (such as a 
contract for the supply of power) would come under the protection of § 823(1) contrary to the 
intention of the drafters of the BGB.501 Consequently, the fact that a cable had been damaged 
on land not belonging to the enterprise affected resulting in a cut in the electricity supply 
could not, in the absence of special circumstances which did not exist in that case, be 
regarded as an interference aimed at the area of operation of the enterprise concerned. In the 
BGH’s opinion, to do so would exceed the range of protection accorded to commercial or 
industrial enterprises by the practice of the courts.502 
                                                            
501 Van Gerven, above n 494, 229. 
502 Bundesgerichtshof (Sixth Civil Division) 9 December 1958. BGHZ 29, 65 translated in van Gerven, above n 
475, 228 . 
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b) The Federal Supreme Court, in 1976, ratified the view that, as a rule, there is no 
liability for indirect damage (economic damage that a third party suffers by mere reflex 
operation through injury to another’s property).503  
The defendant company, which ran a building enterprise, was carrying out 
excavations on a private property when it negligently damaged an electric cable causing a 27-
minute interruption of the power used in the plaintiff manufacturing business. 
 It was held that the claim could find no support in § 823(1), for no property of the 
plaintiff had been damaged and no legal injury was done to the plaintiff’s right of an 
established and active business, since there was no direct interference with it. Again, the 
Court expressed the opinion that the requirement of ‘directness’ was essential if the 
protection provided by case-law in the event of a violation of the right of an established and 
active business was not to be enlarged into a general delictual rule for the protection of 
traders. The floodgate concern is openly revealed by the Court recognizing that matters could 
not be different in the case of power cuts that affect everyone and which are liable to cause 
widespread financial loss to persons who do not exercise any trade and to whom the general 
law of delicts affords no claim for damages. 
In this case also, the attempt to base liability under § 823(2) failed. Under this 
heading, the BGB imposes an obligation to compensate for any violation of a statutory 
provision intended for the protections of others in the following terms: 
§ 823 (1) A person, who wilfully or negligently injures the life body, health, freedom, property or other 
right of another contrary to law is bound to compensate him for any damage arising therefrom. 
            
           (2) The same obligation attaches to a person who infringes a statutory provision intended for the 
protection of others. If according to the purview of the statute infringement is possible even without 
fault, the duty to make compensation arises only if some fault can be imputed to the wrongdoer. 
 
The plaintiff argued that the defendant had violated a building regulation which 
constituted a breach of an enactment designed for the plaintiff’s protection. According to the 
claimant, § 18(3) of the Baden-Wüttemberg Building Regulations stated that ‘Public spaces, 
supply, run-off and warning apparatuses and also hydrants, survey marks, and boundary 
marks must be protected during the process of building and, where necessary, be kept 
accessible subject to the necessary precautions.’ The Court declined the invitation to consider 
                                                            
503 Bundesgerichtshof (Sixth Civil Division) 8 June 1976. BGHZ 66, 388 translated in Markesinis, above n 478, 
180. The Swiss Bundesgericht, on the other hand, holds that economic harm due to stoppage of the business is 
compensable, emphasizing that negligent interruption of a power cable operated by a public utility is a 
punishable offence under art. 239 of the Swiss Criminal Code. Zweigert and Kötz above n 500, 601. 
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§ 18(3) of the Regulations as a protective enactment for the purposes of § 823(2). In its 
opinion, the referred Statute, when regulating building, did not intend to afford to electricity 
users an abnormal individual protection when a cable was damaged. There was nothing to 
show that an arbitrary individual protection was aimed at, alien to federal law and as part of a 
generally inappropriate set of regulations. The Baden-Wüttemberg Building Regulations, as a 
whole, belonged to the law of public security and the language of that provision contemplated 
damage only to things, not to persons. In the Court’s opinion, § 18(3) could not be assumed 
to afford electricity users a claim to compensation since it would lead to a great and 
intolerable extension of liability. Although the Court recognized that admittedly, most rules 
of a public law character operate, in a general way, to protect interest of individual citizens, it 
does not follow that that general operation also specifies the cases where a protective 
enactment in question affords him an individual protection. If the protective function of the 
rule is not indicated, the creation of an individual claim for compensation would be 
admissible if it appeared meaningful, sensible and tolerable in the light of the whole system 
of liability. Only by doing so, said the Court, the undesirable effect of undermining 
Parliament’s ruling against a general liability for purely economic loss would be avoided. 
c) In 1977, another typical cable case where plaintiff put forward alternatively also a 
contractual claim, did not attract the sympathy of the Supreme Court either.504 The 
underlying facts were that before earth removal operations required in the construction of an 
aqueduct and reservoir of the city started, representatives of the parties had a meeting on site 
with representatives of the water authority and the city. The plaintiff’s business manager and 
the city representative drew attention to the presence of the main electric cable where the 
earthworks were about to begin and stressed how important it was for the plaintiff’s business 
not to damage it. The defendant’s clerk was then told that any digging in the neighbourhood 
of the cable must be done by hand rather than by machine. 
The Supreme Court stated that the Court of Appeal had analysed those facts correctly 
and that its holding that the plaintiff was not drawn into the protective ambit of the contract 
of services between the water authority and the defendant could not be criticized. Although 
recognizing that persons not immediately involved in a contract may have a contractual claim 
for damages if they suffer harm owing to faulty conduct by the debtor in breach of contract, 
they emphasized that that depended on the meaning and purpose of the contract and its 
                                                            
504 Bundesgerichtshof (Sixth Civil Division) 12 July 1977. Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1977, 2208. English 
version by Tony Weir in Markesinis, above n 248, 184. 
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construction in accordance with the principle of good faith. They emphasised that the court 
had frequently observed that the duties of care and protection can only be extended beyond 
the actual parties to the contract if the principal creditor (in that case in particular, the water 
authority) had some responsibility for the well-being of the third party, as owing him 
protection and care. It was necessary to take this view, in order to avoid blurring the line 
between contractual and tortious liability contrary to the will of the legislature and to prevent 
an intolerable extension of contractual duties of care beyond what the principle of good faith 
can demand of the debtor of the contractual performance.  
The water authority was in no way responsible for the well-being of the plaintiff. For 
the contractual creditor, the plaintiff was only one of a large number of subscribers that could 
be affected by damage to the cable. The mere fact that the plaintiff’s business was apt to 
suffer a considerable economic loss through interruption of the electricity supply did not 
justify holding that the water authority must look out for its well-being. 
The Supreme Court did not consider that the meeting on site modified the contract of 
work between the defendant and the water authority either. They said that the water authority 
was bound to give such instructions before the work started in order to enable the defendant 
to take the necessary steps to protect the utility cables. The special reference to the harm the 
plaintiff might suffer if the current were interrupted was insufficient to bring it within the 
protective area of the contract. 
 
2.1.3 Economic loss resulting from interference with the use and enjoyment of 
property. 
 
Another sign of the desire of German law to mitigate the basic reluctance to 
compensate pure economic loss is the acknowledgment that the protection afforded by § 
823(1) encompasses not only the material integrity of the property that is owned, but also to a 
certain extent its use and enjoyment. 
This can be illustrated by the famous leading case, known as the Fleet case decided by 
the Supreme Court in 1970.505 The defendant, the Federal Republic of Germany, was the 
owner of a navigable channel which connected a mill to a port and was registered as a federal 
waterway. A part of the badly maintained bank collapsed, taking part of the external wall of a 
house with it. The house had to be secured by means of two tree trunks which were fitted just 
                                                            
505 Bundesgerichtshof (Sixth Civil Division) 21 December 1970. BGHZ 55, 153. 
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above and across the surface of the canal, confining a plaintiff’s vessel to the mill for about 
nine months. Another three vessels, also belonging to the plaintiff, could not approach to the 
mill in order to carry goods.506 
The Supreme Court held that the defendant was liable to pay compensation for the 
economic loss suffered by the plaintiff arising from the immobilization of the vessel due to 
the closure of the waterway leading to the mill for repair work. The ship that had been 
moored to take goods for transport under a contract with the owner of the mill, although 
remaining intact was unavailable to be used for transportation. 
In relation to the contention that there had been an interference with the right to an 
established and operating or active business it was held that this claim is subsidiary in 
character and it applied only if no other remedy exists and, in that case, property of the 
plaintiff had been damaged inasmuch as the vessel had been forced to remain at the loading 
stage of the mill due to the closure of the channel. The Court emphasized that property is 
damaged not only if the substance of an object is adversely affected, but also by any other 
actual interference with the right of an owner. The ‘imprisonment’ of the ship, eliminating it 
as a means of transport, constituted a factual interference which affected the rights of the 
plaintiff as an owner. Besides, the Court held that no direct interference with the plaintiff’s 
enterprise had taken place. The navigability of a waterway could not be considered within the 
ambit of the commercial enterprise of a person engaged in shipping. A temporary closure of a 
waterway which also concerns others engaged in shipping did not interfere with the 
plaintiff’s commercial enterprise. The fact that the closure had temporarily prevented him 
from complying with his contractual obligations towards the mill did not mean either that the 
navigability of the waterway had to be regarded as falling within the sphere of  the plaintiff’s 
commercial enterprise, no matter how important this was as part of his commercial activities. 
In relation to the other three vessels, also belonging to the plaintiff, which could not 
approach the mill in order to carry goods, the Court said that the answer had to be different. 
To this extent, the defendant was considered not to have interfered with the plaintiff’s 
property for the reason that the ships were not affected in their capacity of means of transport 
by the closure of the channel and were thus not diverted from their natural use. The 
restriction of the plaintiff in the enjoyment of the common use of the channel was the same as 
                                                            
506 Some similarities with the old English case Rose v. Miles (1815) 4 M & S 101; 105 ER 773 have been found. 
In this case, a barge-owner navigating a creek obstructed by the defendant’s barges was allowed to claim his 
extra costs for unloading the cargo from his barges and transporting it by land to its ultimate destination, since in 
Lord Ellenborough’s view he had suffered greater damage than other members of the public who might have 
been contemplating using the creek. 
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all others’ who engage in shipping. Such common use was not ‘another right’ in the meaning 
of § 823(1) BGB.  
The difference in treatment has been explained by Larenz and Canaris by 
distinguishing between ‘‘lock-in’ and ‘lock-out’. In the first situation, the ship could not be 
put to other uses, as it was immobilized at the mill and could not go elsewhere. In the second 
situation, the three other vessels were not prevented from moving, but only from reaching the 
mill. They could be put to use to fulfil other contracts. The focus was on the relationship 
between the damage and the purpose of protection which leads to a distinction between 
interference with the substance of property and with the ability to use it for a particular 
purpose. In the case of the locked-in ship, the owner was for all intents and purposes deprived 
of its ownership, since the property could not be used at all and had become worthless (even 
if only temporarily). The core of ownership was affected, and such loss bears a relationship to 
the protective purposes of § 823(1). On the other hand, the owner of the locked-out vessels 
was merely deprived of the possibility of making use of a public waterway, he could, 
nonetheless, use his goods for another purpose. 507 
In spite of the similarities with the channel case, the Bundesgerichtshof has also held 
that the owner of land whose access by public road was blocked for a few hours has no claim 
for violation of property right.508 There is general coincidence in doctrine that drivers who get 
stuck in traffic jams as a result of an accident caused by someone else’s negligence cannot 
recover for opportunities which in consequence they have lost. The reluctance to allow claims 
in cases of traffic jams is clearly motivated by the fear of an undue expansion of liability. 
Bussani and Palmer suggest that it is not at all inconceivable to conclude that a person caught 
in a traffic jam with his vehicle suffers a loss of freedom, and that damages resulting from 
such loss of freedom are covered by § 823(1). But such a decision would lead to boundless 
liability of everyone who causes an accident on Germany’s crowded roads, and it would 
unleash a flood of lawsuits. Thus, the Supreme Court has indicated (although somewhat 
vaguely) that the loss of the use of public highways or a short-term blockage of access is part 
of the general risk that everyone must bear.509 
                                                            
507 Karl Larenz and C Canaris, Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts, Vol II (1994) at 388, apud Van Gerven, above n 494, 
224. 
508 BGH Neue juristische Wochenschrift 1977, 2264. 
509 Bussani and Palmer, above n 495. A different solution was given by the Italian Supreme Court in the Pirolo 
case, where a highway was closed due to a truck that overturned and caught fire because of the driver’s 
negligence. The Court held the truck driver liable because the damage caused to the plaintiff had been directly 
caused by the former’s negligence. Corte di Cassazione, sezione civile, 16.10.1991. In England, civil liability 
may arise from public nuisance, but particular damage, over and above the inconvenience or damage to the 
public at large, must be shown.  
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2.1.4 Economic loss and contract remedies. 
 
A peculiarity in German law, less observed in other civil law countries, is the wide 
use of contract remedies in solving questions of pure economic loss. The reasons for 
contract’s enlarged role seems to be twofold: on the one hand, apart from rules permitting the 
concurrence of tort and contract actions, tort law is considered too weak and narrow to 
safeguard all financial interests that merit legal protection. On the other hand, contract claims 
appeared to be a relatively safer path to those who dread unleashing the floodgates of tort, 
since there is certainly less danger of boundless damages occurring in breach of contract 
situation.510 
In this regard, one of the main instruments is the so-called ‘contract with protective 
effects for third parties’ (Vertrag mit Schutzwirkung für Dritte), a concept developed by 
analogy to the classical form of contracts for the benefit of third parties regulated in § 328.511 
This device allows bringing strangers to a contract under its umbrella and permits them to sue 
a promisor for breach of one of the contract’s secondary obligations, in particular, some 
breach causing purely financial harm to the plaintiff. This contractual liability towards third 
parties is not easy to fit into the legal system and is fuel for a strong debate among 
scholars.512 
The function of the ‘contract with protective effects for third parties’ is considered 
tort-like in the sense that the protected third party need not stand in a close personal 
relationship to the injurer nor be specifically identified in advance. At the same time, it is 
operationally free of the absolute rights requirement of German tort law and permits recovery 
of pure economic loss.513 
                                                            
510 Vernon Palmer and Mauro Bussani, ‘Pure economic loss: the ways to recovery ’, Electronic Journal of 
Comparative Law, Vol. 11.3, 2007, 62. 
511 § 328. Contract for the benefit of third parties 
(1) Performance to a third party may be agreed by contract with the effect that the third party acquires the right 
to demand the performance directly. 
(2) In the absence of a specific provision it is to be inferred from the circumstances, in particular from the 
purpose of the contract, whether the third party is to acquire the right, whether the right of the third party is to 
come into existence immediately or only under certain conditions, and whether the power is to be reserved for 
the parties to the contract to terminate or alter the right of the third party without his approval. 
512 Cees van Dam, European Tort Law (2006), 173. 
513 A well-known example is the case decided by the Reigchsgericht in 1930. A tenant contracted with a repair 
firm for the repair of a gas water-heater which was in the dwelling, and owing to the fault of the gas-fitter, the 
heater exploded and caused injuries to the cleaning woman employed by the tenant. The Court held that the 
victim had a contractual claim against the repair firm. The consideration was that third parties are to be brought 
within the protective ambit of a contract if the duty of care and protection arising from the contract should be 
owed, in good faith and in accordance with the purpose of the contract, not only to the contracting party but also 
to certain other persons. The sole purpose of the decision was to put the victim in a better position than if his 
only claim for damages were based on tort. Under German law, with regard to prescription, burden of proof and 
226 
 
 
 
One of the areas in which this ‘contract with protective effects for third parties’ device 
is applied is the liability of auditors towards third parties. The courts had developed this 
notion, extending substantially the personal scope of contractual duties. Through this 
expansion, the risk of the debtor is increased substantially: potential plaintiffs multiply and 
the duties and potential liabilities are enlarged. 
Initially, cases regularly involved constellations where one contracting party had 
particular, especially personal ties, to the third party. For cases where relatives (minors) of 
contracting party (A) were harmed or else incurred damages by the other contracting party 
(B), the Court applied a ‘care’ standard between A and his minor or another close person in 
order to extend the contractual obligations owed to A by B to the third person. In even earlier 
cases, the Reichsgericht held that a tenant was protected by the contract concluded between 
the landlord and a craftsman if the tenant incurred any damages from this contract. The basis 
for this jurisprudence was the existence of particular ties of a personalised nature between the 
contracting party and a third party, e.g. family, employment or landlord-tenant relations. To 
prevent, however, an unlimited extension of contractual rights to third parties, the Court 
regularly required that the third party be ‘in proximity’ to the specific contract, meaning that 
it would be in the nature of the contract that a third party could in some way be affected by it. 
Later, the Court built on these considerations requiring that the protection of the third party 
could be identified as being in the interest of one of the contracting parties and that it was the 
parties' will to extend the contract's reach to the third party. In the context of false statement 
by experts, in particular, the Federal Supreme Court decided to extend it significantly.514 The 
expansion weakened both requirements: a) physical injury started to look inadequate for 
modern mass transactions, so the potential damage was said to include damage to property 
and economic loss; b) the relation between the creditor and the third party need not to be a 
personal one: a contractual duty of care between them would suffice. 
In a seminal decision, the Supreme Court held an accountant who conducted a 
mandatory audit for company A, liable to the owner of company B who purchased it by 
relying on his erroneous assessment of the financial situation of A.515 Coester and Markesinis 
consider this decision remarkable in the light of the fact that such cases are governed by § 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
especially vicarious liability (far too rigid and favourable to employers), a victim is in a much better position to 
claim damages if he can claim in contract for the harm he has suffered. Herbots, above n 498, 151. 
514 Coester and Markesinis, above n  492, 281. 
515 BGHZ 138, 257. Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, 1998, 1948. 
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323 (1) of the German Commercial Code which provides that if the auditor negligently fails 
in his duties he is liable only to the company in question.516 
The Court agreed that, in that case, the principle of contracts with protective effect for 
third parties could be applied and stated: 
…there are no difficulties about also applying these principles in cases in which an auditor of accounts 
is entrusted with the compulsory audit of a company provided that it appears sufficiently clear to him 
that on this audit a particular work product is wanted from him which is to be used against a third party 
who trusts in his expert knowledge.517 
 
However, it has been consistently said by the Court that there has to be special 
reasons to believe that the parties to the contract intended to protect the outsider in question. 
This requires that the statement be made, at least inter alia, for the benefit of the third party, 
and that the defendant has reason to know that. According to Bussani and Palmer, the 
Supreme Court draws the line between two kinds of cases. In the first kind, the business 
owner hires accountants and other experts, but their work product also serves someone else, 
such as a potential buyer. If they are aware of that, they should know that errors in their 
statements are likely to injury a non-party as well. In such cases, it is fair to hold them liable 
to third parties. In the second kind, they are hired for general purposes, e.g. to perform an 
audit which is statutorily required. In these cases, they serve only their party in contract but 
have nothing to do with outsiders who rely on these accountants at their own peril.518 
An example of the first situation is the so-called ‘group of buyers case’. An expert 
was requested by a prospective buyer to give a statement on the value of an apartment which 
he, or one of the group of interested persons behind him, was considering to buy. Some 
members of this group, including the plaintiff, were present when the expert received the 
order. After the expert delivered his opinion to the one who had contracted with him, the 
plaintiff bought the building, relying on the statement. Due to the omission of some 
restrictions connected with a social housing regulation, the value of the building was much 
lower than what the expert had estimated and the plaintiff ended up overpaying a substantial 
amount.  
The Supreme Court decided that in considering whether the contract between the 
parties had protective effects vis-à-vis the plaintiff, it may be relevant whether the instructing 
                                                            
516 Coester and Markesinis, above n  492, 287. In the same sense Christian von Bar ‘Liability for information 
and opinions causing pure economic loss to third parties: a comparison of English and German case law.’ In B S 
Markesinis (Ed.) The gradual convergence. Foreign ideas, foreign influences and English law on the eve of the 
21st century (1994) 98, 99. 
517 BGHZ 138, 257. Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, 1998, 1948. 
518 Bussani and Palmer, above n 495,  467. 
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party was charged with the care of the third party in question. It was not, however, a 
necessary prerequisite for holding that such duty of care existed. In the present case, it was 
considered that an interested party who asks for an expert opinion to form the basis of a 
decision by a certain group, would normally seek to protect not only his personal interests but 
also those of the other members of the group.519 So the claim succeeded. 
The expansion of the notion of ‘contract with protective effects for third parties’ 
(Vertrag mit Schutzwirkung für Dritte) reached a new level when the Supreme Court applied 
it to cases where the creditor and the third party, not only did not share similar interests or 
belonged to the same group but, on the contrary, had conflicting interests. The owner of a 
house, planning to sell it, requested a valuation from an expert. While he was inspecting the 
house, the owner on some pretext distracted him, prevented him from looking at the roof and 
convinced him that there was no defect. The plaintiff, based on that report, bought the house 
and later, after the transaction was completed, found out serious defects in the roof 
framework which made the value of the house much lower than what he had paid. He sued 
the expert for his loss. The Supreme Court held the plaintiff to be included in the protective 
scope of the contract, regardless of the fact that the seller was interested in a high price and 
the plaintiff in a low price and even though the seller had concealed the defects of the house. 
Coester and Markesinis point out that the fact of having conflicting interests was just 
the starting point for the real problem of the case. In effect, had the expert been sued by the 
seller of the house, he could have defended himself by indicating his fraudulent behaviour, 
since § 334 BGB states that the debtor has the same defences against the third party as 
against the promisee. Now, since the notion of contracts with protective effect was developed 
by analogy to third-party-beneficiary contracts, one might be inclined to think that § 334 
BGB should apply in the case of the expert too. However, it is clear that that defence would 
only be appropriate when the promisee and the third party share common interests, but where 
they are contradictory, it is rather the protection of the third party from the wrongdoing of the 
promisee, which is called for § 334 BGB.520 The Court decided that there was an implied 
waiver on the side of the expert to raise a defence of malice. The function of the statement 
was to dissipate potential distrust of the buyer against the vendor and this could only be 
fulfilled if the risk of deception by the vendor was taken by the expert. If he were not willing 
to take this risk, he would be obliged to say so explicitly in his statement. 
                                                            
519 BGH, November 2, 1983, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, 1984, 355. 
520 Coester and Markesinis, above n 492, 287. 
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In 2002, the general reform of the law of obligations brought a new provision, the 
extension of which is not yet entirely clear, that may change the future approach towards the 
liability of experts.  
§ 311(3) BGB states: 
An obligation involving duties according to § 241(2) 521may also arise with regard to persons not party 
to the contract. Such obligation arises especially when the third party claims special trustworthiness for 
itself and thereby exerts substantial influence on the contractual negotiations or on the conclusion of the 
contract. 
 
2.1.5 Pure economic loss resulting from conduct contra bonos mores. 
 
Before the precedential decisions, the courts had granted the third party a claim in tort 
under § 826 BGB. According to this provision a person is liable if he or she intentionally 
causes harm to another in a manner that is contra bonos mores, a flexible and changing 
notion, which refers to a minimal set of legal-ethical principles seen as a set of legal value 
assessments. This approach to the issue of pure economic loss seems to focus more on the 
quality of the conduct than the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.522 
It is not necessary to show that the defendant actually intended to cause the harm: it is 
enough if he consciously acquiesced in the possibility that harm might occur.523 According to 
the traditional view, intention is taken to include the dolus eventualis, that is, whenever the 
defendant is aware of the consequences of his conduct which he accepts as inevitable even 
though he may not specifically desire them. Therefore, he who gives information off-the-cuff 
must recognize that it could be false; and the very fact that he still goes ahead and gives the 
information demonstrates that he has reckoned with the possibility of damage to others and 
that he has accepted it. This view of the German courts meant that what was essentially 
careless behaviour ended up elevated to the level of dolus eventualis and thereby attracting 
liability under the terms of § 826 BGB.524 
It is clear that the intention of the courts by defusing the subjective requirements (i.e. 
for intention) of § 826 BGB is to improve the protection of pure economic interest which are 
so poorly provided for in § 823(1) BGB.525 
                                                            
521 § 241(2) BGB: Each party to the obligation may, according to the content of the obligation, be required to 
apply proper care as to the rights and interests of the other party. 
522 Van Gerven, above n 494, 296. 
523 Herbots, above n 498, 148. 
524 Von Bar, above n 490, 105. 
525 Von Bar, above n 490, 53. 
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This general provision of the Code was intended from the outset as an all-purpose 
residual provision, able to accommodate future expansion in the growth of the law of torts, a 
formula that, in practice, would confer wide pretorian powers. However, the limitations 
contained in it did not facilitate such growth, with the result that some of the most significant 
extensions of tort liability have been achieved either through § 823(1), or the expansion of the 
law of contract, but not § 826 BGB.526  
According to Markesinis, there is a certain paradox in § 826 in the sense that, 
subjectively, it is the narrowest of the three general provisions, since intention is required but, 
at the same time, objectively, it is the most general, wide and amorphous provision of the 
Code. 
In any event, it was applying that provision that the Supreme Court held that an 
accountant who intentionally issues a false statement as to the creditworthiness of a firm is 
acting contra bonos mores and is liable to a third party if he realized and acquiesced in the 
risk that the statement would be transmitted to and relied on by him.527 In the Court’s 
opinion, to consider the intent it is sufficient if it was conceivable on the part of the defendant 
that the statement could be used in negotiations with a provider and could lead that person 
into taking a decision disadvantageous to him. The Supreme Court concluded that the 
defendant, on the basis of its professional experience as tax adviser, had to take into account 
that the plaintiff would have recourse to bank financing for his purchase. 
Van Gerven emphasizes that the judgment illustrates how broadly the notions of 
unethical conduct and will to harm have been interpreted founding that the defendant, in too 
readily and superficially preparing and certifying interim financial statements, had acted in a 
way which could be regarded as being contra bonos mores.528 
Other cases decided under § 826 include an art expert who deliberately valued highly 
a fake painting so that his report could be shown to a third person and entice him to buy the 
picture; an employer who intentionally gave to a third party an untrue reference about one of 
his employees529; a person who gave recklessly false information about the credit of a third 
person530; a director of a company who produced what to his knowledge was a false balance 
sheet in order to attract a potential investor.531  
                                                            
526 Markesinis, above n 498, 894. 
527 Zweigert and Kötz, above n 500, 614. 
528 Van Gerven, above n 494, 281. 
529 BGH, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1970, 2291. 
530 BGH, Wertpapier-Mitteilungen, 1956, 1229. 
531 RG, Juristenzeitung, 1908, 448. 
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Contrary to the common law, in German law, liability for information and opinions 
causing pure economic loss belongs primarily to the area of contracts (with the exception of § 
826 BGB). The essential explanation for this different approach has been said to be the fact 
that § 823 (1) restricts the protection to absolute rights which are listed in that paragraph in an 
exclusive manner. On the contrary, in the common law, the doctrines of consideration and 
privity of contract have blocked the expansion of contract law. The notion of ‘assumption of 
liability’ is not strange to German lawyers either; however, the German doctrine of 
assumption of liability represents contract law being used to correct a tort law system which 
is too narrow.532 
In 1979, the Supreme Court held that a person who gives in good faith false 
information and subsequently becomes aware of its falsity may, under certain circumstances, 
be under a duty to correct it and if he does not do so he will be liable under § 826 BGB.533 
The case dealt with an employer who, in good faith, wrote an unusually good 
reference for his bookkeeper. Armed with that reference, the employee managed to obtain a 
very good position elsewhere. However, it was later discovered that the bookkeeper had been 
misappropriating large sums of money whilst working for his former employer. Confronted 
by the latter, he requested some time to have the opportunity to pay him back. Time was 
given and the bookkeeper used that time to steal money from his new employer. The 
Supreme Court allowed the claim against the first employer on the ground that the first 
employer had, in breach of his duties, failed to revoke the letter of recommendation 
 
2.1.6 Other provisions. 
 
Another provision, considered by some authors, relevant to pure economic loss cases 
is § 824 which establishes that a person who declares or publishes, contrary to the truth, a 
statement which is likely to endanger the credit earnings or prosperity of another is liable for 
any damage arising therefrom, even if he does not know of its untruth but should know it. 
Another possible expansion yet to be determined is the so-called ‘right to one’s place 
of work’ (Recht am Arbeitsplatz). The primary aim of the Supreme Industrial Court, by 
creating this new right, was to safeguard employees from unfair tactics by employers during 
and after a trade dispute. However, it has been suggested that it could also be understood as a 
                                                            
532 Von Bar suggests that English law could operate more convincingly using the concept of voluntary 
assumption of liability, were it prepared to do without the doctrine of consideration. Above, n 490, 126. 
533 BGHZ Juristenzeitung 1979, 725. 
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right intending, further, the protection of the wider interests of all workers in a continuous 
and unhindered use of their earning capacity, not only against unfair employer tactics, but 
also against acts of third parties. According to this view, an employee could, for instance, 
have an action in tort for loss of earnings against a third party who, by injuring or killing his 
employer in an accident, caused his employment to be interrupted or terminated. Professor 
Grunsky submits that pure loss of earnings or earning capacity should be elevated to a special 
status and granted the protection of the law of tort. He argues that working capacity has 
nowadays, as an interest, overtaken in social importance the interests to (physical) property or 
other quasi-proprietary interests. For the vast majority of ordinary people, he says, their 
working capacity is their main and most valuable asset. The limitation of tortious protection, 
outside personal injury, to physical property only, is, therefore, in his view, anachronistic.534 
 
2.2 Economic loss in France. 
2.2.1 Generally. 
 
As explained in the previous chapter, according to the French Civil Code, the 
principle of neminem laedere is the general rule535, and the instances in which a person is at 
liberty to cause harm can be classified as exceptions to that general rule. Articles 1382 and 
1383 of the Napoleon code do not contain any a priori limitations on the scope of protected 
persons.536 Wrongdoing and unlawful behaviour are never understood or described in 
relational terms. The unitary general clause contains no conceptual equivalent to the 
restrictive, relational concept of the duty of care which plays such a decisive role in the 
common law.  
Art. 1382 is formulated in very broad language and is interpreted as creating a 
universal obligation not to cause harm (the nature of which is unspecified) to ‘another’. The 
idea of interpreting the word ‘another’ narrowly so as to limit the class of plaintiffs to those 
who are the immediate and direct victims of the negligent act would make a civilian feel 
uncomfortable.537 In this sense, it could be said that the notion of ‘another’ (the victim) has a 
                                                            
534 Banakas, above n 491, 21. 
535 However, the general fault liability of art. 1382 develops on a case by case basis J.M. Barendrecht, ‘Pure 
economic loss in the Netherlands’ in E H Hondius (Ed) Reports to the Fifteenth International Congress of 
comparative Law (1998)116. 
536 A tentative to develop a theory of an Aquilian relativity of the duty of care in civil law failed. J. Limpens, ‘La 
théorie de la relativité Aquilienne en Droit Comparé’ in Mélanges Savatier (1965) 559. 
537 ‘Du moment qu’un act fautif lèse le droti d’autri, la compensation est due. Il est contraire aux principes 
généraux de la responsabilité civil de restreindre à la victime immédiate le droit à la compensation. Par contre, il 
ne peut être question d’indemniser toute personne, quelle qu’elle soit, des conséquences d’un acte fautif. Le 
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much stronger or closer biblical resemblance than the Atkinian neighbour. Howarth, submits 
that it would be good for lawyers to reflect that in the original Biblical parable (10 Luke 25-
37) the Samaritan, a traditional enemy of the injured Judean, is declared to be the true 
neighbour of the Judean because he showed mercy on him, unlike the Judean’s fellow 
countrymen, the Priest and the Levite, who passed on the other side. Thus, the ‘neighbour’ is 
not the person who had a special or pre-existing relationship with the injured man, the one 
who might be thought to be ‘proximate’ to him, but instead is the person who acts in proper 
manner, even towards the enemy.538 
Since there is no limitation on the class of protected persons, there is no need to prove 
that a duty of care was owed to the plaintiff. Questions of tort liability are approached by 
verifying the existence of the usual elements of fault, causation and damage, rather than by 
preliminary reference to a numerus clausus of protected rights or interests. In clear contrast to 
German and common law systems, there is no material means by which recovery can be 
peremptorily blocked before the tripartite elements are examined. 
In France, the expression ‘pure economic loss’ is almost unknown.539 There is hardly 
any specialized literature on this subject and no internal criticism of its remarkable 
permissiveness. French law does not rule out from delictual liabilities any particular type of 
harm: the concept of dommage covers what an English lawyer would classify as personal 
injury, psychiatric harm, distress, injury to reputation, damage to or loss of property and pure 
economic loss. Art. 1382 is a general clause whose wording allows assumption of liability for 
any act that causes any kind of damage, as long as the act can be said ‘fautive’. Unlike the 
German civil code, the French civil code does not hold a narrow view of the interests that are 
to be protected by tort law. The principle of full reparation strongly suggests that there should 
be no reason to exclude from the field of tort a form of damage so commonly recoverable in 
contract. Pure economic loss should simply meet the same requirements that any other type 
of damage must satisfy with respect to proof of its existence or certainty. Fault, causation and 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
débat, à notre avis, ne doi pas se situer de façon formaliste et artificielle autour de l’interpretation large ou 
restrictive à donner au mot autrui, mais autour du véritable problème: celui de la relation causale. Jean Louis 
Baudouin, Les obligations (1983) 100. 
538 David Howarth, ‘Negligence after Murphy: time to re-think’ (1991) 50 Cambridge Law Journal 65. 
539 ‘Le problème du dommage économique pur est difficile à traiter pour un juriste français, car celui-ci, a priori, 
ne connaît ni le problème, ni même l’expression! ’ Christian Lapoyade Deschamps, ‘La réparation du préjudice 
économique pur en droit français.’ in Banakas, above n 491, 89. Also Christophe Radé and Laurent Bloch, 
‘Compensation for pure economic loss under French Law’ in  Willem van Boom, Helmut Koziol and Christian 
Witting (Eds) Pure Economic Loss (2004) 41. Von Bar notes that the fact that the distinction between ‘pure’ and 
‘other’ types of economic loss took roots also in England is, in one sense, quite remarkable given that the 
English law of torts thinks in terms of standards of conduct and not, as Germans do, in terms of protected rights 
and interests. Above n 490, 107. 
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damage may be examined using standard rather than special rules. Accordingly, a victim 
should be fully compensated irrespective of the kind of loss that he or she has suffered540 and 
when, in fact, recovery is refused for purely financial damage, the result is never due to a 
particular objection in principle to the nature of the damage but simply because causation or 
certainty of damage failed to be established. As Marshall puts it, in theory, a claim in respect 
of economic loss is just as good as any other and it may depend on the factual circumstances 
which include the absence of legal damage, the uncertainty of loss, the fact that the 
defendant’s conduct does not amount to fault, the absence of any right of the plaintiff’s which 
has been infringed, assumption of risk or contributory negligence by the plaintiff, or the fact 
that such loss might equally well have been suffered anyway.541 
In that sense, the French legal system and its emphasis on reparation represent great 
interest from a comparative point of view. The remarkable permissiveness toward pure 
economic loss, as well as the complete indifference to the policy arguments against recovery 
very relevant elsewhere, are probably simply astonishing for a common law lawyer. This 
could only find a parallel in the disconcerting wonderment suffered by a civilian when 
confronted with the huge controversy surrounding the recovery at common law of negligently 
inflicted pure economic loss. 
Bernard Rudden, in his well-known article, drew attention to the paradox that the 
French seem to ignore almost all of Cardozo’s warnings without suffering ill effects.542 
Against all predictions that the sky will fall, the French judge is immutable. To those who 
argue that the floodgates of liability must be firmly closed, the French experience must seem 
counterintuitive, an empirical enigma awaiting for an answer.543 
The fact that the only control mechanisms to prevent the floodgate in economic loss 
cases in civil law are general concepts of fault (the breach of the duty to act as a reasonable 
person with respect to reasonably foreseeable and avoidable prejudice), causation, and broad 
statements to the effect that the loss must be certain and direct without having experiencing 
any judicial crisis is the most clear evidence that legal chaos will not necessarily follow a 
change in the way common law regulates the recovery of economic loss.544 
                                                            
540 Geneviève Viney, in J Spier (Ed) The limits of expanding liability (1998) 109. 
541 D Marshall, ‘Liability for pure economic loss negligently caused –French and English law compared’ (1975) 
25 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 750.  
542 B Rudden, ‘Torticles’ (1991-92) Tulane Civil Law Forum 105, 107. 
543 Palmer and Bussani, above n 495, 38. 
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Whether there is a hidden exercise of policy behind those elements (for instance, 
manipulating the causal requirement and attributing a negative result to a tenuous link, or 
finding the damage not certain) is more difficult to determine. 
Bussani and Palmer conclude that although the French delictual system takes no 
particular note of economic loss, there is evidence of a subconscious concern with the 
question of excessive, indeterminate liability toward third persons. They stress that it is 
difficult to detect policy since it is never avowed.545 Markesinis also points out that French 
judges are perfectly aware of the danger of indeterminate liability and gives some indication 
about instances in which the theoretical possibility of compensation for economic loss turns 
into a refusal in practice.546 
Palmer and Bussani conclude that, from a comparative perspective France’s emphasis 
on reparation holds great interest since it presents an appearance of maximum permissiveness 
toward pure economic loss as well as an appearance of maximum indifference to the strong 
policy arguments usually made elsewhere against recovery.547 
 
2.2.2 The cable cases. 
 
Factual situations such as those found in the typical cable cases that trouble German 
law as much as common law, do not encounter any particular difficulties in French law. That 
does not mean that liability is necessarily open-ended, but simply that the control is going to 
be exercised through one of the general elements of liability.548 Any of them, and in 
particular the causal link, leave ample room for controlling the recovery of pure economic 
loss where it seems excessive in accordance with the ‘sense of disproportion’ of the judge. 
No need of seeking additional support from contractual remedies (as in Germany) is detected. 
 In the paradigmatical situation where a plaintiff has suffered economic loss as a result 
of the interruption of a public service (water, gas, electricity) caused by a negligent 
contractor, the courts usually do not view the absence of any physical harm as an indication 
that the loss should not be compensable. In 1970, the Cour de Cassation decided a case 
where a bulldozer broke a methane gas line which provided energy to the plaintiff’s factory. 
The production was interrupted and damage resulted. The Court ruled that the plaintiff’s case 
                                                            
545 Bussani and Palmer, above n 495, 456. 
546 Basil Markesinis, ‘La politique jurisprudentielle et la réparation du préjudice économique en Angleterre: une 
approche comparative.’ Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé  (1983) 31, 44. 
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was well founded under art. 1382 (fault liability) and held that his economic loss was a 
‘direct consequence’ of the ruptured gas line.549 
On similar facts, workers cut a high-tension cable belonging to Electricité de France. 
As a result of the ensuing power cut, work at a factory had to be stopped. The court of first 
instance granted the claim up to the amount of the salaries paid to the employees for the time 
during which they had to remain idle. The Court upheld the decision stating that the loss 
suffered by the plaintiff was the ‘direct consequence’ of the public works carried out by the 
defendant.550 It is interesting to see that McLachlin J. of the Supreme Court of Canada has 
stressed that causation and the common law notion of proximity play similar roles: 
[P]roximity may be seen as paralleling the requirement in civil law that damages be direct and certain. 
Proximity, like the requirement of directness, poses the requirement of a loose link between the 
negligent act and the resultant loss. Distant losses which arise from collateral relationships do not 
qualify for recovery.551 
 
Neither the Cour de Cassation nor the Conseil d’État found any restrictions on 
holding the plaintiff liable due to the fact that the loss was not consequential on damage to 
property. Both loss of production and property damage fall indifferently under the category of 
dommages matèrieles. The loss of revenue was certain (and not merely hypothetical) and 
direct consequence of the tortious act and, therefore, recoverable. The only scope for limiting 
liability would be through the application of the criterion of causation, for instance if a break 
in the chain of causation could be proved.552 
Banakas points out the lack of agonizing analysis of the nature of the loss as physical 
or purely economic, in the manner of English and American courts. Both precedential cases 
were reported only in summary revealing the routine character of those decisions.553 
It is important to stress that the Cour de Cassation has no control over the 
quantification of damages. In a case of an illegal strike that caused damage to a factory, the 
lower courts held that the conditions for art. 1382 were fulfilled, but they just awarded 
nominal damages. On the appeal, the Cour de Cassation stated that it could not review the 
amount of the damages discretionarily set by the lower courts.554 
 
                                                            
549 Civ. 2e, 8 mai 1970, Bulletin Civil II 1970, n° 160. 
550 Conseil d’État, 2 june 1972. However, Esmein warns that declaring that the damage is ‘direct’ is without 
significance because the judges declare damages to be direct or indirect in accordance with their desire to award, 
or not to award, an indemnity. Note Cassation civil 2e, 28 april 1965. Dalloz 1965, 777. 
551 Canadian National Railway v Norsk Pacific Steamship [1992] 1 S.C.R. 1021 at 1137. 
552 Van Gerven, above n 494, 241. 
553 Banakas above, n 490, 17. 
554 Bussani and Palmer, above n 495, 173. 
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2.2.3 Other situations. 
 
Another illustration of the generous attitude of the French courts towards recovery for 
pure economic loss is the case of the employees of a beauty salon who sued the driver of a 
car which had crashed through the window of their working place, forcing it to close down 
for six months for repairs. A court in Nanterre ordered the driver to compensate the 
employees for their lost wages.555 
On another occasion, the operator of a dredge had to compensate the expenses of boat 
owners who could not have access to a harbour because, due to the defendant’s negligence, 
one part of the dredge had been lost in the harbour, making it unsafe for navigation.556 
For some authors557, the most striking illustration of the broad conception of the 
notion of protected interests in France is the case of the driver of a vehicle who caused an 
accident that interrupted the traffic. The Court de Cassation granted compensation to the City 
of Marseille for the loss of profits that it sustained when its buses were unable to get past the 
place of the accident due to the traffic jam.558 
 
2.2.4 The manipulation of causal requirements. 
 
No doubt, French law has the most open or liberal approach towards compensation for 
pure economic loss. Whether or not there is a subtle exercise of policy considerations to limit 
recoveries of this type of damage by the judges is hard to say. All we can do is illustrate with 
some examples where the courts felt that it was necessary to place some limit upon the 
recovery of pure economic loss. Invariably this was done through the manipulation of the 
causal requirement.559 
An example where the damage was considered indirect is the case of a singer who had 
an accident and had to cancel a concert. The organizer suffered an economic loss and filed a 
                                                            
555 Tribunal de Grande Instance de Nanterre, October 22, 1975. Gazzete du Palais 1976, 1392. 
556 Cassation Civil 2ème, March 19, 1980. Dalloz 1980, 414. 
557 Pierre Giovannoni, ‘Le dommage indirect en droit suisse de la responsabilité civile, comparé aux droits 
allemand et français’, Revue de droit suisse (1977) 31, 46. 
558 Cassation Civil 2ème, April 29, 1965. Gazette Palais 1965.2.257 
559 Markesinis refers to the multiple resources used by the judges, sometimes skilfully, sometimes arbitrarily: 
‘Une variété de dispositions causales, qui parfois semblent faire double emploi, ont été habilement (sinon 
quelquefois arbitrairement) utilisées pour atteindre ce résultat. Dans certains cas, on dit que la victime a assumé 
le risque; dans d’autres cas, que le préjudice subi n’est qu’indirect; dans d’autres encore, qui’il n’est 
qu’hypothétique et non pas certain. Mais dans tous le cas, la possibilité de dédommagement est théoriquement 
reconnue.’ Basil Markesinis, ‘La politique jurisprudentielle et la réparation du préjudice économique en 
Angleterre: une approche comparative.’ Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé  (1983) 31, 45. 
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claim against the person who caused the accident. The Cour de cassation, holding that the 
damage was indirect, dismissed the action.560 
 In another case a creditor who was not able to collect a debt from someone who was 
killed in a traffic accident claimed damages from the person liable for the accident. The 
debtor’s heirs did not accept his succession and, therefore, the estate could not pay the debts 
of the deceased. The Court of Appeal ruled that the plaintiff’s loss should not be viewed as 
the ‘certain’ result of the defendant’s act and, therefore, held it was unrecoverable. 
Considering the length of time for repayment and the risks that the debtor might discontinue 
his work, the anticipated repayment was aleatory. The Supreme Court, however, quashed this 
decision, stating that repayment of a loan of money is never, in a juridical sense, aleatory. 
The case returned to another Court of Appeal that, in turn, ruled that while the creditor’s 
damage was certain, it was not  ‘direct’ since the refusal of the heirs to accept the debtor’s 
succession broke the chain of causation creating a nova causa interveniens.561  
In another case, the plaintiff’s leading tenor was injured and unable to perform in the 
plaintiff’s opera allegedly causing the box-office takings to fall. The Cour de Cassation did 
not allow recovery, on the ground that the fall in takings could depend on multiple 
circumstances or incidents than the failure of a talented singer.562 
In some occasions the French courts might use the notion of loss of a chance in order 
to award at least some compensation. In a famous case, a very well-known football player 
(Kemp) was killed in a car accident. His club (Football Club of Netz) claimed a potentially 
sizeable transfer fee as well as loss of revenues since fewer people would pay to watch the 
team. The Court of Appeal stated that if the accident had not occurred, the player would have 
probably signed another year’s contract (helping the club’s profitability), or he might have 
demanded a transfer to another club, in which case they would have profit also with the 
transfer fee. In both cases, the club lost a chance to realise an advantage from a patrimonial 
asset.563 
Banakas submits that because the conditions of ‘directness’ and ‘certainty’ are not 
related to property damage in a common law sense, nor to invasion of property rights in the 
German sense, it is almost impossible to tell what they are all about. He stresses the fact that 
French judges are notorious for not providing fully reasoned decisions. The result, he says, is 
that in a codified tort system relying heavily on case law to fill in the details, there is little 
                                                            
560 Civ.2e 14 Novembre 1958. Gazette Palais, 1959.1.31. 
561 Civ.2e 21 February 1979. Dalloz 1979.IR 344. Commented by Markesinis, above n 546, 45. 
562 Civ 2e. 14 nov. 1958, Gazette Palais, 1959.1.31. (Demeyer v Camerlo) 
563 Colmar, 20 april 1955. Dalloz, 1956, 723. (Football Club de Metz v Wiroth). 
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guidance in the masses of cases about the judicial criteria of ruling on important issues such 
as ‘directness’ and ‘certainty’ of loss. He concludes that we shall never know wehether 
French judges are simply shifting around the various causes of each and every loss, including 
the defendant’s fault, and attributing the loss to the one that best serves policy, like English 
and American judges do.564 
Marshall also qualifies the nature of directness as a criterion in French law as 
unsatisfactory. Besides the fact that the doctrine has failed to agree on what directness means, 
he points out that all dommage par ricochet is, by definition, indirect, and so there should not 
in principle be recovery in such a case; and most of all, indirectness is synonymous with a 
vague notion of remoteness, the content of which is determined by policy rather than by a 
legal test.565 
 
2.2.5 Auditor’s liability. 
 
Liability for incorrect financial advice in a general clause system, such as France, is 
based on the simple principle of reparation of any loss or injury resulting from fault and 
causal connection.566 Without derogating the general principles of liability established by 
arts. 1382 and 1383 of the civil code, art. 234 of the law of commercial companies imposes 
liability to auditors for their negligence vis à vis the company and third parties.567  
By reaffirming this general principle in the area of auditor’s liability towards third 
parties, the legislator made it clear that the third party is not an ‘indirect victim’ whose prima 
facie right to recovery is uncertain.568 
The auditor is liable in contract toward the company for the loss resulting from his 
shortcomings in the exercise of his general or specific tasks and in tort toward third persons. 
                                                            
564 Banakas, above n 491, 17. Also Esmein suggests that ‘le tribunaux qualifient un dommage direct ou indirect 
suivant qu’il leur plaît ou non d’allouer une indemnité...’ Note Dalloz, 1967.77. 
565 Marshall, above, n 540, 767. According to Herbots it would be a mistake to consider le dommage par 
ricochet as indirect in the sense of French law. Above note 497, 144. 
566 The same is true for other general clause systems such as the Spanish, the Austrian, or the Italian. Cf. Stathis 
Banakas, ‘Liability for incorrect financial information: theory and practice in a general clause system and in a 
protected interests system.’ 7 European Review of Private Law (1999) 261, 262. 
567 The organization of the auditing profession is mainly regulated by the law of commercial companies (Loi n° 
66-537 24 july 1966)  
Art. 234. ‘Les commissaires aux comptes sont responsables, tant à l’égard de la societé que des tiers, des 
conséquences dommageables des fautes et négligences par eux commises dans l’éxercise de leurs fonctions.’ 
568 Lara Khoury, ‘The liability of auditors beyond their clients: a comparative study.’ (2000-2001) 46 McGill 
Law Journal 413, 455. 
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If he deliberately misstates financial information, he may incur penal responsibility by way of 
a fine or prison term.569 
Following the general principles, the third party will have to prove the auditor’s fault, 
the loss and that his or her damage is a direct consequence of the auditor’s mistake. However, 
fault will almost always be presumed in cases of incorrect information supplied by 
professional defendants, as French courts have recently been pursuing a very aggressive 
development of professional liability towards not only clients, but also, in tort, towards third 
parties.570  
On more than one occasion, courts have shown reluctance to allow recovery in favour 
of third parties even in the event of fault on the part of the auditor by refusing the claim on 
the ground of causation. Several reasons for this restrictive approach have been pointed out: 
a) the auditor’s fault is usually one of omission rather than positive action; b) his fault is 
never the only cause of the damage which creates evidentiary difficulties; c)since their work 
is not meant to provide any certainty, it should normally be only one of the factors involved 
in the assessment of the financial situation of a business.571 
 It is generally accepted that the auditor assumes an obligation of means (obligation 
de moyens), so as to oblige the victim to bear the burden of proof as to the shortcoming and 
the resulting losses. The auditor is not a guarantor of the authenticity of the information he 
compiles and so it has been held that where incomplete and disordered documents were 
submitted, which included a fraudulent invoice that had no suspicious appearance, fault was 
not shown because such matters could escape a normally vigilant auditor’s attention.572 
A particular difficulty might arise in relation to big share buyers who can have a full 
picture of the financial status of a company relying on other sources of information available 
to them and not only the accountant’s statement. Prospective small shareholders will 
probably almost entirely rely on published financial statements as their sole source of 
information before acquiring their shares, but big buyers will attempt to form their own 
opinion on the financial status of the company based on other sources too.  
In most cases of refusal, the plaintiff is defeated because the evidence shows that, 
despite the errors of the report, he knew or should have known about the real situation from 
                                                            
569 Commercial Companies Act, art. 457. 
570 Cour de Cassation. Chambre commerciale, 17.10.1984, Juris Classeur périodique 1985 II.20458 note A. 
Viander. 
571 Bussani and Palmer, above n 495, 455. 
572 Tribunal de Commerce de Paris, 12 juillet 1984. Bulletin CNCC, 1985. 478 Juris-Data 001646. 
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other sources of information at his disposal and he failed to exercise reasonable care in 
relying on the accounts.573  
The Cour de cassation decided in 1989 a case where the plaintiff had invested in a 
company. According to a provision in the agreement, a second investment occurred after the 
accounts of the company were approved on the basis of the report of the auditor. This was 
followed by other investments. Subsequently, a verification requested by the board of 
directors showed an important loss, which did not appear in the certified statements. The 
Court refused the claim. The plaintiff had been present at the meeting of the board of 
directors where it was decided that accounting investigations were necessary and that some 
order had to be brought into the management of the company. The plaintiff, therefore, had 
been sufficiently alerted by the apparent irregularity of the accounts and could have decided 
to postpone subsequent investments until after the investigations requested by the board had 
taken place. No mention of any distinction between existing and new shareholders was made. 
This notion appears to be unknown in French law. 
Sometimes the concept of contributory negligence, allowing only partial 
compensation has been considered adequate.574 In 1984 the Court of Appeal of Paris held an 
auditor liable for only half the damage suffered by the plaintiff. It considered the plaintiff’s 
attitude careless and imprudent since he did not verify the values indicated on the accounts, 
carry out a thorough accounting verification, or seek information from the auditor. It was also 
stated that he should have requested a more recent statement, since the one in question was 
already six months old at the moment of his investment.575 
The courts do not require the auditor’s fault to be the only or even the main cause of 
the plaintiff’s loss.576 It is believed that the consequence of such an approach would make the 
case inadmissible in many circumstances where the cause of the loss is multiple. Often 
examples of this occur when a person buys shares relying on the wrong accounts of a 
company that collapses later due to bad administration or fraud. (Is the cause of the loss, the 
misstatement, or the bad administration?) In these cases, the concept of loss of a chance has 
been applied.  
                                                            
573 Khoury, above n 568, 458. 
574 Viney, above n 540, 108. 
575 Paris, 1 February 1984, Rev.Soc. 1984.779 (Annot. D.Schmidt) 
576 In Irwin (Management Consultants) v Thorne, Ridell [1991] R.R.A. 187 however, it was required that the 
statements be the principal factor. Also in Portugal wrong information does not have to be the sole reason that 
gives rise to liability for the business conduct that led to the damage; contributory cause is sufficient. Jorge 
Ferreira Sinde Monteiro in J Spier (Ed) The limits of expanding liability (1998) 173, 174. 
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The notion of actual reliance does not seem to appear among the causation 
requirements. This was specifically stated in a case where, in spite of lack of reliance, the 
auditor was held liable due to the fact that his faulty omission had allowed the company to 
continue its existence and to benefit from a clean reputation, thereby creating a false sense of 
security in the mind of the creditors. The Court considered that the creditors, contrary to 
shareholders, do not get involved on the basis of the statements of the company, but by 
reason of  its simple existence and reputation.577 The wrong idea created in the plaintiff’s 
mind and the fact that this error prompted the plaintiff to act to his detriment seem to have 
been considered material by the court as to establish the existence of causal link. 
Knowledge of the specific plaintiff or class or plaintiffs to whom the statements will 
be shown does not appear to be relevant either. 
 As a general rule, the plaintiff will have to prove his damage. A shareholder who 
allegedly paid too much for his shares if the accounts would have been correct, will probably 
have some difficulties in proving what price would have been paid without the mistake since 
this often has to do with other circumstances not related with the accuracy of the 
statements.578 
 
2.2.6 Liability for economic loss without fault. 
 
Finally, a brief reference to a particular area of economic loss should be made: 
liability for economic losses without fault. 
Some established categories of no-fault liability of the administration in France 
include: a) injury caused by public works, use of dangerous things including cars and 
aircrafts, and military activities; b) injury caused by lawful but abnormal activities of the 
administration; c) injury suffered as a result of the operation of valid laws or regulations, 
affecting a class of individuals in a disproportionally harsh manner. 
A well-known source of no-fault liability of public authorities in France is the escape 
of borstal boys causing damage to members of the public. All authorities responsible for the 
safe detention or supervision on parole of criminals or mentally disturbed persons are liable, 
without fault, to citizens suffering financial loss as a result of such persons escaping and 
                                                            
577 Rouen, 27 April 1982. Bulletin C.N.C.C. 47.288. 
578 Spier, above n 540, 159. 
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causing damage.579 In two famous cases, La Fleurette580 and Caucheteux et Desmont581 the 
Conseil d’État (the Supreme Administrative Court) initiated a new area of liability. 
According to this novel jurisprudence, the State is also responsible, under certain conditions, 
for special and abnormal injury caused to citizens by valid law, or delegated legislation, as 
well as lawful judicial action, causing the same type of injury. In a case where a 
governmental corporation caused financial loss to a private citizen by lawfully starting and 
then, lawfully, again, withdrawing from an expropriation procedure, it was held that 
compensation should be granted.582 The notion that the lawful activity of the State cannot 
breach the principle of equality before public duties (égalité devant les charges publiques) 
appears to be behind the decision.  
 
2.3 Economic loss in Italy. 
 
The Italian civil code does not mention the category of pure economic loss either. 
Therefore, due to the fact that no distinction is made between that type of loss and material 
damage, compensation has never been denied for economic losses in cases where the general 
requirements for liability in accordance with art. 2043 cc were fulfilled.583 
In relation to typical cable cases the best illustration in Italy is covered by Enel v Ditta 
Giampaoli 584 and specially, the so-called Pastificio Puddu585 case. The first one is related to 
negligent excavation works that cut a cable that delivered energy to a factory. The defendant 
was liable based on the broad principle of art. 2043 combined with art. 2050cc. This last 
provision establishes that: 
‘Whoever causes injury to another in the performance of an activity dangerous by its 
nature or by reason of the instrumentalities employed, is liable for damages, unless he 
proves that he has taken all suitable measures to avoid injury.’ 
 
Since that case, the judicial interpretation consistently given to that article is of simple 
applicability to excavation situations. This has risen some critique from some doctrine which 
                                                            
579 Efstathios K Banakas, ‘Public authority liability for pure economic loss: a comparative study of English, 
German and French law.’ (1992) Revue Hellénique de Droit International 39, 64. 
580 Conseil d’État, 14 january 1938, Dalloz 1938 III 41, note Rolland. 
581 Conseil d’État, 21 january 1944 Recueil Sirey 1945 III 13. 
582 Conseil d’État, 23 december 1970, Juris Classeur périodique 1971 II 16820. 
583 Art. 2043. ‘Any fraudulent, malicious, or negligent act that causes an unjustified injury to another obliges the 
person who has committed the act to pay damages.’ 
584 App. Ancona, 23.11.1982, Rassegna Giuridica Enel, 1982, 747. 
585 Cass. 24.6.1972, n° 2135, Il Foro Italiano 1973, I, 99. 
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considers that it imposes an excessively heavy burden, equivalent to a ‘quasi-strict liability’, 
on excavation activity. 586 
In the second case, some workmen cut the supply of power to a pasta factory which 
had to be idle for many hours. ‘Pasta Puddu’ company had signed a supply contract with 
ENEL (National Electric Company) for the power needed for its plant; the right (of the 
creditor) to obtain that supply was damaged not by the debtor but by a third party, responsible 
for a tort which had caused real and irreparable damage to the pasta company. On the basis of 
these substantiating elements, the Supreme Court held that the losses were recoverable.587 
In 1978 a first instance court found negligent the conduct of an excavator who had 
begun his works without asking previously about the location of the underground cables.588 
In Vecchio v Telecom Italia589 the issue of the probability of contributory damage by 
the plaintiff for not giving enough information in relation to the location of the underground 
cables was raised.590 
The classic doctrine for economic losses derived from injury to a person or property 
suffered a dramatic widening during the 1960s and 1970s which ended in the landmark 
known as the Meroni case.591 A famous football player was killed in a car accident. His team, 
the Torino Football Club sued for damages alleging economic loss.  
The Supreme Court held that a creditor can recover damages for the economic loss he 
suffered from an injury to his debtor. It held that art. 2043 did not make any distinction 
between absolute and relative rights in determining whether or not compensation should be 
given. Therefore, injury to credit can be redressed in tort when such injury is definitive and 
irreparable, as in the case of killing of an irreplaceable debtor.592 
                                                            
586 S Mannina, ‘La responsabilità civile dell’esercente de un’attività di escavazione in caso di danni a cavi 
sotterranei’, note under App. Roma, 12.7.1995, Temi Romana, 1996, 643. 
587 Francesco Busnelli, in J Spier (Ed) The limits of expanding liability (1998) 137, 142. 
588 Tribbunale di Torino, 31 may 1978, (1979) Rassegna Giuridica Enel, 379. 
589 Cass.23.8.1999, n° 8838, Danno e responsabilità, 2000, 512. 
590 A M Musy and L Zamnelli, ‘Cable cutting all’italiana. Ipotesi di concorso di colpa del dannegiato per 
omissione di informativa’ note to the decision in Vecchio. 
591 P.G. Monateri, ‘Economic loss in Italy’ in Banakas, above n 491, 197. 
592 The Supreme Court changed its position. In 1953, in the case of an airplane crash, due to a mistake of the 
pilot, all the players of, again, the same team (Torino Football Club) had died. After the accident, the Turin 
Soccer Club sued the air carrier seeking redress for the damage arising from the loss of its players. Recovery 
was denied. Von Bar, above n 490, 31 (note 152). Also Ricardo Omodei-Salè and Alessio Zaccaria, 
‘Compensation for pure economic loss under Italian law ’ in Willem van Boom, Helmut Koziol and Christian 
Witting (Eds) Pure Economic Loss (2004) 48, 49. 
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The Meroni doctrine is, since then, used whenever an employee is wounded or killed 
in an accident and the employer is bound by statute to keep paying wages.593 
The most famous decision in Italy about inaccurate information is the so-called ‘De 
Chirico’ case.594 The plaintiff was considering buying a painting by De Chirico. He was not 
convinced by the seller that the painting was authentic so he decided to approach the painter. 
De Chirico was quite old at the time. He recognised it as his and painted on it a second 
signature at the back of the painting. Later it was discovered that in fact it was a forged copy. 
In the meantime De Chirico died and since the plaintiff could not find the seller he sued the 
widow Mrs. Paskwer. It was certain that De Chirico did not act deliberately but negligently. 
The Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione) quashed the judgment of the Court of 
appeal rejecting the claim. It held that the harm the plaintiff suffered was an injury to the 
right of patrimonial integrity and, more specifically, the right to freely determine transactions 
concerning the patrimony (guaranteed within the bounds of art. 41 of the Constitution) and 
that the misinformation that he received from De Chirico violated his right of free choice (to 
buy or not to buy) as it was reasonable for him to rely on the truthfulness of his statement. 
The Court had no doubt that an infringement of such a right could be characterized as unjust 
injury within the meaning of art. 2043 of the Civil code and therefore, in principle, 
recoverable. 
It has been submitted that after the De Chirico case it is crystal clear that whenever 
there is a damage (other than moral damage) the patrimony suffers a loss, therefore, creating 
an unlimited possibility to sue for economic losses.595 
 
2.4 Economic loss in The Netherlands. 
 
In the Netherlands, according to its Burgerlijk Wetboek, the most recent civil code in 
the world (1992), liability exists for unlawful damage that can be imputed to a person’s fault 
or from a cause for which he is answerable according to law or common opinion. (art. 6:162) 
The same provision also states what acts are deemed to be unlawful: the infringement of a 
subjective right, an act or omission violating a statutory duty, or conduct contrary to the 
standard of conduct acceptable in society. 
                                                            
593 In a subsequent case, the Court of Cassation even held that it was irrelevant whether the employee was 
‘irreplaceable’, whether he was dead, or whether he had only temporarily lost his working capacity. Corte di 
Cassazione, sezione unite 12 November 1988, n. 6132. Foro italiano 1989, I, 742. 
594 Corte di Cassazione, 14 May 1982. n° 2765 (De Chirico). Giurisprudenza italiana 1983-I-1-786 
595 Monateri, above n 590, 199. 
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The Dutch civil code rejected the narrow view of the interests that are to be protected 
by tort law, like the German BGB (§ 823.1), having adopted instead a general clause similar 
to art. 1382 of the French civil code. Therefore, as in France, pure economic loss liability is 
not a special issue, but simply another instance of fault liability, which develops on a case by 
case basis.596 
Several devices are available, however, to put some limits when pure economic loss 
would become too burdensome. Fine-tuning fault liability, in order to limit from the outset, 
and the rules regarding causation would be the most important ones.  
The Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) has decided in 1977597 that the mere circumstance 
that those who are at fault and therefore liable are at risk of being confronted with an 
extensive number of claims does not alter the duty imposed upon them by law.598 The case 
concerned excavating operations that damaged a gas main owned by a public utility. 
Consequently, a neighbouring brick factory had to halt production for lack of gas. The 
defendant’s argument that the causal connection was too remote and that this specific form of 
damage was unforeseeable was rejected. The Court decided that foreseeability is a factor that 
may be taken into account in the process of ascertaining causal connection. However, other 
circumstances must be taken into consideration as well.  
The dependency of the third party on the supply of gas was used as an argument in its 
favour. In the Court’s view, this showed the directness of the causal link between the 
negligent act and the damage. However, the Supreme Court also suggested that a very high 
degree of dependency would mean that the third party should have taken precautions. 
Because this had not been part of the debate in the proceedings (the defendant not raising this 
line of defence) the Court was not requested to decide the issue; therefore, it remains open 
whether having excessive dependence on a public utility without taking precautions could in 
any way constitute contributory negligence. 
In a similar case, the Supreme Court decided about damage caused by a military 
aeroplane to an electricity cable. The pilot did a nosedive in the vicinity of a high voltage 
cable. He had got orders to do so, while he was, negligently, not informed about the existence 
                                                            
596 Barendrecht, above n 535, 115. 
597 HR 1.7.1977, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1978, n°84 
598 Bussani and Palmer, above n 495, 198. Von Bar, above n 490, 38, note 188. 
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of the cable. The Hoge Raad held that a duty of care599 existed toward those dependent on 
electricity supplied by the cable; the damage was foreseeable. 
An important exception to the possibility to recover for pure economic loss follows 
from the rule that only the injured person himself can recover in cases of personal injury. 
Therefore, claims of creditors of a victim of a car accident are barred, unless the third party 
have incurred costs which are for the benefit of the victim.600 The Supreme Court, in the 
Lapinus case, extended this principle to the claim of a company that incurred loss of income, 
because its employees were injured by pollution in the air stemming from a neighbouring 
manufacturing plant.601 However, a new article 6:107a has been added to the Dutch civil code 
which enables employers to claim for the cost of continued payment of wages. According to 
that provision whenever statute or contract obliges the employer to provide his employee 
with sick pay, the employer can claim that amount from the injurer, if, and to the extend that 
the injurer is liable vis-à-vis the employee. 
Dutch courts do not seem to be reluctant to grant claims for pure economic loss to 
third parties as a consequence of a breach of contract by professionals either. The public 
notary may have duties towards third parties, who are involved in the transactions of his 
clients602; the one who helped a bank with property transactions to the detriment of the 
creditors of the bank was also held liable603; a lawyer who forgot to file a brief in court in 
time was liable for the pure economic loss of the persons who in turn rented the premises 
from the bailee he represented.604 
Reliance on financial information by investors has also been the subject of favourable 
decisions by the Supreme Court that held a bank liable for credit information issued to a 
creditor of its client605; another bank was held liable for the misleading information contained 
in a prospectus.606 
Apart from the above referred rule, which is just judicial interpretation, there is no 
general rule limiting recovery for pure economic loss. As in other civil law systems, fault and 
causation are the most frequent safety valves in order to limit liability, but other devices are 
                                                            
599 Many authors equate the concept of duty of care to the Dutch concept of ‘maatschappelijke zorgvuldigheid’ 
Cf. Bussani and Palmer above n 495, 199. We have some doubts about the appropriateness of this. It seems to 
be misleading since the Netherlands have a general clause system. 
600 Barendrecht, above n 535, 118. 
601 Hoge Raad 12 December 1986, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1987, 958. 
602 Hoge Raad 15 September 1995. 
603 Hoge Raad 23 December 1994. 
604 Hoge Raad 2 April 1982, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1983, 367.  
605 Hoge Raad 10 December 1993, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, 667. 
606 Hoge Raad 2 December 1994, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1996, 246. 
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at hand too, such as mitigation (matiging). In effect, Section 6:109 BW states that awards for 
damages can be mitigated, if full compensation would be clearly undesirable in a particular 
case. The courts have to take into account the kind of liability, the kind of relationship 
between the parties and the financial means of the parties.  
The Dutch code also contemplates the possibility to introduce ‘cap’ damages. 
Although some professional organisations have lobbied for their liability to be capped, there 
seems to be no reaction from the legislator up to  now.607 Van Boom believes that the 
imposition of a cap on damages awards may well prove useful in some areas of pure 
economic loss, like auditor’s liability. According to his view, where a single negligent act can 
cause a number of large claims for pure economic loss, the use of a general statutory limit 
upon damages may strike a fairer balance between the right level of deterrence and over-
deterrence (with possible practices as a negative consequence)608 
Barendrecht submits that until now the argument that liability is extending too far has 
not been heard very often in the area of pure economic loss. The only instance that is disputed 
is possibly the one of auditors and accountants towards third parties relying on their 
statements. But this problem is dealt with as a separate issue and not as a signal that 
something is wrong with the compensation of pure economic loss in general.609 
 
2.5 Conclusions. 
 
The study of the systems under comparison of the present chapter indicates that there 
is a clear approximation between the German and English approaches in relation to economic 
loss. Both of them seem to have made up their minds that, in principle, negligently inflicted 
economic losses should not be compensated. 
However, in spite of the fact that the reasons which led to the decision not to 
compensate in principle pure economic loss are broadly similar in both systems, the legal 
devices used to achieve this aim are quite different: Germany excluding pure economic loss 
from the list of interests which receive legal protection, the common law relying on the 
concept of duty. In relation to the accountant’s liability, in particular, while the common law 
suffers from a narrow concept of contractual liability and needs to turn to Tort for filling a 
protective gap, German law suffering from a narrow concept of Tort liability turns to 
                                                            
607 Cf. Bussani and Palmer, above n 495, 465 and bibliography cited there. 
608 Van Boom, above n 593, 199. 
609 Barendrecht, above n 535, 133. 
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contract. But, remarkably, departing from the different ends of the civil spectrum, both 
systems find sometimes themselves converging on the same ground of liability, which is the 
legitimate reliance of the plaintiff on the accuracy of advice or information supplied in the 
context of a relationship justifying such reliance. 
If the original approximation is clear, the future is not. A considerable consensus has 
been achieved today in Germany that the distinction between consequential loss upon 
physical damage to property and pure economic loss no longer responds adequately to the 
changed social and economic conditions of present times. The emphasis on land and tangible 
property as the main basis of economic welfare, though prevalent when the BGB was drafted, 
now seems outmoded. It is considered that there are significant signs, economic and legal, 
that suggest that nowadays rights and financial claims have moved into the centre of private 
wealth. This new perspective can be seen in the huge intelectual efforts of the 
Bundesgerichtshof in trying to finds ways of expanding the protective scope of the system. At 
the same time, in the common law, the growing number of exceptions to the non recovery 
rule, calling into question the very basis on which claims for pure economic loss should be 
limited, the lack of coherent policy and satisfactory principle and an apparent process of 
constant expansion and retraction seem to indicate the uncertainty of the system about which 
should be its final trend. 
On the other hand, in French law and its derivatives, loss of any type is recoverable 
wherever fault, damage and a direct and immediate causal connection between the two are 
established.  Factual situations such as those encountered in the ‘cable cases’ in Germany or in 
the Spartan Steel case in England have not caused the kind of difficulties that they have 
provoked in both English and German law. French law shows clear indifference to German 
and common law concerns about the cataclysmic effects attributed to an eventual full 
recognition of economic loss. If any concerns of that type exist, they are plenty confident that 
relying on the notion of fault, causative devices and the normative concept of damage 
(requiring it to be certain, immediate and direct) are more than enough for the purposes of 
controlling the limits of liability. Civilian jurisdictions use very effectively the basic general 
test of delictual liability (fault, damage and causal link), without regarding economic loss as a 
separate category of damage, without requiring associated physical damages and without the 
common law consternation over the problems of foreseeability. In front of such effective and 
transparent guidelines, the adequate question seems to be: if the same results are probably 
going to be reached, why should things be made complicated when they can be made simple? 
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If in the common law, it could be said that the battle for compensation of economic 
loss still remains to be won, in the civil law nobody seems to have heard of such a battle. 
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PART III: CONCLUSIONS. 
 
In 1881, Oliver Wendell Holmes made his most influential statement on the fact that 
logic is not the decisive factor nor has it a paramount influence in the development of the law. 
There is no doubt that when Holmes J remarked that ‘the life of the law has not been logic, it 
has been experience’1, he was simply observing that law, as developed by judges, had been 
mainly concerned with securing decisions which seemed to make practical good sense. He 
was not praising illogic as a virtue. It is clear that since legal reasoning is a form of thought it 
must be logical, i.e. must conform to the laws of logic, on pain of being irrational and self 
contradictory. There is no doubt that the law has to be rationally consistent with itself.  
Unfortunately, the most famous utterance of the most prestigious oracle of the law 
ended up being used to its exhaustion to justify any decision no matter how contradictory or 
unacceptable from a rational point of view. It seemed to be assumed that, if logic did not 
compel judicial decision, its role must be trivial, or noxious. This serious misinterpretation 
led to a situation where ‘English lawyers and writers have tended to think of it as almost a 
virtue to be illogical, and have ascribed that virtue freely to their law; being logic is an 
eccentric continental practice, in which common-sensical Englishmen indulge at their peril.’2  
In the 60s, Luis Recaséns Siches, a famous Spanish jurist devoted to legal philosophy, 
developed a theory which evaluated the significance of the criticism against using logic in the 
legal field. He believed that most of the criticism that existed against the inadequacy of logic 
within the field of the law have in mind the traditional logic (Aristotle, Bacon, Stuart Mill, 
etc.), namely, the physic-mathematical logic, but that that did not exhaust the whole domain 
of logic. Apart from the field of that, he said, there is another logical domain related to human 
life, which is precisely that of application to the law, and which he suggested to be called the 
‘logic of the reasonable’ as differentiated from the ‘logic of the rational’ connected with 
mathematics and physics. He emphasized that ‘logic of the reasonable’, although different 
from pure logic of mathematical nature, was still strictly rigorous logic which did not involve 
at all granting any permission to any kind of irrationalism. In regard to every case, easy or 
difficult, he said, it is necessary to think of it reasonably. 3  
                                                            
1 Oliver W. Holmes, The common law (1881) 1. 
2 Neil MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, (1994) 40. 
3 Luis Recaséns Siches, ‘The logic of the reasonable as differentiated from the logic of the rational (Human 
reason in the making and the interpretation of the law)’ in Ralph Newman (Ed) Essays in Jurisprudence in 
Honor of Roscoe Pound (1962) 192, 204. 
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These remarks acquire particular significance in areas such as psychiatric harm, 
‘where the silliest rules now exist’ and economic loss, where arbitrariness prevails and 
limited margin for logic or reasonableness has been left.  
It has been submitted that in the common law, the recovery for pure economic loss 
and for psychiatric injuries under the tort of negligence are the last major battlegrounds for 
the neighbour principle. In relation to pure economic loss, the problem of defining harm and 
the fraud issue which exist in relation to psychiatric harm are largely absent, but in respect to 
the widespread liability the concerns are similar in both situations. Economic harm shares 
with psychiatric harm a characteristic open-endedness which has traditionally prompted 
courts to impose limits upon potential exposure to liability for even foreseeable harm. 
In addition to that, it could probably be said that the courts’ reluctance to grant 
recovery for emotional injury is partially based on an often unarticulated societal devaluation 
of emotional injury.4 Perhaps the clearest example of this unconscious or hidden devaluation 
of psychiatric harm is the Palsgraf case. It is astonishing that the exact nature of the injuries 
of Mrs. Palsgraf in what is probably one of the most celebrated cases of all times was not 
even stated in the no less famous Cardozo’s opinion. ‘The scales struck the plaintiff causing 
injuries for which she sues’, is all he says while describing the facts. It is generally assumed 
(I even dare to say, unanimously assumed) that the injury was a physical one. The assumption 
is implied by both Judge Cardozo and Andrews, who spoke in terms of ‘the right to bodily 
security’ and ‘the safety of others.’ However, in spite of the fact that the scale hit her arm, hip 
and thigh, the injury for which Mrs. Palsgraf sued was a speech impediment brought on by 
the accident5, that is, a typical nervous shock case!  
The chief perceptible effect of the accident, according to the doctors, was a stammer. 
She began to stutter and stammer about a week after the event and it was with difficulty that 
she could talk at all.6 At trial, evidence was introduced that Mrs. Palsgraf suffered from 
‘traumatic hysteria’.7 According to her daughter, she later became mute and spent her life in 
ill health and depression.8 
                                                            
4 Leslie Sandon & Carol Berry, ‘Recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress attendant to economic 
loss: a reassessment.’ (1995) 37 Arizona Law Review 1247, 1258. 
5 Robert Rhee, ‘A principled solution for negligent infliction of emotional distress claims.’ (2004) 36 Arizona 
State Law Journal 805, 848. 
6 Noonan John T. Jr, Persons and masks of the law. Cardozo, Holmes, Jefferson and Wythe as makers of the 
masks (1976) 127. 
7 Robert Rabin & Stephen Sugarman (Eds.) Tort Stories (2003). 
8 Roberts, ‘Palsgraf kin tell human side of famed case.’ Harvard Law Rec., April 14, 1978, 1, 9. 
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Obviously Cardozo was aware of that, but he was deliberately elliptical in that regard 
for if the true nature of the injury was revealed, that is, if the injury was described as ‘shock’, 
he thought the case would not have had the influence that he intended.9  
Be it as it may, if in fact an unconscious devaluation of emotional harm existed in the 
past, in the 21st century, however, society perceives intangible injuries as real and worth 
protecting. In its eyes, fairness demands that the tort system should provide some method of 
redress to victims of such injuries. Mental injuries are not less debilitating nor less worthy of 
legal recognition. 
The common thread running through the limitations on recovery for psychiatric harm 
and economic loss is not difficult to identify. The concern about widespread liability 
establishes, somehow, a sense of congruence between emotional harm and economic loss 
cases: the spectre of collateral claims, virtually unlimited in number, as a result of a single 
accident. The distinctive character of these two types of harm, however, have been placed in 
great doubt and they could more appropriately be described as nothing but one aspect of the 
general problem of limiting widespread tort liability. 10  
The fear that an expansion of the duty of care would open the door to an 
uncontrollable explosion of claims, as we have seen, is one of the most significant policy 
factors restricting the recognition of recovery for psychiatric injury and economic losses. The 
anxiety that a chain reaction of claims may follow an isolated negligent act has been 
frequently voiced in both psychiatric and economic loss cases. In fact, it has become 
increasingly clear that nearly all arguments for restricting negligence liability are at bottom 
versions of the floodgates argument. Exceptionally, in some instances, embarrassment or 
hesitation pervades the decisions to the point that trying to determine how decisively this fear 
                                                            
9 Contrary to his appearance of impartiality, Cardozo had a personal stake in the outcome of the case. As one of 
the collaborators in drafting the Restatement of Torts, he was engaged in the pursuit of an abstract truth. At the 
time Palsgraf was about to be argued before his court, Cardozo, invited by Bohlen, attended an American Law 
Institute meeting at which the facts of the case were presented as a ‘perfect illustration’ of the unforeseeable 
plaintiff problem. It appears that Palsgraf  itself, not an imaginary case, was made the basis of the discussion 
before the Bohlen committee of the ALI, even though the case had not been yet finally adjudicated. Bohlen’s 
discomfort with what he knew to be parallels discussions before the ALI and the New York courts may be seen 
in the minute changes made in the facts of Palsgraf used to illustrate § 165 of the Restatement of Torts about to 
be finally approved in may 1929. The package in Palsgraf became ‘a number of obviously fragile parcels’. The 
unspecified injury to Mrs. Palsgraf became an injury to ‘A’s eyes’, although no damage was involved in the 
actual case. Bohlen may have felt that these minor changes in otherwise identical facts were necessary to 
demonstrate that the case discussed before his committee had not really been Palsgraf. The current editions of 
the Restatement abandoned this pretense. Walter Otto Weyrauch, ‘Law as a mask-Legal ritual and relevance.’ 
(1978) 66 California Law Review 699, 705 n.25. 
10 Robert L Rabin, ‘Characterization, context and the problem of economic loss in American tor law.’ In 
Michael Furmston (Ed) The law of tort. Policies and trends in liability for damage to property and economic 
loss. (1986) 36. 
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weighed in the judge’s mind can be only a matter of conjecture. In Weller & Co. v Foot and 
Mouth Disease Research Institute11 for instance, Widgery J. stressed the fact that in an 
agricultural community (such as the one involved in that case) the escape of foot and mouth 
virus could be a tragedy which could foreseeably affect almost every business in that area. 
Yet, he went on saying that the rejection of the claim does not, and should not; rest on this 
potential for extensive liability: ‘the magnitude of these consequences must not be allowed to 
deprive the plaintiffs of their rights, but it emphasized the importance of the case’.12  
The old spectre that broadening the right to recover for non physical injuries will 
mean to overburden the judiciary with an enormous increase in its caseload, however,  should 
not persist. The evidence in civil law countries shows no indication that flood litigation have 
resulted in these cases. Even in the common law, experience is replete with instances where 
judicial resistance to extensions of liability on the grounds of avoiding the crushing burden of 
liability without limit was abandoned without any evidence that the new rules left a wake of 
crushed defendants. The clearest example of them all is probable Winterbottom v Wright.13 
Although I have said at the introduction that this thesis had not the purpose of pretending to 
demonstrate the superiority of one system over the other, I feel entitled to draw the attention 
to the fact that the consequences of a pro-liability rule of recovery for non physical harm, so 
much feared by English courts, by instinct or tradition, but certainly with no hard evidence to 
support such belief, has not produced in the civil system the cataclysmic results that they 
constantly predict. It is surprising that such a powerful evidence does not give signs of any 
persuasive force in common law courts. 
One of the most frequent arguments is that, if defendants have to pay damages, that 
would place too heavy a burden on useful activity. That fear has two closely related aspects. 
First, it is said that there is the possibility that a large damage judgment will exceed the 
defendant’s resources, bankrupting him. The argument, however, is clearly unconvincing if 
considering the actual judicial lack of particular reluctance to allow recovery in cases 
involving widespread physical harm. No court today would refuse to hold a defendant liable 
in a case involving catastrophic physical loss that has created the potential for unlimited 
claims. Considering the entire range of catastrophic injury cases, from an airplane crash to 
the collapse of a dam, no one would seriously argue that the presence of multiple claims for 
personal injury based on a negligent act, in and of itself, requires a court-imposed duty 
                                                            
11 [1965] 3 All. E.R. 560 (Q.B.) 
12 At 563. 
13 (1842) 10 M & W 109. 
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limitation in these situations. Rather than wholly denying recovery, courts without much 
difficulty and more properly limit liability by applying a proximate-cause foreseeability 
analysis, on a case-by-case basis. 
The unlimited liability concern may also contain an element of fear that a negligent 
defendant will be held liable for damages out of proportion to his fault.14 Yet, this has nothing 
to do with non physical damage in itself. On the contrary, it is a general limitation proper of a 
tort system which is based on the idea of fault and all-or-nothing approach to damages. This 
feature, common to all conventional systems of civil liability, forces however regretfully, to 
accept the consequence that, while liability is undoubtedly based on fault, the extent of 
liability has no relation to fault whatever. Thus, there is no fundamental reason why the 
common law should keep its strong commitment to the all-or-nothing approach with liability 
resulting either in full compensation or no compensation at all. The logic of the reasonable 
seems to be absent in the notion that, because certain consequences would represent an 
excessive burden for a defendant, the deserving innocent plaintiff has to go completely 
uncompensated for the damage suffered. After all, ‘if the result is all out of proportion to the 
defendant’s fault, it can be no less out of proportion to the plaintiff’s entire innocence.’15  
With the conviction that imperfect justice is the lesser of two evils if compared to no 
justice at all, some countries in the civil law (like The Netherlands, art. 6.109 BW; 
Switzerland art. 43.1 and 44.2 COS and Portugal art. 494 C.C.) have come to a compromise 
admitting a relative or limited compensation proportional to the degree of fault. Nothing 
impairs the common law to adopt and develop an approach along these lines which would 
certainly help to reinforce the centrality of the role that blameworthiness is supposed to have 
in the system.16 Moreover, ad hoc control could have the advantage that the courts would 
have to explain (in more detail) why they moderated the amount of damages. 
The increasing significance that the courts have come to attach over the course of 
more than a century to the problem of personal injury and the fact that the common law does 
no longer show reluctance to extend liability to cases of widespread physical harm (as it did 
in an earlier era) might suggest that psychiatric harm and economic loss are simply aspects of 
a period of inevitable historic evolution where the common law will finally lose its 
                                                            
14 W. Prosser, The law of Torts (1971), 334.  
15 Idem 257. 
16 This could be coupled with van Boom’s suggestion that courts should wait for the flood to come and then act 
accordingly. In other words, if a defendant can substantiate his claim that liability would open the floodgates 
and would render the financial burden limitless or otherwise unbearable, then the courts should be able to turn 
the tide. Willem H van Boom, ‘Pure Economic loss: a comparative perspective’ in van Boom, Koziol and 
Witting (eds) Pure Economic Loss (2004) 39. 
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fragmentary character. The demise of the privity bar, the increasing recognition of psychiatric 
damage and the parallel increasing of exceptions to the non recovery rule for economic losses 
seem to indicate that there is a tendency in the common law to a more integral protection of 
the person. At the same time, there is room to believe that the common law is in fact heading 
towards a single and wide principle of liability. Its resistance to elaborate a single general 
theory, founded upon nothing but the pragmatic objection that it provides a means of 
avoiding unlimited liability, might be just the temporary expression of the inner struggle to 
find a way of doing it without losing control of its limits. 
From the extensive comparative research of the previous chapters, it seems possible to 
conclude that in the common law an exaggerated concern for policy has diminished or 
impaired a proper authoritative and clear exposition of principle. The impression is that 
judges are not deciding according to principles at all. Case after case we have witnessed 
judges imposing policy constraints in the name of administrative convenience or public 
necessity. Courts systematically declare their commitment to the pragmatic restriction on the 
doctrine of foreseeability, without which, they say, ‘foreseeability loses much of its ability to 
function as a rule of law.’17 The argument that the physical harm requirement acts as a 
boundary on limitless liability seems to underestimate the potential of legal reasoning and 
experience to limit liability. At the same time, to accept that the only way to impose 
restrictions to an otherwise boundless liability for a simple act of negligence is by means of a 
bright-line rule, eliminates the significant consideration of whether a more flexible open-
ended criteria based upon the traditional concepts of negligence would not be more 
convenient.  
A civilian observer cannot avoid noticing that the central concern of limitless liability 
and the consequent policy arguments, so frequently seen in the common law, bring at no 
point into consideration the fundamental question about why should the victim carry on his or 
her shoulders all the weight of a public necessity. In the law of non physical damage, judges 
and legal writers have concentrated their attention almost exclusively on the reasons for 
limiting the scope of liability, having paid insufficient attention to the reasons for imposing 
liability in the first place. The crucial point, which appears to be neglected, however, is that in 
most of the cases and no matter what policy indicates, the defendant was at fault and the 
plaintiff was not. This offends generally accepted principles of justice and is undoubtedly at 
odds with the notion that, to the extent which is possible in human society, there should be 
                                                            
17 State of Lousiana ex rel. Guste v M/V Testbank. (1985) 752 F.2d 1019 at 1029. 
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reward or punishment according to our behaviour.18 In other words, those responsible for 
causing injuries should bear the costs of their tortious conduct, irrespective of the 
classification of the resultant damages. Whatever system society decides to impose, it should 
create an expectation that those who act in accordance with the system will be able to 
preserve their accumulated wealth and values, including health, psychic and economic well-
being. 
There is something indigestible in the idea that, because of an empirical assumption, 
insensitive to the most basic notion of fairness and equity, a plainly innocent plaintiff has to 
absorb all the damages instead of the negligent defendant. There is something unacceptable 
when policy outweighs justice making the process of moral valuation unduly subordinated to 
pragmatic concerns. In a complex normative system like the law, that is inescapably 
intertwined with the morality of the society in which it operates, it is required that the choices 
made somehow reflect ‘the ethical or moral sense of the community, its feeling of what is fair 
and just.’19 Judicial decision should not be lacking the necessary content of moral sensibility 
that the principle that wrongdoers ought to pay for their wrongs represents, nor should they 
be in disjunction with the social perception of where liability should lie in individual cases, 
for the courts are nothing but ‘the spokesman of the fair and reasonable man’.20   
In a way, all cases that involve policy seem to be expressing the idea of convenience, 
not of reasonableness. I believe that if, instead of asking ‘is it convenient that this defendant 
compensate this plaintiff’ (which is behind all policy decisions) the question were ‘is it 
reasonable that this victim suffers this loss caused by this plaintiff’, the approximation to 
substantial justice would be much closer. If having a law of tort largely developed on the 
basis of what judges consider is more convenient to the public interest (instead of what is just 
between the parties) represents a serious anomaly, to reduce everything to the question of 
what outcome is administratively more convenient certainly represents an abandonment of 
‘precisely those questions that make tort law a unique repository of intuitions of corrective 
justice.’21 
By treating the litigants only instrumentally as simple representatives of convenient 
outcomes, the courts are missing the significance of the rights-vindicating structure of tort 
                                                            
18 ‘It is a principle of civil liability…that a man must be considered to be responsible for the probable 
consequences of his act. To demand more of him is too harsh a rule, to demand less is to ignore that civilized 
order requires the observance of a minimum standard of behaviour.’ The Wagon Mound (n 1) [1961] A.C. at 
422. 
19 F. Harper & F. James, The law of torts (1956) 743. 
20 Dorset Yach Co. v Home Office [1970] AC 1039. 
21 George Fletcher, ‘Fairness and utility in tort theory.’ (1971-1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 537, 538. 
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law. Weinrib suggested that tort law should not be considered as a vehicle of public policies, 
but as a repository of non-instrumental judgments about action. The concern should be with 
the propriety of an action.22 The focus should be exclusively on the nature of the defendant’s 
act and the fairness of holding him liable, rather than the inconvenience of attributing liability 
to his conduct. Because tort adjudication is morally limited to what is inherent in the 
defendant’s doing and the plaintiff’s suffering of the same harm, a court cannot impose upon 
the relationship an independent policy of its own choosing. It intervenes at the instance of the 
wronged party in order to undo or prevent the wrongful harm. Adjudication thus conceived 
makes explicit what is latent in the relationship between the parties. It does not involve the 
legislative selection of a course of action that will promote the general welfare.23 As Spier put 
it, opting for a dismissal may well contribute to the wealth of nations on a macro level but it 
is not necessarily fair, seen from the plaintiff’s point of view. Why should he be sacrificed in 
the altar of the floodgates?24  
The often mentioned criticism that the real factors controlling judgments should be 
fully disclosed and that that is the reason why the more recent tendency to express policy 
arguments is welcomed, misses the point. The point is that the doing and suffering of harm 
cannot be the occasion to further an independently justifiable goal, such as avoiding the 
floodgate.25 Tort law should not be public law in disguise.26 Public policy is a tool of the 
legislature, not of the judicature and it is certainly justifiable to condemn any step of the 
courts beyond the proper limits of the judicial role.  
It has long been accepted that the basic structure of tort law is made up of two 
features, the procedural bipolarity of plaintiff and defendant and the doctrinal centrality of 
fault and causation.27 Thus, when the courts refer to considerations of policy, they certainly 
go far beyond the interests of the immediate parties to the litigation; they are not concerned 
with its implication as between any particular claimant and defendant. On the contrary, their 
concern is with the potential impact that the recognition of a duty might have upon a number 
(if not innumerable) parties who are not before the court. 
If one searches in the history and the evolution of the policy issue, one will find that 
the expression ‘public policy’ is of not very old standing in English law.28 Leaving aside 
                                                            
22 Ernest Weinrib, ‘The special morality of tort law.’ (1988-1989) 34 McGill Law Journal 403, 404. 
23 Idem, 409. 
24 The limits of expanding liability.  J. Spier (Ed.) 1998, 7.  
25 Weinrib, above n 22, 403. 
26 Contrast, L. Green, Tort law: Public law in disguise (1959-1960) 38 Texas Law Review 1, 257. 
27 Weinrib, ‘Understanding tort law.’ (1989) 23 Valparaiso University Law Review, 485. 
28 Knight W.S.M. ‘Public policy in English law.’ (1922) 38 Law Quarterly Review 207. 
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some earlier obscure references that can be discovered in the Year Books of the 15th century, 
the first instance in which the term ‘public policy’ is judicially used with a clearly intended 
definition is Lord Mansfield’s speech in Homan v Johnson29 stating that ‘The principle of 
public policy is this: ex dolo malo non oritur actio. No court will lend its aid to a man who 
founds his cause of action upon an immoral or an illegal act.’30 Thus, the introduction of the 
term in English law appears clearly associated with bare immorality and illegality. In other 
words, it was a conceptualistic device to reinforce the moral dimension of the law. 
The process in the common law seems to be going from the early times of strict 
liability (a man acts at his peril), throughout the heyday of negligence where the focus was on 
fault, to the present period where policy occupies such a central and dominant place that it 
could be affirmed that the true principle is that if policy demands, there is no liability even if 
at fault. The ethical standard of reasonable conduct that replaced the unmoral standard of 
acting at one’s peril seems to be now substituted by a new unmoral standard (liability resting 
entirely on reasons of policy). At the beginning of last century, Professor Ames submitted 
that the early law asked simply, ‘Did the defendant do the physical act which damaged the 
plaintiff?’ and that the law of his time asked, ‘was the act blameworthy?’31 It seems fair to 
say that the question today would be, ‘is liability supported by policy?’ which, in a way, is 
nothing but returning to a standard as unmoral as it was before.  
Critics argue that in civil law there is the tendency to obscure policy considerations 
behind the general concepts of fault or causation. For a common law lawyer, since the 
questions of causality and certainty of damage are questions of fact, some inconsistencies and 
unpredictabilities are unavoidable. The advantage of such an approach, however, is that it 
involves the use of known concepts which are flexible enough to yield the desired results 
conferring, at the same time, the consistency that whenever a person can foresee damage to 
another (be it physical, mental or economic) he or she is under a duty to take care. Thus, it is 
suggested that allowing or denying recovery for negligent infliction of non physical harm 
                                                            
29 (1775) 1 Cowp. 
30  At 343. 
31 James Barr Ames,‘Law and morals’ (1908-1909) 22 Harvard Law Review 97, 99. An interesting range of 
opinions is presented in (a) Wigmore, ‘Responsibility for tortious acts: its history’ (1894) 7 Harvard Law 
Review 315, 383, 441 suggesting that law began with an amoral concept that a man acts at his peril and 
gradually developed toward the theme of liability based on fault; (b) Holmes, The common law (1881) 1, 3, 4 
suggesting that in early law liability was associated with revenge, and was based on the thought that someone or 
something was to blame, and that though in a sense law always measures liability by moral standards, it is 
continually transmuting these moral standards into external or objective ones, from which the actual guilt of the 
party concerned is wholly eliminated; and (c) Isaacs, ‘Fault and liability.’ (1918) 31 Harvard Law Review 954 
suggesting that culpability has always been an important factor in determining rules of liability, and that the 
degree of emphasis on culpability has alternately waxed and waned. 
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using traditional negligent analysis instead of just policy would result in stronger unity and 
harmony of the system.  
It has been said that to seek the solution in terms of remoteness (or any other 
traditional negligence concept) instead of policy, will at best lead to an evasion of judicial 
responsibility to articulate the genuine premise of the decision, and at worst deceive the court 
as to the true nature of the issue before it.32 What has not been said, however, is that to use 
policy to deny redress to a deserving victim is to alienate the courts from its most ancestral 
and fundamental function: to do justice between the parties; it does not reflect the special 
moral character of the law and clashes with the overriding purpose of contemporary tort law: 
compensating wronged persons for their injuries. After all, ‘liability for negligence, whether 
you style it such or treat it as in other systems as a species of culpa, is no doubt based upon a 
general public sentiment of moral wrong-doing for which the offender must pay.’33 
It is interesting to remember, for instance, that in the Alcock case, there were 16 
plaintiffs initially, and that eventually all of them lost on the duty of care issue, despite the 
admission of negligence by the police and without ever having to prove whether or not they 
had suffered the relevant form of loss. The perverse function of policy can be seen if 
considering that what the court was asked to do was to judge on a preliminary and limited 
question: was there a duty of care owed to these plaintiffs by this defendant? It is not clear 
how and why the fact that the potential number of plaintiffs in that case where hundreds of 
people were present and thousands were watching at home should alter the answer to that 
initial question. This example clearly shows that open or frank articulation of the policy 
factors influencing a decision does not help to make it less unfair when those who without 
justification harmed others by their conduct do not put the matter right. 
In that context, it is suggested in this thesis that the question of tort liability would be 
more accurately analyzed if the concept of duty were eliminated. Besides the well known 
argument that the requirement of duty involves circularity, 34 the artificiality of judicial 
determinations that defendants owe no ‘duty’ to plaintiffs seems alien to the significant moral 
dimension that the law of torts is supposed to represent and clashes with the most ancient 
axiom of any civilized culture: alterum non laedere. The notion that the absence of a concept 
of duty of care makes French law open-ended is simply wrong.  
                                                            
32 J.G. Fleming ‘Remoteness and duty: the control devices in liability for negligence.’ (1953) 31 Canadian Bar 
Review 477. 
33Donoghue v Stevenson. [1932] A.C. 562, 580. 
34 Julius Stone, The Province and function of law. Also in Legal reasoning and lawyers’ reasonings. (1964) 258. 
261 
 
 
 
One would like to presume that the common law has moved beyond the belief that ‘a 
man is entitled to be as negligent as he pleases towards the whole world if he owes no duty to 
them.’35 The immorality subtly lying underneath the notion of duty has already been stressed 
by Howarth when he affirmed that ‘duty of care cases are cases in which the defendant says, 
so what if I was at fault and you were harmed as a consequence, I win anyway.’36 It is 
certainly discomforting to think that it is in the best interest of society to conclude that where 
there is no ‘duty’ an individual may act negligently. A tort analysis that requires this element 
as a starting point seems inconsistent with the fundamental moral notion underlying the rule 
of liability that each of us owes a duty to all others to refrain from acting negligently. 
Certainly, this does not mean suggesting that is part of the business of the courts to impose a 
code of ethics, yet, ‘it remains as true today as it ever was that the law of tort must remain the 
‘ultimate secular guardian of morality within the fields with which it is concerned.’37 
It has been submitted that the negligence concept must be acclaimed as the most 
creative factor in the modern law of tort liability, ‘a unifying force of vast potential in a 
branch of law which has suffered its due share of haphazard development and historically-
conditioned anomalies.’38 However, it is undeniable that the source of its persuasiveness and 
attraction, which rests upon the fact that it makes liability commensurate with fault, fades 
when the force of that general principle suffers from constant limitations.  
No doubt, limitation of liability is a controversial issue where there is an appealing 
and apparently morally sound basic principle at work. Once a strong justifying principle is 
discovered and generally applied, it becomes more difficult (and far less acceptable for the 
Clapham omnibus passenger) to limit the application of that principle for policy reasons. The 
system seems to be destabilizing when judges, stepping beyond the proper limits of the 
judicial role, systematically compromise through an exaggerated expression of policy 
concerns well established and central organizing concepts such as fault and causation. Simple 
principles as fault and causation, unrefined as they may be from a legal point of view, 
nevertheless, give society as much morality as can be introduced by tort law, eliminate the 
complex analytical labyrinth that may severely restrict recovery in many non physical 
damage cases and pragmatically they have been found for centuries in the civil law capable 
of judicial management.  
                                                            
35 Le Lievre v Gould [1893] 1 Q.B. 491, 497. 
36 Howarth, Textbook on tort. 162. 
37 J.A. Jolowicz, ‘The law of tort and non physical loss’. (1972-1973) Journal of the Society of Public Teachers 
91, 92. 
38 Fleming, above n 32, 471. 
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The time has come to abandon the anachronistic protection of negligent defendants 
against economic loss and psychiatric harm. Courts in the common law should stop crying 
wolf trying to convince people that they must stoically endure the varied harms that modern 
society is increasingly inflicting upon them. The concept that ‘resignation, not litigation is the 
response to the vicissitudes of life’ represents archaic Victorian values incompatible with 
modern society. Citizens should have an entitlement to non physical tranquillity just as they 
are entitled to be free of wrongfully inflicted physical injuries. Tort law is not just about 
administrative expediency, easing the burden on over-worked courts, or making sure that 
commercial firms are kept in business. More importantly, it is about justice, compensation, 
deterrence and most of all, about victims. 
Foreseeability has long been accepted as an adequate device in cases in which 
physical injury is immediately caused by the defendant’s conduct. Lawyers and courts are 
quite familiar with its concept for it has been a linchpin of tort liability for more than a 
century. There is no reason why in non physical cases courts have to assume that additional 
protection is necessary. The degree to which a defendant knew or should have known of the 
extent of the consequences of the negligent conduct should play a dispositive role in a court’s 
holding in non physical just as it does in physical damage. Application of a foreseeability of 
harm rule to negligence actions is a concept that courts could also successfully apply to cases 
of both economic loss and psychiatric damage.  
Liability based on foreseeability would serve the dual function of compensation for 
injury and deterrence of negligent conduct. The role of deterrence in tort law is one of the 
system’s fundamental aspirations. In that sense, a full recovery rule would result in behaviour 
changes reducing the number of non physical injuries because of two reasons. First, because 
this rule would create an incentive not to engage in certain behaviour by increasing the cost 
of such behaviours. Second, because by making the statement that culpable actors must pay 
for the non physical injuries they cause, the law will make actors generally more aware of the 
potential for such injuries and, therefore, increase the probability that those actors will act in 
ways which minimize the chance of such injuries.39 
It has been frequently submitted that, although foreseeability may set tolerable limits 
for most types of physical harm, it provides virtually no limit on liability for non physical 
harm. However, even admitting the fact that the notion of foreseeability is to a certain degree 
                                                            
39 Peter Bell, ‘Reply to a generous critic.’ (1984) 36 University of Florida Law Review 437, 438. For a critical 
view of this belief, Pearson, ‘Liability for negligent inflicted psychic harm: a response to Professor Bell.’ (1984) 
36 University of Florida Law Review  413. 
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indeterminate, its emphasis on risk is much better integrated in the moral notion of liability 
for negligence. It facilitates rational risk spreading, correlates liability with the risk that the 
defendant should expect and used in conjunction with doctrines such as proximate cause 
could perfectly keep reasonable control of its limits.  
Non physical harm issues should be governed by the general rules of tort law long 
applied to other types of injury. The problems should be solved ‘by the application of the 
principles of tort, not by the creation of exceptions to them.’ The experience in the civil law 
shows that mechanisms associated with liability for negligence, such as the fault and 
causation concepts are sufficient to function as reasonable control devices fashioned by the 
courts to achieve that purpose. They already represent the necessary combination of logic, 
common sense and notions of fairness that can usually be ascertained on the basis of intuitive 
conceptions of justice to adequately limit the class of potential claims. 
Jane Stapleton, after summarizing a series of anomalies that generated the collapse of 
confidence in the law of tort, submits that the problem is that there is a lot of conduct in 
modern life which can be implicated in the occasioning of injury and much of this can 
plausibly be described as negligent.40 That is precisely why the efforts to establish a single 
general principle of liability for all negligence cases must be renewed. It is true that 
negligence law is a wilderness of single instances.41 But, because all arbitrary lines of 
demarcation are inevitably going to crumble at some time, what is needed is a broad 
consideration of principles.  
John Noonan recalls that Seavey used to confess an inability to think if confronted by 
an abstract proposition – ‘Give me a case,’ he would demand.42 Unfortunately, it seems 
inevitable to think in abstract terms if ‘the wilderness of single instances’ is to be conquered 
and the patchwork to be mended. Less importance has to be attributed to the facts while 
concepts should be enhanced. In the end, that seems to be the real challenge, for at bottom, 
the strongest contrast between the civil and the common law appears to be the importance 
attributed to the facts. In the common law, any construction of an ordered account of the law 
firmly rests on the disorder of fragmented and dispersed facts. On the contrary, in the civil 
law tradition, the aim is rapidly to eliminate any trace of the circumstances and to establish an 
idea or a concept.  
                                                            
40 Jane Stapleton, ‘In restraint of tort’ in Peter Birks (ed) The frontiers of liability (1994) 83, 84. 
41 Robin Cooke, ‘Tort illusions’ in P.D. Finn (Ed.)1989, 74. 
42 Noonan John T. Jr, Persons and masks of the law. Cardozo, Holmes, Jefferson and Wythe as makers of the 
masks (1976).  
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The reluctance to extend responsibility for nervous shock and economic loss in the 
21st century indicates notable and unacceptable gaps in the protection of personal security. A 
new torts law that fundamentally recognizes the integrity of the being must be born. It is 
suggested in these conclusions that the question whether a defendant is liable to the plaintiff 
in any particular case of non physical injury would be solved most justly by the application of 
general tort principles. It is necessary to go to the basics and focus more on three of the 
constituents of any cause of action: the standard of the defendant’s behaviour, causation and 
especially damage. ‘Foreseeability’, ‘proximity’, ‘voluntary assumptions of responsibility’, 
etc. are merely variants of the fault principle and its increasing number does nothing but re-
emphasize the notion that the fault principle is the real foundation of them all and that it is 
perfectly possible to take refuge in it to handle really novel or challenging cases without the 
need to recourse to more detailed principle.  
It is submitted that greater consistency in decision making is likely to be achieved by 
way of legal reasoning based upon tests for fault than on the basis of policy deliberation. 
There are a number of alternative approaches that coupling the requirement of foreseeability 
to the application of general principles of negligence could assure more proportional results. 
Liability could be established, as in any other negligence case, by the conventional use of 
foreseeability and by fulfilling other requirements of legal proximate cause, without using 
any of these concepts artificially to serve policy concerns created because the circumstances 
are of a psychiatric harm or economic loss case. 
Serious concerns and incomprehension of the utility of having flexible general rules in 
a system have systematically been expressed in the common law:  
‘We are rapidly approaching the day when liability will be determined routinely on a 
case by case “under all the circumstances” basis, with decision makers guided only by the 
broadest of general principles. When that day arrives, the retreat from the rule of law will be 
complete, principled decision will have been replaced with decision by whim, and the 
common law of negligence will have degenerated into an unjustifiably inefficient, thinly 
disguised lottery.’43  
That type of scepticism is not new. Leon Green emphatically protested against 
Glanville Williams’ affirmation that there should be only one question: was the defendant 
negligent as regards the damage. ‘That the common law of negligence has required more than 
150 years of litigation and scholarly writings to arrive at this simply inquiry is 
                                                            
43 James Henderson, ‘Expanding the negligence concept: retreat from the rule of law.’ (1975-1976) 51 Indiana 
Law Journal 467, 468. 
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incomprehensible’, he said. ‘That such a formula will clarify and simplify the issues of duty, 
negligence, and damages does not seem possible. That it will make judgments easy to reach 
is subject to serious doubt.’44 
Those fears are naturally based on a complete disbelief of the utility of general 
principles. Civil law courts for centuries have managed to cope fairly well with the potential 
difficulties associated with the negligence concept, and have kept the levels of the extension 
of liability in negligence cases within reasonable limits through the use of no more than 
general concepts.  
 Negligence liability is and will always remain an essentially pragmatic subject where 
there are no simple solutions for complex problems. Non physical damage is a complex 
problem and it seems utopian to think that it is possible to solve all issues by magic formulae. 
However, it might be productive to think whether or not the time has come to discard all 
artificial distinctions and simply adopt a foreseeability test with traditional negligence control 
mechanisms such as fault and causation. It is suggested that a formula for all non physical 
damages universal in its application and indistinctive from physical damage should be tested 
without preconceptions or unsubstantiated assumed cataclysmic prophesies. The control 
mechanisms against unlimited loss in the civil law based not in the type of loss but in the 
factual determination of whether the loss is a direct, certain and immediate result of the 
negligence have proven to be simple and effective in avoiding frivolous claims and the threat of 
unlimited liability. 
The actual trend of the law of torts in the common law does not seem to reflect the 
fact that material conditions of life have dramatically changed in the last century, 
accompanied by ideas and values about social and economic organization, the nature of the 
individual, and his place in society. The growing space that liability based on risk has gained 
all over the world during a significant part of that century reveals a substantial shift and focus 
now directed to the needs of the victim. The actual conception, articulation and 
implementation of economic loss and psychiatric harm as self-contained categories with 
severe restrictions to recoverability in the common law go in the opposite direction to those 
changes.  At the same time, liability in the civil law has undergone a huge transformation 
during that period. From the former philosophy of civil responsibility based on the debt of the 
defendant to make reparation we have moved to a philosophy based on the credit of the 
injured party for compensation. From a pure system concentrated on the action of the 
                                                            
44 Leon Green, ‘Foreseeability in negligence law.’ (1961) 61 Columbia Law Review  1401, 1415. 
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defendant, we have moved to a system of reparation with the attention largely focused on the 
victim and his or her needs, and what the victim needs is reparation!  
It is doubtful that the traditional emphasis that the common law puts on individual 
freedom is any longer adequate. The greater exposure to damages to which the members of 
modern societies are submitted to, added to the greater potentiality to cause damages that 
human conduct has nowadays, demands a system which mainly promotes deterrence and 
compensation. The common law with its categorisation of different types of losses (pure 
economic loss and psychiatric injury) being recoverable only under narrowly constrained, 
special conditions, certainly does not contribute to delineate the model of tort law of the 21st 
century that is desirable. It is my strong belief that a flexible system following the French 
guidelines would better represent that model, re-enforcing at the same time the essential 
ethical content that the present system seems to be lacking. 
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